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Abstract 
The creation of the National Health Service is treated, 
analytically and historically, as a planning process involving major 
changes in the social organisation of health as a part of the larger set 
of social and economic reconstruction policies undertaken by the wartime 
Coalition and postwar Labour governments. Definitions of 'health' are 
considered as relative both to social expectations and ideology, and to 
theoretical models of the organisation of health services. These models 
are identified with certain socio-political agents or interests in the 
providing and consuming of health services: professional groups, public 
and private authorities, non-professional workers, and the public. The 
models of the health service advocates and of the medical profession are 
considered as reference points. 
A framework is presented for the analysis of the representation of 
these interests, by the state, in the planning and operation of the NHS, 
and as beneficiaries of its services. Through a detailed historical 
consideration of internal health service planning documents of the major 
interests, including the medical profession, the health service 
advocates representing the Labour party and trade unions, and recently 
released documents of the Ministry of Health and the Coalition and 
Labour Cabinets, the interaction of the interests with the two 
governments and with each other is traced, and the reconciliation by the 
state of the health service models proposed by them is analysed. 
It is argued that the changes wrought in the social organisation of 
health in Britain can be described according to certain principles of 
the organisation of pre- and post-NHS health services: principles of 
public access, structure of services, structure of administrative 
control and structure of planning representation. Tne major interests 
were represented differentially by the state with respect to each of 
these criteria; similarities and differences between the approaches of 
the two governments to the representation of interests are examined, and 
it is concluded that, although the health service advocates and the 
public benefited from a free and universal scheme, the public and 
non-professional health workers enjoyed considerably less representation 
than the medical profession in the particular services provided by the 
NHS and in its planning and administration. 
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HISTORICAL AND THEORETICAL APPROAC~~S TO THE 
STUDY OF THE NATIONAL HEALTH SERVICE 
Themes of the Study 
The National Health Service is rightly seen as a most significant 
element .. of British postwar· social policy, a landmark in the 
transformation of social and economic relations accomplished under the 
aegis of the state. It bears important structural similarities and 
differences to schemes for the provision of medical care undertaken by 
several western nations as part of their planning during the Second 
World War for postwar construction. It bears equally important 
similarities and differences to alternative model schemes advocated in 
Britain in the same period by representatives of the organised medical 
profession and, on the other hand, by representatives of the socialist 
and labour movements. 
This study is concerned, historically and theoretically, with the 
formation of state policy leading to the implementation of the National 
Health Service (NHS) in Britain in 1948. The processes involved in this 
policy formation, it is suggested, are essentially political. They may 
be analysed through a variety of approaches, from the empirical and 
historical to the abstract and theoretical, from particular debates and 
negotiations over health policy to the more general imperatives, based 
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on the nature of a mid-twentieth century capitalist economy and society, 
toward state intervention in the creation of major health and social 
service systems. The concern here is to locate and analyse debates, 
campaigns and negotiations over the main principles and structures of 
the NBS within the context of the political dynamics of an advanced 
capitalist society, in particular within the context of the wartime 
reconstruction of economic and social relations in Britain. 
The analysis can be seen as a contribution to the ongoing 
discussion of the welfare state. Most of the main historical accounts 
of the genesis of the NBS focus upon the conflict between the British 
Medical Association (BMA) and the two governments. Both the theoretical 
and the historical intent here is to shed some light upon what might be 
thought of as the other side: the advocates of a state health service 
who took their position on behalf of the public as consumers of health 
services and on behalf of the large number of non-professional workers 
in the health services. These groups held, as part of their overall 
political or ideological position, that only a state-provided, fully 
comprehensive and co-ordinated health service, open to all without 
financial or other eligibility barriers would be an adequate replacement 
of the chaotic and class-biased system then in existence. Democratic 
organisation, the rights of health workers and the addressing of 
preventive and occupational health issues were especially emphasised. 
This position was taken as part of the reform programme of the labour 
movement, and by socialists as part of the programme for the transition 
to a socialist Britain. 
This position has not, as yet, received a great deal of attention 
in the literature on the history of the NBS; nor has the relationship of 
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the health service advocacy campaign to the government policy making 
process, and to its outcome, the NHS Act and its amendments. 
It is hoped the study will make a double contribution to the 
welfare state discussion, first through its specific historical 
approach, which examines the policy making processes inconsiderably 
more detail than earlier studies of the formation of the NHS, and 
second, through bringing this new set of historical data to bear upon an 
analytical approach which itself is of much recent interest, the 
political sociology of the British welfare state. 
The NHS was created as part of the series of social and economic 
interventions by the state in housing, income security, employment, 
education, to name but a few areas -- popularly termed the 'welfare 
state'. These new interventions, provisions and institutions, referred 
to at the time as 'reconstruction', represented a process of state 
economic and social planning, begun early in WOrld War II, designed both 
to facilitate the execution of the war, and the return to stable 
peacetime conditions. Security and reconstruction were at the time 
interpreted in the broadest economic and social senses; it was widely 
seen, among business, government and labour circles, although not 
unanimously, that for the war to be waged effectively, especially on the 
home front, for Britain to return to peacetime productivity, prosperity 
and political stability, and, given the fundamentally private nature of 
the economy which was both the cause of much insecurity and at the same 
time the foundation of Britain as an industrial nation, that the state 
must intervene to reduce or eliminate intolerable pre-war insecurity --
the vicious cycle of unemployment, poverty, poor health and poor 
education so dramatically pointed out by Sir William Beveridge in his 
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landmark Report of 1942. (1) 
The planning, legislating, implementing, executive and regulating 
functions of reconstruction, begun early in the Second WOrld War, 
involved not just the two governments in charge, the Coalition 
government of Sir Winston Churchill, and the Labour government of 
Clement Atlee. Rather it involved the state in the largest sense: the 
complex of institutions, legislative, executive, and judicial; central 
government Ministries and permanent civil servants; local government and 
its executive agencies. (2) These were the branches of the state in 
charge of formulating plans, carrying out detailed consultations and 
negotiations with parties affected, drawing up and administering 
leg islation. Cabinet and Parliament were, of course, in both a formal 
and substantive sense, in charge of final legislative policy decisions. 
Here party platforms, social philosophies and ideolog ies, and 
aggregations of interest groups identified with each party, had their 
influence, but not an exclusive influence. In a very important sense 
the Ministries, particularly the senior advisers to the Ministers, had a 
determining effect on the initial appearance of policy and legislation, 
if not upon the final, formal decisions. Equally, since local 
government was involved in administering much central government policy, 
especially in the health and social services, its role too must be 
considered a part of the role of the state. 
The creation of the National Health Service, like many of the 
reconstruction policies, involved this entire complex of state 
institutions, which, for purposes of brevity we shall denote the state. 
The state is thus distinguished from government, by which we mean the 
Prime Minister and Cabinet constituted upon the majority party or 
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parties in Parliament. Government in the final analysis is responsible 
for policy legislation ond ultimately for administration, while the 
wider institutions of the state are responsible for prepatory planning, 
administration, and liaison with forces outside the state, in I civil 
society' • Thus we are concerned here with the role of party government 
in the wider context of state involvement in reconstruction policy 
making, of which the NHS was a part. 
We are concerned, especially, with the field of interests in 
society within which the state, and governments, must operate. The 
British state, during World War II as now, existed in an economy and 
society based upon private property and private ownership, with 
traditional, elite control of many non-state institutions (including, 
for example, the medical profession), and with a working class well 
organised but only beginning, in World War II, to be represented in 
policy making. This representation was through the mechanism of 
tripartism, through which the government, employers, and labour (the 
latter largely through the efforts of the Labour Party Ministers in the 
Coalition government) consulted on major economic and social policy 
matters, with the object of minimising disruptive conflicts. Indeed, 
one of the premises of this study is that the reconstruction process 
represented a massive intervention by the state to reorganise inherently 
dysfunctional aspects of an otherwise laissez-faire economy, to create a 
network of institutions for individual security and opportunity, in the 
interests of the long-term stability and profitability of the private 
economy. Inasmuch as this process represented an intervention by the 
state in the laissez-faire economic relationship between capital and 
labour, it can be seen as an at least partial reorganisation of the 
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social relations of capitalism. 
The NHS itself was planned through a complex process which involved 
reconstruction policy initiatives from within and outside the Ministry 
of Health, political party influence on Cabinet and Parliamentary 
decisions, and consultation by the Ministry with, or its taking account 
of the views of, a variety of interests directly and indirectly 
concerned with the provision or reorganisation of medical services. 
These included consumer, labour, professional, hospital and local 
authority interests among others. 
The state had available in its planning endeavours alternative 
models of a national health service identified with or advocated by a 
range of conflicting interests in the organisation, provision and 
utilisation of medical services. These models might be placed on a 
continuum and identified with alliances of the major interests. On one 
end might be placed the modified but still restrictive National Health 
Insurance model of the insurance companies, the medical profession and 
the voluntary hospitals; on the other, the plan for a 'socialist' 
comprehensive, 
Labour Party, 
state-owned, fully salaried scheme advocated by the 
the Socialist Medical Association, the Trades Union 
Congress and others, which we shall refer to as the advocate groups. In 
the centre of the continuum might be found a model representing a 
liberal compromise among the major conflicting interests, a free, 
comprehensive and universal scheme relying on state co-ordination rather 
than state ownership, with less emphasis on integration, preventive 
health, and elimination of class biases than that of the advocates and 
offering more scope for professional autonomy and private practice. 
This was a model favoured by some Ministry of Health officials, some 
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members of the medical profession, and would have been accepted by some 
of the advocates. These, then, in summary description, were the models 
to be reconciled or adapted by the state in response to the general 
social and political imperatives toward a health service and to the 
conflicting interests actively involved in the planning process. 
The rival groups and alliances of interests had great significance 
both as indispensable participants in the provision and management of 
health services at all levels, and as purveyors of plans and blueprints 
for reforms, minor or major, to the government of the day and to the 
public. They thus operated through at least two political channels, 
direct approaches to and negotiations with government, and indirect 
pressure, through raising the practical and ideological implications of 
their blueprints in the arenas of public, trade union, party, and 
parliamentary politics. 
It is thus apparent that the policy models represent not only 
narrow interests of the affected groups, but alternative models of the 
role of the state, not only in the provision of medical and allied 
social services, but in the economy and society. They represent 
alternative models of both the social definition of health, and of the 
social organisation of health services. 
At the one extreme, the state would have served only a regulatory, 
co-ordinating and subsidising function, with the institutions of care 
and insurance being firmly in professional, voluntary, or other private 
hands, with the exception of the local authority facilities. The 
private sector would, in effect, have been reinforced, while being 
subject to increased regulation, and the private-public medical care 
dichotomy exacerbated. At the other extreme, the state would have been 
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the owner of all facilities, the direct employer of all personnel, and 
would have established and co-ordinated a series of old and new health 
functions, from prevention to rehabilitation, in a one-class, all public 
service. 
It is the argument here that both the features of the NHS, and the 
processes by which it was planned, legislated and implemented are the 
result of the state on the one hand taking the initiative in the face of 
a set of political and economic circumstances requiring fundamentally 
reorganised, accessible, and effective health services, and on the other 
hand, responding to the alternative models of a health service, 
advocated by the major alliances of interests in the provision and use 
of medical services. In this process the state did not act merely as a 
neutral arbiter. 
Thus it is further argued that there was a complex and differential 
structural representation of the major interests in state policymaking. 
This included a differential representation of the interests, and 
alliances of interests, with respect to each of the two governments 
concerned, Coalition and Labour. This differential representation, and 
the priorities of the state to override the particular viewpoints of 
pressure groups are demonstrated both in the features ultimately 
included in (and excluded from) the NHS, and in the bargaining and 
consulting processes between the state and the interests affected, which 
are documented historically in the following chapters. 
The NHS, as planned by the Coalition government, and as revised and 
enacted, and ultimately amended by the Labour government, did not follow 
directly the policy of either the Conservative or Labour Parties. Nor 
did these intermediate and final versions of the NHS correspond directly 
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to the viewpoints of the interests ostensibly allied with each party, 
for example the medical profession with the Conservative Party and the 
health workers' unions and the Trades Union Congress (TUC) with the 
Labour Party. Features of the plans, and the planning and consulting 
processes were, indeed, often anomalous when compared with traditional 
party policies and alliances of interests. For example, the Coalition 
government accepted the universal and comprehensive scheme advocated by 
labour and bitterly opposed by the medical profession; the Labour 
government nationalised all hospitals, but turned down the occupational 
health service vociferously supported by the labour movement and Party 
(and the medical profession), and granted concessions to private 
practice tending toward a two-class system, which were demanded by the 
medical profession, opposed by the TUC and contrary to Labour's health 
policy. By both governments the medical profession was given first 
priority in the procedures of consulting and negotiating, such that, 
even if it did not win the plan of its choice, it was able to set the 
terms and conditions of service. Those interests making up the alliance 
of health service advocate groups on the other hand the TUC, the 
Labour Party, the Socialist Medical Association, among others -- did win 
the universal scheme of their choice, but not certain important features 
including full-time salaried medical service, occupational and 
preventive health, and neighbourhood health centres, which they deemed 
critical not only to the success of their model, but to its larger 
purpose of reforming fundamentally the social organisation of health. 
It is therefore argued that the creation of the NHS, including 
these apparent anomalies in policy, may be explained with respect to the 
policy priorities of the state in the context of its reconstruction 
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planning, in the constraints of a capitalist economy, and with respect 
to the particular structural representation of interests in government 
and state policymaking, all of which formed the basis for the evolution 
of the NHS plans under the two governments, and the legislation and 
ultimate amendment of the NHS Act. 
It is for reasons of this analysis that methodologically neither a 
... t.raditional . studyofpressllr~grQuPPQli1:iG$,n9r- . 9 nqU9wl.Y __ C::QnGeiv~ 
Marxist approach, nor a purely historical account of the creation of the 
NHS is adequate. Pluralism is unable to conceive of the state as other 
than a neutral arbiter among conflicting pressure groups or interests of 
potentially equal power, and certainly does not see state policy in 
relation to dominant institutions, philosophies and practices of 
capitalist society, and structural blocs of interests such as capital 
and labour and fractional formations within them. Marxism, until the 
recent advent of debates on the relative autonomy of the state from the 
dominant influence (or direction, as 'vulgar' Marxism would have it) of 
capital, and studies in the political economy of state institutions, had 
little to offer in the way of subtle analytical tools by which the 
origin and use of state policies could be explained; Marxist analyses 
tended toward overly general references to the level of class struggle 
between capital and labour, and the relative captivity of the state to a 
monolithically-conceived capital. (3) A purely historical approach, 
lastly, presents a chronicle of relevant events, but lacks the 
possibility of a rigorous interpretation of dynamics rooted in social, 
political and economic structures. 
A sociological approach is clearly necessary -- one recognising the 
political nature of the processes involved and their origins in the 
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social and economic structures of a capitalist society. 
In this study, the approach taken must account for several things. 
It must first account for the creation of the NHS (among the various 
institutions created during the process of reconstruction) as a part of 
the role of the state in reorganising and ameliorating the social and 
economic conditions prevailing within British capitalism prior to the 
War. It must secondly account for the initiatives of the state in 
response to the many fundamental problems of medical practice and its 
determination of a policy ostensibly in the general interest. Thirdly, 
it must account for more than just the detailed interactions of pressure 
groups and the government of the day, but the apparently differential 
treatment accorded to the various major interests concerned in the 
creation of the NHS. Lastly, it must account for the resolution of 
these factors the significance of the chosen designs for the NHS, 
under two governments, in relation to the policy alternatives available, 
and the differential treatment accorded to interests advocating them, 
for the state's role in the social reorganisation of medical care, and 
its larger role in the reorganisation of capitalist social relations. 
The study therefore makes use of a methodology drawing on several 
approaches: an historical approach, using new primary archival data; 
and the data and analyses of earlier pressure group studies concerning 
the medical profession and the NHS; but primarily it is a study within 
the parameters of recent Marxist debates on the political sociology of 
the welfare state. It may be seen as case study in the policymaking 
processes of the state, in its task of restructuring the social 
organisation of medical care, as a part of the larger project of its 
partial reorganisation of the social relations of British capitalism in 
11 
the Second War and after. The chief assumption is the relative 
independence of the state, under both governments, from the direct 
interests of either capital or labour in the larger sense, or organised 
medicine and the labour movement and health service advocates in the 
case of the NBS. The chief problematic, to recapitulate, is the 
relationship between features of the NHS, as they were adopted from the 
alternative health service models, and the representation of the 
interests concerned in planning, working within, or consuming the 
services of the NBS. 
In the remainder of this chapter, we shall consider four bodies of 
literature which are relevant to the historical and analytical 
approaches here. These are: historical and pressure group analyses of 
the NBS; the literature on the social organisation of health; the 
welfare state and the political economy of the state; and on the 
representation of interests in policy making. 
Early Studies of the Origins of the NBS 
Most of the works on the origins of the NBS which have come to be 
accepted as authorative were written relatively early in its existence 
and were intended to serve the dual purpose of providing general 
historical or sociological background to the founding of the service, 
and, equally importantly, to provide informative description and 
analysis of the performance of the new service in operation. 
The two best-known of the historical and descriptive studies are 
those written by James Stirling Ross in 1952, and by Almont Lindsey in 
1962. (4) Several works combine both historical and sociological 
approaches. Harry Eckstein has written two works, from different 
12 
perspectives. THE ENGLISH HEALTH SERVICE begins by analysing the 
condition and class distribution of medical services, inequalities in 
access and anomalies of the insurance system, then describes the changes 
wrought during WOrld War II through the government's organising of the 
Emergency Medical Service (EMS), which he sees primarily as an act of 
rational ising and redistribution. He looks at the views of the main 
political protagonists in the debates over health services in the 
interwar period: the political left; the voluntary hospitals; and the 
medical profession, with its several divisions, including the BMA as its 
most representative association and chief pressure group. He reports in 
some detail the stormy battles between the Coalition and Labour 
governments and the medical profession over health service plans from 
1942 to 1946, emphasising divisions in the profession's interests and 
strategies, and the fundamentally rationalising, efficiency-oriented 
motives of both governments. The government-medical profession 
relationship is the primary focus of his analysis of the course of 
planning and implementing the NHS, against a background of structural 
deficiencies in services exacerbated by two wars and interwar economic 
depression. (5) 
A second work by Eckstein, PRESSURE GROUP POLITICS, (6) is a study 
of the organisation, tactics and effectiveness of the BMA as a pressure 
group, cast in the framework of classic pressure group theory. Eckstein 
here seeks the factors which determine the 'form', the 'intensity and 
scope' , and the 'effectiveness' of the BMA as a pressure group. These 
in turn are affected by: the pattern of governmental policy, the 
structure of decision making of both the group and government, and the 
prevailing attitudes or 'political culture' within which the group 
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operates. Against this theoretical background, Eckstein provides a 
great deal of informative detail regarding the structure and strategies 
of the BMA, and the ways in which its interests are represented in the 
Ministry of Health. Much of the detail concerns the BMA's role in the 
planning of the NHS, and its successes and failures in pressing for 
amendments subsequent to the implementation of the NHS. Eckstein 
pressure group. 
Another pressure group study, by A. J. Willcocks, THE CREATION OF 
THE NATIONAL HEALTH SERVICE, (7) provides a systematic account of the 
published positions of a wide variety of interested groups on issues 
relating to the design of the health service, and compares these with 
the views of the government, at four key points in the planning of the 
service: (a) the short-lived plan of March 1943 of Ernest Brown, the 
Coalition government's (Liberal National) Health Minister; (b) the White 
Paper of February 1944 of his Conservative successor, Henry Willink; (c) 
revisions to the White Paper discussed confidentially by Willink with 
major interest groups in March and April 1945; and (d) the National 
Health Services Bill introduced by Labour Health Minister Aneurin Bevan 
in March 1946. A variety of groups were considered by Willcocks, 
divided into three categories for purposes of analysis: those with 
skills to offer, including the professions; administrative 
organisations, including the local authorities; and those with property 
to offer, including the voluntary hospitals. Accordingly, the published 
positions of a number of associations, from each of these categories, 
were examined, and related to the government's announced intentions, at 
the four planning stages, with respect to several major substantive 
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features of the health service: financing methods and extent of 
population to be covered; central administration and advisory machinery; 
and the services themselves, divided into hospitals, general 
practitioner, local authority, and other services. By means of 
comparing the groups' views, with the government's plans, at the key 
points, with respect to the health service features, Willcocks 
demonstrates the relative 'successes' and 'failures' of the groups in 
having their views realised, or interests served, in government policy. 
He concludes that, of the three categories of groups, those with skills 
to offer, particularly the medical profession, achieved the greatest 
'success', measured against the provisions of the NHS Act. 
Gordon Forsyth, in DOCTORS AND STATE MEDICINE, (8) documents and 
analyses changes in the functioning of the NHS up to the mid 1960s, in 
response to the changing distribution of medical need, changing 
professional pressures, and as the result of recommendations of several 
official commissions and review bodies. His primary emphasis is on 
contemporary financial, medical, epidemiological and professional 
aspects of the NHS. After noting changes in the method and amount of 
payments to physicians under the service, he sets out a theoretical 
model of a continuum of medical care, based on the assumed NHS goal of 
continuity of care from presymptomatic factors in vulnerable groups 
through general practitioner and specialist care, to convalescence, 
rehabilitation and readjustment. Forsyth's critical evaluation of the 
actual performance of the NHS points out weaknesses in all phases of the 
spectrum, but especially in the sphere of general practice and its links 
with specialist and rehabilitative care. While one of the chief goals 
of the NHS (and one of the chief arguments of the health service 
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advocates) was to integrate and co-ordinate levels of care, the 
separation of general practice from the hospitals, which became the base 
of the specialist services, and the subsequent failure after 1948 to 
implement the reorganising of general practice into neighbourhood health 
centres which would have been the vehicle for co-ordination of services, 
meant, in effect, the reinforcement of the isolation of general 
practice, according to Forsyth. 
Two historical accounts of the founding of the NHS are written from 
a socialist perspective. These are Dr David Stark Murray's WHY A 
NATIONAL HEALTH SERVICE?, and the portions of Michael Foot's biography 
of Aneurin Bevan dealing with Bevan's taking over the Ministry of Health 
in the 1945 Labour landslide, redesigning some major aspects of his 
predecessor's plans, and piloting the NHS Bill through Parliament and 
through a period of concerted opposition from the BMA. (9) Dr Murray, 
one of the founders of the Socialist Medical Association (SMA) and 
active with his organisation in Labour Party politics, describes the 
beginnings of the SMA, its development of blueprints and strategies for 
a 'socialist' state health service, and its political activities within 
and outside the Labour Party. He notes progress achieved, and failures, 
with respect to three issues which were the hallmark of the SMA's 
blueprint: an occupational health service; full-time salaried service 
for all doctors; and the proposed network of local health centres. 
Despite the SMA's close political relationship with Aneurin Bevan, their 
advice to him on these three fundamental issues was not ultimately 
taken. 
Michael Foot's work on Bevan is valuable in several respects. As a 
political biography, it places Bevan, after he took over in 1945 as 
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Minister of Health with full responsibilities for housing, in the 
context of party, government, and interdepartmental politics. Foot 
refers to the health service plans and the permanent officials Bevan 
inherited, the sometimes conflicting priority of housing, Bevan's 
relationship with senior members of Cabinet, and describes in 
considerable detail Bevan's dealings with the BMA through the difficult 
years 1945 to 1949. His discussion of Bevan's strategy with respect to 
the medical profession is useful in comparison with Eckstein's 
discussion of BMA strategy. Most relevant in the present context, 
however, is Bevan's attitude toward outside pressure in relation to 
Parliamentary and Cabinet privilege. Before the NHS Bill was published, 
his discussions with the BMA were on an entirely non-committal basis; he 
would not, until the Bill was passed, engage in 'negotiations' 
committing Parliament, a priori, to concessions. On the other side, 
Bevan's relations with his socialist colleagues of the backbenches and 
in the SMA at crucial times followed the same principles as his dealings 
with the BMA, apart from the fact that the BMA continued to enjoy its 
traditionally privileged formal access to the Ministry and its 
officials. For his apparently aloof Ministerial stance, and his 
traditional arguments for it, he gained some criticism from socialist 
colleagues, which Foot also documents. 
Bevan gives his own opinion of these issues, and his particular 
philosophy of the welfare state in IN PLACE OF FEAR. (10) Both these 
works by Foot and Bevan are journalistic in style, but Foot portrays 
particularly well Bevan's sometimes stormy dealings with the BMA, and 
his astute strategies with respect to Cabinet colleagues, backbenchers, 
the BMA, and the voluntary hospitals and local authority interests, by 
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which he was able to design and sustain major changes to his 
predecessor's White Paper proposals. Neither Foot nor Bevan himself 
discuss relations between Bevan and his sometimes critical colleagues 
among the socialist health service advocates. 
Thus there exist general histories of the NBS in larger works which 
address other questions, such as the functioning and later adaptation of 
_______ theNBS,~re~sur§~_grou2s,~Lthe22liti~albiograIDY' of the Minister who __ _ 
inaUJurated it. 
Apart from the few early works which treat aspects of the NBS 
sociologically, two recent works discuss the NBS from a Marxist point of 
view. Lesley Doyal, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF HEALTH, considers the 
social production of health and illness and of medical care in relation 
to capitalist industrial, and colonial, economic structures, and the 
reproduction of the labour force in each case. She concludes that the 
NBS represented an extremely important social reform in providing, 
theoretically, equality of access to medical services for the British 
population, and that, as such, it was an important political gain for 
the working class in the 'post-war settlement' between capital and 
labour. She agrees with P. Corrigan who sUJgests that the political and 
ideological organisation of the working class was insufficient for it to 
have a major share in determining the way the NBS was created or 
subsequently controlled. (11) 
Vicente Navarro, in CLASS STRUGGLE, THE STATE AND MEDICINE, a 
survey of state involvement in the health sector in Britain from 1911 to 
the 1970s in relation to the balance of class forces, draws similar 
conclusions to those of Doyal. He finds particularly that the Labour 
government, far from reversing traditional class relationships in the 
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production of medicine, actually reinforced the hierarchical role of the 
medical profession in the service, and virtually neglected the labour 
movement in its management structures, and in the lack of special 
occupational health services. (12) 
The Social Definition and Organisation of Health 
It is only relatively recently that sociology has embraced 
theoretically the study of illness, the health professions and their 
ideologies, and the structure of health services, with attempts to 
relate these previously disparate areas of study to characteristics of 
~Stlrrounding social strueture. (13) 
Hans Peter Dreitzel argues that medical ideology and the scientific 
method have tended to individualise and isolate medical problems and 
solutions, neglecting relationships with social and economic forces. 
The profit-making basis of capitalist economies, he suggests, has tended 
to foster ideologically 'instrumentalist' attitudes toward people as 
workers, or as factors in production, along with giving rise to medical 
and psychosocial pathologies related to the long hours, competitiveness, 
stress and environmental hazards of industrial working conditions. From 
this an 'instrumentalist' concept of health arose, identifying health 
with capability to work: 
Obviously then, there is a functional relation between 
the internalization of the instrumentalist attitude and 
the maintenance of a social system based on productivity 
and profit. In our capitalist societies, health is 
institutionally defined as the capability to help 
produce the very surplus the owners of the means of 
product appropriate. 
He notes the significant social class differences in the incidence of 
physical and psychiatric illnesses and the neglect of the aged, 
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chronically ill, and disabled in medical services. Making an important 
distinction, with respect to the origin and the solution of these 
medical inequities, he points out: "If the incidence of illness is to a 
large extent a SOCIAL problem, the organization of health is a POLITICAL 
one." (14) 
The relative nature of the definition of health, relative, that is 
to the structure of the society and economy, is a point made separately 
by Martin Rossdale and Ronald Frankenberg. Rossdale traces the 
development of scientific medicine, with its emphasis on the cure of 
individual pathologies, and its failure, and indeed the failure of 
modern health services, to tackle the social bases of pathologies, for 
example the relationship of tobacco production to cigarette smoking to 
lung cancer, and the relationship of industrial production to chronic 
bronchitis. Medicine, even socially organised as it is in the welfare 
state has preserved the patient-doctor relationship as an intimate and 
isolated one; the doctor's duty is to treat only the individual symptoms 
of the individual patient. (15) 
Frankenberg reviews several sociological approaches to health and 
health care. He begins with Marx and Shaw on the relation of ill health 
to early capitalism, then considers the eminent medical historian Henry 
Sigerist as a link with modern medical sociology. Sigerist was well 
aware of social and economic factors in illness, and a radical critic of 
them. His solution, however, was in large measure a medical one. He 
urged an obligation upon physicians to engage in preventive medicine and 
health promotion through education, especially for social groups most at 
risk, and the personal and social rehabilitation of patients. 
Frankenberg concludes that in advocating this last task, the 
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readjustment of patients to work and family life rather than the 
provision of healthy and fulfilling working and living conditions, 
Sigerist has much in common with functionalism, with professional 
elitism, and, in the end, with 'intelligent conservatism'. Sigerist 
was, in his time, a 'radical reformist', in advocating medical 
solutions, in relative isolation, to essentially social problems. But 
the social bases of disease, as well as the ideology and the patterns of 
organisation of medical 
other Marxist analysts, 
practice, are, according to Frankenberg and 
related to fundamental class divisions in 
capitalist societies. Thus, while Freidson, the American medical 
sociologist, may criticize the ideology and the dominant power of the 
medical profession, his solution of greater lay administrative direction 
and limited patient-power is a liberal one; it too does not address the 
question of the appropriate organisation of medicine to meet the 
underlying social and economic causes of disease. (16) 
A more precise formulation of the definition of 'health' in 
relation to its social basis is undertaken by Sander Kelman. He argues 
that 'health' must be seen in an essentially social, rather than 
strictly biological way. He suggests two opposing definitions of 
heal th, 'experiential' and 'functional': lithe former may be defined as 
freedom from illness, the capacity for human development and 
self-discovery, and the transcendence of alientating social 
circumstances," and the latter, after Parsons' definition, lithe state of 
optimum capacity of an individual for the effective performance of the 
roles and tasks for which he has been socialized." Kelman too links 
medical ideologies and treatment paradigms, and the 
health services with their guiding ideologies, to 
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organisation of 
the social and 
economic structure. He develops his argument considerably more fully, 
however, than do Dreitzel, Rossdale, or Frankenberg. He does this using 
a materialist approach to the study of health in capitalist societies, 
linking the prevailing or operational definition of health, the 
'functional' definition, with a key economic feature of capitalism, the 
drive to accumulate capital. According to his thesis, tendencies in 
_______________ m==ed==ic~a=l=_o~rganisation or ideolggy toward the maintenance of minimal 
'functional' health or work capacity would be in conflict with the more 
subjective and positive impulses toward 'experiential' health. Economic 
resources devoted to the latter, to the attainment of higher than merely 
functional levels of health, would be seen then as wasteful expenditures 
from the point of view of capital, and as a drain on capital 
accumulation. What results, in reality, according to Kelman, is a state 
of 'health' which is "nothing more than the prevailing standoff at a 
point in time between its functional and experiential aspects, between 
the tendency for the accumulation process to reduce its subsumed human 
populations to the status of resources employed for its expansion and 
the tendency of people to seek their own transcendent (of the 
accumulation process) fulfillment." (17) 
A balance between these two aspects of health is what Kelman 
suggests is produced by health policy in capitalist societies, due to 
the conflicting ends of capital accumulation and personal and collective 
fulfillment. To determine the precise nature of that balance, 
therefore, one would look to the extent of social resources spent on 
guarding and improving the general health and wellbeing of the whole 
population (including the aged and non-working groups) as compared to 
that spent on health solely as related to productivity, although the two 
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categories, like the two definitions of health, are in reality not 
mutually exclusive. 1bey are, rather, models or theoretical 
definitions, which are indicative of tendencies in the economic and 
social system and in the social organisation of medicine. 
Using these definitions of 'health' and their implications for 
health policy, we are here interested in the extent to which they apply 
to the NHS. As we shall see subsequently, these theoretical definitions 
of Kelman correspond to the opposing philosophical principles and 
political approaches and the model health services proposed by, for 
example, the early socialist advocates of a national health service who 
stressed 'positive health', and on the other side, by the advocates of 
schemes such as Lloyd George's National Health Insurance of 1911, which 
was concerned primarily with returning the sick or injured worker as 
quickly as possible to productivity. 
These rival concepts of health resurfaced during the reconstruction 
planning of the 1940s in the polar positions of the SMA and the SMA. 
Elements of both were incorporated by the Ministers of Health in their 
construction of the NHS. 
While Kelman, using a Marxist approach, elaborates conceptions of 
'health' related to countervailing tendencies within capitalism, linking 
his definition of 'functional health' in general terms with the tendency 
toward maximising productivity and capital accumulation, Arthur 
Schatzkin uses the same paradigm to elaborate the connexion between 
health and the Marxist category 'labour power', in relation to 
production and capital accumulation. (18) 
'Labour power' is considered in Marxist theory as the productive 
capacity of an individual to work, purchased in wages from the worker, 
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by the capitalist, who is able to pay these wages from the sale of the 
goods produced. A part of the total proceeds goes to the worker as 
wages, and part is retained as 'surplus', going toward capital 
accumulation. In the Marxist paradigm, wages going to the worker are 
minimised (in the interest of maximising accumulation) so that they 
represent, in theoretical terms, only the 'value of labour power', or 
the amount necessary for the basic maintenance of the worker and his 
family -- for the daily subsistence and the generational reproduction of 
labour, termed the 'reproduction of labour power'. Included in costs 
necessary to produce labour power are the basics of life, food, shelter, 
and the like, education to a level sufficient to contribute adequately 
to production, and health: 
Heal th under capitalism is an integral component of an 
individual's labor-power or productive capacity. The 
capitalist's objective interests reside only in the 
use-value of labor-power, that is, how much value the 
worker produces. A certain level of physical and mental 
health is thus necessary to maintain the maximum level 
of productivity. Below that level of health, the 
capacity to work falls off, and with it the amount of 
surplus-value that will be generated. The capitalist is 
simply not interested in the level of health beyond 
this, although the worker will be vitally interested 
from the point of view of quality of life, not of 
productive capacity. It follows from this 
conception of health as labor-power that medical care 
services are designed to maintain the requisite level of 
health, a kind of labor-power 'repair and maintenance 
service' • 
Analysing health costs as related to capital accumulation, 
Schatzkin notes: 
Since the provision of health is part of maintaining 
labor-power, it represents to the capitalist part of the 
wages he must payout -- whether it is direct wages 
which buy food to keep the worker healthy or indirect 
'social' wages in the form of medical services. Thus, 
the provision of health, although a necessary part of 
the overall process of surplus-value generation, 
represents IN ITSELF a surplus value LOSS for the 
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capitalist. (19) 
There would be assumed in this formulation to be an optimum level 
of social expenditures on health, from the point of view of capital, 
whereby an optimum state of health in the labour force is attained, such 
that production is not unduly impeded due to poor health, nor is the 
generation of surplus, or accumulation of capital, impeded due to 
excessive (or 'non-essential') expenditure on the 'social wage'. Thus, a 
hypothetical balance must be reached, from the point of view of capital, 
in spending on health, which is similar in essence to that referred to 
by Kelman, the balance between society's recognition of and provision 
for 'functional' as compared to 'experiential' health. 
Thus Kelman stresses the definitional aspect of health in the 
theoretical context of a Marxist paradigm, and Schatzkin notes the 
economic relationship among spending on health, the reproduction of 
labour·power and capital accumulation. 
Lesley Doyal, also elaborating a Marxist analysis of health care, 
discusses, in addition to the points noted above, its ideological 
significance, and its role in the reproduction of the social relations 
of capitalism: 
If capitalist production is to continue, there must be a 
renewal of its 'general conditions' as well as a renewal 
of the means of production. Mechanisms must therefore 
exist for capitalist societies to reproduce themselves. 
Two things in particular need to be reproduced -- the 
productive forces and the existing relations of 
production. That is, there is a need to renew both the 
'inputs' of production, and also the sets of beliefs and 
relationships that hold society together. Included in 
the forces of production are its material conditions 
(raw materials, buildings, machines, etc.) and also the 
labour power of workers. • • • However it is important 
not just that the labour force should be physically 
regenerated, but that it continues to work within a set 
of economic and social relationships. •• [M}edical 
care is a highly significant factor in the reproduction 
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of both the forces and the relations of production. (20) 
The effects of the system of provision of medical care on social 
relationships and ideology, in Doyal's analysis, are at least threefold. 
First, modern high technology medicine aids in establishing, by 
reflection from its assumed record of spectacular scientific cures and 
techniques upon society's general commitment to science and efficiency, 
the overall l§gitimising of the existing,~s~o~c~i~a~l __ ~sy~~s~t~em~.~ __ ~S~e~c~o=n=d~, __ ~t=h=e __ __ 
bureaucratic, hierarchical and authoritarian social relations within the 
structure and practices of medical care, both among staff, and between 
doctors and patients, reinforces existing hierarchical patterns of 
socialisation and social control. Third, "it is precisely because 
health, and therefore medical care, are so vital to every individual 
that the provision of medical care often comes to represent the 
benevolent face of an otherwise unequal and divided society. II (21) 
Socially, therefore, medical care represents simultaneously the 
reproduction of professional elitism and hierarchy, lack of autonomy and 
dependence, but also, because of the vulnerability of the sick, the 
reinforcement of an apparent benevolence on the part of the providers of 
care, including the professions and the state. In these ways, medical 
care contributes to patterns of socialisation in the wider society, and 
to the reproduction of social relations. 
This, of course, begs the question of the particular nature of the 
health care system, or, to use Doyal's term, the nature of the "mode of 
production of health care." Analysing the social organisation of a 
health care system in these terms involves examining the structuring of 
a given medical care system in relation to the forces and interests 
which formed it and influenced its evolution, the role of the state in 
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creating and maintaining or merely regulating the means of provision of 
health care, and some attempt at determining the social functions -- the 
effects and effectiveness -- of that system. 
The first and most outstanding fact about the NHS, in this context, 
is that, in the broadest sense, it is a universal, free, state system of 
health care provision. The three branches of its tripartite division, 
general practitioner, hospital and specialist, and local authority 
services, are all ultimately united under the (now) Department of Health 
and Social Security (DHSS). In the change in 1948 from National Health 
Insurance to the NHS, private ownership of hospitals was ended by the 
nationalisation of virtually all hospitals, practitioners became 
contracting agents of the service, and, apart from the small but 
important remaining sector of private practice, private insurance was 
ended. The state thus figures most importantly in the creation and 
operation of the NHS and in the vast social reorganisation of the health 
system which this involved. 
Approaches to the Study of the Welfare State 
Since the Second World War a wide range of government provisions 
for education, housing, social security and the like have come to be 
summarised in the rather amorphous popular term 'welfare state'. The 
key here is the reference to the state, for it is the substantial 
intervention of the state in providing institutions or regulations in a 
great many aspects of social and economic life which has marked in most 
western countries a critical characteristic of the period since the 
wars. While the shorthand term 'welfare state' has won commonplace 
acceptance, the term itself and the body of state policies which it 
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represents have at the same time been the object of intense academic and 
political debate. 
Health services in the postwar world, in Britain perhaps more than 
anywhere else, form an important part of the general body of welfare 
state provisions. In the crucible of the war, the dysfunctionality of a 
vast number of archaic laws, practices and attitudes became critically 
obvious to workers, planners and reformers, and political and economic 
leaders of all political orientations. 
The state had already reorganised vast areas of economic and social 
life for the waging of the war; it was clear that unless many of its 
major interventions were maintained in some form in peacetime, a 
reversion to prewar economic chaos and insecurity would probably result. 
This would have predictable consequences in political instability and 
radicalisation, as had been the experience after the First Wbrld War. 
The state would be, in peacetime as in war, the only agency of 
sufficient means and overarching authority to create a new or renovated 
series of social provisions and institutions adequate to the purpose of 
ensuring stability, security, and adequate standards of health and 
education in the 'national interest'. It was clear that new social and 
economic provisions would be, in some fashion, in the common interests 
of both workers and industry (capital), and of political stability. A 
new postwar political compromise, or settlement would be attempted among 
the major social forces labour and capital -- with the active 
assistance of the state. 
It is in the context of the 'postwar settlement', the major 
organisation of large areas of social and economic life, that the 
welfare state, and, as a part of it, the NHS, is seen in this study. 
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The term 'welfare state' has been the subject of much academic 
discussion. Maurice Bruce traces the origins of state intervention in 
social policy to the Elizabethan Poor Laws; the term itself might be 
traced to Bismarck's social insurance scheme of the 1880s, referred to 
as the 'WOhlfahrtsstaat'; in Britain, though it was used minimally in 
the interwar period, it was not widespread until the popular reaction to 
the Beveridge Report; in the United States, it came to be used as a 
derogatory term by conservative opponents of state intervention in the 
late 1940s. (22) 
Richard Titmuss has referred to "the indefinable abstraction 'The 
Welfare State'," noting the lack of agreement over its meaning, and the 
dangers of such terms concealing more than they disclose. He has, 
however, paid a great deal of attention to eliciting the essential 
principles of state policies which represent "collective interventions 
to meet certain needs of the individual and/or to serve the wider 
interests of society." (23) Maurice Bruce, in a definition which 
perhaps vindicates Ti tmuss , warning against the too-general use of the 
term, considers the welfare state " the sum of efforts over many 
years to remedy the practical social difficulties and evils of a modern 
system of economic organisation which grew with but little regard for 
the majority of those who became involved in it. ••• " (24) He goes 
on to identify those difficulties and evils as endemic to early British 
industrial capitalism, and concludes that, in the welfare state, society 
has created, in effect, the means to remedy its own problems. This of 
course begs the question of the effectiveness of the means and the 
intransigence or structural nature of the problems. 
Dorothy Wedderburn notes the view prevalent in sociology that the 
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welfare state is a common phenomenon of all capitalist or industrial 
societies, as part of the logic of industrialisation. There is 
agreement, she says, that the term implies a state commitment to modify 
market forces in order to ensure a minimum income for all by insuring 
against incapacity to work; to guarantee the provision of education; and 
to guarantee treatment and benefit for sickness and injury. There is 
_ .. _IJ,~.s_s_ag_r_e~el)_LqS..t.~L1tzlte..t..h~LJ:"~_isJ~.cibl.lt_io_n __ o_Lll)c.ome __ should __ b~ ____ Qne ___ Qf _____ .. 
its goals, and much evidence that little if any redistribution has 
occurred. 
(a) the 
She identifies four groups of theories of the welfare state: 
anti-collectivist school of liberal economics; (b) 
functionalism; (c) the 'citizenship' view; and (d) the integrationist 
school. The latter three schools, which approve of a broad range of 
social interventions by the state, agree in the interpretation that 
welfare state measures are of benefit both to individuals and to the 
economic and social system. They differ in their emphasis on the role 
of class and class conflict, justice and fairness, and progress toward 
equality. But they share a good deal of common ground in seeing the 
welfare state as serving to ameliorate fundamental social conflicts and 
inequalities. 
While there may be agreement among these schools on the functions 
of welfare state policies, there is relatively less agreement on their 
origins and perceived purposes. Wedderburn herself stresses the 
historical and political aspects of the creation of the welfare state, 
noting some of the unique circumstances of Britain after the war. She 
accepts the view of Titmuss and Professor T. H. Marshall that the 
welfare state represents one stage in the completion of a formal 
equality (but not necessarily substantive or thoroughgoing) of status, 
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civil, political and social, implying equal rights and access in these 
areas, as the foundations upon which structures of fundamental economic 
inequality could remain. 
Marshall, as an exponent of the 'citizenship' school (i.e., the 
gradual expansion of the formal rights of citizenship) sees greater 
areas of formal social equality (e.g., the NHS with its universal, free 
and equal accessibility) being created as a process of reducing, bit by 
bit, the deep social inequalities of capitalism. But Marshall, although 
recognising an essential conflict between universalist principles of 
state social provision and competitive principles of market capitalism, 
along with Titmuss, has no adequate explanation of the reasons why 
universalism might triumph to a greater or lesser degree in certain 
state policies. Titmuss, Wedderburn notes, has produced a revealing 
model of the effectiveness of interest groups on legislation, but he 
does not consider " any notion of class conflict as crucial in 
creating the overall balance of political forces which determines 
whether or not social legislation is enacted, or has an influence upon 
the final form of that legislation." In contrast, Ralf Dahrendorf, 
representing an integrationist approach, suggests that the increases in 
social rights implicit in welfare state policies are in reality part of 
the process of institutional ising class conflict, integrating, 
channeling and limiting, rather than eliminating it. 
Wedderburn concludes that the welfare state should not be analysed 
as a static entity -- its nature changes with the balance of political 
forces, in particular with the balance of class forces: " ••• there is 
nothing about any of the particular bits of social welfare legislation 
which is specifically or 'essentially' socialist. At all points, the 
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actual effect of welfare legislation (i.e., whether it contributes to a 
reduction of inequality), the values embodied in welfare legislation 
(i.e., whether it is fair shares for all, or help to those who have 
paid), represent a compromise between the market and laissez-faire on 
the one hand, and planned egalitarianism on the other." (25) 
T. H. Marshall himself, in a vignette illustrating Bevan's own view 
of the compromise of social forces and principles inherent in social 
policies, poses the question of "whether the measures taken in the field 
of public health were a natural fulfilment of Victorian democratic 
capitalism or an attack launched against it. Aneurin Bevan took the 
latter view, but he qualified it by adding that the system was quick to 
claim the credit for what had been imposed upon it by its attackers. 
Public health measures, [Bevan] said, have become part of the system 
'but they do not flow from it. They have come in spite of it • In 
claiming them, capitalism proudly displays medals won in the battles it 
has lost.'n (26) 
The point is made, through Bevan's irony, that in the incomplete 
resolution of the social conflicts which resulted in the Victorian and 
later health reforms, protagonists representing both the status quo and 
reform were able to claim at least partial victory. 
A more critical approach to theories of the welfare state is 
presented by Ian Gough, who examines sociological functionalism on the 
one hand, and welfare economics and political pluralism on the other. He 
finds these three groups of theories lacking, primarily in their failure 
to take into account historical and social class factors responsible for 
the generation of an interventionist social policy by the state, and in 
their assumption, particularly in the case of pluralist theories, of a 
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state neutral amongst a plethora of contending interests. He concurs 
with Wedderburn that the balance of class forces must be looked at in 
assessing why social legislation is enacted at a particular time, and 
why it takes the form it does; pluralism is unable to explain or rank 
the power of interest groups, and cannot identify the social origins of 
dominant ideologies leading to consensus on various policy issues. (27) 
Counterposed to these three groups of theories is a theory of the 
welfare state based on Marxist political economy, taking as its central 
concern, in Gough's words: 
way production is organised 
and processes of society 
"the relationship between the economy -- the 
and the political and social institutions 
[in] particular •• the relationship 
between the capitalist mode of production and the set of institutions 
and processes that we call the welfare state." This theory uses the 
Marxist model of conflict or contradiction to explain the dual nature of 
the welfare state, that it "simultaneously embodies tendencies to 
enhance social welfare, to develop the powers of individuals, to exert 
social control over the blind play of market forces; and tendencies to 
repress and control people, to adapt them to the requirements of the 
capitalist economy." (28) The welfare state, in this paradigm, has the 
apparently contradictory or dual functions of mitigating the inherent 
dysfunctional aspects of social relations and conditions (i.e., the 
"relations of production") of capi tal ist soc iety, and protecting or 
enhancing the accumulation of surplus or profits in the economic realm 
of capital ism (i.e., intervening in the "forces of production") • 
The 'state derivation' ('Staatsableitung') debate is a relatively 
recent debate among German Marxist scholars, introduced to Britain by 
Holloway and Picciotto. One of its central theses is that the state is 
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derived, in function, II from the inability of capital, as a result 
of its existence as many mutually antagonistic capitals, to reproduce 
the social nature of its own existence: to secure its reproduction 
capital requires a state which is not subject to the same limitations as 
individual capitals, and which is thus able to provide the necessities 
which capital is unable to provide." (29) 
theoretical explanation of the relative independence or autonomy of the 
state from the particular interests of capital. As an explanation 
grounded in logic, it thus certainly begs the question of the unique 
historical and political manifestations of the state and its various 
social interventions in relation to capitalism and society. 
The 'relative autonomy of the state' from the direct control of 
capitalist interests is a position now accepted by many western Marxist 
theorists, in reaction to the traditional Marxist concept of the state 
as merely the executive arm of the bourgeoisie, this latter notion being 
considered incorrect, indeed 'vulgar' in its oversimplified caricature. 
The nature and degree of I relative autonomy' of the state, however, is 
still very much under debate, as has been noted above. 
Health and the Political Economy of the Welfare State 
It has been postulated that the state supports the economic and 
social system through its 'welfare state' functions. We shall look at 
three mechanisms through which this occurs, their implications for 
health policy; and for the social reorganisation of health: 
(1) the state's role in providing the social conditions conducive to 
capital accumulation; 
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(2) welfare state functions and the reproduction of labour-power; 
(3) the role of the welfare state in furthering the legitimation of 
the social relations of capitalism. 
These areas are, of course, closely related, but divide roughly in 
terms of emphasis, into the economic, social, and political and 
ideological effects of the welfare state in capitalist society. 
(1) The Welfare State, Capital Accumulation and State Health 
Services: While there is general agreement that the schemes making up 
the welfare state are functional politically for social stability 
through guaranteed security for the working class, there is disagreement 
in Marxist theory over the extent to which they affect the central 
economic process of accumulation of surplus within the capitalist 
sector, since the provision of state social services must be paid for 
through taxation, which comes directly from capitalist enterprises, or 
from wages, hence indirectly from capitalist enterprises. Social 
services thus funded through taxes, which are of direct benefit to 
workers and others, are often referred to as the 'social wage'. The 
theoretical dispute is over the extent to which the 'social wage' 
ultimately aids capital accumulation, or is a burden upon it. 
There are two main positions in this economic debate. Ginsburg 
argues that the cost of state social expenditure is borne solely by 
capital, including that part paid by workers in income taxes. Schatzkin 
too takes this position, as do Fine and Harris, who go one step further 
in denying the concept of social services as a social 'wage', since, 
unlike money wages, they have no exchange value in relation to 
commodities. 
The opposing point of view is taken by Gough, who argues that 
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social services do represent a 'social wage', and that lithe welfare 
state redistributes income WITHIN the wage- and salary-earning class 
(the working class, broadly conceived), not from the upper and 
upper-middle classes downwards, and certainly not necessarily from 
profi ts to wage incomes." He, however, makes a distinction between 
welfare services as cash benefits, terming these a 'social wage', and 
direct services, which he terms 'collective consumption'. Added 
together and added to the money wages, these represent the total value 
of labour power, i.e., the amount necessary for capital to pay as wages 
both to the worker and to the state to ensure the daily and generational 
reproduction of labour power. If the social services, whether in cash 
or in kind, are included in this amount, they must perforce represent 
not an extra burden on capital, but a redistribution within the wage 
sector. "This redistribution of payments for labour need not 
necessarily encroach on the share of profits or suplus value in total 
output. II (30) To what extent the costs (and benefits) of the welfare 
state, or the NHS, might or might not encroach is a subject for detailed 
economic analysis beyond the scope of this study. 
We are here interested in the political aspects of this question, 
therefore it is appropriate instead to look at a political 
interpretation of the role of a health service (as part of the broader 
social services) in increasing the efficiency of production. The 
assumptions of the extremely limited provisions of the National 
Insurance Act of 1911 indicated the purpose of the plan: to return to 
productive work the sick or injured worker as soon as possible with a 
minimum of expenditure. Under the basic scheme, only general 
practitioner treatment was included, not specialist or hospital care, 
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and dependent family members were not covered. Although some extra 
coverage was available through the Approved Societies, families had to 
bear a large burden of uninsured health costs, or go without care. It 
was recognised by critics of this scheme, and certainly by Beveridge, 
that the accumulated individual costs of this uninsured treatment, or of 
lack of care leading to premature incapacity or death, added up to a 
vast social cost and loss of productive capacity. 
The argument of Beveridge, of Political and Economic Planning 
(PEP), and of the advocates of extensive state social and health 
services, was that rationally organised services, available to all, and 
emphasising prevention, early treatment, a full range of care, and 
rehabilitation, could not but reduce this social burden of prolonged 
ill-health and misery leading to the incapacity of workers, poverty of 
families, and poor health among the children who were the country's 
future workers, soldiers and homemakers. 
Beveridge treated the financial aspects of the recommendations for 
comprehensive social security, including health services, as primarily a 
matter of national redistribution of expenses already necessarily 
incurred by individuals, with the state bearing the only significant 
extra burden. (31) His 1942 estimate of 170 million pounds to be spent 
by the state on a comprehensive health service compares closely with the 
1936 estimate by Political and Economic Planning (PEP) that 150 million 
pounds were being spent at that time by all agencies and individuals on 
all health services. In 1937 they noted the loss of 30 million working 
weeks per year for absences of longer than three days for workers 
covered by National Health Insurance, most of this due to poor diet, 
housing, and bad working conditions. PEP suggested that "millions of 
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pounds are spent in looking after and trying to cure the victims of 
accidents and illnesses which need never have occurred if a fraction of 
this amount of intelligence and money had been devoted to tracing the 
social and economic causes of the trouble and making the necessary 
readjustments." (32) They thus stressed prevention, rational 
organisation and free access to services as key principles to 
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ill health. Herbert, using PEP figures, estimated the annual cost of 
treating ill-health in Britain, including not only personal medical 
costs but public health and environmental service expenditures, to be 
300 million pounds. (33) 
While the actuarial figures in the Beveridge Report, the PEP Report 
and the 1944 White Paper were only estimates of the total cost of a 
health service compared with amounts spent by individuals and local and 
central governments, the argument was made strongly that even if the 
amounts were roughly equivalent and the benefits difficult to calculate, 
the money would be much more efficiently spent in a comprehensive, 
prevention-oriented health service. This argument, in the context of 
wartime enthusiasm for rational planning, had a considerable following 
across the political spectrum. It was widely assumed, even though there 
was no general agreement on actuarial or cost-effectiveness estimates, 
that plans such as Beveridge, PEP, and the 1944 White Paper recommended 
would be the most efficient, and in the long run least costly way of 
spending the nation's funds on social and health services. 
We may, for purposes of analysis, assume certain features of a 
model organisation of health services most suited to attaining Kelman's 
concept of 'functional health', a standard of health related primarily 
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to maintaining productive capacity at minimum cost, or, with minimum 
detrimental effect on capital accumulation. Such a model would have 
resembled most clearly the extended National Health Insurance proposal 
of the major medical, insurance, and private hospital interests during 
the planning process. This model, in its pure form the most 
conservative of the alternatives, was not supported by either of the 
governments concerned in planning the NHS Labour or Conservative 
(although the Conservative party was divided), so had little chance of 
being enacted. 
The opposing model, the preventive, comprehensive and universal 
scheme, run entirely by the state, proposed by the advocate groups, 
would have most nearly embodied Kelman's concept of 'experiential 
health' attainment of the maximum personal capacity and fulfillment 
of all individuals, a state of ideal health, although the advocate 
groups did also argue the efficacy of their proposals in terms of 
national productive efficiency. (34) 
Although in principle it was much closer to the model of the 
advocate groups, the NHS as enacted and amended was something of a 
compromise between the two models. We may thus assume, from the 
theoretically opposing economic points of view of capital accumulation 
and of ideal health for the whole population (productive and 
non-productive), that a compromise was reached between the cheapest (in 
the short run) and most expedient provision for health care, and the 
most comprehensive and costly. It must certainly be emphasised, 
however, that this must remain a theoretical observation pending 
detailed empirical research within the sphere of political economy, a 
task beyond the scope of the present study. 
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(2) The Welfare State, Health and Labour Power: Related to but 
distinct from the issue of the economic burden of state welfare services 
upon capital accumulation is that of their effectiveness in maintaining 
a healthy population, such that maximum productivity of workers and 
minimum financial dependence of the non-working population is obtained. 
In the 20th century, the state has intervened actively with welfare 
state policies, in assisting the 'reproduction of labour power', i.e., 
both the daily subsistence and the generational reproduction of the work 
force, through support schemes for the family, the education system, 
public housing, and health care. (35) 
Gough sees such activity as the essential purpose of the welfare 
state, which he defines as: "the use of state power to modify the 
reproduction of labour-power and to maintain the non-working 
population. II He adds: "The welfare state is the institutional response 
within advanced capitalist countries to these two requirements of all 
human societies." (36) 
Clearly, therefore, not just the amount of money spent by the 
state, but the effectiveness of the services provided, will be critical 
to the most efficient reproduction of labour power. Schatzkin considers 
the distribution, accessibility and adequacy of health care to be of 
fundamental importance to the concept of health as labour power. He 
refers to concern in late nineteenth century Britain regarding the 
deleterious effects of poor health, due to poor working conditions and 
housing, on industrial productivity, and the widespread conclusion at 
that time that the state must intervene to protect the health of the 
worker. (37) 
A further argument, beyond the scope of the present study, would 
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link increased industry and state concern for the health of the worker 
with periods of high demand for productive labour. While we are not 
able here to investigate this hypothesis historically, it is worthy of 
note that the emergency conditions of the Second WOrld War had a great 
deal to do, pragmatically and ideologically, with the urgent planning 
and nearly universal acceptance of a state health service. A large part 
of this impetus came from the widely perceived need for healthy war 
production workers (as well as military recruits), and for a fit new 
generation to rebuild Britain industrially and socially in the postwar 
era. A term commonly used at the time was the need for 'national 
efficiency', implying primarily the work force. Much of this concern is 
reflected, for example, in the work of Political and Economic Planning 
(PEP), a highly regarded independent policy research and advisory body. 
PEP sought in its review of health services to bring the principles of 
equity and efficient planning to bear, among other things, upon the 
problem of poor health as it affected both current national productive 
efficiency, and the health of the next generation, which would inherit 
the task of rebuilding Britain. (38) 
We may assume here that the model type of service proposed by the 
advocate groups, and by PEP in its major review of Britain's health 
services, was directed to achieving the maximum potential standards of 
health for all persons: children, workers, housewives, dependants, and 
the chronically ill or disabled. As such, it comforms to Kelman's 
criteria for promoting both 'experiential' and 'functional' health. The 
efficient reproduction of labour power would have been but a part of the 
functions of a health service structured according to this model. 
The argument of those groups wishing to extend insurance-based 
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services, on the other hand, mainly stressed reduced financial barriers 
for all low-income persons to existing services, with little attention 
to the preventive aspects or quality of care, or the reorganisation of 
services. The significance of such a model then, with respect to the 
theoretical criterion of its relation to the reproduction of labour 
power, would have been to provide primarily for the minimal 'functional' 
aspec:tsQfhegltb.Nt.hQugh tbe plgnQf these groups clearly went 
beyond the relatively narrow aims of the 1911 National Health Insurance 
scheme, and in doing so took a much broader approach to 'functional' 
health by including dependents and specialist care, it could not be said 
to have promoted the 'experiential' concept of health. 
Both Conservative and Labour Ministers promoted their plans for the 
NHS, inasmuch as they included comprehensive care, from prevention and 
education through rehabilitation, as designed to achieve 'positive' 
health, a concept close to Kelman's 'experiential' health. However, the 
compromises resulting from the negotiations of both Ministers primarily 
with the medical profession and in the implementation and amendment of 
the 1946 NHS Act show a less clear commitment to this concept of health. 
With respect to the contribution of the NHS to the reproduction of 
labour power, perhaps the most obvious omission, even at the planning 
stage, was that of an occupational health service. The purpose of this 
would have been to ensure both the optimum health of workers at the 
workplace, and, most importantly, optimally healthy working conditions 
through elimination of occupational hazards. Another large omission at 
the implementation stage, was that of the long-promised reorganisation 
of individual general practice into integrated, teamwork-based, 
preventively-oriented neighbourhood health centers. These two 
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omissions, of items vvhich would have been critical in reorganising 
health services so as to render them medically more effective to 
individuals and to society can be seen here as a retreat by both 
Ministers from their announced commitment to 'positive' health, and, at 
least in theoretical terms, as a matter of lower priority being given to 
aspects of the NHS specifically designed to promote in the long term the 
quality and reproduction of labour power. 
(3) Health Services and the Legitimation of the Social Relations of 
Capitalism: Theorists of the welfare state, whether functionalist, 
pluralist or Marxist, are generally agreed that health and social 
services, in addition to meeting significant material needs in the 
maintenance of health and wellbeing and protection from insecurity, also 
have the ideological effect of promoting social harmony. Functionalism 
would see the welfare state as a mechanism of social integration; 
pluralism would see it as the working out of a common set of goals by a 
diversity of interests; and Marxists, as part of the various shoring up 
mechanisms through which the state aids in the maintenance of the 
particular economic order. 
T. H. Marshall, as we have noted, sees the welfare state as a 
victory for the rights of citizenship won over decades of political 
articulation and struggle by those most in need of its net of security. 
Titmuss would also subscribe to this view, seeing it -- and especially 
the NHS as a significant step toward the recognition of egalitarian 
principles in social policy. Most of the early historians of the NHS 
refer to the wartime atmosphere of social solidarity which bred strong 
expectations of a more secure postwar world, the state being expected to 
continue its wartime social interventionist role. The Beveridge Report 
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in 1942 catalysed both widespread and detailed discussion over health 
and social security schemes, and helped immeasurably to make concrete 
the popular expectation of state action. 
Beveridge in particular, in advocating the divorce of health 
services from the individual contributory insurance principle (although 
not going as far toward a free and one-class service as the socialist 
health service advocates), added greatly to egalitarian expectations. 
Between the Beveridge Report and the implementation of the NBS, a period 
of six years, these popular expectations grew enormously. 
Partisan politics, within the constraints imposed until 1945 by the 
Coalition arrangements, were also suffused with the health and social 
services debates. The Labour Party took the lead, followed by the 
Liberal and Conservative Parties (the latter being obviously divided on 
major questions of principle), in advocating massive state intervention 
in the social services. There were, however, significant differences in 
principle in the type of state intervention advocated, particularly with 
respect to health. The Labour Party had adopted the Socialist Medical 
Association scheme for a universal, tax-supported, free, state owned and 
organised service. Notwithstanding the commitment of the Conservative 
Health Minister, Mr Willink, to a universal health scheme free at time 
of use, it would probably be fair to say that a majority of the 
Conservative Party would have supported a plan such as that proposed by 
the BMA and BHA, basically an extension of National Health Insurance to 
only ninety percent of the population, with retention of facilities 
under existing ownership. The differences at the level of party 
programme, of course, corresponded to deeper differences in political 
philosophy between the advocates of a universal, tax-financed, versus a 
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restricted, insurance-based service. 
Health services were part of the economic and political planning 
arrangements during the Second Wbrld War among the state, employers, and 
trade unions, known as tripartism. With Beveridge's blueprint for 
health and social security services, and the promise of planned full 
employment, the labour movement was expected to commit itself, through 
joint planning machinery, to industrial peace and wage restraint. 
According to Gough, "This formed the basis for the 'post-war settlement' 
between labour and capital in the late 1940s under the new Labour 
Government," and in effect laid the political foundations for the 
welfare state. (39) 
Ginsburg comments on the verdict of Richard Titmuss that Labour's 
postwar welfare measures were inspired by the desire to create equal 
standards and opportunities for all in social services, to promote 
social integration, self-respect, and more equal social relations 
without class distinctions: 
The welfare state is thus conceived as the crucial 
apparatus, though incomplete, for putting individual 
citizenship and the unity of the nation before class 
loyalty and organisation, and therefore mitigating the 
effects of class conflict and inequality. This is 
clearly an expression of the now predominant tendency 
within the ideology of British Labourism that has sought 
to establish the Labour Party as capable of offering 
national leadership and promoting class harmony not 
least through welfare reform. The welfare state tempers 
the disquieting effects of inequalities and 
'diswelfares' among citizens, setting aside the 
fundamental class inequality inherent in the 
capital-labour relation. • • • Hence the welfare state 
is conceived within the predominant ideology as a 
historic act of collective altruism, which serves to 
integrate the citizen into society and to meet his/her 
needs as they are recognised by the collectivity. (40) 
Although the NHS is now assumed in popular ideology to be nothing 
if not a 'victory for the working class', one must certainly examine the 
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rival ideological principles and processes of its founding in the course 
of further analysing its political character. 
Ginsburg suggests "that while the welfare state is a response to 
the presence and pressures created by the working class which obviously 
goes some way towards meeting basic needs, it does not represent a 
victory for socialism nor ••• is it a realm of the state over which 
th.e_working classhasestablisl1ed real control." He referS tot.hedual 
character of the state, which lIis nowhere more apparent then in the area 
of state welfare, where the demands of the working class have produced 
important material gains; but those demands have been processed and 
responded to in such a form that, far from posing a threat to capital, 
they have deepened its acceptance and extended its survival." (41) 
T. H. Marshall, making an analogous point with respect to early 
Conservative support for state welfare intervention, quotes Arthur 
Balfour: "'Social legislation, as I conceive it • is not merely to 
be distinguished from Socialist legislation, but is its most direct 
opposite and its most effective antidote. I II (42) 
Of all the pieces of postwar social legislation which exhibit this 
dual character, the NHS is arguably the most egalitarian in principle, 
the feature which has perhaps given it the greatest popularity among the 
social services, even though in practice it did not sweep away the 
inequities and class biases of the old system to the extent promised by 
all three Ministers responsible. 
Several features of the health service models had particular 
ideological significance under the political circumstances of wartime 
social solidarity and reconstruction enthusiasm, and might have been 
expected to enhance the role of the NHS in legitimating the larger 
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social and economic system. A one-class service, available to all 
without discrimination according to means, was perhaps the foremost 
criterion of political popularity; this would end the invidious class 
distinction between private medicine and the inferior quality of 
existing public medical care. Almost as important was the question of 
equitable distribution of high-quality services, especially in 
industrial and rural areas, which were badly underserved. There was, as 
Eckstein points out, an inequitable distribution both of disease and of 
medical services, by social c1ass, which were in obvious need of redress 
through a redistribution and co-ordination of medical services. (43) 
The existing medical services were seen to be unduly hierarchical 
by practitioners, general health workers, and the public; 
democratisation would clearly augment the popularity of a new health 
service with the majority of persons in these categories, if not with 
the relatively privileged minorities. Uniform collective bargaining 
rights for health workers, and participation in management of services, 
were issues pressed strongly by the advocate groups, and supported 
strongly by existing health workers' organisations. The inclusion of 
health education, prevention, occupational and rehabilitative services 
would, if included, reinforce the ideological impression that the 
service was designed to ensure the attainment of the highest possible 
level of health for all persons, and especially for those least well 
served under the old system. 
Such a model scheme, which was clearly oriented to achieving high 
standards of health with socially equitable access, and democratically 
organised, would, in addition, have corresponded to Kelman's concept of 
'experiential health'. 
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In principle, then, the NHS as implemented represents perhaps the 
most democratic of the postwar social measures, and as such it has great 
ideological significance. But it is clearly a compromise between the 
two models of the social organisation of medicine. Many of the 
extremely popular principles of the advocate groups, also held among the 
senior Civil Service advisors to the Minister of Health, were 
incorporated into the scheme, virtually from the start of planning in 
1942. Those egalitarian general principles, such as free, universal and 
equal access, have, through the subsequent history of the NHS, remained 
among its most popular features, and have corne to represent an 
ideological hallmark of the British welfare state, despite complaints 
regarding adequacy of resources and failure of the NHS to live up to its 
ideals. It is undeniable that the NHS, although not corresponding 
entirely to an ideal model calculated to win fundamental working class 
approval, and despite a chronic lack of financial resources, has helped 
build a foundation of political loyalty to the general principles of the 
welfare state, and indeed to welfare capitalism, as it represents the 
Labour Party's corning to terms, in its 'post-war settlement', with the 
exigencies of a private economy, the power of the medical profession, 
and the popular demands of the labour movement. 
The Representation of Interests in State Policy Making 
We have earlier commented upon and rejected the pluralist notion 
that state policy making is a direct result of the competition of 
contending, organised pressure groups, with the state acting as a more 
or less neutral arbiter of this process. Rather it has been argued that 
because of combinations of certain economic, social, political and 
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historical factors, some interests enjoy a structural advantage which 
results in the incorporation of their positions and policies by the 
state. 
Eckstein has made the case that the SMA enjoys such a position of 
strategic advantage because of its traditional prestige and as the near 
monopoly representative of organised medicine. At a more general level, 
and referring to the state itself, Miliband speaks of the 'bias of the 
system', the tendency of the state, regardless of the government in 
power, to accept and work within the ideological and economic 
constraints of the surrounding private economy, to pay greater attention 
in policy-making to interests organised on the basis of property. 
Marc Renaud describes a similar 'structural constraint' upon the 
state with respect to medical care, suggesting that in societies in 
which much illness is occupational or environmental, and where medicine 
is privately organised, not addressing the social correlates or causes 
of illnesses, the state is severely restricted in the ultimate 
effectiveness of any interventions because of the entrenched power of 
the private economic and professional interests oriented to the status 
quo. (44) 
Samuel Beer suggests that because of the programmatic nature of the 
Labour Party, it was in a strong position to gain more power for the 
labour movement in the post-war 'social contract'. Beer sees the 
origins of this power not just in the 1945 Labour election victory and 
the party's comprehensive social and economic programme, but in the 
forging of the party's 'social contract' as early as 1940, with the 
incorporation of labour representation in government economic 
decisionmaking the tripartism of Labour Minister Ernest Bevin, which 
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achieved a new and lasting adjustment in the balance of power between 
classes. (45) 
Ian Gough, on the other hand, suggests this new power was more 
apparent than real. He notes the partial congruence of interests 
between capital and labour, each for opposing reasons, in wartime 
industrial peace and in postwar state intervention in welfare, but finds 
'that the cornpromise,E?stablishc=d asanassumegha.rmony of interest.s ,was 
extremely illusory. State intervention in social and economic security 
was irreversible, as was its commitment to full-employment policies, but 
Gough argues that the representative power of labour within the new 
structure of state intervention was not commensurate with its role as 
beneficiary. It is Gough's interpretation that the more important 
political function served by the 'postwar settlement' was a 
"regeneration of capitalist social relations", with the full initial 
participation of social democratic and trade union leadership, which had 
the effect of reducing militant pressures for more drastic economic 
change. Not until the 1960s did the labour movement take particular 
advantage of its increased bargaining power in policy making, he says. 
(46) 
Ginsburg develops a similar theme, that the role of labour in 
ini tiating and planning the welfare state is much less than assumed in 
the commonly held myth surrounding it: 
It is true that the support of the organised working 
class has been crucial to almost all progressive 
reforms, but one cannot argue that the welfare state is 
the product of a consistent mass campaign by the 
working-class movement. The labour movement has never 
in fact developed and promoted a programme of state 
welfare measures. 
He notes the incorporation of Labour Power and Tue leadership into 
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the state apparatus in the period after 1940 of reconstruction and 
postwar planning. That involvement, combined with "the continued 
absence of a distinct and comprehensive socialist welfare programme," 
makes it difficult to determine the precise contribution of the labour 
movement. While the movement exerted pressure on its leaders and on the 
government for imprOVed conditions, pressure which was politically 
effective with respect to the state's general commitment to new social 
policy, 
the planning and implementation of the reforms 
were left to individuals and groups largely outside the 
Labour movement and the working class. Labour party and 
trade union members did of course discuss the reforms, 
but they were delivered 'from above' in the form of 
------------------------ftgovernment reports and 80 on,--~abo~t-----------------­
gratefully accepted the deliverance in the absence of 
their own programme and in the concomitant rejection of 
more fundamental, socialist proposals for change. 
Ginsburg credits the Labour Party's commitment to its interwar 
pol icy programme for the determination with which the postwar Labour 
government implemented its welfare state schemes after 1945. But the 
real authors of the government policies themselves "were in fact the 
progressive, liberal bourgeois who had become committed to Keynesianism 
and the interventionist state in the crisis of the 1930s. The 
interpretation and implementation of the post-war legislation, as well 
as its design, were left in the hands of civil servants and 
professionals, whose class bias, particularly in the upper echelons, 
remains unshaken. II "We must conclude," states Ginsburg, II that the 
working class through the organs of the trade union movement and the 
Labour Party has exerted very little 'real' as opposed to 'formal' 
control over the shape of welfare policy and administration •••• 11 (47) 
Since the representation of working class interests in Labour Party 
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policy making is one of the critical questions of social democracy and 
the welfare state, clearly a more systematic sociological approach must 
be taken. lAle look at three models here. 
George and Wilding distinguish two stages of state policy formation 
in a model which sees social policy arising out of situations of 
problems or conflicts "involving (primarily) the economic interests and 
value systems of competing population groups and social classes." They 
assume that an inherent class conflict exists between lithe working class 
and the upper class" involving more or less constant working class 
pressure for reforms. The two policy stages are first, the initial 
recognition by the state of a problem made manifest through class 
conflict or pressure, and the general determination to solve the 
problem; and second, the detailed formulation of policy in which the 
groups whose values and interests are to be affected attempt to 
influence legislation, or to redefine the situation through policy 
changes to their own advantage. Here, there is a form of articulated 
conflict between pressure groups representing working and upper class 
interests in the area of the social problem in question, and compromises 
are reached in the detailed policy solutions, generally in accordance 
with the power and effectiveness of the groups concerned. George and 
Wilding cite the 1911 National Insurance Act, the purpose of which --
income security -- IIwas the result of both actual and potential class 
conflict," whereas the method contributory insurance involving 
private insurance schemes and limited coverage -- reflected the relative 
power of the interests involved. 
The second stage of social policy formation acts as a 
check to the victories of the working class. When one 
also bears in mind that the actual implementation of 
social policy legislation generally falls short of its 
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stated intentions, the limited effects of social policy 
provision on the stratified nature of society becomes 
clear. The distribution of economic and political power 
in society is such that if social policy is to improve, 
even slightly, the conditions of the working class, it 
must adopt a policy of over-kill. •• It is a 
corollary of the thesis that the values of the dominant 
class are the reigning values in society and that the 
definition of social problems owes more to the values of 
this class than to the larger but less powerful class of 
working people. (48) 
Robert Alford takes a more structural approach to the 
representation of conflicting interests in policy formation, in a 
historical study of health reforms in New York City. He describes three 
types of interests materially concerned with policy changes, according 
to their structural relationship to a central decisonmaking power. 
These are dominant, challenging and repressed structural interests. (49) 
A structural Marxist theory of the representation of external 
interests within the policymaking apparatus of the state is developed in 
a recent work by Rianne Mahon. Her analysis seeks to locate the 
disproportionate weight of certain conflicting interests outside the 
state within a parallel, and equally disproportionate, structure of 
representation of interests within the institutions of the state. This 
'unequal structure of representation' involves, concretely, the 
particular historical relationships between the various representative 
organisations of capital and labour with their counterparts in the 
senior policymaking offices of the state: the Cabinet, individual 
Ministers and their political advisers, and senior civil servants. 
The assumption is made by Mahon, in common with recent Marxist 
theories of the relative autonomy of the state, that, although the 
fundamental functions of the state are to serve the general economic 
conditions necessary for the accumulation of capital and the social 
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conditions conducive to the legitimation of capitalism, the state must 
remain 'relatively autonomous' from the plurality of major competing 
capitalist interests, regulating conditions of competition, defining the 
common interest of the 'power bloc' representing capital, and 
intervening in social welfare in order to mitigate the adverse effects 
of capitalist economic relationships upon the majority of the 
poPlllation. 
The various institutions of the state are seen by Mahon as 
reproducing the complex and contradictory network of class interests 
outside the state, in 'civil society', in a form quite particular to 
each state agency. The difference between direct interest group 
representation (as in pluralist theory) and 'structural representation' 
within the state is that the state is bound to consider the relative 
social and economic power of relevant outside interests, and in fact a 
relatively permanent set of relationships develop between them in 
setting policy. The unequal structure of representation and the 
alliances between state agencies and officials with outside interests, 
reflects the relative degree of predominance of the 'power bloc' 
representing capital within each state policy agency. Thus, while the 
state as a whole is capable of containing conflicting elements of 
representation, there is a general bias among the policymakers in 
arranging the compromises of interests necessary to produce a given 
policy, toward the dominant interests. (50) 
The assumption of Mahon, along with Miliband 
structural 'bias of the system') and Alford 




institutionalised advantage of the 'dominant' structural interests), is 
that a natural advantage in state policymaking accrues to those 
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interests which are best organised, have a tr ad i tional , 
institutionalised rapport with state policymaking bodies, and which best 
conform to the past general policy tendencies or orientations of the 
state. 
In this study we seek to explore the relationships, or 
effectiveness of representation of those forces pressing for profound 
change in the state's responsibility for ensuring the health of the 
population. 
We contend, using the three criteria applied to the social aspects 
of a state health service (its effects upon capital accumulation, the 
reproduction of labour power, and the legitimation of the social 
relations of the economic system) that the particular combination of 
features of the health service are consistent with the structural 
representation of interests involved, although they do indicate a 
considerable shift in the social organisation of the health care system 
toward equality of provision for the whole population and vastly 
improved access for the working class. 
In the following chapters, we attempt to shed some light upon the 
particular representation of interests involved in the several stages of 
the planning of the NBS, and to explain some of the apparent paradoxes 
among the successes and failures of the advocate groups as compared with 
those of the traditional medical interests. 
A Note on Methodology 
The historical, or research, portion presented here represents a 
body of data not yet aggregated or analysed in previous accounts of the 
origins of the NBS. While secondary sources are used to describe 
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developments prior to World War II, primary sources are made use of with 
respect to the specific planning and enactment of the NHS during the 
years of World War II and the postwar Labour government. 
These primary sources consist, in the main, of archival material 
drawn from a variety of documentary collections, most important of which 
are the Ministry of Health Service planning files and documents held by 
the Public Record Office (PRO) and the Department of Health and Social 
Security (DHSS). Most of this material, because of the thirty-year 
closure rule, was not open to inspection until the period 1975 to 1978. 
From these documents it was possible to trace the contacts between 
individuals and the major organisations involved in the planning of the 
health service and the Ministry of Health. The Ministry's own evolving 
plans could also be detailed. Relevant documents of the Ministry of 
Reconstruction, Cabinet, and Prime Minister's office were also 
consulted. 
In addition to these government papers, the health policy documents 
of organistions comprising the movement in favour of a health service, 
and of the BMA, were consulted, with several aims: first, to describe 
the internal health policy formulation processes of the individual 
organisations; second, to examine these health service policies within 
the larger political and ideological orientations of the organisations; 
third, to elicit from these positions and political strategies some 
model of the organisations' expectations of government social policy. 
This latter would then become the basis for theoretical analysis of the 
relationship between the health service advocacy campaign and 
characteristics of welfare state policymaking. 
Accordingly, archival materials of a number of major organisations 
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were consulted: the British Medical Association (SMA); the Labour 
Party; the Socialist Medical Association (SMA); the Trades Union 
Congress (TUC); the Medical Practitioners' Union (MPU); the National 
Union of Public Employees (NUPE); and the Confederation of Health 
Service Employees (COHSE). The archives of these organisations, in 
addition to providing detailed information on internal policy and 
strategy debates, also revealed joint policy development efforts and 
exchanges of views among the chief proponent organisations, as well as 
with other related or less active organisations. Most importantly, 
examination of records of these organisations dealing with the 
government made it possible to reconstruct the parallel evolution of 
political strategies and policies. This reconstruction provides an 
historical basis for theoretical analysis of the organisations' concerns 
and the two governments' responses, and of the representation of 
interests in state policy making. 
The role of organised groups is analysed, but, as noted earlier, 
not in isolation from the sociological context. Indeed the theoretical 
orientation here adopted is the relationship between the state and the 
variety of social forces militating toward its adoption of a national 
health service. Some of those forces comprised organised groups. Other 
factors, both structural and ideological, included the disorganised and 
maldistributed condition of medical services, the financial crisis of 
the voluntary hospital system, the medical exigencies of war, and the 
ideology of social solidarity of wartime which came to be expressed in 
an almost generalised working class opinion in favour of a state medical 
service. Organised groups, especially those representing the labour 
movement, undoubtedly played an important role in articulating the 
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problems of existing insurance and health arrangements, proposing models 
of a national service, and engaging in educational, publicising and 
organising activities to bring pressure to bear upon government. A part 
of their political effect was to reinforce the growing ideological trend 
among the working class and relatively insecure middle class in favour 
of welfare state measures. This not only brought concrete pressure to 
bear on government but began to alter the ideological dimensions of the 
expectations and obligations between state and citizens. 
These effects were of course augmented by a number of official and 
unofficial reports on the public services, including the issue of a 
popular edition of a 1937 report on the nation's health service by 
Political and Economic Planning (PEP), the 1942 Beveridge Report, and a 
number of regional medical and hospital facilities surveys commissioned 
by the government, under the Emergency Medical Service, through the 
Nuffield Provincial Hospitals Trust. 
The particular groups leading the campaign for a health service can 
be seen as representative of the position of organised workers, and of 
organised socialists, during the historical period under review. The 
question of what sort of health and social services might ultimately be 
in the interests of the working class is of course a more abstract one, 
and one which begs the further question of the priorities of the 
society, a matter of great 
tangentially here. The health 
interest which can only be considered 
service models posed by the various 
organisations representing socialists or trade unionists are therefore 
taken at face value, as the expression of self-interest, idealism and 
political pragmatism, in the circumstances of wartime reconstruction 
politics. They cannot be assumed ipso facto to represent a 'class 
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interest', which must remain a matter for further theoretical debate, 
beyond their relevance to models of state intervention discussed here. 
There can be no doubt, however, as to the influence of working class 
opinion and pressure on welfare state policy; this study is concerned 
primarily with the extent of that influence. 
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CHAPTER 10 
CONCLUSION: STRUCTURAL INTERESTS IN THE PLANNING OF THE NHS 
The creation of the National Health Service has been seen in this 
study primarily as a process of creating major changes in the social 
organisation of health in Britain. The concern has been with the major 
structural changes accomplished, with the social principles lying behind 
them, and particularly with the representation of conflicting structural 
interests in the provision of health services, both in terms of the 
guiding ideology behind their rival health service models, and their 
degree of actual participation in the planning process. 
It is apparent that the health service policies of neither the 
Conservative nor the Labour governments followed exactly the policies of 
their respective parties. The process of planning and adaptation of 
party policy by the two governments owed much, not only to the presence 
of interest groups concerned with various aspects of health services, 
but to the relative structural strengths of those interests within the 
health services and in society in general. 
At a level of greater generality can be seen the role of the state, 
the complex of permanent institutions of government, including the 
Ministry of Health in this case, in interpreting and responding to the 
political, social and economic forces of wartime, most of which 
militated in favour of a universal, 
state-run health scheme. 
comprehensive, regionalised 
These were the pressures which set some of the conditions and 
parameters within which both governments were obliged to work. They 
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were the pressures which virtually obliged the Conservative leadership 
to accept a more egalitarian service than they might have chosen if they 
had paid attention to the very vocal sector of the party which wanted 
only a partial extension of means-tested National Health Insurance. 
These pressures also made it a more opportune moment for the Labour 
government to build on the egalitarian principles of public 
accessibility to the service established by the Coalition, with further 
structural modifications in the direction of state control most 
particularly the nationalisation of the hospitals. 
But, just as there were pressures propelling the Conservatives 
towards a more radical, egalitarian policy, there were also constraints 
upon the Labour government which, in effect, prevented it from fully 
implementing the plan drawn up by its internal policy advisors and 
ratified by its annual Conferences. 
In the light of some of the theoretical considerations introduced 
in Chapter 1, and the historical material discussed in Chapters 2 to 9, 
we shall examine here some of the pressures and constraints which made 
the NHS as planned by two governments -- arguably the most democratic 
of the reconstruction period welfare state measures, particularly in 
terms of principles of public access, but still not as democratic as its 
proponents would have liked, with respect to principles of range and 
purpose of services, and of public and workers' participation in control 
of the services. 
One of the most important systems of parameters and constraints 
upon change in the structure of health services derives from the elusive 
relationship between the mode of production of medical services, and the 
characteristics of the larger economic mode of production. It has been 
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noted earler that in Britain of the 1940s, a common theme united these 
two sectors -- that of state intervention directed towards the goals of 
economic stability and social security. The groundwork for this new 
departure was set by the exigencies of the war economy, mass public 
pressure for postwar social and economic security, the framework 
provided by Beveridge, and the tripartite (labour, business and state) 
planning processes established under the Coalition government. In the 
pre-war medical system in Britain, as in the economy in general, there 
were many glaring dysfunctional aspects which led to both inefficiency, 
and to profound public sentiment in favour of greater equality and 
security. 
In the context of the combined economic and social strategy of 
reconstruction policies, therefore, reforms in the mode of production of 
health services, or in the social organisation of health, took their 
place. While the pressures for, and contraints upon change in the health 
sector were unique to some of the manifest structural problems or 
dysfunctionalities of that sector, they were also closely related to the 
demands for and constraints on change in the economy and society as a 
whole. Indeed many aspects of the pre-war social organisation of health 
represented a microcosm of wider social and economic structures, 
particularly the social class disparities in access to services, in 
control of services, and in the structures of public and voluntary 
provisions and facilities. 
Beveridge, in concert with a large body of public opinion, 
particularly in the labour movement, wished to reduce or eliminate the 
Poor Law legacy in the social services, and provide a full range of 
social security and health services as assumptions, guaranteed by the 
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state, upon which an economy of full employment would rest. Among the 
socialist and Labour Party health service advocates, many went beyond 
Beveridge in wishing to see health services not only guaranteed to 
everyone, but changed in purpose and structure, as part of a socialist 
or social democratic transition in the society. These would provide not 
only equality of access, but a service directed towards preventive and 
occupational health, radical changes in the labour process of 
professional and non-professional services, new integrated structures of 
community medical care, and elements of workers' democracy. 
In the socialist reform schema, these features were linked to a 
wider set of aspirations for the working class for security, equality of 
opportunity and full employment. In this context, the socialist and 
Labour position on a health service stressed not just improvements in 
access to existing services, but improvements to the qualitative aspects 
of health programmes, with special emphasis on research and prevention 
in both industrial and community settings. There was a desire among the 
advocate groups, and a significant sector of society, including the 
health services trade unions, for substantial changes in the social 
organisation of health, consistent with their programme for changes, to 
be undertaken by the state, in the wider economy and society. To 
reiterate a point made in the first chapter, the demands for changes in 
the social organisation of health were linked to, or derived from, a 
different 'social definition of health' itself, one which stressed 
fulfillment of human potential in addition to increased productivity due 
to reduction in illness. 
For each of the sets of interests involved in the health service 
debates and planning, it has been argued earlier, from the advocate 
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groups, through the liberal, pro-universality reformers such as 
Political and Economic Planning and senior Ministry of Health officials, 
to the conservative forces of the medical profession and voluntary 
hospitals, a particular 'social definition of health' could be 
identified. This would correspond with their chosen health service 
model, and their particular viewpoint on state intervention in social 
and economic life. 
Thus the discussion of the representation of these various 
interests in state policy making for the NHS can be seen in part as a 
question of the extent to which various aspects of their health service 
models were opposed or accepted. In addition to this relatively 
abstract conception of representation is the more practical or immediate 
form of representation -- the role of the interests, and the state, in 
the bargaining process itself. 
A third concept of representation of interest, discussed by Alford 
(1) and noted in the first chapter, is that of structural 
representation, or, in Alford's typology, dominant, challenging, and 
repressed structural interests. The application of this typology is of 
some utility in considering changes in the social organisation of health 
within the larger, surrounding mode of production. This is true since 
the 'dominant,' 'challenging' and 'repressed' structural interests in 
the health sector may be delineated, and compared, with respect to 
influence on public policy, with those in the wider society, or other 
sectors. Although such a task is well beyond the scope of the present 
study, it is of interest to note the case of the private insurance 
industry, an 'interest' deeply involved in several sectors of society, 
and especially involved in health in the form of approved societies 
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after 1911. This major financial institution was, in effect, removed 
from a very significant structural position, indeed a dominating one, 
with the rejection of insurance as the basis for health care provision 
in the NHS. 
To apply this typology to NHS policy formation, the dominant 
pre-NHS structural interests may be identified as the medical profession 
and voluntary hospitals and to a lesser extent the local authorities; 
the challenging interests as the organised advocate groups including the 
Tue and Labour party, and the repressed interests as those unorganised 
sectors of the population not covered by National Health Insurance, or 
poorly served by the pre-NHS social organisation of health. In the 
planning, establishment and modification of the NHS, each of these sets 
of interests interacted with the state, at the centre, to create major 
changes in the social organisation of health. To a significant extent, 
the creation of the NHS involved, implicitly, a realignment of the 
'dominant,' 'challenging' and 'repressed' structural interests. The 
elimination of the insurance industry has just been noted a 
consequence of the decision to take the health service 'out of the 
marketplace' and make it a universal, free state service. 
The realignment of the various structural interests can be more 
clearly seen in relation to several criteria by \~ich the social 
organisation of health services before and after the inception of the 
NHS may be described. These criteria are: 1) Principles of public 
access to services, or degree of universality; 2) Principles of the 
structure of services, referring to ownership, comprehensiveness, and 
degree of integration or co-ordination; 3} Principles of representation 
in administrative control and management, with reference to the degree 
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of institutional power given the medical profession, non-professional 
health workers, other agencies, and the public in the operation of the 
service; and 4) Principles of representation of interests in the 
planning of the service, (which can be expected to be reflected, in 
part, in the first three substantive criteria above) • 
In effect, the first three criteria can be seen as a way of further 
specifying or breaking down the substantive 'models' of health services 
held by the various interests, and ultimately decided by the state in 
the process of policy formation, legislation and regulation. The state 
also had the deciding role, ipso facto, in determining the fourth, 
procedural criterion, the principles of representation of the various 
interests both in the planning process, and finally in the institutional 
structure of the service. 
The chief focus in this study has been the extent of influence or 
representation of the health service advocates, both as partners with 
the state in the planning process, and on the substantive features of 
the health service, under the two major governments involved, Coalition 
and Labour, and the short-lived caretaker government. The following 
synopsis recapitulates some of the main points of decision by the 
governments on the substantive features of the service, and some of the 
main characteristics of representation of interests in the planning 
process itself; discussion of the four criteria of representation noted 
above will be resumed after this brief historical recapitulation. 
The Coalition Government 
Three major sources of ideas and pressure impinged upon the 
Coalition in the early years of the war: the Draft Interim Report (1938) 
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of the BMA-sponsored Medical Planning Commission; the popular Beveridge 
Report (1942); and the proposals of the various advocate groups for a 
socialised service. The BMA Council and a part of the Conservative Party 
established their support for a limited extension of National Health 
Insurance in the period between 1942 and the issue of the 1944 White 
Paper. In effect, the various interests were just beginning to organise 
their positions and tactics at this time. 
The first of the two Coalition Health Ministers, Ernest Brown, 
accepted the Beveridge Assumption that the state must provide a 
universal service, with no discrimination by financial status. Brown did 
not hold the view of the Labour Secretary of State for Scotland, Tom 
Johnston, that all services should be free of charges. Brown was, 
however, willing to test the advocates' position in favour of salaried 
health centre practice and suffered the consequence of fierce opposition 
from the medical profession. Willcocks suggests that Brown's scheme 
bore the strong influence of his senior officials, many of whom had 
experience in local government medical services, and that it closely 
resembled plans proposed by the National Association of Local Government 
Officers and the Society of Medical Officers of Health. (2) Brown and 
his successor Willink lost the issue of hospital charges (supported by 
the three major voluntary hospitals associations) to the Labour 
viewpoint in the Coalition, and although he had no more than suggested 
that salaried service be discussed, he suffered the censure of the 
medical profession for doing so. 
Brown and Johnston were, nonetheless, responsible for much of the 
groundwork of the 1944 White Paper, a fact now borne out by Cabinet and 
Ministry documents, but generally unrecognised in previous assessments 
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of responsibility for original NBS proposals, since the White Paper was 
published by Brown's successor Henry Willink. 
A basic and persisting pattern in NBS policy was established by the 
Coalition Cabinet during Brown's tenure. The service would be 
fundamentally egalitarian with respect to public access to it, through 
the principles of universality and comprehensiveness, and medicine would 
in all essential respects be taken out of the market; but the 
egalitarian principle which was applied to access would not extend to 
control and terms of service, in vvhich the medical profession was to 
enjoy effective dominance, won by degrees following their first 
confrontation with Brown. 
The Coalition government went far to recast the basic relationships 
between the state and the various producers and providers of health 
care; in doing so it established the state in a position to define and 
regulate the conditions and relations of the production of medical care 
in the context of a national medical service. Even though, under the 
1944 White Paper scheme, half the hospital system would remain private, 
and most doctors would remain independent contractors, health care was 
to be seen as a matter of right for everyone, not of insurance for 
certain income groups. The role of the private insurance industry would 
be eliminated, and the principle was determined that virtually all 
health services and facilities would be co-ordinated in a national 
service. 
The Coalition was also responsible for defining the three major 
groups or blocs of interests with which the government would deal in 
consulting and negotiating the details of the service. These were the 
medical profession, the voluntary hospitals, and the local authorities. 
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While the views of organisations representing the labour movement were 
noted by the Ministry and government, there is no indication that close 
negotiation with, or the agreement of the TUC or health services trade 
unions representing skilled and unskilled health workers, were seen as 
necessary to designing the scheme despite their vast numerical 
predominance. The other professions were given a relatively minor role 
both in discussions, and in the central administrative bodies to be set 
up to guide the service. 
Even though arrangements were not complete by the end of the 
Coalition for trade union bargaining and representative structures in 
the NHS, it was clear that the trade unions perforce must negotiate 
their role in the service only after the government had finalised 
arrangements with the other three interests. 
It was also clear that the substantive or health service policy 
interests of the labour movement (in health centres, preventive and 
occupational health, and against incorporating elements of private 
practice) were not at all accepted as bargaining issues by the 
government. 
The Conservative Caretaker government, during its brief interregnum 
in 1945, undertook no further concessions from the original White Paper 
and subsequent negotiations, but it did consolidate decisions in certain 
important policy areas (e.g., the provisional retention of sale and 
purchase) and produced a draft White Paper, with the initial assumption 
that a Conservative health service proposal would be announced before 
the election. The statements made by Lord Wool ton in commending the 
scheme, with its inherent compromises, to Churchill, as reflecting to a 
far greater extent the point of view and interests of the Conservatives 
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in the Coalition than those of Labour, are illustrative of the views of 
at least part of the Conservative party. Indeed it was stressed in this 
draft White Paper, which the Cabinet decided not to release before the 
election, that the essential purposes of a comprehensive, universal 
health service had been retained, while the changes made during the 
previous negotiations would ensure a greater degree of freedom for 
patients and doctors (i.e., a wider scope for private practice), and 
greater autonomy for voluntary hospitals. (3) 
Although Willink claimed the support of the BMA, the tenor of the 
resolutions passed at its Annual Representative Meeting in early May 
1945 make that assumption questionable, and its offical support was only 
tentative. It would also appear, from Lord WOolton's careful defence of 
the predominant representation of Conservative views in the 
Coalition/Caretaker proposals, that a part of the Conservative Party 
suspected undue representation of Labour views and was reluctant to see 
the negotiated scheme go ahead. (4) 
The Labour Government 
Bevan's first task, as Minister of Health, in the autumn of 1945, 
was to evaluate the principles established by the Coalition and 
Caretaker governments and the concessions made to the independence of 
the medical profession and voluntary hospitals. He was faced with the 
choice of retaining the model finally determined by Will ink, or making 
alterations according to Labour Party policy, and the policies of his 
colleagues in the several advocate groups. 
His choices were made in relative isolation from the interests 
outside government, but, it would appear, with the concurrence, or at 
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least acquiescence, of his senior permanent officials, many of whom had 
espoused the principles of a universal service from 1942. Although he 
held no formal consultations at this stage, Bevan was well aware of the 
positions of the advocates in favour of full integration of services, 
salaried payment for general practitioners, occupational or industrial 
health, and health centres -- in short, the desire to renovate and 
reorientate medical services into a service for health. 
Few of the Ministry of Health documents covering this critical 
planning period remain; however, among those which do, there is no 
indication of disagreement within the Ministry with Bevan's decision to 
nationalise the two hospital systems. In fact, his view that it would be 
an eminently rational step, solving several major problems in the 
hospital sector at once, seems to have been shared. It was clear that he 
was determined to maintain this decision against the most vehement 
protests of the voluntary hospitals, with the assured knowledge that 
only by state ownership could a more secure future for all hospitals and 
for specialist practice be guaranteed. He had been supported in this 
position by a number of respected counsultants. Even though the local 
authorities were reluctant to lose a major part of their sphere of 
administration, the municipal hospitals, they were assured that there 
was equity in the nationalising of the two systems. 
The early decision to end the sale and purchase of medical 
practices was one for which there had been considerable support among 
Ministry officials under the Coalition, but which it appeared extremely 
unlikely Willink would support -- notwithstanding extensive discussions 
-- under the sustained opposition of the medical profession. Although at 
least some of the Labour members of the Coalition government had 
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supported abolition of sale and purchase, they did not press the issue 
in the War Cabinet. Bevan's decision thus affirmed Labour Party policy 
on this issue. However, like Willink, Bevan, too, was reluctant to press 
the issue of salaried service, even optional salaried service, upon an 
antagonistic profession, despite this being one of his party's key 
points for the transformation of medicine as a state service. 
Also like Willink, and despite the sustained requests of both the 
advocates and the SMA, Bevan refused to open for discussion the issue of 
an industrial health service and the related issue of the integration of 
all government health services under one Ministry. These issues, along 
with that of health centres, to which both governments demonstrated a 
commitment vacillating between rhetorical support and practical lack of 
support, were the issues of structural change most important, in the 
advocates' arguments, for the revolutionising of medical care into a 
service designed to promote 'positive' health, rather than simply making 
the traditional curative services more readily accessible. 
Bevan's earliest policy decisions those prior to the 
announcements to the interested groups in January 1946 -- were firm 
decisions which he did not rescind or alter in their fundamentals; and 
they were, significantly, decisions which went considerably beyond the 
limits of Coalition policy. Nationalising the hospitals had never been 
considered by the Coalition, and sale and purchase was showing signs of 
being retained, with the Coalition's suggestion of a waiting period and 
an enquiry. 
Nationalisation was defensible on several grounds in Bevan's 
overall strategy: it would relieve the financial crisis of all, but 
especially the voluntary hospitals; it would facilitate a one-class 
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hospital service; it would facilitate administration of the hospitals, 
with one system, regionalised, for finance, policy, personnel, and 
treatment arrangements; and, not least, it would provide a secure, 
uniform national base for the employment of medical specialists, a key 
element in driving a wedge between the specialists and the BMA 
leadership. Against these substantive factors, the opposition of the 
voluntary hospitals was a relatively minor matter. 
The university teaching hospitals were further placated, and driven 
apart from the non-teaching voluntary hospitals, by being given special 
status as the base institutions around which regional hospital services 
would be organised. 
The arguments for this course of action were a blend of Labour 
Party policy commitments to an egalitarian national hospital service, 
principles of sound public and financial administration, and shrewd 
pragmatism in the splitting of the medical profession and voluntary 
hospital interests. It might be inferred from the small amount of 









would certainly have supported 
that he was advised similarly by at 
least a few eminent consultants, who took the view that nationalisation 
was the best means of re-establishing specialist practice with a sound 
economic and organisational base. It is noteworthy that the medical 
profession's first reaction to Bevan's NBS proposals, the statement of 
the Negotiating Committee in mid-January 1946, was in favour of the 
national hospital system, particularly since the local authorities would 
cease to run the municipal hospitals. 
Nationalisation, therefore, is perhaps the clearest case of Bevan's 
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adoption, and pragmatic use of one of the key positions of the 
advocates. But while nationalisation undoubtedly served the goal of a 
unified hospital system, the more general, overriding principle of a 
unified health service, also critical to the advocates' model, was not 
revived by Bevan. The final tripartite structure of the NHS demonstrated 
the tradeoffs made by Bevan and his predecessors with both the local 
authorities and the medical profession, to secure their participation. 
The structural arrangements with the general practitioner service 
were those which were least safisfactory to the advocates. On most of 
the policy issues which would have been central to a wholesale 
reorganising of general practice -- salaries, central regulation of 
location of practices, and health centres -- major concessions were made 
to the medical profession. The promise of an Amending Act outlawing 
general practitioner salaries was one of Bevan's final means of 
persuasion to the SMA to join the service in 1948. 
The extent of Bevan's commitment to health centres has been debated 
on the basis of interpretations of the 1948 Ministry Circular which 
relieved local authorities from the responsibility of planning for 
centres under the NHS Act, and interpretations of the significance of 
the government's austerity measures of 1947. (5) It is, however, evident 
that Bevan did not proceed early and decisively with plans for health 
centres, whatever his personal commitment to the idea, as he had done 
with the nationalisation of the hospitals. He had, like Willink, agreed 
with the medical profession that health centres should proceed on the 
basis of centrally controlled experiments with medical advice, when it 
was known on the one hand that the profession's commitment was ambiguous 
at most, and on the other that many local authorities were prepared to 
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proceed with plans. By the time the question had been given to the 
Central Health Services Council for its official advice, and budgetary 
and political restrictions were imposed on Bevan in the Cabinet, the 
fate of the centres had been decided. It is certainly evident also that 
Bevan did little at any point to encourage the pro-health centre forces, 
including the advocate groups or the local authorities, to form a 
lobbying group to act as a countervailing force against the reluctance 
of the medical profession. 
The 'model' service constructed by Bevan represented, therefore, a 
hybrid of the positions taken by the advocates and the major interested 
parties. 
Four Criteria of Structural Representation of Interests 
To return to the four structural principles of the social 
organisation of health and representation of interests noted earlier in 
this chapter -- principles of access, structure of services, structure 
of administrative control, and of planning representation -- the various 
interests were, it has been argued, treated differentially. This may be 
summarised briefly, if not wholly comprehensively, as follows. 
1) Principles of public access 
In general it may be said here that the 'challenging' and the 
I repressed' interests (i.e., the organised advocates and the unorganised 
and underserved public) fared better than did the 'dominant' (i.e., 
medical and hospital) interests. This may be demonstrated by the choice, 
by the state -- under both governments -- consistently to reject the 
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demands of the medical profession for a ninety per cent service, and the 
Beveridge recommendation for some user charges, and to accept the 
advocates' plan of a service covering the whole population without means 
testing, and without user charges (with few minor exceptions). 
It may be concluded that, for the state, the evidence -- political, 
social, and economic was overwhelmingly in favour of equality of 
access without distinction by means, or the disincentive of fees. It is 
clear from the documentary evidence of the period, that the chief 
planning and decision making figures of the state were obliged to make 
this commitment to the nation's health, productivity and political 
satisfaction with postwar social programmes; in the face of such a 
massive commitment to the public welfare, the opposition of the 
profession and hospitals to universal public access could not take 
precedence. It is notev~rthy also that among the leadership of the two 
governments, particularly between the two Health Ministers, there were 
no significant differences over universality, with the exception of that 
part of the Conservative Party which supported the BMA. 
2) Principles of the structure of the health service: 
The chief issue at stake here was comprehensiveness, i.e., the 
inclusion of all services within the NHS. Subsidiary issues included: 
range of services, whether existing or new; unification under one 
Ministry, with state ownership, or various schemes of co-ordination; 
preventive, occupational, and health centre services; and the extent of 
private practice, and related terms of medical service issues. The views 
of the 'challenging' interests, the advocates, clearly supported the 
widest interpretation of comprehensiveness, stressing extension of 
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preventive, occupational and community services and integration under 
state ownership. The 'dominant' interests, their power residing in the 
existing medical and hospital institutions, wished as little disruption 
to the status quo as necessary, providing a sound financial basis for 
their services would be guaranteed by the state. They did wish a 
decrease in the power of the local authorities, and sided with the 
advocates in wishing to unite all government health services under one 
Ministry. The issue of professional control over existing services was 
predominant. It is in the area of the structure of NHS services that 
perhaps the greatest degree of compromise between 'dominant' and 
'challenging' interests (the latter advocating on behalf of the 
'repressed' public interest) was arranged by the state. 
Here also, differences between the two governments were most 
apparent. The Coalition government, and its successor the Caretaker 
government, had planned a system of co-ordination of hospitals which 
appeared to be the maximum degree of co-ordination tolerable to the 
municipal and voluntary sector. Bevan superimposed a conception of the 
public interest consistent with the position of the advocates in 
overriding the sectoral differences among hospitals by nationalising the 
two entire systems. When it come to adding extra services to those 
already provided, for example, health centres, occupational health 
services and extra research and preventive efforts, however, both 
governments at most agreed only in part with the advocates, and the 
commitment to health centres, which did not come to fruition under 
either government, was finally handed to the medical profession for its 
not unfamiliar advice. A compromise was also effected in the area of 
private practice, with Labour certainly going further than the Coalition 
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in banning sale and purchase of NBS practices but turning down the 
advocates' position against private practice in hospitals and for 
whole-time salaries, in favour of payment and private hospital bed 
arrangements satisfactory to the medical profession or parts of it. It 
may be concluded that these positions of the 'challenging' interests, 
even though they argued on behalf of the improved health and 
productivity of the working class, were not seen by the state as 
sufficiently overriding concerns to warrant their implementation, 
against the will of the medical profession. The industrial or 
occupational health service remins an anomaly, since it was proposed by 
the advocates and the SMA alike, and rejected by both governments; it 
may be assumed, until further evidence comes to light, that both were 
unwilling to commit financial and administrative resources, and to 
challenge the prerogative of the Ministry of Labour over industrial 
health, despite the long entreaties of the Labour movement. 
3) Principles of the structure of administrative control: 
A very clear conflict existed between the medical profession, which 
wished to maintain and institutionalise a dominant influence, and the 
advocates, who wished in effect to democratise the division of labour 
and structures of control in the service. It was the concern of the 
state, with a certain difference in degree between Coalition and Labour 
governments, to extend the area of final public responsibility for 
health services without radically diminishing traditional medical 
administrative power. The local authorities, as one of the 'dominant' 
structural interests, were offered the compromise of retaining augmented 
public health functions while cedeing their ownership of hospitals. The 
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Labour movement was almost entirely rebuffed, even by the Labour 
government, in its attempt to achieve a significant and 
institutionalised role in the management and direction of the NHS at all 
levels, apart from the establishment of Whitley Councils and NHS-wide 
collective bargaining. Thus the structures of professional and of 
workers' involvement in the end reflected the original dominant and 
subordinate positions of these groups. 
4) Principles of representation in NHS planning: 
This has, in essence, been a key theme of the historical material 
of this study. Along with the structures of administrative control 
established in the NHS, it is the area where the influence of the 
'challenging' and 'repressed' interests remained weakest. Neither 
government appeared willing to enter into a new relationship of 
bargaining with, and offer administrative responsibility to, the 
advocate groups, in particular the labour negotiations,054l0 middle 
class not covered by National Health Insurance movement, which was 
ostensibly the greatest beneficiary of a universal, comprehensive 
service, along with those parts of the middle class not covered by 
National Health Insurance. In negotiations, both governments, it has 
been shown, dealt first with the three major or dominant interests, and 
primarily with the medical profession. Bevan made most initial decisions 
without formal consultations, then entered into a long period of 
essentially bilateral discussions with the medical profession. The 
labour movement, despite the extent of trade unionism in the health 
services, remained essentially outside this close bargaining 
relationship; there appeared to be no degree of reciprocity between the 
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minimal role accorded to the labour movement in planning and 
administering the service, and either its large degree of industrial 
power within the service or its support for the Labour government. 
Conclusion 
The question has been frequently asked, in the three-plus decades 
of existence of the NHS, of whose interests it serves, or serves best. 
Is it to be interpreted as a 'victory for the working class,' a 
'socialist health service,' or, on the other hand, should it be seen as 
something primarily functional for the perpetuation of the existing 
order, a minimal concession to egalitarianism arranged cynically by the 
state in the interests of social harmony? These questions are truly 
complex; the approach here has been to provide a structural framework 
through which such issues may be explored in the historical data 
pertaining to the founding of the NHS. 
It would certainly appear, considering the pattern of 
representation of structural interests explored here, that the policies 
themselves may diverge substantially from representation in the process 
of policy making. Accordingly, it would appear that the substantive 
gains made by the beneficiaries of NHS services were made, by both 
governments, through a relatively dramatic change in service delivery 
policy and final state responsibility without a correspondingly radical 
change in planning or administrative representation for the challenging 
interests. The extent to which this situation of structurally 
differential representation in the health service sector is reflected in 
other sectors of state policymaking can only be the subject of further 
fruitful research. 
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FROM THE POOR LAW TO NATIONAL HEALTH INSURANCE 
AND THE INTER~AR REFORM DEBATES 
The advocacy of state involvement in the provision of health 
protection and medical care has its origins as a reform movement in the 
mid to late nineteenth century. The earliest origins of this advocacy, 
or of state involvement, might be debated among social historians like 
the debates among geographers over the ultimate source of a great river. 
It is clear, however, that by the mid-nineteenth century sufficient 
developments were taking place in the politics of public health to say 
that reform movements were well underway and that the state was being 
called upon to assume significant responsibility in what had previously 
been the relatively laissez-faire domain of the private industrial 
economy, and the medical profession, with some palliative assistance 
from the Poor Law. 
Medical and social historians draw a major distinction between the 
sanitary and public health reform movement, directed toward measures 
which would affect the collectivity through regulations and the 
provision of general services, and the movement to reform personal 
health services, for example by abolishing the invidious discrimination 
against the poor of the Poor Law medical services. The former movement 
typified developments before the turn of the century, the latter, the 
early part of this century. 
Through these two periods, a number of major principles were 
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established concerning the respective involvements of the state at both 
national and local levels, the medical profession, private agencies such 
as insurance companies, and last but not least, the individual, 
according to his or her economic status. 
These principles, and the extent of political debate surrounding 
them bear direct relation, as antecedents, to the principles and models 
of a health service debated during the National Health Service planning 
process of the 1940s. 
Since the history of public health reforms, and of the period 
following the end of the Poor Law in 1929, has been dealt with 
exhaustively by other authors, we shall deal with them here only in 
summary fashion, primarily with reference to the political principles of 
state, professional, private capital, and personal involvement, with the 
related issue of social class, which provide both continuity and 
contrast with the World War II reconstruction debates over public health 
services. 
Social Medicine and Principles of State Responsibility 
Studies of the social incidence of disease began relatively early 
in the nineteenth century. Vital statistics were collected with some 
expertise following the founding in 1836 of the Office of the 
Registrar-General of Births, Deaths and Marriages. Many prominent 
physicians were by then serving the government as advisers on quarantine 
policy, and in parliamentary inquiries. 
The most notable of these early state investigations was the 
Commission of Inquiry into the Working of the Poor Laws, in the 1830s, 
of which the later renowned Edwin Chadwick was secretary. Chadwick 
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himself reported in 1842 in THE SANITARY CONDITION OF THE LABOURING 
POPULATION OF GREAT BRITAIN, an exhaustively documented survey with 
recommendations. The General Board of Health, a body with relatively 
weak enforcement powers was set up by Parliament under the Public Health 
Act of 1848; its public health responsibilities were turned over to the 
Privy Council in 1858. 
Coinciding with this centralisation of powers was the tenure as 
Medical Officer of the Privy Council (1858-71) of John Simon, who was to 
articulate state responsibility for health on an entirely new basis. 
Jeanne Brand comments that Simon "conceived the state's role as that of 
superintendent-general of health -- an earnest advisor and supervisor of 
local sanitary administration, ready in the last resort to enforce the 
law. Acting on this theory, [he] explored new areas of preventive 
medicine, expanding the basic concept of public health". 
These concepts, at the time, embraced mainly central government 
supervision of sanitary conditions and infectious disease measures. The 
Sanitary Act of 1866 gave wide powers of sanitary regulation to the 
local authorities, which would be responsible to the central government 
for their enforcement. 
An entirely separate and backward system of individual care existed 
in the form of medical relief to the poor meted out by the local Poor 
Law Boards of Guardians. These Boards paid certain appointed doctors a 
meagre sum to attend to the certified poor of the parish. The process 
of application for relief was sufficient disincentive that generally 
persons only in a very deteriorated condition would apply, with 
consequent loss of their full rights as citizens, in order to receive 
the most rudimentary of care. 
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The zeal for sanitary reform in the medical profession did not at 
that time extend to the miserable state of Poor Law medical treatment. 
liThe 'sanitary idea', or Chadwick's principle that improvement in the 
material environment ~Duld advance the physical well-being of the 
English people," Brand comments, "seemed far more important to 
midcentury sanitary reformers than did the extension or improvement of 
public medical care." Despite the progress marked by the Sanitary Act 
of 1866, the confusion of statutes and overlapping of powers still in 
existence prompted reformers to demand the overhaul and rational ising of 
the entire complex system. 
This need was well recognised in the Privy Council, in no small 
part due to the enthusiasm for reform of Simon and his staff. Not long 
after a joint report and memorandum by the British Medical Association 
and the Social Science Association requesting a comprehensive inquiry, 
the Royal Sanitary Commission was set up, in 1869, by the new Gladstone 
government. It reported in 1871, recommending local centralised 
sanitary and health offices, responsible for both the sanitation and 
relief of the poor, to be supervised and directed by a national agency 
of Ministry status. Its recommendations were accepted by government and 
resulted in the 'three great Acts': the Local Government Board Act of 
1871, the Public Health Act of 1872, and the Public Health Act of 1875. 
Although the latter consolidated in one Act well over a dozen 
preceding pieces of legislation, its scope was not sufficient to satisfy 
the leading reformers, among them John Simon, and the Joint Committee of 
the British Medical Association and the Social Science Association. 
The Joint Committee had considered both the 1872 and the 1875 
Public Health Acts minimal in their provision and began, as early as 
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1876 in a large conference on sanitary measures, to organise new 
pressure to extend and streamline government supervision and powers. 
Along with the great need for sanitary and public health measures 
v~ich was occasioned by the severe disease epidemics of the late 19th 
century, went considerable discussion regarding the required extent of 
state intervention. Legislatively, less progress was made after 1875, 
and Simon retired early from the medical branch of the Local Government 
Board, in frustration. There was considerable agitation among Poor Law 
Medical Officers, particularly through their association, for 
legislation to improve the nature of their practice. 
Among private practitioners, too, there was discussion of state 
involvement. A number of proposals appeared from the l870s to the 
1890s. While these mainly took the form of proposals for a Ministry of 
Health, several advocated a national medical service of state-employed 
personnel, at least for the poor. 
Perhaps the most famous of these proposals, Brand notes, was that 
of Dr Robert Rentoul. The Rentoul plan, debated into the l890s, would 
have provided two parallel medical services for the "wage-earning 
class. II One would require a small fee for treatment, the other would be 
provident, with payments (similar to insurance) made during health. The 
wide debate resulted in an investigation by the British Medical 
Association Committee, and a vote by several local branches. All 
rejected the plan. "The professional organisation of medical men was 
not willing, however, at this time to accept a 'State Department of 
Curative Medicine' (for other than the destitute) ~ich might act in 
competition with their professional interests." 
The BMA II ••• was zealous in promoting many measures ~ich involved 
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further state control in public health ••• " and did watch legislation 
closely. However f "The British Medical Association never formulated a 
rigid and permanently applicable conception of the central government's 





a medical viewpoint in all levels of government, and to that 
made a substantial contribution to the development of 
public health measures by the turn of the century. This it 
upon the solid foundations of the statistical and 
epidemiological data compiled during the numerous investigations into 
public health and working conditions from the mid to late nineteenth 
century. 
The knowledge of need therefore existed; and legislative reform was 
being promoted by a large number of energetic and well-positioned 
persons, both medical professionals and administrators. Even the BMA 
had been in the forefront of organisational pressure for broadening of 
central and local legislative powers. But jurisdictions still remained 
complex, the considerable power and inertia remaining in the Local 
Government Board's Poor Law administration, and a number of other 
factors had meant much slower progress than Simon and his fellow 
reformers had wished. Not least of these was the policy distinction 
between collective public health reform, and state intervention in 
personal medical services, which asserted itself in the BMA's strenuous 
objection to any state medical scheme which would, by setting up a 
parallel system, threaten the prerogative of the private practitioner. 
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Health and Social Security as New Political Priorities 
The period from the turn of the century to Lloyd George's 1911 
National Health Insurance Act was marked by some consolidation and 
rational ising of existing public health legislation and by several 
important and searching inquiries into the workings of such 'social' 
services as did exist, and the extent of need. Several landmark 
investigations had exposed widespread poverty and subsistence living 
conditions, notably those undertaken in the late nineteenth century by 
Charles Booth in London, by Seebohm Rowntree in York in 1901, and by 
Fabian Society members, in particular by Beatrice and Sidney Webb. (2) 
. ·--·---------The·pr"0bl-ems·0f--the--ar-my--infine-ing-heal-t:hy-r-ecruits-for--the---Boer--War -----------
had prompted the establishment by the Privy Council in 1904 of the 
Inter-Departmental Committee on Physical Deterioration, which reported 
graphically on the deleterious living and working conditions of the 
poor. 
The Inter-Departmental Committee recommended a national advisory 
council on health, public creches, extended health visiting, medical 
inspection and the provision of meals for school children. Its Report 
was taken seriously by the public and by all of the medical bodies 
concerned with public health. 
Many of the concerns of the Report with respect to children's 
health were dealt with in the 1907 Education (Administrative Provisions) 
Act, which has subsequently been taken as the beginning of state 
provision of personal health services on a collective basis. Already by 
this time many personal health services were provided, in a piecemeal 
way, by many local authorities. For example, acute infectious disease, 
diagnosis, treatment and vaccination, free treatment by doctors called 
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in by midwives, and school doctors and nurses were only a few of many 
services. 
The Fabian Society had produced a voluminous body of material on 
\~rking and living conditions (indeed Beatrice Webb had worked with 
Booth on his earlier London studies), but had made few direct 
recommendations concerning public health until the publication of B. L. 
Hutchins' "What a Health Committee Can Do" (1908), and F. L. Dodd's "A 
National Medical Service" (1911). (3) 
It was abundantly evident to reformers by this time that the 
plethora of local authority, private, voluntary and Poor Law health 
facilities comprised a most inefficient system of overlaps and gaps, the 
horrifying disincentive of pauper status under the Poor Law, and 
extremely unequal regional and class distribution of services, and 
standards of eligibility. 
There were also problems with the system of contract practice, the 
most common form of collective provision for personal medical care, 
whereby a doctor would, generally for the lowest possible contracted 
payment, provide care to the members of an informal neighbourhood 'club' 
or mutual benefit society. Several varieties of these existed, the 
largest being the 'friendly societies'. Contracts were not regulated, 
and there was fierce competition among practitioners to obtain them, 
because of the element of security, despite the fact that the 
competition kept payment rates very low. The quality of care was 
therefore extremely variable. The BMA in 1905 recommended an overhaul 
of the system, with the establishment of local public medical services 
as an alternative to the variety of contracting societies. 
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National Insurance: A Battle of Principles 
The period of the Royal Commission on the Poor Laws coincided with 
the planning by the Liberal government of Prime Minister Asquith, 
particularly by Chancellor Lloyd George, of ambitious measures of social 
insurance. Several were original in Europe and were politically quite 
significant as new state initiatives, but their principles of limited 
access were in due course to be challenged in the ensuing three decades 
with demands for comprehensive and universal social and health services. 
Old Age Pensions, with numerous restrictions on eligibility, were 
legislated in 1908; in 1909 came the Labour Exchange Act, precursor to 
--------unemployment-instlrance.-In-the-same-year-WH-ltam-Bevertdge-pub-l-ished-hi-s'---
first major work, UNEMPLOYMENT: A PROBLEM OF INDUSTRY, based upon his 
own investigations and experience in East London. His earlier advocacy 
of Labour Exchanges won him an invitation from Winston Churchill, then 
Liberal President of the Board of Trade, to join the Board and supervise 
organisation of the Labour Exchanges under the new Act. He had seen 
labour exchanges in successful operation in Germany in 1907, as a 
supplementary function to Bismarck's social insurance system. 
Churchill himself, an influential figure in Prime Minister 
Asquith's Government, was an avid partisan of social insurance -- indeed 
he saw insurance as the basis for dealing with both domestic insecurity 
and political threats from abroad. "Already in 1906 Churchill had 
defined the Government's social policy as drawing a line 'below which we 
will not allow persons to live and labour' , a phrase and aim obviously 
inspired by the Webbs' campaign for 'a national minimum of civilised 
life' and and by the revelations of Booth and Rowntree." (4) The 
principal of the national minimum was, however, not fundamentally to be 
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enshrined in the the insurance schemes of the day, which in practice 
were based on stringent means-tested eligibility, or covered only 
portions of the working population for a limited range of risks. 
As Chancellor of the Exchequer, Lloyd George began preparation for 
a planned series of insurance and social measures with a budget in 1909 
which effected some considerable redistribution of the tax burden from 
the poor to the rich, the so-called 'People's Budget'. The ensuing 
opposition of Conservatives and the House of Lords caused two general 
elections in 1910, the eventual restraining of the veto of the Lords to 
a delaying power in 1911, and considerable delays to the insurance 
programs. 
G.D.H. Cole notes that Liberal social legislation caused a deep 
division of opinion in the labour movement between the trade unions and 
the socialists, a division which reflected a significant difference of 
opinion on strategies for advancing the interests of the working class. 
All supported the measures regulating industrial hours and conditions of 
work, and the non-contributory Old Age Pension scheme. It was the 
principle of contributory insurance, to be applied in the National 
Insurance Act of 1911, which provided the point of division. In the 
socialist view, enunciated vociferously in the Labour Party's campaign 
for its Right to WOrk Bill, it was the duty of the state to provide 
either for satisfactory work, or failing that, for adequate maintenance 
for its citizens. The Bill " ••• summed up the Labour Party's conception 
of the State as a co-operative undertaking with a responsibility for 
securing to all its members the conditions of a good life." (5) 
The National Insurance Bill consisted of two measures: Part II 
provided contributory unemployment insurance, ostensibly on an 
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experimental basis, for approximately 2.5 million workers in some of the 
most seasonal trades. Part If a long-lasting forerunner of the National 
Health Service, provided a scheme known as National Health Insurance, 
contributory sickness insurance for employed workers, for general 
practitioner treatment only. 
Lloyd George had begun preparation for National Health Insurance in 
1908, following a visit to Germany, during which he had gained first 
hand experience of health services and sickness insurance. In late 1910 
he delegated the young, reform-minded William Braithwaite of the Board 
of Inland Revenue to study the German system and prepare a Bill; this 
was done by early 1911. Discussion of the draft Bill marked the 
beginning of a series of bitter disputes with both socialists and the 
powerful insurance interests. The latter were to exact significant 
compromises in the original Lloyd George plan. It was necessary, through 
this period, for Lloyd George and the minority Liberal Government to 
retain the support in Parliament of the Labour Party. One means was to 
satisfy at least the trade unions (especially considering the high 
unemployment of this period), if not the socialists. 
National Health Insurance: A Conflict of Interests 
Preparations for the National Insurance Act are reported to have 
been well under way before Lloyd George saw the recommendations of the 
Royal Commission on the Poor Law. He is further reported to have paid 
little attention to consulting the medical profession in framing the 
National Health Insurance portion of the Act. (6) The British Medical 
Association, during the period of the Royal Commission, had recommended 
locally operated public medical services to "meet the overwhelming needs 
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of the class just above those aided by the Poor Law" and had proposed to 
the Commission considerable extension of Poor Law medical care. (7) In 
1910 the BMA held extensive discussions on the likely effects of medical 
insurance on private practice and voluntary charities. This was the 
beginning of a well-organised pressure campaign which was to last until 
the coming into effect of National Health Insurance in 1912-1913 and to 
result in an enduring split in the profession's previous political 
unity. 
National Insurance, including National Health Insurance, underwent 
much change from Lloyd George's original conception to the Act as 
passed. The changes were the result of an extremely successful pressure 
campaign -- even more effective than the SMA's -- waged by the friendly 
society and private insurance interests. The campaign had a much 
greater influence than the opposition of the Webbs and other socialists 
to the insurance principle. Eckstein comments on the enduring effects 
of the concessions won by the insurance interests: "The vested interests 
in opposition (the insurance companies) did not prevent passage of the 
measure, unlike their modern transatlantic counterparts. But they 
managed to make a shambles of it and a considerable windfall for 
themselves -- by imposing on it an incredibly complicated administrative 
organization which doomed the system to ineffectiveness, especially from 
a medical standpoint, from the outset.1i (8) 
The commercial insurance interests were successful in having the 
primary purpose of National Insurance (Part II) changed from pensions, 
payable to the family upon death, which they saw as a threat to their 
own death benefit policies, to the administration of sickness benefit. 
Since the friendly societies were also interested in administration of 
75 
the latter, the two sets of interests were granted the concession under 
the Act of being able to form 'Approved Societies', the entities to be 
licensed to administer National Insurance. Even though these were 
required to be non-profit organisations, the ability to form them was 
advantageous to both existing friendly societies and private insurance 
companies, which could recruit more regular business through their 
part-association with the compulsory, contributory insurance scheme. 
Although Lloyd George had originally intended only to use friendly 
societies, which were non-profit insurance associations, the very 
powerful private companies exerted irresistable pressure, on the one 
hand to be included as eligible to become 'Approved Societies' and on 
the other to have widows' and orphans' pensions (and the possibility of 
funeral benefits) excluded from the National Insurance provisions in 
order that they might be retained wholly within the private sector. "So 
it was that pensions, the original object, disappeared, and national 
insurance became a matter of sickness benefit." (9) 
Part I of the Act, titled Insurance Against Loss of Health and for 
the Prevention and Cure of Sickness, dealt directly with medical care 
(and very little with prevention). It provided, for employed persons 
earning less than 160 pounds per year (not for the self-employed or 
dependents, the rationale being that a worker's uninsured illness might 
cause the destitution of his family, but not vice versa) compulsory, 
contributory insurance to cover only attendance by a general 
practitioner, and medicines (not specialist, hospital, or rehabilitative 
care) • 
The BMA, reacting strongly against contract practice with friendly 
societies and other insurers, successfully pressed for local 
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administration of the scheme by Insurance Committees, with medical 
representation. This concession was related to one of the Association's 
"six cardinal demands," passed at a special representative meeting in 
June 1911. Other SMA demands specified: a maximum income limit of two 
pounds per week for beneficiaries; free choice of doctor by patient; 
benefits to be administered by local health committees rather than 
friendly societies; the method of remuneration to doctors by the local 
committee to be according to majority vote of local doctors; rate of 
remuneration to be approved by the profession; and adequate medical 
representation on central and local bodies. 
By third reading of the Bill in August, 1911, the Government had 
accepted amendments on all of these points but the two pounds income 
limit. Royal Assent was given in December, 1911. For the new scheme, 
administrative bodies were to be in operation by July, 1912, and 
benefits to patients were to begin in January, 1913. In the intervening 
period, a determined campaign of medical opposition to the new Act was 
organised. 
In the latter half of 1911, socialist opposition to National Health 
Insurance was also voiced. The Webbs had been opposed since the new 
scheme was revealed to them at a breakfast meeting with Lloyd George and 
the Bill's author, William Brai thwai te, in February, 1911: "I Sickness 
should be prevented, not cured,' cried the Webbs, as they 'singly and in 
pairs' leaped down Lloyd George's throat.1I (10) The Fabian Society, 
Brand comments, was from that point opposed to the Bill, seeing it as a 
temporary measure serving to circumvent the recommendations of the 
Minority Report of 1909 for a public health service. 
Socialists, Cole notes, "were strongly opposed to the contributory 
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principle, which they regarded as a denial of the Socialist doctrine 
that the provision of work or maintenance and also the care of the 
people's health were direct obligations falling on the community as a 
whole. II (11) They saw the contributory principles as both demeaning to 
the workers who were compelled to contribute, and as contradictory to an 
essentially social measure, by virtue of its being financed at the 
expense of the poor. 
The trade unions, on the other hand, were relatively pleased with 
both parts of the National Insurance Act. Compulsory contributions to a 
state scheme (even if administered by existing agencies under the Act, 
as Approved Societies) would free some of their own funds for other 
purposes; the Act extended benefits to groups of workers who would 
probably have remained unprotected without state intervention; and the 
new Approved Society arrangement of collection and administration would 
mean a certain aggrandisement of function for the trade union benevolent 
fund machinery. They had, in short, several material reasons for 
favouring the particular form of the new insurance scheme even though 
some union interests at the same time opposed aspects of it. 
In Parliament, therefore, the Labour Party was split between its 
trade union members, who favoured amendment and quick passage of the 
Bill, and a small socialist minority who maintained uncompromising 
opposition to it. The minority Liberal government had relied upon 
Labour support to pass the Bill, and had received it. But the negative 
features of the insurance scheme, apparent as they were to many Labour 
supporters, despite the tactical support they gave the Liberals in 
Parliament, marked the divergence of the Labour Party from Liberal 
social policy, which it had supported for several years. It opened a 
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political split within the Party, between the trade unions and 
socialists, over the nature of social reform, and fuelled a general 
questioning of the Party's commitment to socialism and political 
independence. 
The Beginnings of the Socialist Medical Reform Movement 
Reference has earlier been made to the founding of the State 
Medical Service Association on July 26, 1912. It is worth noting here 
that this occurred at what was perhaps the height of the British Medical 
Association's campaign against National Health Insurance, which had 
teclnriccd-ty---come-irrto--effect---on July 15, l%-r.---L-l-oyd---&:Jtge was-to wage.-------
a difficult battle with the British Medical Association until early 1913 
for their acceptance of the plan, while the sustained opposition of the 
SMA leadership helped to promote several splits in the profession, 
including the formation of the State Medical Service Association. This 
organisation, on its inaugural meeting in July 1912, adopted a programme 
answering in many respects the 'six cardinal demands' which the BMA 
passed a year earlier. The socialist programme of the State Medical 
Service Association would have required: 
1. The medical profession to be organised as in other State 
Services 
2. Entry to the profession by one State examination 
3. All members of the Service to be paid by salaries, which 
would reflect experience and seniority, with pensions 
4. Free choice of doctor as far as possible, but specified 
maximum patient lists for doctors 
5. Preventive as well as curative orientation; 
nationalisation of all hospitals; hospital use for all 
relevant procedures by referral of and in conjunction 
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with the patient's practitioner 
6. Eligibility in the Service to all persons, regardless of 
age, income, health status, etc. (12) 
Dr Benjamin Moore, one of the founders of the State Medical Service 
Association, had begun his campaign a year earlier in the pages of the 
BRITISH MEDICAL JOURNAL. (13) With the founding of the Association, the 
campaign became more widespread, particularly through pamphlets, 
meetings and articles concerning the advantages of a comprehensive 
health service. Dr Charles Parker, Secretary of the Association, 
publicised in 1912 a plan for a regionally organised system, with 
regional catchment areas of about 100,000 population around a district 
hospital, in which consultant practice and Medical Officers of Health 
would be based. General practitioners and some specialists would work 
at local 'receiving stations', well-equipped collective surgeries, 
clearly similar in concept to what were later termed 'health centres' • 
Dr Milson Rhodes in a 1912 pamphlet elaborated further this structure of 
a state scheme organised around district medical facilities, publicly 
owned and managed by local doctors; he did not recommend a fully 
salaried service. Discussions on the structure of an ideal state service 
were maintained by the Association through the First War. It also 
"discussed its relations with the r ising Labour Party and continuously 
advocated the setting up of a Ministry of Health as a preliminary step 
to a National Medical Service." (14) 
There were other breakaway movements from the unity of the BMA, 
occasioned more directly by its opposition to insurance. In its Special 
Representative Meeting, following an increased capitation fee offer by 
Lloyd George in late October 1912, a vote was taken on participation in 
the new scheme. Of the approximately one-half of the BMA membership who 
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voted, the majority were overwhelmingly opposed. The meeting 
recommended that doctors in each locality negotiate independently with 
insured persons, outside the specified local committees. The first 
significant break from the apparently united opposition was the refusal 
of fourteen prominent doctors, eminent consultants and private 
practitioners, to resign from the national insurance advisory body. In 
December 1912, led by this group, doctors willing to serve under the Act 
- despite BMA policy - formed the National Insurance Practitioners' 
Association, following a proposal by Dr Alfred Salter who was later to 
be Labour Member of Parliament for Bermondsey. 
Lloyd George offered support to the new group in their effort to 
begin practice under the Act. The Association aided the establishment of 
the first insurance panel in Birmingham. By the beginning of January 
1913, 10,000 doctors had defied BMA policy and registered with the 
Insurance Commissioners as willing to serve. By mid January, the BMA 
recognised that it had lost the confidence of a majority of doctors in 
opposing the Act, and another Special Representative Meeting voted to 
release them from their previous pledge of opposition to it. The public 
began immediately to join in large numbers, while BMA membership began a 
sharp decline. By 1917, the BMA's Insurance Act Committee was reporting 
near unanimous support of the Act among members -- a substantial number 
of members wanted extensions of both the portion of the population and 
of medical treatments covered by insurance. (15) Brand notes the 
important role played by those eminent dissenting members who felt their 
primary social responsiblity was to practise under the Act, and the 
failure of the BMA to control its membership, as crucial in giving the 
victory to the government. 
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The Social Organisation of Health by 1913 
Going into Wbrld War If therefore, Britain had several major items 
of social legislation in operation, including National Health Insurance, 
with its limited coverage. The legislation was enacted by a Liberal 
government, under the apparently progressive impulse of Lloyd George, 
and with the Parliamentary assistance of the Labour Party. There was 
unanimity in recognising that the social risks addressed by the 
legislation should be lessened by action of the state, on society's 
behalf. There was less unanimity, indeed disagreement, about the 
principles upon which action should be based, and the agencies to be 
enlisted by the state (the artificially created 'Approved Societies' in 
the case of health insurance) to administer the scheme. 
The medical profession, in the end, as satisfied with the insurance 
principle, having been protected from the previous evils of contract 
practice with insuring agencies by the compromise of the new local 
insurance committees. They were satisfied, too, with most of the other 
arrangements, including higher fees, security of tenure, free choice of 
participation, and the exclusion of middle class patients, who would 
have to continue to pay private fees. Titmuss notes that "compared with 
what had obtained before, the material rewards for most general 
practitioners were approximately doubled." (16) 
The insurance companies and friendly societies were able to take 
advantage of participation in health and disability insurance while 
being able to preserve their traditional, private forms of insurance, 
including pensions and funeral benefits, no mean gain considering their 
profi tabil ity. 
The trade unions, along with the non-profit friendly societies, 
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were happy with the 'Approved Society' arrangements. It allowed them to 
free substantial funds for other purposes and for member benefit 
schemes, some of course being the extra medical insurance benefits such 
as insurance for dental and optical treatment which the sufficiently 
wealthy Approved Societies were allowed to give their members. The 
unions thus became more attractive organisations to potential members. 
It was left to socialist groups, therefore, and to some sectors 
within the Labour Party to object in principle to insurance (and very 
limited insurance at that) as a means of implementing society's new 
recognition of a responsibility to deal with individual sickness and its 
consequences. Lloyd George was on record, both before and after 
enactment of National Health Insurance, as preferring much extended 
forms of social and medical insurance, seeing his particular Act as only 
a "temporary expedient" on the way to provision for treatment for the 
entire family, increased sickness benefits, and pensions for widows, 
orphans and upon retirement. Indeed he had planned improvements in the 
1914 budget and an inquiry into insurance which were interrupted by the 
War. While the BRITISH MEDICAL JOURNAL noted the lack of insurance 
coverage for diagnostic services, specialist treatment, nursing and 
hospital care, Brand remarks, the British Medical Association "had not 
seen fit to incorporate them in its 'cardinal points ' ''; rather its final 
battle which it lost, was in fact for the limitation of the plan to 
those earning only very low incomes. (17) 
Sidney and Beatrice Webb maintained vocal opposition to the 
principle of insurance for limited medical treatment on the grounds that 
it did nothing to prevent individual ill health or even to extend the 
principles of past public health measures. The State Medical Service 
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Association, through its individual members' writing and publicising, 
and as a group, was developing and attempting to popularise detailed 
plans for a national health service available to all, based on 
restructured neighbourhood general practice and a new relationship 
between general and hospital practice. And the Labour Party, now 
separating itself from Liberal social reform, was also beginning to 
consider adopting a health service as party policy. 
The Labour Party took such a position not only for philosophical 
reasons and because of pressure from socialists within, but also because 
the identification of social insurance as a Liberal policy was becoming 
a distinct political disadvantage to Labour. The Liberals had adopted 
and encouraged the popularisation of insurance for a variety of reasons. 
The actuarial principle suited their philosophy; and it was possible to 
employ the private insurance sector in administration. 
politically, according to Fraser: 
in the longer term social insurance was deliberately 
used as a means of making socialism less likely. The 
National Insurance Act is sometimes hailed as a major 
step on the road to a socialist Britain, but just the 
opposite was intended. Lloyd George and Churchill were 
using that strategy propounded by Balfour at the 1895 
election which would use social policy to head off 
socialism. Liberal collectivism was not to be a half-way 
house to socialism but its opposite ••• 
Insurance, by helping to provide that 'national 
minimum' of vmich the Webbs were always speaking, would 
make changes in the organisation of the whole society 
less likely. Indeed insurance was the capitalist's 
answer to the problem of want, and by reducing it, 
insurance covered up what the socialist saw as the root 
cause of poverty ••• It was not just in the details but 
also in the underlying aims that the British insurance 
scheme was modelled on that of Bismarck. (18) 
But, 
It would appear to be the case from fragmentary memoranda of Lloyd 
George, that he wished to transcend the "temporary expedient" of 
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insurance sooner rather than later by providing insurance not only for 
sickness but also for unemployment and poverty, honourably implemented 
by the state in recognition of its obligation to citizens in these 
matters. (19) The War was soon to intervene, however, and the insurance 
measures enacted before it were to remain in place until after the 
Second WOrld War, coming under increasing scrutiny and criticism in the 
latter part of that period. Aspirations for political and social reform 
were to surge in the First War -- there were high expectations that 
'reconstruction' would bring increased security, provided by the 
community. 
The war helped to raise expectations in the practice of medicine --
in medical science, in which many advances were made -- and in social 
medicine. As Sigerist observes of Europe and the Soviet Union, "The war 
had demonstrated the importance of protecting the workers' health, and 
industrial medicine developed as never before." (20) 
The Inter-War Period: A New Ministry of Health 
Public aspiration for social change following the war merged with 
government fears of the development of revolutionary politics and with 
some far-sighted reform impulses in government. These were given 
recognition in the creation in 1919 of a Ministry of Reconstruction, 
under the reform-minded Dr Christopher Addison. Lloyd George took 
personal interest in the project of rebuilding the state's role in 
social relations and thus in the activities of the Reconstruction 
Ministry, which were to be mainly health, housing, education and 
unemployment insurance. 
The condition of public health had been brought to public and 
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government attention during the war by the appalling health status of 
potential military recruits. The concern engendered by this along with 
concern for war casualties aided health reformers, including Dr Addison, 
in the drive to have a unified Ministry of Health established. It took 
him two years, however, to overcome the vested interests of the Poor Law 
Division of the Local Government Board (which feared the 1909 Minority 
Report being implemented, in effect, in their transfer to a central 
Ministry) and of the Approved Societies (which feared a takeover of 
maternity benefits by local authorities and the negative identification 
of insurance with the Poor Law). "In effect the new Ministry was a 
merging of the old Local Government Board with the Insurance Commissions 
and it meant that the Poor Law remained intact within the Ministry of 
Health. Though under immediate attack, the Poor Law was not to be 
remodelled until 1929." (21) The new Ministry of Health was responsible 
for another major policy undertaking, housing. 
One of the first actions of the Minister, with respect to health, 
was to appoint Lord Dawson of Penn as chairman of the new Consultative 
Council to report on necessary health services, assuming a regional 
basis of organisation. The Council presented, with much urgency, an 
interim report in 1920 on the "Future Provisions of Medical and Allied 
Services." The now-famous Dawson Report noted the failure of existing 
services to make widely available the best medical knowledge and 
recommended the integration of preventive and curative medicine within 
the sphere of both individual general practice and specialist hospital 
practice. The two levels of practice could effectively be integrated by 
the establishment of two levels of 'health centre', primary, or 
neighbourhood-based for general practice, and secondary, or services for 
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tuberculosis, mental health, epilepsy, some infectious diseases, and 
orthopaedic treatment. (22) The emphasis was on providing the best 
quality care, and on careful, steady construction of the service. 
Lord Dawson described facilities to be provided at primary and 
secondary levels in some detail. Perhaps the most well-remembered 
aspect of his Report is the plan for primary health centres, which would 
have integrated all primary health care including dental and ophthalmic 
and ambulance services, along with child welfare, prenatal, and horne 
nursing care. A whole-time salaried service was not recommended, nor 
was the abolition of fees to patients. The latter was, however, 
advocated by a minority on the Consultative Council; the majority felt 
patients should contribute through insurance. The scheme was seen as a 
locally-organised one, with no position taken on the form of local 
administration or on the general question of relation to Poor Law 
medical services. 
The recommendation of health centres by Dawson ironically caused 
something of a setback for the State Medical Service Association. D. 
Stark Murray reports that many in the Association felt their ten-year 
fight for reorganised health services was complete with the Dawson 
Report, and dropped out of activity. Others in the SMSA were critical of 
Dawson, finding the proposals for general and specialist practice ill 
thought out. They disagreed with the Dawson's rejection of salaried 
service, particularly in light of the success of salaried medical 
practice during the war. Nonetheless, apart from small, infrequent 
meetings the SMSA was nearly dormant until 1929, following the Dawson 
Report, and under the urgency of greater postwar social problems. 
Several of its prominent members remained active in an advisory 
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committee on health to the Labour Party. (23) 
The Dawson Report of 1920 would appear not to deserve the 
present-day credit given to it for being the first statement on hospital 
regiona1isation: the SMSA had advocated such a plan in 1912. Navarro 
sees the Report not as the pioneering and radical document it is 
frequently reported to be, but rather as essentially "a conservative 
document, produced by a Conservative-Liberal coalition as a reaction to 
a social movement -- the socialist labour movement -- that was perceived 
as a profound threat to the forces and constituencies that brought about 
and supported the report. II This was especially so since the Labour 
Party, with a more radical platform advocating state action in health 
and social security, had risen to the largest opposition party in the 
1918 election, with 22 percent of the vote. In its deference to the 
medical profession and private practice, and in its caution over 
reorganising medical services, referring to simple co-ordination rather 
that the regional 'integration' proposed by the SMSA, Navarro sees the 
Dawson Report as "the conservative rebuttal to the socialist [plan] for 
regionalisation." Hart too sees it as a temporary and rhetorical 
response to the radical tenor of the times, which were soon to change in 
the crushing depression of the 1920s. (24) 
Meanwhile, the issue of restructured health services, including the 
possibility of a breakup of the Poor Law medical facilities, was in 1919 
and 1920 a matter of cabinet concern on several levels. 
The breakup of the Poor Law services had been mooted in a draft 
Parliamentary bill presented by the Approved Societies to the Government 
in 1917, in the early negotiations for the founding of the Ministry of 
Health. This 1917 draft anticipated the Dawson recommendations of 1920 
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by suggesting the regionalisation of hospitals, but the Societies were 
extremely reluctant to give their approval to a new Ministry, except on 
their own terms, essentially, control over Poor Law services to be 
incorporated. (25) Those terms were unacceptable to the Poor Law 
administration. With the Ministry finally in existence after protracted 
negotiations between the Government and the insurance and Poor Law 
interests, Dr Addison as Minister was keen during his brief tenure to 
reform the Poor Law and reorganise its medical services. But the impetus 
for this major reform was to lose the support of the government by early 
1921, when Addison was succeeded as Minister by Sir Alfred Mond. 
In the context of a readjustment of the rate of medical benefit 
paid to doctors under National Health Insurance, a discussion was held 
by the Health Insurance Committee of Cabinet in late 1919, during which 
it was concluded that medical benefit was an inappropriate benefit in an 
insurance scheme, causing difficulties in actuarial calculation that 
were virtually impossible to translate into government policy. In this 
debate, it was accepted by the Cabinet that the problems of health 
insurance could not be resolved; they had the difficult option of an 
overhaul of health services, but did not take it. 
Gilbert notes that this was" one of the few Cabinet level 
reviews [the subject of national health insurance] would receive in the 
interwar period. Here the reconstruction of British medicine, and 
Addison's goal, the establishment of a separate medical service, were 
put off for a quarter century." It was clear at that time that the 
vested interests in support of the retention of the Poor Law, including 
the Approved Societies, were able to muster sufficient opposition to 
deter the Lloyd George government from trying to reconstruct medical 
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services, beyond establishing the new Ministry of Health, which had been 
difficult enough. Further, Gilbert comments: 
••• by 1920, the surge for reform had nearly run its 
course. The rebuilding of state medical and health 
activities might have been possible at the end of the 
war with thousands of doctors without established 
practices returning from the armed services, but such 
changes would have been incredibly expensive. With 
relentless City pressure upon the Cabinet for the 
reduction of the cost of housing and unemployment 
programmes, there was little chance of the expansion of 
any government activity which seemed to be working at 
least reasonably well. This is particularly true of a 
programme that was largely supported by the 
working-class beneficiaries themselves. The transfer of 
the burden of the medical benefit from national health 
insurance contributions to the income surtax payer would 
have caused a political explosion among the Government's 
backbenchers in the Coupon Parliament, who detested the 
Minister of Health and all his works and who were 
fighting with every weapon to have government 
expenditures and taxes reduced. (26) 
Health Services Reform Debates in the 1920s 
It was clear, therefore, that by the time Addison was replaced as 
Minister of Health in 1920 the forces aligned against major health 
reform, including the insurance organisations and financial interests of 
the City of London, had acted successfully. On the other side there 
existed a body of ideas and reformers, organised but not nearly as 
powerful, both within and outside Government. They had, by 1920, gone 
some way toward establishing detailed policy proposals addressed to the 
most evident problems of the Poor Law public medical services, the 
limitations of National Health Insurance, the disorganised hospital 
services, and the gulf between general and specialist practice. These 
views, in general and with varying emphases, were held across a wide 
political spectrum, from radical socialists to the Labour Party and 
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Fabian Society, to a number of prominent medical reformers, some within 
government. Although the political climate and austere economic 
circumstances of the 1920s were generally to prove barren for the 
enactment of health service reform, ideas did not cease to emerge. 
The major policy recommendations of the Dawson Report died, but 
observations that the financial troubles and widely varied services of 
the voluntary hospitals should be investigated were acted upon. Viscount 
Cave was appointed to head a Committee in 1921 to examine the situation 
of voluntary hospitals. The Cave Report recommended a Hospitals 
Commission for Great Britain to co-ordinate their functions, and the 
administration of grants-in-aid through local Voluntary Hospitals 
Committees. (27) It might be noted that the Cave Committee was 
appointed following the defeat by the House of Lords of Addison's 
Ministry of Health (Miscellaneous Provisions) Bill of 1920, which would 
have given local authorities the power to take over Poor Law 
infirmaries, under permission or direction of the Minister, to be 
operated as municipal hospitals. Also, importantly, it would have 
permitted local authorities to subsidise voluntary hospitals which were 
then in a state of financial crisis. The Tories in Parliament objected 
to what they saw as both the beginnings of the municipalisation of 
voluntary hospitals, and an unwarranted increase in the powers of the 
Ministry. The Bill barely passed the House of Commons, was defeated in 
the House of Lords, and was soon dropped by Lloyd George. In this 
context, the Cave Committee was appointed in January, and Addison, by 
April 1921, resigned, his influence at an end. (28) With Sir Alfred 
Mend succeeding Addison as Minister of Health and Housing, the 
possibility of any radical restructuring of health services or Poor Law 
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functions was also at an end. Ministerial continuity itself ended 
temporarily. There were to be no fewer than six Ministers by the end of 
1924. (29) 
The recommendations of the Cave Committee, however, were taken 
seriously, resulting in the appointment of a Voluntary Hospitals 
Commission, with Local Voluntary Hospitals Committees, and a substantial 
grant made by Parliament. The financial and administrative condition of 
voluntary hospitals was further reported on, negatively, in 1923, by the 
Chairman of the Commission, Lord Onslow. 
Ross reports the retrospective findings of the Sankey Commission in 
1937 on voluntary hospitals. The co-ordination recommended by Cave had 
not been effectively carried out, the Local Committees having largely 
ceased to function. The voluntary hospitals had been in internal 
financial trouble in 1920 and through the 1920s, but it was not until 
the widespread creation of a competing municipal hospital system after 
the Local Government Act of 1929 (signalling the end of Poor Law 
institutions and their takeover by local authorities) that the voluntary 
system felt any great external threat. By 1937, therefore, the voluntary 
hospitals were demanding assistance in regional co-ordination and 
demarcation of their services, and more financial aid, for fear of being 
overtaken by the growing municipal hospital system. (30) 
Medical benefit to doctors through the early 1920s had become the 
object of much heated political discussion, the capitation fee having 
been amended downward, and then raised following a Court of Inquiry in 
1924. Only a few days earlier, the Baldwin Government had been defeated 
in the House of Commons, and it was up to the new Minister of Health in 
March to announce a capitation fee settlement and the appointment of a 
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Royal Commission on National Health Insurance, under Lord Lawrence. It 
had wide terms of reference, but a generally conservative group of 
Commissioners dominated by the private insurance industry, with no 
Approved Society representation. (31) The Commission conducted an 
extensive and well documented inquiry. It concluded that the insurance 
system was working efficiently, given its premises. It did note the 
problem of exclusion of dependants and limited benefits, and recommended 
correcting these by extending the coverage of the scheme to include 
dental, ophthalmic and some specialist treatments, but no inpatient 
hospital care. It suggested adding dependants' allowances to the sick 
benefi ts (which had been paid at a flat rate to the wage-earner 
regardless of family size). Since some Approved Societies were 
wealthier than others (many could not have afforded the extra benefits) , 
the recommendation was that half of the Societies' surpluses be pooled 
in order to provide a uniform extension of new benefits. This was taken 
to be the most significant recommendation, since its implementation 
v~uld mark the beginning of the end of the competitive Approved Society 
system. That very fact, of course, made pooling politically impossible, 
since the parent organisations of the Approved Societies, particularly 
the large insurance companies, guarded jealously their independence and 
profitable investment funds, which in large measure depended on the 
perpetuation of the Approved Society system. Indeed, that system itself 
came under heavy attack in evidence to the Commission, as a sham 
administrative compromise which worked vastly to 
profitability of the major private insurers. 
enhance the 
A minority report of the Royal Commission, largely ignored at the 




to major private companies. 
beyond the Labour Party's 
Gilbert notes that this report 
attack (in evidence to the 
Commission) on the power of insurance companies, in stating that health 
insurance as it was administered stood entirely in the way of a 
comprehensive national health policy. (32) Even the majority report 
concluded, significantly, that the ultimate solution for medical 
services would be to separate them entirely from insurance, as a public 
service, but it declined to take a position on how wide a public should 
be served, and how the service should be financed. (33) 
The Royal Commission's majority and minority reports, despite their 
very moderate immediate policy recommendations, were not acted upon. 
However, immediately following their completion in February, 1926, the 
Conservative government under Baldwin began a squeeze on the Approved 
Societies by a further cut in government contributions to National 
Health Insurance, taken to be mainly a money-saving measure. The 
Government waited until 1928 to take any action on the Royal 
Commission's reports. Then, in the National Health Insurance Bill, it 
acted on none of the substantive recommendations for extension of 
coverage and benefits, but made only minor housekeeping changes. (34) 
The end of the decade of the 1920s in public health marked the end 
of the Poor Law Boards of Guardians, under the provisions of the 
important Local Government Act of 1929. The Guardians were abolished and 
Poor Law medical services, particularly their extensive if poorly 
equipped hospital system, and maternity, child welfare, tuberculosis and 
other special facilities were handed over to the new, enlarged local 
authorities. It made possible a great rationalisation of pub'lie health 
facilities and their formal removal from Poor Law stigma. The new Act 
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gave local authorities wide discretionary powers. This fact, combined 
with the worsening economic situation after 1929, meant progress in 
developing new facilities was quite uneven. While it was mandatory for 
the new authorities to set up bodies to co-ordinate services between 
municipal and voluntary hospital sectors, these bodies, according to 
Eckstein, "had little more than a perfunctory life in the majority of 
cases. They had to cope with the formidable barriers of distrust and 
jealousy between the two hospital systems and generally restricted their 
activities to desultory meetings which satisfied the statutory 
requirement but little else." (35) 
The 1930s: Steps Toward a National Medical Service 
The decade of the 1930s saw initiatives taken by two of the main 
non-government interests involved in health services -- the British 
Medical Association and the British Hospitals Association, representing 
voluntary hospitals. These two associations published their views in 
major reports which became important documents in the planning process 
leading up to the National Health Service. 
The British Medical Association published its first report, 
PROPOSALS FOR A GENERAL MEDICAL SERVICE FOR THE NATION, in 1930, and 
re-issued it in 1938 as A GENERAL MEDICAL SERVICE FOR THE NATION, along 
with a statement on Hospital Policy. Its scheme was based on the 
existing health insurance system, but it was recommended that coverage 
be extended to dependants of insured persons, and to others of like 
economic status. Covered services would include dental, ophthalmic and 
full maternity treatment. It further proposed regional administrative 
units for all public health services. Its Hospital Policy statement 
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recommended reg ional groupings, with close co-ordination among each 
region's voluntary and municipal hospitals, a landmark position 
recognising the growing influence of the newly organised municipal 
hospital system. Hospital treatment would not, however, be covered by 
compulsory insurance: rather, fees would be charged to patients, who 
would have the option of participating in various hospital contributory 
insurance schemes which were strongly favoured by the SMA, and expected 
to grow. Lindsey refers to the SMA report of 1938, and the more 
comprehensive INTERIM REPORT OF THE MEDICAL PLANNING COMMISSION of 1942, 
as ". • • classic examples of impartial i ty, constituting the high water 
mark of progressive thought for that organization." (36) 
The voluntary hospitals after 1929 were coming under increasing 
pressure from financial constraints and the competition of the municipal 
hospitals. Their problematic situation prompted the British Hospitals 
Association, as their representative organisation, to appoint, in 1935, 
a Voluntary Hospitals Commission, under Lord Sankey, to consider 
measures which would protect their future. The Sankey Report, completed 
in 1937, included a detailed survey of the functioning of the voluntary 
hospitals. It recommended, most importantly, the creation of hospital 
regions and a structure of regional and central hospital councils to 
co-ordinate their services within and among regions. It proposed some 
representation for local authorities on behalf of the rival municipal 
hospitals, but had no suggestions for co-ordination within the municipal 
hospital system. 
Although the BRA report expressed views in harmony with those of 
the British Medical Association, neither its minimal proposals nor those 
of the SMA for a voluntary scheme of co-ordination were acted upon by 
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the hospitals. It was to take the exigencies of war, and the Emergency 
Medical Service, to begin any kind of regional reorganisation of 
voluntary hospitals. This was followed during the war by the now-famous 
Hospital Surveys, detailed government-sponsored inventories of all 
hospitals, which became the basis for the regionalisation attained by 
the National Health Service. Eckstein notes that "By 1944 ••• the view 
that the hospitals should be regionalized under some sort of effective 
authority had become orthodox doctrine. The only major point still 
debated centered on the role which the voluntary hospitals would play in 
the hospital regions; in brief, whether it was worth preserving the 
system or not." (37) 
The final major report of the 1930s was the Political and Economic 
Planning SURVEY OF THE BRITISH HEALTH SERVICES, issued in 1937. (38) 
PEP, as an independent, non-political group of expert social and 
economic analysts, had been publishing "broadsheets" based on extensive 
research, since its founding in 1931. In 1937 it published major 
reports on both social services and health services in Britain. The 
latter was summarised in a popular edition, BRITAIN'S HEALTH, edited by 
S. M. Herbert, published in 1939, which became a best-seller, (39) ample 
indication of the growing public interest by that time in reform of the 
heal th services. 
The PEP Report emphasised the quality of health of the population 
as the primary matter for concern in any overall approach to health 
services. Breakdowns in personal health as a result of poverty, 
insecurity, lack of health education, bad housing and working 
conditions, lack of recreation and other such factors became in the last 
analysis the responsibility and the burden of the medical services. As 
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long as adverse economic and environmental conditions existed, health 
services, despite their best prevention and curative efforts, could not 
possibly be expected to restore a population to health if only because 
of an excessively large patient load. 
With respect to reforms in the existing medical system, PEP 
stressed co-ordination, from general practitioner through hospital and 
environmental services, all under regional authorities with 
representatives from each service. 
But it recommended proceeding gradually with expansion, 
implementing the extension of services in stages (a position which PEP 
was soon to change) , and did not propose an entirely public service. One 
of the first stages of reform would have extended national health 
insurance for general practitioner care to dependents. Other changes 
were to come later. 
While its recommendations were not radical in comparison with the 
earlier mentioned reports, the detailed analysis of the PEP Report was 
perhaps more significant in aiding informed public discussion of the 
state of existing services and their accessibility, and the state of the 
public's health as related to economic and social factors. Coming when 
it did, on the eve of war, it became both a natural source of 
documentary evidence and a guide to the discussion of issues and of 
principles for constructing a new medical service. 
The Socialist Case for a State Health Service 
The State Medical Service Association, which had spent the latter 
part of the 1920s in relative dormancy, was ready for rebirth. In 1929, 
after much debate about the political role of the SMSA with respect to 
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the Labour Party, in which several SMSA members had been active in the 
Public Health Advisory Committee, the majority view prevailed and it 
became a 'non-party' group under the name National Medical Service 
Association. As such its policy advocated: 
1. A free National Medical Service available to all members 
of the community and providing every form of medical, 
surgical, obstetrical, dental, and preventive treatment 
2. The provision of necessary institutional treatment, 
consultant and specialist services including 
bacteriological, pathological and X-ray, together with 
all known means for the treatment and prevention of 
disease 
3. All to be co-ordinated in one service by the Ministry of 
Health (40) 
While there was unanimous agreement on these principles, D. Stark 
Murray notes, there was growing disagreement on the political means of 
attaining them. A good deal of opinion in the Association favoured 
gradual implementation, in stages, beginning with an extension of health 
insurance to dependents, but taking insurance out of the hands of the 
Approved Societies, and giving the whole scheme to the Ministry of 
Health and local authorities. This was, reports Murray, the view at that 
time of the Public Health Advisory Committee of the Labour Party. The 
other viewpoint opposed insurance, and favoured an immediate move to a 
full-scale health service not yet defined in detail. 
These political differences were to result in the National Medical 
Service Association being overtaken in 1930 by the newly founded 
Socialist Medical Association (SMA). Mr Somerville Hastings, Labour MP 
for Reading, who had left the older Association and was nominated the 
first President of the SMA, was committed to an integrated and 
co-ordinated service, preventively oriented, stressing medical teamwork 
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to back up the role of the general practitioner, and operating from 
health centres, which would house the various health practitioners and 
services, including, where appropriate, an industrial health service. A 
new notion was that of the hospital-based specialist visiting patients' 
homes, where necessary, in consultation with their family doctors. 
The SMA was unanimous in its political commitment to socialism and 
to pursuing the goal of a health service as an affiliate organisation of 
the Labour Party. Its founding principles were: 
1. To work for a Socialised Medical Service both preventive 
and curative, free and open to all 
2. To secure for the people the highest possible standard 
of health 
3. To disseminate the principles of Socialism within the 
medical and allied services 
The first Executive Con~ittee of the SMA included, among others, 
two Members of Parliament, both doctors, and, indicating a close 
relationship between the SMA and a fraternal medical organisation, Dr 
Alfred Welply, General Secretary of the Medical Practitioners' Union. 
By the end of 1930, the Executive Committee had given its new 
Research Sub-Committee the task of drawing up in detail "practical 
measures for a Free Socialised Medical Service." Even the British 
Medical Association, among other groups, responded to an invitation to 
submit views to the Sub-Committee. (41) 
In 1931 the SMA prepared a "Health Policy for London" which was 
later to become the basis for London County Council policy. Somerville 
Hastings was influential for many years as Chairman of the LCC Public 
Health Committee. 
The SMA made its first major contribution to Labour Party national 
health policy at the 1932 Labour Party Conference, which passed a 
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general resolution calling for the establishment of a State Medical 
Service. Murray reports that there were some doubts among a minority of 
SMA members in 1932 over the appropriateness of calling for a complete 
health service. Some still favoured the more conservative course of the 
initial extension of health insurance to be followed later with a 
regionalised hospital service. This was an argument which was to be 
repeated outside the SMA, particularly by the BMA, up to the founding of 
the Health Service. A further minority view stressed democratic control 
by the workers in the various parts of the service. 
A more elaborate policy statement on a 'National Health Service', 
prepared mainly by the SMA, was passed unanimously by the 1934 Labour 
Party Conference. At the same time, the Party issued a discussion 
document by Somerville Hastings, again proposing that all services be 
grouped within regional health authorities, based when possible on 
reorganised local government but until then on the county system. It 
also presented a detailed proposal for Health Centres, and for group 
laboratories. In 1934 the SMA issued a proposal for a national maternity 
service, having sponsored extensive debates on maternal health and on 
the relative merits of home midwifery and hospital maternity services. 
The Labour Party took advantage in the 1935 general election of its 
new policy for a National Health Service, and of the affiliation of the 
SMA; ten SMA members were Labour candidates. Included among these was Dr 
Christopher Addison, the first Health Minister. Only one of the SMA 
members was elected -- Dr Alfred Salter MP, who was re-elected. As has 
been noted by Dr Stark Murray, the SMA was already having considerable 
influence on London County Council health policy through the Labour 
majority elected in 1934. 
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In 1936 the Voluntary Hospitals Commission accepted views submitted 
by the SMA on several particular aspects of hospital policy, including 
centralised regional procedures for emergency admissions, convalescent 
hospitals, and outpatient arrangements. (42) 
The Socialist Medical Association oriented itself toward the 
public, the profession, international politics, and toward its base of 
operation, the Labour Party, in the years preceding WOrld War II. 
Internationally, it was aiding refugees of Nazism, and through the 
Spanish Medical Aid Committee it sent volunteers and equipment to the 
aid of the Republican side in Spain. Its role in the Labour Party and in 
the London County Council have been noted. Its public presence was as an 
educational group, promoting discussion of the future of Britain's 
health services through organising meetings, and through its journal, 
MEDICINE TODAY AND TOMORRaN'. Although most of its leading members were 
medical professionals, it was open to all health workers, and in fact 
had the active contributions of a wide variety of both medical 
specialists and members of other health-related professions and 
occupations. Though not a large organisation, it appears to have had a 
disproportionately large influence on the progress of ideas. With its 
philosophy, the promotion of a concept of health linked with its vision 
of a democratic, socialist society, and as the leading edge of the 
Labour Party in medical-political matters, the SMA was to become the 
ideological opponent of the British Medical Association and the British 
Hospitals Association in the war years, during which time the National 
Health Service took shape. 
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The Social Organisation of Health Before WOrld War II 
By the end of the 1930s, therefore, there had been a considerable 
clarification of opposing and conflicting models of reform of the 
organisation of health care. The continuum of ideological positions was 
virtually complete, the interests were beginning to organise, with the 
expectation that the state was about to be obliged to make major changes 
in the existing system. 
On the one side were grouped those interests who favoured retention 
of National Health Insurance, with expanded coverage. The BMA was in 
favour of a regionally co-ordinated health service, based on insurance, 
and on the inviolable independence of the doctor, but the Association 
was far from united internally. The BRA, concerned for the financial 
viability of the voluntary hospitals, and of specialist practice within 
them, supported extended insurance and state subsidies, but was 
extremely fearful of administrative co-ordination with the municipal 
hospital system. The Approved Societies, whether related to the 
friendly societies or commercial insurance companies, took a proprietary 
interest in National Health Insurance, which was an extremely profitable 
branch of their operations; but their financial allies of the City of 
London opposed any large-scale extensions of state expenditure which 
would, of course, have to be raised through taxes. 
On the other side were the as yet not well organised forces 
advocating a state health service, which had little direct influence on 
the government. The SMA, having regrouped in 1930 to advocate a state 
health service the features of which, and its guiding definition of 
health, would reflect its socialist philosophy, was having an increasing 
influence on Labour Party policy. The TUC, and its member unions in the 
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health services, were not yet active participants; the unions themselves 
still had some ambivalence based upon the lucrative involvement of their 
friendly societies in health insurance administration, but clearly 
wished at least extension of coverage against illness, disability, and 
loss of earning capacity. 
In the centre of the spectrum of health service models was that 
proposed by PEP, an ostensibly "disinterested" body, which informed 
debate on the health services enormously through its well-documented 
reporting on the multiple crises of the existing system, and its clear 
definition of issues and alternatives. While PEP originally advocated 
an extended insurance scheme, it was soon to re-evaluate this position 
in the light of its own analysis of the shortcomings of insurance. The 
views of PEP, which were shared by other reformers, including some 
progressives of the medical professions, spoke perhaps most directly to 
senior planners of the Ministry of Health, then cognisant on the eve of 
war that a vast reorganisation of services would be necessary. 
The Ministry of Health, only two decades old in 1939, and charged 
with dealing with the chaotic division of jurisdictions, the two 
hospital systems, the Approved Societies, and the powerful medical 
profession, was to be the formulator of new state policy in health. Two 
decades' of investigations of health services and insurance had made 
clear the depth of problems to be overcome if a scheme were to be 
designed to serve the national interest fully. The balance of class 
forces was clearly changing: Titmuss points out that the burgeoning 
middle classes, excluded from National Health Insurance, were now 
demanding the fruits of modern scientific medicine without financial 
insecurity, as a matter of right; the anomalies and exclusions of the 
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old scheme were clearly a source of discontent for the working class. 
Not all the political forces were aligned in 1939 as they were to 
be by the middle of the war, but it was clear that the state must take 
drastic action according to a new definition of the "national interest," 
in which the traditionally powerful sectional interests of private 
insurance, private hospitals, and organised medicine must be compromised 
and the middle and working classes must benefit significantly. 
The emergency conditions of war were to add further clarity to the 
alternatives for the state, and further strength to the realignment and 
representation of interests in the state planning processes, as we shall 
see in the following chapter. 
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CHAPTER 3 
HEALTH SERVICES IN WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION 
The campaign for state health services had undergone some changes 
in composition and direction during the interwar period. The earlier 
constellation of forces from the late nineteenth century to the advent 
of insurance, that is, the alliance of medical reformers in the public 
health field with likeminded government officials and with political 
campaigners such as the Webbs and the Fabian Society, had given way to 
reduced initiative from government and an increase in activity outside 
government by political groups. There was, for example, the new 
alliance of the Fabian Society and Labour Party, with the additional 
stimulus and expertise of the Socialist Medical Association. 
The several Reports and Commissions of the 1930s highlighted the 
weaknesses of health insurance and the disparate array of medical 
services, while at the same time recording the views of the major 
interests and stimulating discussion among the public, the medical 
community, the trade unions and political parties. 
But to a large extent it took war preparations and contingencies to 
confront the structural limitations of the old patchwork of health care 
and of social security provisions, and stimulate thinking along the 
lines of fundamentally restructuring services. 
This became part of the vast task of reconstruction, of rebuilding 
and re-designing those social and economic arrangements which before and 
during the war had been antithetical to the health, security and 
productivity of the national community. Class relations had been 
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thoroughly strained through the twenties and thirties, and the 
government remembered well the political radicalisation that had taken 
place following the First WOrld War, when the general expectation for a 
more secure and prosperous society, exemplified in the demand for 'Homes 
for Heroes', was not met. 
Thus reconstruction planning during the Second War was undertaken 
earlier, with more urgency and with the increasing knowledge that social 
expectations were becoming irresistible, except at the peril of mass 
radicalisation on the scale of that following the First War. It was 
clear also to the government, and to the social policy analysts of 
Political and Economic Planning, among others, that improved social 
security and economic opportunity would further post-war industrial 
productivity and the nation's peacetime economic life; that was 
certainly one of the lessons of managing the wartime economy_ 
From the beginning of the war, then, three aspects of Britain's 
health services were to come under intense scrutiny: the quality and 
distribution of medical services, the arrangements for payment, and the 
differential accessibility of public and private health care to various 
social classes and groups. These, of course, were not new issues. 
Uppermost among matters for debate was the disparate nature of 
existing health services. The patchy, unco-ordinated and often very 
poor quality of services was brought to light especially during the 
course of planning the wartime Emergency Medical Service. 
Accomplishments of the Emergency Medical Service 
Arrangements for 
as 1938, following the 
the Emergency Medical Service were begun as early 
Munich crisis, when the Ministry of Health 
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launched a survey of the nation's hospital capacity, with a view to 
arranging special priority medical treatment for war casualties. This 
would involve the establishment of twelve regions, within which hospital 
services and specialties could be co-ordinated among voluntary and 
municipal hospitals, and special blocks of beds reserved, their 
maintenance subsidised by the government, for expected air-raid 
casualties. Free treatment under the Emergency Medical Service was at 
first reserved for civilian and military casualties, but through the 
course of the war was extended to several categories of war workers, to 
evacuees who had been eligible for free public treatment in their horne 
local authority but were not in their new locality, and to a wide 
miscellany of cases. The very matter of eligibility for free treatment 
was extremely complex, because of the multitude of local public, 
voluntary, private and insured arrangements in existence before the war. 
It took, for example, a sixty-two page official circular to specify 
cases eligible under the emergency scheme. (1) 
The hospital surveys began in 1938 with a complete absence of 
statistical data, since no reporting system had existed for hospital 
capacities, services, catchment areas, admission policies, or finances. 
The Nuffield Provincial Hospitals Trust joined the Ministry in carrying 
out extensive regional surveys which were published in 1945. (2) The 
investigative part of the surveys uncovered, perhaps even more than any 
of the preceding government and commission reports, the chaos existing 
in hospital services, more so because of the necessity of placing all 
the nation's facilities in the context of one national system, for 
emergency services. Only a few of the overwhelming problems will be 
discussed here, as they are examined in detail elsewhere. (3) 
III 
The surveys covered both voluntary and municipal hospitals. They 
confirmed that the voluntary hospitals had the best medical staffs, 
particularly specialists, who were largely self-financing through 
lucrative private practices outside the hospitals. Voluntary hospitals 
were able to choose their patients, generally preferring those who were 
medically interesting or likely to be short-stay, while public hospitals 
were obliged to take anyone entitled, therefore became crowded with 
long-stay cases. Geographical distribution of beds in both hospital 
systems was most unequal, as was the distribution of general 
practitioners throughout the country. (4) 
Perhaps more glaring than the problems of distribution were those 
of disorganisation and inefficient competition among hospitals. The 
competition stemmed from the historical foundations of each system, the 
one representing a type of elitist medical philanthropy, the other 
deriving from the Poor Law. It resulted in wasteful duplication and 
overlapping of specialist services, with frequently no co-ordination 
attempted. The municipal hospitals were subject to local authority 
boundaries in their catchment areas, which often made for unreasonable 
exclusion of patients in areas where no informal sharing arrangement 
existed. The systems suffered lack of co-ordination as much within as 
between them. 
Both hospital systems were desperate for funds. Municipal hospitals 
were often little-improved from their original workhouse condition. Many 
had been transferred to the local authorities from Poor Law 
administration by permissive provision of the Local Government Act of 
1929, and many local authorities had indeed planned large capital 
improvements as part of their new responsibilities, but these were 
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curtailed by the economies of the Depression years, followed by war. 
The voluntary hospitals had relied on fees, collections, 
contributory schemes and larger philanthropic donations. As their 
expenses went up dramatically following the First Wbrld War, however, 
their voluntary income remained virtually the same. They thus came to 
rely on fees and grants from public funds: "By 1947, public authorities 
supplied more than half of the total income, or more than it had cost to 
run the entire system in 1935. From a financial 
the voluntary hospitals were losing their 
standpoint, therefore, 
voluntary character long 
before the Labour Government altered their legal status." (5) Eckstein 
comments further that the financial desperation of the voluntary 
hospitals had forced many to neglect maintenance, expansion and 
modernisation before 1946, which later had serious consequences for the 
NHS since some of the most important institutions for the new service 
were voluntary hospitals. 
Several structural deficiencies therefore confronted the Emergency 
Medical Service planners in their efforts to create, at the very least, 
efficient and co-ordinated services to serve the worst medical 
emergencies of war. The major problems included badly funded and poorly 
equipped facilities, inequitable geographical distribution and near 
absence of efficient co-ordination among services, shortages of all 
types of manpower and of beds, discrepancies in availability of 
services, discrepancies of eligibility of the public to use them from 
one area to another, and irrational competition among hospitals. 
Finally, pervading the entire system, were all the shadings, glaring and 
subtle, of social class differences in access to certain facilities, 
payment methods, and quality of treatment. (6) 
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Planning by the Ministry of Health proceeded energetically and 
decisively. It was decided that the problems in the two hospital 
systems would have to be treated as irrelevant to the creation of a 
workable, regionalised emergency scheme: 
Thus, from the outset of the planning process, all the 
crucial factors which defined the very nature of the 
institutional medical system were found to be either 
obstructive or irrelevant to the satisfaction of actual 
medical needs: the division of the system into voluntary 
and public institutions, the use of the latter strictly 
within local government boundaries, the differences 
between the two systems in staff and amenities, and the 
mushroom-growths of specialised institutions. 
Unfortunately the very factors which made the 
existing institutional pattern inadequate also made it 
difficult to reorganize along rational lines. (7) 
The Ministry set a goal of 300,000 beds to be allocated to the 
Emergency Scheme across Britain. This would be done by surveying and 
classifying all hospitals, grouping them in regions, determining the 
special role and particular emergency bed allocation for each hospital 
and planning for the co-ordination of functions of all hospitals in each 
region. Patients were to be over-crowded in some wards, or transferred 
to other institutions, in order to create free wings and wards for 
emergency use. Extra accommodation would be provided in tents, hutted 
annexes and other public and private buildings. Standards for quality 
of service and equipment for all hospitals would be achieved by 
upgrading and re-supplying operating suites, X-ray rooms, laboratories, 
dispensaries, medical and surgical supplies and the like. 
By mid-1938 regional boundaries had been determined, regional 
administrations appointed, and all hospitals classified and graded into 
eight categories. (8) In 1939 the grouping and upgrading was carried 
out. Grouping was done on the principle of chains of hospitals. For 
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example, ten radial sectors were drawn from the London metropolitan 
area, functions being assigned to each hospital on a continuum, from 
acute reception units in the city centre, to evacuation and 
rehabilitation facilities in outlying areas. The grouping was done 
without regard to the status (voluntary or public) of the hospitals. For 
London, the inner-city hospitals were affiliated with each other between 
sectors and with the outlying hospitals in each sector. The central 
teaching hospitals were the key facility in each sector. The London 
region was administered directly by the Ministry of Health. The process 
of grouping was slowed by the suspicions of the voluntary hospitals of 
the Ministry's intentions, by their fears of loss of independence, their 
mutual jealousies and by compensation arrangements for participation. 
To supplement this hospital scheme, both laboratory and blood 
transfusion services were organised, and continued under the NHS. 
Salaries for medical manpower posed additional difficulties. While 
payment arrangements for municipal hospital staffs posed few problems, 
since they were already on full-time salary, the same was not the case 
for specialists in voluntary hospitals, who were honorary and part-time 
employees deriving their income from private practice outside the 
hospitals. The Ministry negotiated with the representative groups for 
specialists and arrived originally at a grading and salary scale for a 
full-time salaried medical corps to serve in the emergency scheme. The 
unpopularity of this arrangement among doctors prompted the Ministry to 
change to part-time salaried appointments along with other modifications 
in the emergency scheme implemented in 1939. The assignment of doctors 
to the emergency service, as well as their recruitment to the armed 
forces, led to a serious shortage in civilian medical services, which 
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continued to exist apart from the superimposed emergency scheme. 
The very distinctness of the Emergency Medical Service from 
ordinary civilian services, while it did much to impose order on a 
chaotic structure, served in many ways to emphasise and exacerbate the 
contrasts between a state-organised, relatively efficient service and 
the underlying inefficiency of the plethora of disorganised services 
upon which it was superimposed. In the case of the voluntary hospitals, 
for example, Eckstein notes that it was to their advantage to reserve 
their quotas of beds for the emergency service and to be paid for doing 
so, but as far as possible to keep their regular beds empty to reduce 
expenses; this they did by unduly restrictive admission policies. The 
municipal hospitals, on the other hand, became even more than before 
dumping-places for the chronically ill, having no power to refuse 
admission. (9) The problem was particularly serious in London, where 
London County Council hospitals were virtually full with their previous 
caseloads of the chronically ill, plus the many civilian rejects of the 
voluntary hospitals. 
The financial desperation of the voluntary hospitals was by this 
time more than apparent. The Ministry was paying a high proportion of 
their costs; many of them were severely damaged by bombing and had 
clearly insufficient resources of their own for rebuilding. Thus, in 
the face of the increasing contradictions between the two systems, and 
the increasing dependence of the voluntary institutions on the Ministry 
for their maintenance and very existence, it was clear that the crisis 
of war had thrust an irrevocable responsibility upon the Ministry of 
Health, in the form of a financially unsound collection of privately 
owned and managed hospitals bent on maintaining every vestige of 
116 
independence possible. 
Many lessons were learned 
building of the Emergency Medical 
and precedents established through the 
Service. It had been conceived 
originally as a temporary, state-organised service for the war-injured, 
parallel to pre-existing services; it was not seen as a replacement for 
the old system. It soon became clear that the civilian sick, especially 
the chronically ill, were suffering neglect because of the emergency 
system and that eligibility for treatment by the emergency service had 
to be extended beyond war casualties. It was, accordingly, extended by 
new sets of regulations to more and more categories of patients, 
especially to evacuees, who would otherwise be ineligible for treatment 
outside their home area. By 1942 the attitude of the government toward 
its responsibilities in the area of hospitals had changed very much from 
1939, and many of the practical foundations for a national scheme 
already existed in the emergency service. 
The First Announcement of Postwar Policy 
This change was given recognition in October, 1941, when the 
Minister of Health and the Secretary of State for Scotland announced in 
the House of Commons a policy for the future of the hospital services. 
That policy would be, as soon as possible after the war, to ensure by 
means of a comprehensive national hospital service, that appropriate 
treatment would be readily available to every person in need of it. (10) 
This marked the beginning of the extensive surveys undertaken for the 
government by the Nuffield Provincial Hospitals Trust, which were to be 
the basis for the comprehensive postwar hospital service. No policy on 
eventual hospital ownership had been arrived at in 1941; the role of the 
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voluntary hospitals was vigorously debated until it was resolved in the 
1946 NHS Act, with the British Hospitals Association acting as staunch 
defender of their independence and most of the proponents of a National 
Health Service advocating merging the two systems under public 
authority. 
There is no doubt that the medical profession and hospital 
interests were, even early in the war, suspicious that the Emergency 
Medical Service might threaten their autonomy. Lynch and Raphael report 
a reassurance by the Presidents of the Royal Colleges to readers of the 
BRITISH MEDICAL JOURNAL: 
'There is suspicion amongst some doctors that the 
Ministry of Health may be proposing to use the EMS as a 
thin edge of the wedge for a post-war State Medical 
Service. We can assure such, on the highest authority, 
that nothing is further from the Ministry's intention 
and that all such fears are groundless. It may well be 
of course that after the war, economic conditions may 
make some form of assistance to the voluntary hospitals, 
by grants in aid or otherwise, necessary, but the 
voluntary system will continue, there is no reason to 
doubt. I (12) 
The practical gains toward a comprehensive service made during the 
war were, according to Eckstein, relatively small, but the shift in 
expectations was enormous: 
The system was not greatly changed. Rather, the war 
experience produced a general feeling that it would have 
to be radically altered afterwards, in the calmer 
atmosphere of peace. This is a point of very great 
significance: the first serious deliberate attempt to 
provide an effective institutional system quickly 
produced overwhelming sentiment for a large-scale public 
reorganizing of the existing services. (11) 
It might be added that not only did sentiment develop, but a great 
deal of practical experience and knowledge was accumulated, especially 
in the Ministry of Health, with regard to the administration of 
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comprehensive, co-ordinated health services. The idea was legitimised 
and alternative methods of organisation were explored and evaluated. 
(13) 
Perhaps the most important factor about the EMS as a step on the 
way to NHS was the inevitable contrast it established with the 
non-emergency, civilian health services. Indeed the latter suffered, and 
many civilian patients in categories not included under EMS provisions 
endured much hardship and inconvenience, due to the shift of resources 
to the emergency scheme, despite the two • systems' existing side by side 
in the same institutions. (14) 
Titmuss comments on the change of outlook with respect to 
collective provision of health and social services brought about by the 
struggle of war: 
In many ways it was fortunate for the nation that this 
revision of ideas and rearrangement of values carne so 
early in the war. They allowed and quickly encouraged 
great extensions to the social services; they helped 
many of these services to escape from the tradition of 
the poor laws, and they made them more acceptable to 
more people. The fact that the area of collective 
responsibility moved out so soon in a wider circle, 
drawing in more people and broadening the obligations to 
protect those in need, was to serve the nation well 
during the following five years of strain and 
deprivation. (15) 
These new values and corresponding state services established 
irrevocable precedents. The EMS had provided treatment, in an efficient 
and co-ordinated service, as of right for war casualties, albeit not 
without restrictions to the rest of the population. But it had done so 
without regard to means or to insurance status; it had brought the two 
rival hospital systems at least partially into one; and it had enrolled 
a large number of practitioners and specialists in a salaried state 
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medical service. 
These were developments which, but for the exigencies of war, would 
probably have remained the unfulfilled ideas of reformers. In effect, 
they were now to provide in practical terms a starting point for NHS 
planning. The mid-war reconstruction debate, from about 1941 to 1944, 
was also to prove extremely influential in legitimising state activity 
in health services provision, among other areas, and in giving further 
opportunity to socialist and other proponents of a National Health 
Service to make their points. 
The Coalition government was formed in May 1940. Conscious of the 
social and economic problems caused by the mismanagement of 
reconstruction after World War I, it was determined to be seen to be 
serving broadly national interests, this time including those of labour. 
The Labour Party as a partner in the Coalition was concerned to 
implement social policies it had been advancing since long before the 
war. In this it had some success, holding several important Ministries, 
including the Ministry of Labour, under Ernest Bevin. Arthur Greenwood, 
experienced in reconstruction plans in WOrld War I and a former Labour 
Minister of Health (1929-31), was appointed Minister Without Portfolio 
and Chairman of the Cabinet Committee on Reconstruction Problems. 
The Beveridge Report 
Greenwood, in June 1941, responded to a Trades Union Congress lobby 
against the inadequacy of existing health insurance provisions, with the 
appointment of a committee of inquiry with broad terms of reference. 
This was the Interdepartmental Committee on Social Insurance and Allied 
Services chaired by the Liberal reformer Sir William Beveridge. 
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The Beveridge Committee took evidence from a large number of 
organisations, between January and October 1942. Having personally 
formulated and presented the basic framework of his scheme early in 
1942, Beveridge was obliged to take full personal responsibility for the 
Report, which was published in December 1942. (16) According to Calder, 
however, lithe civil service experts who advised him generally 
sympathized with his ideas,1I (17) just as it was clear that many trade 
unions, employers' organisations, academic and political groups were in 
agreement with the fundamental principle of eliminating loss of earning 
power and insecurity through much more comprehensive social insurance. 
The important portion of the Beveridge Report with respect to 
health services is the famous Assumption Bf that a comprehensive health 
and rehabilitation service should be arranged by the state as one of 
three prerequisites of a social insurance scheme. (The others were 
children's allowances, and a policy of maintenance of full employment.) 
Upon these assumptions would rest a comprehensive social security 
scheme, with flat-rate contributions and subsistence benefits to cover 
sickness, medical, unemployment, widows', orphans', old age, maternity, 
industrial injury and funeral benefits. It would in effect rationalise 
existing schemes, closing gaps, centralising administration, widening 
eligibility and benefits. The purpose was, in Beveridge's terms, the 
positive one of providing freedom from the 'five giants': want, disease, 
ignorance, squalor and idleness. In this lay the relevance of the Report 
to the social policy of reconstruction, and the basis of its vast and 
immediate popularity. Beveridge had invited as much publicity for his 
recommendations as he could get, even before the publication of the 
Report, and near-universal awareness and popularity were the result. 
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While the Beveridge scheme was radical in the sense of proposing a 
social policy attack on deprivation and insecurity, the method proposed 
-- flat-rate contributory insurance rather than a redistributive tax 
supported plan -- was not. But because of the unfortunate association of 
Poor Law relief and medical services with a means-tested tax-supported 
scheme, Beveridge preferred benefits earned as of right through 
contribution. Fraser observes: IICulturally conditioned by capitalism to 
respect contract, British society resented means-tested relief which 
penalised thrift and impaired personal dignity, while respecting 
benefits of contractual entitlement. History and social psychology 
dictated that insurance, in Beveridge's phrase, 'is what the people of 
Britain desire'." (18) He notes that it was the universalism of the 
Beveridge proposals, especially in the context of wartime social 
solidarity, which made them most popular -- everyone, irrespective of 
wealth, would contribute equally and benefit equally. This of course 
made the scheme a regressive tax upon low income earners who would in 
addition not be subsidised with higher benefits. But politically, it was 
the principle of universality of contribution and equality of 
entitlement which made the recommendations so immediately popular. This 
was, even at the time, but especially in relation to the values of 
post-war Britain, something of an anachronism; later, equal 
subsistence-level benefits were gradually to be rejected in favour of 
earnings-related, tax-supported schemes. 
Benefits under the proposed health service would be provided under 
the same universal principles as the rest of the social insurance 
scheme. The health service itself would be comprehensive, maintained by 
the Ministry of Health and paid, at least in part, from the general 
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social insurance contributions collected by the Ministry of Social 
Security. Its primary purpose in relation to social security would be as 
far as possible to ensure the positive health and wellbeing, 
particularly the productive capacity, of the population. By doing so, 
the financial burden of ill-health, loss of earning power and productive 
ability would be reduced for the various social insurance benefit 
categories: "Disease and accidents must be paid for in any case, in 
lessened power of production and in idleness, if not directly by 
insurance benefits." (19) "From the standpoint of social security, a 
health service providing full preventive and curative treatment of every 
kind to every citizen without an economic barrier at any point to delay 
recourse to it, is the ideal plan." (20) Beveridge specifically 
recommended against any charge for use of health services, apart from 
the general insurance contribution. In the Report, he argued in some 
detail in favour of comprehensiveness, i.e., the inclusion of all 
general practitioner, diagnostic, specialist, hospital, rehabilitative 
and other institutional care, and dental and ophthalmic treatment, with 
a small charge for appliances only in the latter two cases. Hazardous 
industries would pay a special levy toward the cost of the 
rehabilitation service. 
The quality and effectiveness of the proposed service was of 
primary importance to Beveridge, in order that it should fulfill its 
goals of maintenance of health and productive capacity, and efficient 
restoration of earning ability after disease or injury. In this way the 
orientation of Beveridge is significant, and one of the keys to the 
political popularity of his scheme. For these features of his 
recommendations for a national health service, Beveridge acknowledged 
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his accord with aims of the service proposed by the Medical Planning 
Commission of the British Medical Association. (21) But he differed in 
recommending coverage for "not ninety per cent of the population (the 
present insured persons and their dependants), as is assumed in the 
Draft Interim Report ••• but one hundred per cent of the population." 
(22) This latter point was made in the context of discussing the future 
of private practice, which he felt should remain as an option for those 
willing to pay, over and above the public service which would be paid 
for by and available to all. 
Other matters of the structure and organisation of the service were 
left aside by Beveridge as not relevant to his terms of reference. It 
was not necessary to express opinions on the issues of "free choice of 
doctor, group or individual practice, ••• the place of voluntary and 
public hospitals respectively in a national scheme, the terms of 
service and remuneration of doctors of various kinds, of dentists and of 
nurses, except in so far as these terms may affect the possibility of 
diminishing and controlling sickness and so [might] affect the finances 
of the Social Insurance Fund. 1I (23) These, however, from the viewpoint 
of the medical profession and the voluntary hospitals, were to remain 
the key issues of debate with the three Health Ministers involved in 
planning the NHS. 
The Medical Profession: The Medical Planning Commission Report 
The Socialist Medical Association was in complete agreement with 
Beveridge's Assumption Band 
comprehensive and high-quality 
comments that Beveridge had in 
hi s suppo rting 
service, free 
fact accepted in 
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arguments for a 
at time of use. Murray 
essence the scheme 
earlier developed and publicised by the SMA: lilt was the same scheme 
that was in front of Beveridge and it was that scheme which he accepted. 
It is clear that Beveridge had read SMA literature on the subject and 
the Draft Interim Report of the Medical Planning Commission, the 
thinking of which had been so influenced by its SMA members. II (24) 
Following publication of the Beveridge Report, the SMA used its 
publicity machinery including its journal, MEDICINE TODAY AND TavIORRaN, 
its BULLETIN, and its occasional pamphlet series, MEDICAL N~lS AND 
VIEWS, in support of Beveridge's proposal. 
The Draft Interim Report of the British Medical Association's 
Medical Planning Commission, unique among SMA statements in its 
commitment to the creation of a health service, was less influential 
with the public, because of its professional orientation, than was the 
semi-official Beveridge Report. It was, nonetheless, taken very 
seriously as a planning document in the government, and, as a 
controversial statement of the goals of only a part of the medical 
profession, became a focal point for professional debate for several 
years. 
The success of the Emergency Medical Service, and the fervour of 
reconstruction discussion had prompted the BMA in August 1940 to appoint 
the Medical Planning Commission, in conjunction with the Royal Colleges. 
The Commission comprised over seventy members from all of the U.K., with 
observers from the Ministry of Health. The terms of reference of the 
Commission were quite general: 
their effects on the country's 
future.' II (25) 
.. I To study war-time developnents and 
medical services both present and 
The Socialist Medical Association was represented by three members, 
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Mr Somerville Hastings, Dr D. Stark Murray and Dr H. H. MacWilliam. All 
three were prominent in both the BMA and the SMA. "Their appointment," 
Murray notes, II was a measure of the support the SMA had within the 
profession and a recognition that some changes were inevitable and that 
the SMA should be aware of what the Labour Party was likely to plan." 
(26) Approximately ten of the nearly seventy members of the Commission, 
some nominated by bodies other than the SMA, were active proponents of a 
health service. 
According to Murray, polarisation developed within the Commission 
over the issue of a fully socialised, salaried service, which twelve to 
fifteen influential members would have supported in a minority report 
had the Commission issued more than its Draft Interim Report. The 
reason for the early report, which concluded the Commission's work was, 
Murray suggests, that it became obvious that the Commission "was 
proceeding very much farther than its terms of reference suggested and 
would, whatever its conclusions, face the SMA with the alternative of 
accepting an advanced political view or of repudiating its own 
Commission." (27) 
But the majority sentiment of the Draft Interim Report on most 
questions of health service policy was relatively conservative. With 
respect to eligibility, it proposed extending the contributory insurance 
principle of National Health Insurance to cover dependants, the 
self-employed, and all others whose incomes were below the existing 
limit. It is estimated this would have covered ninety per cent of the 
population, leaving the wealthiest ten per cent to the private medical 
sector. For the covered population, benefits would be extended to 
include diagnostic, specialist, dental and ophthalmic services, and 
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drugs. Hospitals, however, would continue to charge flexible fees based 
on patients' incomes. 
General practice would be given an important place. Both group 
practices and local authority provided health centres were proposed. The 
health centres were described in some detail, with attention to their 
range of co-ordinated services and their close liaison with local 
specialist and hospital services. While a minority of the Commission 
favoured a fully salaried service for general practitioners, the Report 
proposed capitation payments up to a maximum caseload, plus a basic 
salary reflecting qualifications and experience. Part-time salaries were 
suggested for specialists. Abolition of sale and purchase of practices 
was suggested as an eventual possibility, but was not proposed. 
The service as a whole would be centralised, under either the 
Ministry of Health or a semi-independent corporation. The latter idea 
was later to be pressed resolutely by a section of the medical 
profession. Payments would be made by contributions from the insured, 
employers and government to the central agency and paid out to the large 
regional units responsible for administration and co-ordination. 
The Report proposed protection for the voluntary hospitals. They 
would remain independent, supported by grants-in-aid from the 
government, and would continue to raise revenue through charity, fees 
charged to patients, and their own pre-paid contributory insurance 
schemes. Co-ordination among hospitals would be achieved by grouping 
both voluntary and public hospitals around a large voluntary or teaching 
hospital, making a regional unit, directed by a body representative of 
participating institutions. Regions in turn would be grouped in 
provincial units. Co-ordination, therefore, was to be achieved 
127 
voluntarily among hospitals grouped and represented on two levels, and 
other medical services, particularly that of general practitioners, 
would be co-ordinated regionally in a similar representative manner. 
Despite its apparent lack of finality, the Draft Interim Report was 
to achieve the status, through the following several years leading to 
NHS, of an authoritative statement of progressive thinking within the 
medical profession. A health service was proposed, but based on the 
insurance principle and covering only ninety per cent of the population, 
and excluding hospital benefits. General practice, particularly the 
private sector of it, was encouraged, as was the financial independence 
of voluntary hospitals. 
The Report was published just in time to be considered by the 
Beveridge Committee, which took its goals seriously, but disagreed with 
its proposed limitation of eligibility to ninety per cent of the 
population. (28) 
The British Medical Association took the opportunity of its Annual 
Representative Meeting in 1942 to pass specific judgement on the 
'interim' recommendations of the Medical Planning Commission. It 
approved all major proposals, particularly those of health centres for 
general practice and regionalisation of hospitals. However, even the 
possibility of full-time salaries for general practitioners was 
overwhelmingly rejected, and a number of matters were left for future 
decision. The Report itself was discussed both before and after the BMA 
meeting in discussion groups of doctors throughout the country; many 
such groups, according to Eckstein, produced their own plans for a 
health service. He refers to 1942 as a year of "reformist zeal" for the 
medical profession. (29) 
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But, Eckstein notes, the profession's zeal for planning at that 
time may have been aided by the likelihood that no major reforms would 
be undertaken until after the war. The plan produced by the Medical 
Planning Commission was, he says: 
the most remarkable plan for self-reform in the history 
of the British profession. The effects of this plan on 
the profession's attitudes were perhaps as short-lived 
as they were intense; its effects on government 
planning, however, were immense. It is certainly a 
curious fact that the leaders of the profession, during 
the war, produced precisely the sort of grandiose plan 
they were so desperately to oppose afterward. (30) 
Another report issued from the medical profession in late 1942 was 
the "Medical Planning Research Interim General Report, II published in 
LANCET (31) by a group of about 400 younger doctors, many in the Armed 
Forces, and others associated with health services. Like the Medical 
Planning Commission, it supported substantial reorganisation of general 
practice into health centres which would provide a wide range of 
services in conjunction with a co-ordinated regional plan, including 
hospi tals. The authors stressed effective preventive services, 
including industrial medical services, and a nationally co-ordinated 
plan to improve the health of children and to restore the productive 
capacity of the country. The report differed from the Medical Planning 
Commission in proposing that both health and social security funding be 
paid through taxes and rates. It did not take positions on many of the 
matters of administration covered in the former report, but did support 
payment for practitioners in health centres by basic salary plus 
capitation, and the maintenance of voluntary hospitals, at least 
initially, under their existing ownership. 
This latter document was perhaps more representative of the 
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opinions of younger doctors than was that of the Medical Planning 
Commission. In particular it reflected the greater enthusiasm for 
publicly organised general practice in multi-functional health centres 
among younger and Armed Forces doctors. The opinions of this group, as 
the war and health services discussions proceeded, along with the 
efforts of the Socialist Medical Association, were to place increasing 
pressure on the BMA, and ultimately to widen polarisation of opinion in 
the profession. One issue on which the younger doctors' report did this 
especially was the abolition of sale and purchase of medical practices, 
which, from their position either as salaried doctors serving the 
military, or experiencing great difficulties in establishing a civilian 
practice, they supported wholeheartedly against much of the rest of the 
profession which held sale and purchase a nearly sacred part of private 
practice. 
Government Response: The War Cabinet Reconstruction Committee 
The recommendations of the Beveridge Report, going so much further 
than the BMA in proposing compulsory coverage for all of the population, 
and in inclusion of hospital care as an insured benefit, caused some 
unease in the profession, and perhaps marked the turn from its 
"reformist zeal" to a posture of growing defensiveness. Lindsey notes 
that the cool reaction accorded the Beveridge Report by the BMA was much 
at variance with the public enthusiasm. (32) 
Also at variance with public reaction to Beveridge was that of the 
government, particularly Prime Minister Churchill. The Beveridge Report 
was submitted in November 1942. Although various Ministries were 
studying a variety of reforms in health and social security, no policy 
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announcement was made until a statement in the House of Commons on 16 
February 1943 by Sir John Anderson, Lord President of the Council. 
The War Cabinet Committee on Reconstruction Problems (Official 
Committee on the Beveridge Report) (33) made its recommendations to the 
War Cabinet in January 1943 on the question of government acceptance of 
Beveridge's proposal for a comprehensive health service. The Committee's 
recommendations reflected, in part, the detailed thinking of the 
Ministry of Health on medical policy questions, and the Committee's 
thinking on overall strategy. Acknowledging the government's commitment 
to medical reform and the specific commitment in the House of Commons, 9 
October 1941, to postwar provision of a co-ordinated hospital service, 
the major questions now were seen to be the re-organisation of general 
practice into grouped health centre practices and the method of payment: 
full-time salaried service, or an element of competition with capitation 
fees which \\Quld be "unworkable" in a health centre setting. The 
Committee anticipated that the nearly 6,000 young doctors about to be 
released from military service would expect some guidance soon about 
conditions of practice, and would probably be disposed to salaried 
service. Negotiations with the profession and the other major interests, 
however, were likely to be long and unpredictable in outcome: " ••• it is 
difficult to assign any date for their completion, or to forecast the 
precise form which the new service will take and in particular how far 
private practice will persist." (34) The same vagueness of purpose was 
apparent in the final recommendation of the Committee, that the 
government should make a single general announcement of its intentions 
with respect to the Beveridge Report. 
A more detailed presentation on the question of the government's 
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commitment to a health service was made to the War Cabinet in early 
February 1943 by the Minister of Health, Mr Ernest Brown, and the 
Secretary of State for Scotland, Mr Tom Johnston. While similar in 
general principles to the report of the Committee on Reconstruction 
Problems, it presented certain new emphases in the organisation of the 
scheme. 
It stressed that local authorities must be the administrative base 
of the service, grouped into uniformly large, workable regional units to 
co-ordinate the hospitals and the general practitioner service, for 
which health centres were favoured: liThe comprehensive health service 
must be one and indivisible in each area of the country." Voluntary 
hospitals would remain under present management, but would have to 
conform to regional standards of facilities and services, staffing and 
salaries, and admission policy in order to receive subsidies. The 
question of direct payment by patients for hospital care was termed 
"difficult" and left for later consideration. 
Private practice was seen as an important issue for doctors already 
in practice -- they should have the option of part-time public service; 
but for younger doctors not yet established, the Ministers expressed "no 
doubt that they should be under an obligation to give full-time 
serv ice, II wi th perhaps a later option of part-time serv ice depend ing on 
publ ic demand. The Ministers noted the strong demand by younger 
specialists for a full-time salaried service but felt a flexible 
arrangement of optional part-private practice was desirable. 
Freedom of choice of doctor was seen as relative to the 
availability of doctors, but important to 
Exclusion of ten per cent of the population, as 
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preserve in principle. 
the SMA had proposed 
would be "unworkable"; there was "no ground on which exclusion could be 
justified," especially if the plan were financed from taxes and rates. 
The inclusion of the whole population, on the other hand, need not rule 
out the option for both doctors and patients of private practice. The 
profession's fear of lay control should be allayed by adequate medical 
representation on local, regional and national committees. The question 
of salaries was left unsettled, although the Ministers expressed 
disagreement with the SMA's contention that free choice of doctor could 
be preserved only by payment of doctors on a competitive, for example 
capitation, basis. They felt a salary option for younger doctors only, 
at a reasonable rate and with superannuation, would go some way to 
remove the fears of older doctors of salaried service. The Ministers 
finally and decisively recommended against the gradual extension, in 
stages, of National Health Insurance. Rather they suggested early 
legislation for uniform application of a comprehensive tax-based 
service, as in the best interests of practising doctors and those about 
to leave military service, the local authorities and the public. (35) 
Two subsequent memoranda to the War Cabinet on health service 
policy aspects of the Beveridge report indicate some indecision 
resulting from a division of opinion on the matter of universality of 
coverage (the vexed 'ninety-per cent' question raised by the SMA), but 
agreement on the urgency of a policy statement and commencement of 
negotiations which were in any case likely to be long and difficult. The 
first of these summary memoranda from the Committee on Reconstruction 
Priorities proposed announcing the government's commitment to a 
comprehensive health service, but its reservation of the issue of 
universal coverage versus restriction to only part of the population. 
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(36) The second memorandum, only days later, recommended both acceptance 
of the principle of universal coverage and reassurances that private 
practice and voluntary hospitals would continue. It cautioned, as did 
the preceding memoranda, that it would be many years before there would 
be sufficient manpower to provide full dental and ophthalmic services, 
and that the ultimate shape of the service could be determined only 
through detailed negotiations with all concerned organisations. But, 
there was urgency to proceed -- the medical profession had indicated 
both readiness and enthusiasm in the Medical Planning Commission Report, 
and a large number of demobilised doctors would be looking for secure 
places in a new postwar health service -- therefore discussions and 
negotiations should be opened at once. (37) 
Earlier interdepartmental correspondence between the Ministry of 
Health and the Treasury concerning health service proposals indicated 
much less caution on the issues of freedom of choice of doctors, 
salaries and health centre practice than did War Cabinet Committee 
papers. It was the opinion, for example, of Permanent Secretary Sir John 
Maude at the Ministry of Health, that existing freedom of choice of 
doctor was almost absent in rural areas, and little exercised in the 
large towns; this was demonstrated in the success of the sale of 'good 
will' of medical practices (i.e., the sale of a list of the doctor's 
clientele) to which most patients submitted readily. He commented that 
the right of free choice must, however, be preserved, and significantly, 
that it could most realistically be exercised in a health centre 
context, where the patient would have free access to any of several 
doctors. This practical form of free choice would not be affected by a 
salaried method of payment of the doctors. He felt that postwar health 
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centre building should be undertaken energetically, even if it meant 
adapting old properties and making use of surplus Emergency Medical 
Service Equipment. As for private practice, his feeling was that it 
could not be eliminated, but that it would not likely be popular with 
the younger generation of doctors. Special emphasis would be needed to 
integrate general and specialist practice, and public health and 
preventive work; both research and medical recruitment would be enhanced 
by the establishment of a health service. (38) These opinions expressed 
to a Treasury official are perhaps indicative of thinking among senior 
Ministry of Health officials in the opening months of the several 
difficult years of preparation for the NBS. They are notably oriented 
toward the proposals of the BMA Medical Planning Commission, but express 
a significant independence of view on the especially emotive questions 
of free choice of doctor and its relation (or non-relation) to method of 
payment, and health centre practice. A sense of urgency in getting on 
with preparations is evident in the correspondence. 
That same sense of urgency pervaded the War Cabinet Reconstruction 
Priorities Committee documents, and the joint Ministers' proposal to the 
War Cabinet referred to above. The reaction of the Prime Minister, 
however, to the entire issue of implementation of the Beveridge 
proposals was cool. He was personally on record as opposing any 
government encouragement of optimism ("false hopes," as he put it) about 
postwar social change. In a much publicised incident, a summary of the 
Beveridge proposals intended for distribution to the armed forces was 
withdrawn on War Office orders, which began a process of erosion of 
public confidence in the Churchill government's social policy 
intentions, and of confidence in Churchill himself. 
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Churchill was responsible for the statement made in the House of 
Commons in February 1943, three months after publication of the 
Beveridge Report, merely welcoming it and giving no indication of 
Government action. (39) This clear lack of commitment to legislation 
prompted nearly one hundred Labour Members of Parliament led by Arthur 
Greenwood, who had appointed Beveridge, to support an amendment in 
favour of implementing the proposals. Lloyd George with several 
Liberals and a number of Conservative backbenchers also supported it. 
The amendment was defeated, but the backbench revolt, together with the 
wide publicity given to the Conservatives' equivocation over Beveridge's 
plan, did, according to Calder, " ••• as much as anything to bring 
about the Labour Party's electoral victory in 1945," (40) and, contrary 
to Churchill's wish, heightened public pressure for implementation. 
The government, following Churchill's embarrassment at the 
publication and the publicity and massive popularity surrounding the 
Beveridge Report, did not consult Beveridge further during the ongoing 
departmental discussions about his plan, and he was not involved in 
preparation of any of the White Papers of 1944 which summarised official 
thinking to that point. The Conservatives had been put in a dilemma by 
Beveridge: IIChurchill was interested only in the prosecution of the war, 
and the government was enabled to hold together [the Coalition] by 
pursuing that aim and avoiding controversial issues of domestic policy. 
Under these circumstances the Labour Ministers were chagrined to have 
Beveridge steal their thunder, and were cool in their response, greatly 
to the concern of the Labour rank and file, while Churchill may well 
have been aiming to have the Plan up his sleeve for post-war 
reconstruction in which Labour, he hoped, would have no part." (41) 
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The February 1943 House of Commons announcement accepted in 
principle Beveridge's three assumptions, including a national health 
service. While the long delay in making any policy statement and the 
generality of the commitment made in February gave the impression to the 
public that the government had been delaying (as indeed Churchill had) , 
much detailed preparatory work had by then been undertaken by the 
Ministries concerned. The commitment within the Ministry of Health for a 
national health service had taken it much further in its internal 
discussions than the government was prepared to support in public by the 
spring of 1943. 
Progress to Early 1943: Health Service Models and Interests 
By now it was clear that the Ministry had recognised the 
fundamentally different and opposing approaches to, or models of, 
reorganisation of the nation's health services. The debate over these 
approaches, which had been developing among the medical profession, and 
the health service advocates, was now being internalised within the 
planning agencies of the state, especially with the experience of the 
Emergency Medical Service. A twofold process was beginning, a 
reappraisal by the state of the social definition and organisation of 
health, and an assessment of the viewpoints and interests to be 
consulted or represented in designing the new health services. 
The Ministry of Health -- both the permanent officials and the 
Minister -- had reached the determination that the nation's health, a 
critical factor in national industrial and military efficiency and 
postwar recovery, was very much dependent upon socially related risk 
factors, and upon the limited effectiveness of existing insurance and 
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medical arrangements. The popular political expectation of universal, 
non-discriminatory health and social services was becoming undeniable. 
But for the restrictions on political competition imposed by the 
Coalition, there would probably have been open political rivalry on this 
issue, with Labour and Conservatives anxious to claim credit for the new 
social service. The Parliamentary dispute over action on the Beveridge 
Report was ample evidence of the political importance of the burgeoning 
welfare state. 
Beveridge himself had redefined health in the context of economic 
security and productivity, and had pointed out the dysfunctionality of 
National Health Insurance and the Approved Society system to the 
maintenance of health. PEP had developed a similar critique of the 
ineffectiveness of medical and insurance services. Both had redefined 
the organisation of health services not as an end in itself but as a 
means to the end of health and productivity for the nation. In the face 
of these reports, and the others of the 1920s and 1930s, to which 
reference has been made, and the political pressures generated 
especially by Beveridge, the Coalition determined in early 1943 to 
include a comprehensive, 
reconstruction plans. 
regionalised health service in its 
By this time, a good deal of thinking about the general principles 
of the scheme had gone on within the Ministry. Beveridge's opinion that 
it should apply to all persons had been accepted against the view of the 
SMA that the wealthiest ten percent should be excluded. Beveridge's view 
that the scheme should be financed through a single contributory 
insurance scheme had been rejected in favour of a tax-based service, 
with eligibility as of right rather than through contribution. The 
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scheme was to be comprehensive, that is, including in addition to 
general practitioner services, hospital and specialist services, a view 
opposed by the BMA and BHA which wished to retain independent hospital 
fees and insurance. 
In arriving initially at these general, overarching principles for 
the reorganisation of health services, the Ministry, and the Cabinet in 
so far as it occasionally debated and ratified the Health Minister's 
proposals, were beginning to establish the bases for the representation 
of interests which was to take place later in the stages of detailed 
policy formulation. The views were now known of most of the major 
interests, especially of the SMA through its Draft Interim Report. The 
Labour Party with the Socialist Medical Association was formulating 
plans for a state-operated scheme based upon the principles of 
prevention and equality of access to first class services. And other 
interests were preparing for their defence in the conflict anticipated 
over the arrangements for the service. The planning process of the state 
for the NHS was underway, and certain aspects of a representation of 
interests were taking shape following the decisions of the War Cabinet 
in favour of a universal, comprehensive, tax-based service. 
Even though the medical profession was to be denied its 'ninety 
percent', insurance-based, non-comprehensive scheme, it was to be well 
represented in further detailed planning, according to the memoranda to 
Cabinet of the Minister of Health. It was also clear that even though 
private practice was under severe criticism, and some consideration was 
being given to a salary option for young doctors (in lieu of purchasing 
a private practice), it was not at all fundamentally in jeopardy_ 
Despite the much publicised fears of the SMA in 1943, Ernest Brown's 
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memoranda to the War Cabinet indicate as conclusively as can be 
determined that he was not considering a fully salaried service. On the 
contrary, it was apparent that he wished to retain the confidence of the 
medical profession, and wished to begin negotiations with them as soon 
as Cabinet approval was obtained. A firm commitment was also apparent 
at this stage to the local authorities as the basis for regional 
unification and integration of all branches of the service. The 
functions of the local authorities would be further aggrandised through 
maintaining the network of health centres, then in an early stage of 
consideration. 
With respect to their prior commitment to a universal and 
comprehensive service, Ministry officials and the Minister were 
evidently dedicated to the rational critique and perspectives of 
Beveridge and PEP, much of which coincided with the position of the SMA 
in favour of a state service. This view was based on the belief that 
only a service covering all persons and all risks would serve, and be 
seen to be serving, the national interest. In later campaigning, the 
SMA, Labour Party and TUC were to elaborate a model based more clearly 
on the interests of the working class. 
however, the chief concerns of the 
At this early stage of planning, 
state were with the broadest 
principles of the scheme, and with the role and representation of the 
traditional interests in the health services. 
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CHAPTER 4 
THE ADVOCATES OF A NATIONAL HEALTH SERVICE: 
GROUPS AND ISSUES IN THE EARLY PLANNING PERIOD 
Once it was clear that political pressures and the force of 
economic circumstances were great enough to move the state to a major 
reorganisation of health and social services, as part of its more 
general intervention in the restructuring of economic relationships, the 
time had clearly arrived for the second stage of planning, that of 
detailed policy making by the state, which the various interests now 
worked to address. 
The organisations discussed in the following sections, the Labour 
Party, the Socialist Medical Association, the Trades Union Congress and 
the Medical Practitioners' Union, represent the major sources of 
planning, organising, and publicising in the early part of the campaign 
for a comprehensive health service. Other organisations were also 
active; these we shall encounter in due course, their activities 
generally feeding into those of the main proponent groups. 
The Labour Party and the TUC had perhaps the greatest claim to be 
taken seriously in government policy planning -- the Labour Party being 
a partner in the Coalition, and the TUC as part of the tripartite 
structure of wartime economic decisionmaking. The Labour Party could 
also assume that it would have the power to make policy directly, 
provided it won the next election. Thus it was of critical importance 
that both organisations prepare relatively detailed policies as the 
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basis for rallying opinion and ultimately for legislation. 
The SMA and the MPU were, in effect, the 'brains trusts', or 
repositories of expertise, respectively for the Labour Party and the TUC 
in their policy planning endeavours. The SMA was primarily a political 
organisation, dedicated to the advocacy of a state health service 
according to socialist principles (which, in its literature, were more 
assumed than elaborated). The MPU advocated an essentially similar type 
of service, from its perspective as a small trade union concerned with 
conditions of work for medical professionals. The SMA was (and remains) 
affiliated to the Labour Party, the MPU to the TUC. 
There were, of course, considerable overlaps of interest and 
membership among these organisations. Indeed they were all represented 
together in the National Council of Labour, a co-ordinating body 
representing the Labour Party, the TUC, and the Co-operative Union; the 
SMA and the MPU were represented with respect to health service policy, 
on the delegations of their senior organisations. 
In the following sections, we examine the internal health 
policy-making 
difficulties 
processes of these 
in formulating a 
four bodies, 
common policy 
their progress and 
(noting some early 
differences of opinion, particularly over industrial health strategy and 
local medical representation), their public advocacy activities, and 
their initial attempts to press their case for a state health service 
with the Ministry of Health. 
Labour Party Health Policy Planning, 1941-1943 
In March 1941 the Labour Party's reconstruction planning machinery, 
through a series of partly overlapping committees set up under the 
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National Executive Committee (NEC) of the Party, began to grapple with 
questions of postwar Labour policy. The several committees, dealing with 
education, health, social insurance and services, industry and finance 
v~re later rationalised as sub-committees of the party's Central 
Committee on Reconstruction, closely paralleling those Ministerial and 
interdepartmental committees charged with considering in detail the 
implementation of the Beveridge recommendations. 
The Labour Party began its reconstruction planning in 1941. The 
Public Health Advisory Committee of seven members met in March at the 
House of Commons. (The announcement noted that respirators were required 
for those attending.) The meeting was chaired by Mr Somerville Hastings 
MP, long prominent in the Socialist Medical Association, the Labour 
Party, and the London County Council. The task at hand was to dust off 
and examine the party's 1934 conference policy, "A State Health 
Service," itself a product of earlier work by the Socialist Medical 
Association, and to look at Somerville Hastings' 1941 paper, "A Scheme 
for a Wartime National Medical Service. II 
By the group's second meeting in May 1941, several medical and 
other expert members had been co-opted, making the full complement of 
fifteen, including Dr David Stark Murray, also a well-known member of 
the SMA. The government's Emergency Medical Service, along with other 
circumstances, brought into sharp relief the task of the Committee. 
There was a good deal of urgency to produce a detailed party policy 
aimed at developing a complete civilian service from these wartime 
beginnings. The Labour Party would have to update its own and SMA 
proposals, 
experience, 
reflecting its pre-war 
into a policy tailored 
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social priorities and wartime 
for implementation in the latter 
stages of the war or immediately after the peace. 
The Public Health Advisory Committee met five times between March 
and October 1941 to consider memoranda on two aspects of health services 
long given top priority by the SMA: health centres and an industrial 
health service. While these programmes were not the exclusive proposals 
of socialists, they were considered intrinsic to a socialist health 
plan; both would bring the preventive and curative services of medicine 
much closer to ordinary people. 
In a memorandum to the Committee in October 1941, recapitulating 
both Labour's 1934 conference proposals for health centres and the 
Committee's discussions of the preceding months, Dr David Stark Murray 
set out in detail the characteristics of the health centre service 
agreed upon. It would be a service presupposing and parallel to a 
unified hospital service (as opposed to dual municipal and voluntary 
systems); it would be nationally organised, but with both health centre 
and hospital services planned locally for population units of about 
100,000. The work of health centres was summarised in some dozen 
points: 
1. Periodic general medical examination of all patients 
registered 
2. Surgery work of general practitioners to be located in 
the centre 
3. To be the base for domiciliary services of general 
practitioners 
4. To take over some of the work of hospital casualty 
departments 
5. To make use of the services of consultants both in the 
centre and in patients' homes 
6. Specialised local authority health services to be 
included and co-ordinated 
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7. Full dental services to be located in the health centre 
8. Foot care to be provided 
9. Accident and factory medical services to be included at 
the centre, and co-ordinated with existing services in 
factories 
10. Rehabilitation and occupational therapy; laboratory and 
X-ray facilities to be included 
11. Pharmaceutical departments would dispense drugs and 
supplies 
12. Health education and propaganda to be organised for the 
centre's catchment area 
The idea was not to alter the basic pattern of medical work of the 
general practitioner, rather to locate the practitioner with co-workers 
in premises where ancillary services would be available. The centre 
would be closely linked with the hospitals covering the same catchment 
area, in such a way that the specialists would be available for 
consultation even in the home, as arranged by practitioners at the 
centre. Local authority services in the same building would comprise 
midwifery, health visitors, social welfare workers, home nursing 
services and home helps. Nurses, to broaden their experience, would work 
alternately in hospitals and health centres in the area. Social workers, 
home nurses and others would be concerned with the same cases as 
practitioners, when necessary. Teamwork would be the new emphasis in the 
health centre form of general practice. Comprehensive medical records, 
comparable in form with those in other health centres, would be kept, 
and could be transferred as necessary_ (1) 
The Committee had agreed by this time that a health service should 
be the full responsibility of the Ministry of Health, with the Minister 
answerable for it to Parliament, that only publicly elected authorities 
should be in charge of the service, and that the unit of administration 
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should be as large as possible, if necessary involving co-operation 
between adjacent local authorities. 
In the autumn of 1941 the Committee considered several papers 
advocating plans of gradual transition to a full state service. One such 
paper, for example, proposed first the transfer of Emergency Medical 
Service hospitals to a fully public function, and contractual 
arrangements with voluntary hospitals for public service. It was 
proposed that after the war, Labour-controlled local authorities should 
by agreement take over voluntary hospitals, uniting them in a single 
superior system with municipal hospitals. On October 9, 1941, Health 
Minister Ernest Brown announced in the House of Commons the government's 
intention to establish a local authority-based system, essentially 
similar to the Committee's proposals. The apparent disadvantage of such 
a scheme of voluntary co-operation by the voluntary hospitals was that 
the managerial structure of the Emergency Medical Service hospitals on 
which the scheme would be based was so dominated by voluntary hospital 
interests that they would stand to inherit general control after the 
war. 
A policy paper by Somerville Hastings, taking something of a 
'gradualist' position, noted: "The conditions for the developnent of a 
municipal hospital system will, therefore, probably become much more 
favourable soon after the war, and will be best achieved by 'Fabian' 
methods." (2) He recommended against government takeover of voluntary 
hospi tals, a move which would be attacked as "confiscation," and in 
favour of charging local authorities with the duty of providing hospital 
services for all willing to use it, while providing contractual payments 
for voluntary hospitals conforming with a regional plan. The plan would 
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cover standards of service, admission of patients solely on the basis of 
medical need, (3) staff hiring policy, pay, and working conditions, 
which would be uniform with those of the local authority hospitals. 
These would be the requirements for shared funding. Hospital treatment 
would be made free only when postwar financial stringency eased, thus 
promoting the later assimilation of non-contracting voluntary hospitals. 
A natural development would be the combining of local authorities to 
form hospital regions. 
certain provincial 
proposals. 
The Committee decided to solicit the opinions of 
Labour Party members and officials on these 
In the Committee's papers, the structure of a health service as a 
whole continued to be developed in increasing detail. In particular 
there were proposals for a national maternity service, and for 
determining optimum population groups to be served by planned and 
decentralised health facilities. One paper envisaged an operational 
unit consisting of one general hospital of up to 1200 beds for a 
population area of 100,000. Around this would be grouped a few 
Divisional Health Centres for specialist and consultant services in 
close association with the hospital, and Local Health Centres comprising 
about 50 general practitioners in all, scattered in teams of 3 to 12. 
Health centre features agreed upon earlier were reiterated, and certain 
additional ideas proposed. "Industrial hygiene," for example, would be 
part of the work of all doctors, who would have authority to require 
changes in conditions of work in factories, shops and offices. 
Administration of the service as a whole would be based on large regions 
centred on a university medical school, and would be representative and 
responsible through election. This same paper proposed as a first step, 
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the compulsory establishment by local authorities, with central funding, 
of a variety of specialist clinics, including industrial health, to be 
available both to those insured under National Health Insurance and 
those not insured. (4) 
Further elaboration of the national maternity service was provided 
in a paper submitted by the WOmen Public Health Officers' Association, a 
trade union affiliated to the Trades Union Congress and comprising 
mainly health visitors. Their proposals included, among other items, 
ante- and post-natal care organised at health centres, midwifery and 
supervision of home confinement. 
Between February and April 1942, the Committee dealt with detailed 
proposals for the health of children including a school medical service, 
and a tuberculosis policy. Lady Simon, author of the school medical 
proposals, stressed co-ordination and regular contact between school and 
health centre medical services. 
By May 1942, the Public Health Sub-Committee was able to issue its 
interim report, "A Scheme for a State Medical Service." (5) As in the 
earlier draft proposals, a consistent point of emphasis was 
co-ordination of all branches of the service, particularly the linking 
of the general practitioner health centres with domiciliary and hospital 
consultant services. Other points agreed upon earlier were restated in 
the interim report with special stress on easy accessibility for people 
in their own area to comprehensive and co-ordinated health and welfare 
services. 
Some time appears to have been lost during the summer of 1942 by 
the Labour Party's Central Committee on Reconstruction, in approving the 
proposals of the Public Health Sub-Committee. When the Sub-Commitee next 
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met in November 1942, it complained to the senior committee that other 
bodies were already publishing health service proposals -- indeed the 
Beveridge Report was released the same month -- while the Labour Party 
had so far failed to do so despite the basic documents having been ready 
in October 1941. 
In December 1942 the Sub-Committee turned its attention to the 
urgent matter of tuberculosis. It arranged to send a deputation to the 
Parliamentary Labour Party to discuss immediate programmes of mass 
radiography, nursing, and rehabilitation, and industrial conditions as 
they related to tuberculosis control and prevention. 
A document intended for public distribution, entitled "Labour's 
Plan for Health" (6) was approved in December. It summarised decisions 
of the group to date, stressing comprehensive regionalised services 
maintained by single and joint local authorities, and salaries and 
improved and regulated conditions of work for doctors. It noted also 
the urgency of beginning a service before the end of the war. 
By January 1943, the Reconstruction Committee's policy congestion 
had given way to the pressure to produce final policy documents for the 
Annual Conference of the party. A draft resolution on health was 
prepared for sponsorship by the National Executive Committee (NEC); it 
was further approved by a joint medical committee of the Trades Union 
Congress, the Co-operative Congress and the Labour Party. The only point 
of contention to be raised at this stage was the recommended local 
administrative structure. While the Labour Party committee envisioned a 
large part of the service under the administrative control of local 
authorities, the Medical Practitioners' Union (MPU) sided with the 
historic objection of the medical profession to local authority control, 
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and demanded instead a regional planning and administrative structure 
with strong medical representation. 
In the Social Insurance Sub-Committee, meanwhile, a summary 
statement had been issued following the release of the Beveridge Report. 
It welcomed the Report as conforming to Labour's 1942 Conference policy, 
called upon the government to implement the proposals, and suggested the 
Parliamentary Labour Party should have the power, in the Coalition, to 
make amendments. (7) Early in 1943 detailed comparisons were made of 
Beveridge's recommendations, party policy, and announced government 
policy, (8) as part of preparations for the 1943 Annual Conference, at 
which an item of major importance would be the party's reconstruction 
policy. (The Conference was to be held in mid-June 1943 at Central 
Hall, Westminster.) 
The March meeting of the Public Health Sub-Committee was the last 
before the Conference. In addition to final drafting of the NEC 
resolution on health policy, a draft was also completed of a pamphlet, 
"A National Service for Health," which would be launched in a national 
Labour Party campaign following the Conference. In April these drafts 
were approved by the senior Central Committee on Reconstruction 
Problems, along with statements on the Beveridge Report and on social 
services in general. This was the final stage of policy formulation 
before submission to the Conference. 
At the Annual Conference, debate on what was now the National 
Executive Committee's resolution on health policy took place in the 
shadow of the considerable split in the Parliamentary Labour Party as a 
result of the Commons debate in February on the Beveridge Report. In the 
Commons, the Coalition Cabinet, including the Labour Ministers, had 
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committed the government merely lIin principle" to sixteen of Beveridge's 
twenty-three recommendations and only to the preparation of legislation, 
any decision on implementation to rest with the first postwar 
government. (9) This proposal, combined with the Conservatives' 
apparently half-hearted attitude in debate toward the entire scheme 
provoked nearly all members of the Parliamentary Labour Party, led by 
Arthur Greenwood, who had appointed Beveridge, to break ranks with the 
Labour Ministers and vote against the Government. 
At the Conference, the National Executive Committee's resolution on 
the Beveridge Report welcomed it "as a valuable contribution to the 
well-being of those suffering want through adversity and an important 
advance toward democratic social policy such as the Labour Party 
envisages as an essential part of its postwar plans." While admitting 
need for interim improvements, it called for preparation of major items 
of legislation for a National Medical Service, for Children's 
Allowances, and for measures to promote full employment, to be 
implemented at the end of hostilities. Mr Clement Attlee, a Minister of 
the Coalition government who had remained loyal to it in the Commons 
debate, said the government had accepted the Beveridge Report's 
principles: " every phase of it, every aspect of its assumptions is 
being pursued day by day with utmost vigour." (10) 
Opposition to the NEC position came in the form of an amendment 
proposed by Mr S. Silverman MP congratulating the Parliamentary Labour 
Party for recording its distrust of the government's intentions with 
respect to Beveridge and calling for immediate legislation to secure the 
implementation of the Report's recommendations. He noted this was the 
first time since entering the Coalition in 1940 that a majority of the 
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Parliamentary Labour Party had opposed the government in a division in 
the Commons. It was essential, he said, that the party affirm its 
socialist principles, and asked the conference to vote for an amendment 
indicating support for the Parliamentary group, against the position of 
the National Executive Committee which maintained support for the 
Coalition government. The Executive was supported, among others, by the 
Transport and General WOrkers, and by Arthur Greenwood, who cautioned 
that withdrawal from the Coalition Cabinet would be suicidal for Labour. 
The Executive and the Labour Ministers were upheld in a vote on Mr 
Silverman's motion by a margin of two to one, and the Conference turned 
from the general issues of action on the Beveridge Report to its own 
policy for health. (11) 
TRIBUNE, journal of the Labour left, had during 1943 taken a 
position highly distrustful of the government's intentions with respect 
to Beveridge's health and social security proposals, and had supported 
Labour backbenchers in voting against their Ministers in the Commons in 
February. TRIBUNE did not, however, go so far as to suggest that Labour 
withdraw from the Coalition. Aneurin Bevan, future Minister of Health 
in the 1945 government, writing just after the Commons debate, had harsh 
words for Labour's Parliamentary leaders. Backbenchers well knew the 
popularity of the Beveridge Report in the constituencies. But, he 
remarked, the implicit condition of participation in the National 
Government was that Labour "drop its programme of social regeneration 
and help to put across the plans of vested interests •••• Only a 
leadership determined to lose the political initiative could have thrown 
away the possibilities presented by its relationship with the Beveridge 
Report." While the Parliamentary Labour Party supported Beveridge, lithe 
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General Council of the TUC were on record supporting Clement Attlee, 
Ernest Bevin and Herbert Morrison in their wrecking of the Beveridge 
Plan." (12) He noted the division in the TUC over this position; the 
leadership would defy the pro-Beveridge opinion of the members at their 
peril a split existed between political and industrial labour. Bevan 
urged the rank and file to make clear to TUC and Labour Party leadership 
their support of Beveridge. Bevan's only other comment in TRIBUNE before 
the party conference, however, was a plea for more freedom for Labour 
within the Electoral Truce, to fight byelections, and to set the 
political terms of its participation in the Coalition. (13) 
At the Conference, Bevan made his only major contribution in the 
debate on strategy for the Beveridge plan, following the spirit of his 
earlier statements. While not advocating withdrawal from the Coalition, 
as some in the Labour left wished, he noted that the national unity of 
which Labour had been the author in 1940 had become"... an instrument 
of blackmail in the hands of the Tories •••• The Executive'S Report 
was not leadership, it was bankruptcy. II (14) Bevan's concern at this 
point was with Labour's overall political initiative, of which 
commitment to thoroughgoing action on the Beveridge proposals was only a 
part. 
" 
His comment in TRIBUNE after the Conference was typically terse: 
the attitude of the Party toward the Beveridge Report has been 
proclaimed with quite bewildering ambiguity." (15) 
Health service proposals were debated at the 1943 Conference after 
the "ambiguous" debate on Beveridge. The National Executive Committee's 
special resolution, "A National Medical Service" was moved by Mrs 
Barbara Ayrton Gould. The resolution, since it is the major reference 
point for the future Labour Party health policy is here quoted in full: 
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This Conference, 
Believing that the nation needs a Medical Service 
which is planned as a whole; fitted to prevent, as well 
as cure, ill health; complete, including all kinds of 
treatment and advice required; and open to all 
irrespective of means or social position; and 
Believing that these needs are not adequately met by 
the existing service, and can only be met by a State 
Medical Service, nationally planned, regionally 
administered and paid for out of public funds, 
Calls for the organisation of a State Medical Service 
as soon as conditions permit. 
To this end the Conference recommends that 
(a) The Ministry of Health, responsible to Parliament, 
should be empowered to plan the Health and Medical 
Service broadly for the whole nation, and to exercise 
supervision and general control to ensure the carrying 
out of the plan 
(b) The Medical Service should be financed through taxes 
and rates, the bulk of the cost being defrayed through 
percentage grants from the State to Regional Authorities 
for approved health expenditures 
(c) Regional Authorities should 
accommodation in their area, 
being brought into the scheme 
organise the hospital 
the voluntary hospitals 
(d) Regional Authorities should be required to establish 
Divisional and Local Health Centres 
(e) Doctors for the Service should be enlisted for 
whole-time, salaried, pensionable service, and should be 
paid out of public funds 
(f) The whole Service should be made available to all, 
irrespective of means. (16) 
A supplementary resolution submitted by the Socialist Medical 
Association called on the government "to provide forthwith a complete 
Industrial Medical Service," its medical officers to be appointed by the 
government (not by employers as company doctors). It urged the labour 
movement to consider health a direct concern at the workplace and to 
appoint workers' Health Committees in factories, to supervise conditions 
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of health and safety in the place of employment. The SMA also introduced 
a resolution urging full implementation of Beveridge's Assumption B, 
with a "free, comprehensive, co-ordinated, salaried Health Service 
.. (17) 
It would appear from the fact that the SMA introduced these 
resolutions separately that it, too, felt the Executive's resolutions on 
Beveridge and on the health service issue to be lacking both in 
urgency of commitment, and in commitment to an industrial health scheme. 
The latter had come to be a very important plank in the SMA platform by 
1943, after its studies of poor health conditions and facilities in war 
industries and subsequent policy discussions. 
In its Annual Report to the Conference, the National Executive 
Committee announced in particular its acceptance of Beveridge's 
recommendation for a comprehensive health service of the best standard 
for all citizens. The statement recalled the 1941 proposals of Health 
Minister Ernest Brown (which anticipated some features of the Coalition 
Government's 1944 INhite Paper) to "IIvhich Labour's left wing and the 
Socialist Medical Association were opposed. "While it is likely," the 
Executive said, "that elements of private practice and voluntarism may 
play their part in a comprehensive scheme, these must not be allowed to 
conflict in any way with the maintenance of adequate standards of health 
services for every citizen." (18) 
Now, introducing and elaborating upon the special resolution for 
the Executive, Mrs Ayrton Gould could outline the two notable omissions 
in the Executive's report on Beveridge. Two major areas, mental health 
and industrial health, were left out. The latter, the Conference was 
reassured, was to be discussed with the National Health Committee of the 
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TUC and a joint statement to be incorporated in the National Executive 
Committee's next report. 
The foundation of the NEC's proposal was co-ordination of the new 
Medical Service by the Ministry of Health, assuring responsibility for 
it to parliament, and the responsibility of regional authorities to 
implement the scheme in conformity with various local authority 
structures, which would also \I incorporate" voluntary hospi tals. The 
precise status of ownership of the hospitals was not indicated. Health 
centres were to be "the crux of the whole scheme," as centres for their 
surrounding neighbourhoods of preventive and curative health services. 
Again, the two-tier system of divisional and local health centres was 
stressed as the ideal structure to integrate general practitioner and 
consultant services. The local centres would be easily accessible, and 
would be staffed by "salar ied, pensionable doctors. II There would, as far 
as possible, be free choice of family doctor. Such a service l;vould have 
significance beyond individual treatment: a healthy nation was essential 
to postwar production and reconstruction, happiness and vigour, Mrs 
Ayrton Gould concluded. 
Next to speak in debate on the Executive's resolution was Mr 
Somerville Hastings MF. He noted that ten years had elapsed since he 
first moved a resolution for a State Medical Service at a Labour 
Conference. The task now was to organise as much pressure as possible 
from the Conference, and from "all the working class movement" for a 
health scheme, and against "reactionary forces" likely to hinder its 
achievement. Mr Hastings had clearly by now consolidated his opinion in 
favour of an all-public service, and had moved some distance from the 
compromise with private institutions, notably the retention of the 
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voluntary hospital system, contemplated in the Sub-Committee discussions 
of 1941. A key principle of the scheme, he now said, was that doctors 
and staff should give their undivided attention to public service: 
"Therefore, I think it follows that there can be no place in such a 
service for the panel and for the voluntary hospital scheme, by which 
doctors give part of their time to their public duties and part to their 
private practice." (19) 
This was perhaps the most unequivocal expression of support for a 
wholly public hospital service to be made in Labour Party debate, and 
stands in notable contrast to the Party's acquiescence to the Coalition 
White Paper the following year, especially with respect to the status of 
voluntary hospitals. 
Dr Edith Summer ski 11 MP supported Mr Hastings' position. The 
Conservative interpretation of Assumption B would mean only an extension 
of the system of charitable voluntary hospitals, extended National 
Health Insurance and competitive private practice. Within such a basic 
structure the potential of health centres to revolutionise general 
practice could certainly not be attained. The alternative, she said, was 
the socialist method: co-ordinated health services, abolition of 
voluntary hospitals as well as the profit motive in medicine and a 
salaried medical service. Doctors in private practice should also be 
included in a salaried medical service. Conference, she said, must make 
it clear to Labour members of the government that they reject the 
Conservative interpretation of Assumption B: health services would be 
the first indication of the government's intentions. Labour members 
would be able to test the influence of their Ministers; there would be a 
split in the Labour Party if there were any compromise. With these stern 
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words, the resolution was carried. (20) 
Unity was preserved in support of the Executive's resolution, but 
the division in the Parliamentary Party could not entirely be hidden at 
the Conference. The Socialist Medical Association and the Amalgamated 
Engineering Union supported stronger commitment to implementation of 
Beveridge's health service proposals than the Executive resolution 
implied, and gained a large measure of support, and the SMA proposed an 
industrial health service, action on which was to be followed by the 
Labour Party with the TUC. A variety of opinions existed on the role of 
private practice and voluntary hospitals, but the SMA's strongly held 
opinions against both were widely supported. 
Following the Conference, initiative was resumed again in July by 
the Public Health Sub-Committee, which now asked the Party Executive to 
consider sending a deputation to the Minister of Health with the Party's 
newly-ratified health policy. They noted their satisfaction with press 
comment on the policy, and with the wide distribution of the pamphlet "A 
National Service for Health," and they began plans for a national 
campaign including educational conferences to build a base of popular 
support for Labour's new policy. To complete that policy, the Committee 
approved draft statements on mental health and an industrial health 
service, but declined to prepare a statement on medical education, 
concluding that this would end their work until the publication of the 
government's White Paper on medical services, then expected in the 
autumn. 
Resuming work in November 1943, the (renamed) Public Health 
Advisory Committee considered a number of refinements of Conference 
policy proposed formally by the SMA, which had several members on the 
161 
Committee. (21) The SMA recommended that the Party's policy be made 
explicit in four areas: 
1. The need for unitary control of a fully integrated 
health service 
2. The danger of extending the panel system of general 
practice 
3. The need to end the dual hospital system; in particular 
the Party should dissociate itself from the expected 
government pledge to retain voluntary hospitals 
4. A declaration in favour of Health Committees in 
factories, to function as sub-groups of the (wartime) 
Joint Production Committees and to operate via TUC 
machinery 
Expanding on the reasons for a unified hospital system, the SMA 
said that conditions of admission of patients must be standardised and 
independent voluntary hospitals would continue to be selective about the 
cases they would accept; equally, medical education must be co-ordinated 
and standardised among all appropriate institutions; building and 
modernisation must be planned for all hospitals in a co-ordinated 
fashion; likewise, the distribution of specialist services and research 
must be rationally planned. 
Difficulties over an industrial health scheme arose again at this 
time. On the fourth point, factory committees, there was disagreement 
between the SMA and the TUC representatives, who were concerned about 
control of the committees. 
The SMA, in its resolution submitted and withdrawn at the Party 
Conference, had called upon the government to provide forthwith a 
complete Industrial Medical Service, in addition to urging the labour 
movement to press for elected factory health committees to work with the 
TUC. These committees, the SMA argued, should be specialised and 
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concerned with the enforcement of existing health and safety 
regulations, with advice and education on safety, optimum working hours, 
ventilation, canteens, rehabilitation and regular medical examinations; 
they should be democratic, including elected factory workers; and they 
should not be imposed from outside, as the TUC representatives appeared 
to misinterpret the SMA proposal. The SMA hoped the TUC's concerns would 
be satisfied if the committees were established as subsidiary to 
Production WOrks Committees, operating through TUC machinery. 
This disagreement over industrial health policy was only a small 
indication of the lack of unanimity on the question among the SMA and 
the TUC, the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Labour, and of the 
shades of opinion in the Labour Party, even though most agreed it was an 
urgent priority. The issue was to come up at later points in the 
evolution of the NHS, especially with Aneurin Bevan as Minister of 
Health, who had frequently been in disagreement with the TUC leadership. 
For the next year, until discussions began on the 1944 White Paper, the 
development of Labour Party policy, in conjunction mainly with the TUC, 
was a relatively smooth process. 
Trades Union Congress Activities Before the White Paper 
The TUC began developing policy on health services from July 1941 
as it prepared evidence for submission to Beveridge's Interdepartmental 
Committee. This it did in collaboration with the Labour Party and the 
Co-operative Union, with the expert assistance of a TUC member-union, 
the Medical Practitioners' Union. The General Council of the TUC 
appointed its Joint Social Insurance Committee and WOrkmen's 
Compensation and Factory Committee (hereafter abbreviated JSIC) to be 
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responsible for inviting submissions from concerned trade unions and 
drafting TUC policy. The TUC maintained direct contact with Arthur 
Greenwood, Chairman of the Parliamentary Labour Party, who had responded 
to TUC pressure in having the Beveridge inquiry established. 
From August 1941 the JSIC heard detailed proposals from the Medical 
Practitioners' Union on priorities in reorganising the health services. 
By mid-August, the JSIC had formulated nine areas on which 
recommendations would be made under Beveridge's general terms of 
reference, including a IIcomprehensive State Medical Service covering 
everything that medical science can command for the prevention and cure 
of sickness ••• available to everyone in the State." (22) 
When the committee next met in October, it was noted with concern 
that the general principles of a state service agreed upon would mean a 
drastic alteration or perhaps abolition of the Approved Societies, many 
of which were maintained by trade unions. Late in 1941 and early in 
1942 the TUC-JSIC committee met with the Labour Party's Social 
Insurances, Assistance, and Family Allowances Sub-Committee and the 
Co-operative Union to consider points to be submitted jointly to 
Beveridge. The Labour Party group was delegated to prepare discussion 
documents on a national medical service and social insurance; 
accordingly, the Labour Party submitted papers, "A Scheme for a State 
Medical Service" and "The Health Centre in the Organisation of Medical 
Services. II 
In January 1942 the General Council met with the Interdepartmental 
Committee on Social Insurance and Allied Services, to present to Sir 
William Beveridge the views of the TUC. The exchange was a preliminary 
one, with Beveridge submitting a list of questions on TUC priorities for 
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further consideration. 
new hospital policy, 
Brown, was noted in 
In March 1942, the government's commitment to a 
outlined in speeches by Health Minister Ernest 
the TUC committee as a likely priority for 
Beveridge. Both the TUC General Council and the Association of Trade 
Union Approved Societies had by now come to the view that the approved 
society system of insurance administration must be abolished in favour 
of a uniform system, with uniform benefits. This position, submitted to 
Beveridge in August, was in accord with that of all other trade unions 
submitting views individually. The TUC reiterated its support for 
Labour's proposals for a comprehensive state health service. 
The TUC held conferences in the major cities in the late summer on 
its social insurance and health service recommendations. Response was 
sufficiently enthusiastic that it was decided, upon publication of the 
Beveridge Report, to hold meetings nationwide, similar to those the 
Labour Party and co-operative movement were planning, to popularise 
health service proposals. 
Sir William Beveridge met personally with the JSIC and the General 
Council on 9 and 16 December 1942, after publication of his Report, for 
a general discussion of its implications. This was followed almost 
immediately by a decision of the social insurance sub-committees of the 
TUC, Labour Party and Co-operative Union unanimously in favour of 
accepting the general principles of the Report, subject to further 
examination of details. (23) 
Discussion began early in 1943, in light of the Labour Party's 
detailed documents, and the MPU memorandum, liThe Transition to a State 
Medical Service. II The MPU was assured by the TUC of representation on 
any TUC deputations to the Minister of Health following complaints to 
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the General Secretary of the TUC and to the Minister by the aggressive 
Dr Alfred Welply, Secretary of the MPU, that his organisation had been 
neglected in any such representative capacity. 
In February 1943 the National Council of Labour, the highest body 
representing the TUC, Labour Party and Co-operative Union, met twice to 
consider the Beveridge Report. The later meeting followed the split in 
the House of Commons between the Labour Ministers and backbenchers. 
Both Arthur Greenwood and Clement Attlee attended, the latter making the 
point that the Parliamentary Labour Party had not understood the extent 
to which the government had accepted Beveridge's recommendations. The 
General Council passed a vote of confidence in the Ministers, and 
decided the parliamentary crisis had been "unjustified". (24) 
Between March and May 1943, the tripartite Labour, TUC, and 
Co-operative social insurance committees were considering policy aimed 
at producing a joint resolution for the Labour Party Annual Conference 
in June. The resolution originally drafted by the Labour Party Public 
Health Sub-Committee (the one finally passed by the Labour Conference) 
was approved one month before the Conference. One noteworthy aspect of 
the resolution was its partial similarity with the SMA proposal that 
Regional Authorities be responsible for the health centre practitioner 
and ancillary medical and social services. The MPU intervened here in 
support of the medical profession's antipathy to lay control, however, 
arguing, along with the SMA, for a medical majority on all health 
service bodies at regional and lower levels. Doctors, the MPU felt, 
would not work under existing local authority arrangements or under 
their Medical Officers of Health. Labour Party representatives raised 
strong objections to this effective medical veto, but the disagreement 
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was not at that time resolved. Dr H.B. Morgan, physician to the TUC, 
presented a memorandum, "State Medical Service," to the joint committee 
in March 1943, supporting in detail all of Beveridge's arguments in 
Assumption B, and suggesting attractive conditions of service for all 
employees, with national Whitley machinery; and the democratisation of 
hospitals, in particular regarding voluntary hospitals as national, not 
private institutions. He emphasised integrating a preventive approach in 
the service, with expanded applied medical research. 
In July, following the directive of the Labour Conference, the 
issue of industrial health policy was added to the joint committee's 
work. Again the material prepared by the Labour Party Public Health 
Sub-Committee was adopted jointly and included 
pamphlet, "National Service for Health," intended 
distribution. (25) 
in a revised Party 
for wide public 
By October, the committees were moving from general principles to 
more detailed considerations of the structure of a health service. A 
lengthy memorandum was discussed, emphasising the interest of working 
people in socially equal access to services and medical education; 
occupational and environmental illnesses and those associated with 
industrialism and poverty; and democratic control of the distribution, 
range and quality of service. 
"Health," the memorandum declared, "is frequently the workers' only 
asset, and on its unimpaired continuance depends his livelihood, 
economic position and the stability and happiness of his home, and that 
of his dependants." Thus full rehabilitative and preventive services 
must be provided. Industrial health should be integrated into all levels 
of medical education and research, along with social and environmental 
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issues; an integrated industrial medical service should be set up 
covering factories, small firms and shops, and linking these with 
community practitioner services. (26) 
The memorandum voiced regret over the government's pledge to retain 
voluntary hospitals; this would prevent unification and impede 
co-operation and equality of access to hospital care. The memorandum 
recommended that practitioner and public health services be provided 
from local authority-run health centres, financed from the rates, and 
have all necessary staff for examination, diagnosis and treatment. The 
staff, including medical staff, would be all full-time and salaried. 
Preventive and health education functions would be part of the health 
centre service. A key to success in attaining a high quality service 
would be good conditions for all employees: security, professional 
advancement, promotion, study and travel, freedom to publish 
professional observations and opinions, full communication with 
hospitals treating the centre's patients, and free choice of doctor as 
far as possible. 
Based on this memorandum, a brief statement was prepared and sent 
in October 1943, as a first summary of TUC recommendations, to Health 
Minister Ernest Brown. (27) The TUC's request to send a deputation was 
deferred by Brown, pending the White Paper. 
The disagreement in the joint committees with the MPU over local 
medical control persisted until December 1943, when a compromise was 
reached: there should be no medical veto over local authority health 
decisions, but Local Medical Advisory Committees could appeal to the 
Minister and could publish their views in event of a dispute. 
This agreement ended the work of the joint Labour, TUC, and 
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Co-operative health policy committee for 1943. 
The Medical Practitioners' Union 
The Medical Practitioners' Union had been active independently, 
outside the joint committee, in publishing its recommended health 
service policy. Its major memorandum, "The Transition to a State 
Med ical Serv ice," was issued in August 1942, and sent to the Minister of 
Health. In addition to the general principles of the service --
comprehensiveness, universal coverage of all the population for all 
medical risks, prevention, rehabilitation, research, no financial 
penalty -- with which the MPU was in agreement with the SMA, Labour 
Party and TUC, the memo made more detailed administrative proposals. It 
put much emphasis on ending the twelve Emergency Medical Service regions 
in favour of a system based on local authorities, single or combined 
depending on population, and using local authority democratic machinery 
to administer the comprehensive service, with central government 
standards and supervision. 
The general practitioner service would be much improved through 
salaried practice. While private practice would be allowed to continue, 
the state service would be whole-time and salaried, with regularised 
salary grades, allowances, paid study leave and holidays, pensions, 
compensation for loss of "goodwill" on entering the service, and other 
benefits. The state service thus would be expected to be superior in 
every respect for doctors and patients. 
Perhaps the most radical of the MPU policies concerned hospitals. 
First, the MPU recommended the nationalisation of all hospitals by the 
Ministry of Health, to be administered by the local authority structure. 
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Voluntary hospitals, including all property, assets, and investments 
would be taken over, along with municipal hospitals. Private wards would 
be abolished, except on a small scale for medical need. A new 
administrative structure, standardised hiring policies and conditions of 
work for staff, salaried consultants, and co-ordination of the special 
functions of certain hospitals within the areas would be features of the 
new hospital service. 
The MPU was concerned, too, with medical education as a part of 
remodelling health services. The Ministry, not just the profession, 
should supervise all aspects; teaching should be broadened to encompass 
former municipal hospitals; universities and the Royal Colleges would be 
subsidised for participation in teaching programmes; and a single state 
examination would be the only necessary qualification for appointments. 
These features would be common to dental and nursing education also, and 
would have the effect of standardising entrance procedures, teaching 
programmes, and qualifications, for all medical schools. 
The general principles of free choice of doctor and professional 
freedom in medical practice were stressed, and were seen, contrary to 
the BMA's view, as not at all incompatible with a state salaried 
service. The MPU made detailed proposals for the reorganisation of local 
public health and environmental services. It also emphasised that in a 
co-ordinated service, hospitals should cease to be the foundation and 
focal point of treatment as they had been in the past. In the new 
service, hospitals could be rationally organised into a scheme of 
central, district and specialist institutions co-ordinated with a 
well-organised general practitioner service. They need no longer be the 
place of first resort for treatment for large numbers of people, their 
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outpatient departments could be linked with the health centre 
practitioner service, and the interests of both medical efficiency and 
economy could be served in the process. 
A request by the MPU to send a deputation to the Ministry was 
turned down, pending publication of the White Paper; the MPU then 
directed its attention in 1943 to the work of the TUC, Labour, and 
Co-operative joint committee. 
The Socialist Medical Association 
The SMA's activities preceding and following the Beveridge Report 
were not limited to aiding the Labour Party formulate its health policy. 
Through 1941 and 1942 it continued its publicist activities. In 1940, 
the Association's journal had published a detailed scheme for a 
socialised health service, based upon the general principles of 
universality and comprehensiveness which it had earlier propounded. It 
offered some detailed suggestions, again those for which it was well 
known, prefaced by a comment on the general political significance of 
its position: 
A completely socialised medical service will be 
possible only in a completely socialised community; yet 
there is no reason why medicine should not be in the 
vanguard of the march forward, based as it is on service 
and imbued with altruism, and no reason why it should 
not be an example of the benefits to be derived from 
State organisation. (28) 
The emphasis was on making available to all persons, without financial 
barriers, the best of modern scientific medicine, in all aspects, and in 
an efficient national service, with maximum freedom of choice for doctor 
and patient and democratic administration. 
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Two years later, in 1942, MEDICINE TODAY AND TOMORROW printed again 
the SMA programme, in light of the British Medical Association's tiDraft 
Interim Rep:>rt of the Medical Planning Commission. II The Report was 
criticised for its failure to break with certain strongly-held 
orthodoxies of the medical profession, in particular that the wealthiest 
ten per cent of the population should be excluded from a public scheme 
in order to benefit the private medical sector. Again the structure of 
a socialised service was set out, with stress placed on health centres 
as the base for general practice and public health, on an industrial 
health service, and on wide reforms to democratic medical education. 
Suggestions for the transition from the Emergency Medical Service to a 
comprehensive state service were made. (29) 
Also in 1942, Dr David Stark Murray published for the SMA, in book 
form, a popular account of the SMA's position on why Britain should have 
a state health service, and the form it might take. (30) The SMA journal 
approved of Beveridge's linking, in his Assumption B, of health and 
social security measures in interdependent relationship, and his 
suggestions that general practice, reorganised in health centres in the 
context of a comprehensive service, would provide the basis for the 
necessary co-operation between state and citizen in the maintenance of 
heal th. (31) 
Following the release of the Beveridge Report, the SMA stepped up 
its activities in both the public advocacy and the policymaking spheres. 
Public meetings were held in many places. In March 1943 an SMA 
deputation met with Minister of Health Ernest Brown to put forward the 
Association's proposals, and followed up by sending a number of the 
SMA's policy documents to the Ministry. The annual meeting of the SMA, 
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in May 1943, gave formal approval to Assumption B, noting it could only 
be fulfilled by the establishment of a socialised health service. This 
position was elaborated at the Labour Party Conference in June by Mr 
Somerville Hastings, who argued forcefully for those features of the 
SMA's policy which distinguished it as a socialist scheme, in comparison 
with the more conservative proposals of Beveridge. 
In October 1943 an SMA conference, under the title "A National 
Service for Health," with some 200 delegates from professional, 
co-operative and trade union groups, endorsed Beveridge, 
of the Minister immediate implementation of the 
and requested 
health service 
proposals. This followed the "London Conference on Health" in February, 
and a Health Wbrkers' Convention in May 1943. (32) 
In November 1943 the SMA again requested to send a deputation to 
the Minister; the request was turned down in favour of a postponement 
until after the White Paper had been released. Meanwhile, a deputation 
was received in November by the Lord President of the Council, the Rt. 
Hon. Clement Attlee, one of the three Labour cabinet Ministers. The 
SMA's views on the urgency of action, and on basic principles of 
universality, unification of hospital systems, administration by 
enlarged local authorities, and free, tax-financed services, were put 
forward, in the context of the government's apparently weak commitment 
to implement Beveridge, and the Labour Party's conference policy which 
the SMA had had a large part in framing. Mr Attlee's reactions to the 
SMA deputation are not recorded. 
S~ membership in 1943 had grown rapidly to 1,500. While many of 
these were professionals, the Association attempted to involve, through 
leaflets, meetings, and the health workers' conferences, as many persons 
173 
from other health service occupations as possible; this attempt was 
reflected in its rapid membership growth. The SMA aided also in the 
distribution of the Labour Party policy material. 
All these efforts were geared to the widest distribution and 
discussion of the state medical service proposals of the SMA and Labour 
Party. In several respects 1943 was an ideal time for such activity --
after the immensely popular but relatively general Beveridge proposals, 
and before the government made definite proposals of its own in the 
anticipated White Paper. 
The SMA incurred criticism from the SMA in 1943. While the SMA had 
earlier tentatively endorsed the Beveridge recommendation for a 
comprehensive health service, its Annual Representative Meeting, with 
support of its Council, now voted for a resolution calling for health 
service coverage for only ninety per cent of the population, for the 
right of health service doctors to do part-private practice, and for the 
retention of sale and purchase of practices. The SMA saw this as a volte 
face from the SMA Council's decision on the Draft Interim Report of the 
Medical Planning Commission, and was prompted to comment that "the SMA 
is not concerned with general principles nor with the health of the 
community or the individual, but only with the incomes of the doctors. II 
(33) The lines were thus beginning to be drawn on several major issues 
of principle concerning the structure of the health-service-to-be: 
coverage of all the population, private practice, and the sale and 
purchase of public practices. The two medical associations were in 
battle, if not directly against each other, certainly for the principles 
and interests most fundamental to their membership and following. The 
SMA, says Dr Stark Murray, "clearly saw that it had to influence the 
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medical profession as much as possible but it also had to make the 
public so convinced of the need for a national health service that 
nothing would be allowed to stand in its way. Ii (34) 
The Position of the Advocates by Late 1943 
There had developed by this time a certain division of opinion 
within the Labour Party over support for the S~'s 'socialist' model 
health service, implying full state ownership of facilities, salaried 
medical practice, and fully integrated, preventive industrial health 
services, as part of a thoroughgoing and immediate reorganisation of the 
social organisation of medicine. The opposing body of opinion, which 
was less articulate and organised, but nonetheless significant, since it 
was based in the Parliamentary leadership and the National Executive 
Committee, argued mostly on grounds of political expediency against too 
rapid a changeover, and against nationalisation of voluntary hospitals. 
The compromise was to propose the "incorporation" of the voluntary 
hospitals, which might have meant a scheme of voluntary, subsidised 
co-ordination. Significantly, the 1943 Party Conference supported 
whole-time salaried service for doctors, and the establishment of health 
centres. 
The TUC, by the end of 1943, had resolved the issue of the probable 
demise of the trade union approved societies, if a national health 
service were to be created. Its concerns were equally that the service 
address comprehensively the social and industrial bases of ill-health 
and that, internally, it should provide adequate and attractive 
conditions of work for all grades of employees, and for democratic 
organisation of health workers. While it was quite prepared to endorse 
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most of the Labour Party - SMA proposals including the nationalisation 
of voluntary hospitals, it was apparently wary that the SMA's proposals 
for industrial health committees would involve too little trade union 
representation. This the SMA denied. It was, however, at one with the 
SMA in strongly advocating an industrial health service, a point which 
the Labour Party NEC declined to include in its 1943 Conference 
resolution, but was willing to amend later. 
The MPU was in agreement with, or expressed stronger views than, 
the other bodies on most general issues: it strongly supported the 
nationalisation of all hospitals, along with the abolition of private 
wards; it urged an entirely salaried basis for medical practice, which 
it argued was not at all incompatible with free choice of doctor; and it 
argued for the reorganisation of general practice in health centres, so 
that hospitals would be primarily for referral, and no longer the focal 
point of the medical system. It advocated far-reqching reforms to 
democratise medical education. The MPU's main point of difference with 
the other advocate groups was in the extent of local authority control 
over the regionalised medical administration, an important element in 
their model service. Here, agreement was reached by the end of 1943, 
which satisfied the MPU's concern for medical freedom. 
All the advocate groups, separately and jointly, had approached the 
Coalition government with their views, particularly after the release of 
the Beveridge Report. They interpreted their task as the double one of 
supporting Beveridge because of the enormous popularity of his 
proposals, but critically, since he provided few details for the 
construction of a health service. On the other hand, they had to 
prepare such detailed blueprints, and inject them into both popular 
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discussion and government planning. Apart from Health Minister Brown's 
few pronouncements, and his suggestions to the advocates that no further 
submissions or deputations be sent until after the publication of the 
White Paper, expected near the end of 1943, the government's response 
was not yet clear. 
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CHAPTER 5 
GOVERNMENT PLANNING AFTER BEVERIDGE: 
HEALTH MINISTER BROWN, THE MEDICAL PROFESSION 
AND WIDER CONSULTATIONS 
The political consensus had clearly shifted in the first half of 
the war toward acceptance of massive permanent state intervention. ~~ile 
the Coalition cabinet was, of course, heavily weighted toward the 
Conservatives, with only three Labour Ministers, there were, however, 
differences of opinion among the Conservatives which, between 1943 and 
1945, were to be very important in the shaping of parts of the health 
service. 
Calder comments on the political context in which the Coalition 
began to act on the Beveridge recommendations and in which it began, in 
its reconstruction plans, to construct a continuity in state economic 
and social activity, from wartime to the postwar world: 
From the consensus which was now developing sprang the 
ideology which was to govern the practice of both 
parties in office after the war. Capitalism, and with it 
a system of powerful private interests, must be 
preserved; but the state would take a positive role in 
promoting its efficiency ••• In effect, this consensus 
included the whole centre of British political life. (1) 
Even as the stormy debate in Parliament was taking place in 
February 1943, over the government's apparently ambiguous commitment to 
Beveridge's particular recommendations, and as Beveridge was being 
banished from any further role in implementing his scheme, officials of 
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several departments, under the direction of Cabinet, were at work taking 
the initial steps to shape legislation. 
Indeed, Ernest Bevin, as Minister of Labour, strongly impressed 
with the importance of health in industrial production, had instructed 
his officials as early as April 1942 to draw up plans for the postwar 
continuation of the Factory Medical Service and the Industrial Health 
Research Board. The assumption was that they would continue to be part 
of the Factory Department of the Ministry of Labour. Bevin's biographer 
admits it is not clear why he wished these medical schemes to remain 
under the Ministry of Labour rather than the Ministry of Health. 
A year later, in March 1943, Bevin again took the initiative in 
industrial health with the appointment of a twenty-seven member 
Industrial Heal th Corrnni ttee, wi th med ical, trade union and employers I 
representation, and himself as Chairman. In April he attended, with the 
Minister of Health, a large conference on industrial health. According 
to Bullock, Bevin's object "was to put industrial health on the map and 
to give it as wide an interpretation as possible, covering not only 
factory medical and nursing services, but medical research, the design 
of buildings and machinery, corrnnunal feeding, and personnel management." 
(2) 
In the Conservative Party, a group of fifty young MPs, convinced of 
the appropriateness of state intervention, and, unlike some of their 
colleagues willing to defend Beveridge, constituted itself the Tory 
Reform Committee. This group, led by Quintin Hogg, among others, 
continued to share with the Labour Ministers, particularly with Herbert 
Morrison, an affinity for pragmatic, rational ising economic and social 
measures, includ ing some national isation. 
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In March 1943, Churchill, with evident reluctance and conspicuous 
omission of any reference to Beveridge, made an important broadcast to 
announce a Four Year Programme of "five or six large measures of a 
practical character" including "national compulsory insurance for all 
classes for all purposes from the cradle to the grave," in addition to 
full employment, state aid for farmers, a National Health Service, equal 
opportunity in education, and a "broadening field for state ownership 
and enterprise. Ii This was to usher in a two year period of planning and 
discussions resulting in what Sir William Beveridge dubbed the lI\AJhi te 
Paper Chase," prior to the enactment of the last major legislation of 
the Coalition and the first of the 1945 Labour government. (3) 
The War Cabinet Approves Brown's Preliminary Plans 
During February, the Reconstruction Priorities Committee of the War 
Cabinet gave consideration to the first detailed plan for a national 
medical service. The proposals were contained in the memorandum 
prepared jointly by the Minister of Health, Ernest Brown, and the 
Secretary of State for Scotland, Thomas Johnston. The memorandum was 
concerned mainly with the structure of the service, and based on the 
paramount principle that "the comprehensive health service must be one 
and indivisible in each area of the country." The logic of this was 
that, if local authorities were not to be deprived of their existing 
services, to which there would be much objection, they should be in 
charge of the entire service, which could be achieved by combining local 
authorities into regional units of roughly similar size and amalgamating 
their health functions as joint health authorities. Careful 
negotiations with local authorities would be necessary, and with the 
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medical profession, which would have to be given adequate representation 
on the joint authority health committees, to assuage its extreme fear of 
local authority control. Voluntary hospitals would be brought into the 
scheme by subsidised, contractual arrangements with the joint 
authorities. The status of teaching hospitals, and the question of 
whether to make them central to the hospital services in each joint 
authority area, were seen as debatable, as was the recovery of hospital 
costs from patients, as recommended by Beveridge. 
The health centre concept was seen by the Ministers as a desirable 
way of reorganising general practice, with the proviso that competitive 
private practice and freedom of choice of doctor must be preserved. For 
young doctors entering the service, however, the Ministers had "no doubt 
that they should be under an obligation to give full-time service." 
A reorganised general practitioner service was crucial to the 
overall scheme; it was a matter of great urgency to arrive at a policy 
to present to young doctors leaving war service, so that they could be 
taken directly into the new system before having to make interim 
arrangements. The Ministers proposed eight main features of the new 
general practitioner service: 
1. Administration by the single health authority in each area 
2. Coverage of all persons, there being "no ground on which 
exclusion could be justified ll in a publicly funded service 
3. Optional private practice for doctors and 
part-private practice for doctors 
patients and 
4. Supervision of the quality of medical services by the joint 
health authorities -- the panel system under National Health 
Insurance exercised little such control 
5. The profession's fear of lay control should be met 
ways: (a) a central Medical Advisory Committee with 
regional groups, to advise the Minister; (b) 















6. In hiring practitioners, local health authorities would make the 
final selection from a short list provided by the Central 
Medical Board; the "protected tenure" system would end 
7. Payment to doctors was seen as a difficult matter, the BMA 
attaching much importance both to competition for patients and 
free choice of doctor with which it believed only the capitation 
system to be consistent; the Ministers saw no logical connection 
between free choice and method of payment, preferring payment by 
a merit system, especially in health centres where a reasonable 
salary scale with superannuation could operate 
8. The gradual implementation of a comprehensive service, in 
several stages, was rejected in favour of full application of 
the scheme, with due consideration to adaptations necessary for 
doctors already in practice. (4) 
By the time of the House of Commons debate on the general 
principles of Beveridge, in mid-February, the War Cabinet Reconstruction 
Priorities Committee had agreed on several fundamental principles: 
1. The service would be comprehensive, i.e., covering all aspects 
of medical care 
2. It would be universal, covering all the population. Here the 
Committee notably rejected SMA arguments for a 'ninety percent 
scheme', i.e., excluding the wealthiest ten percent of the 
population 
3. There would remain scope for private medical practice 
4. Voluntary hospitals would continue 
5. It would probably take several years before full dental and 
ophthalmic services could be included 
6. Detailed negotiations with the medical profession and other 
interests should begin at once. (5) 
These principles were announced in the Commons February 16 by the 
Lord President of the Council, Sir John Anderson, in Prime Minister 
Churchill's absence. No commitment was made to early legislation. There 
would first be confidential discussions with the medical profession and 
health authorities, a White Paper would be prepared for public 
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discussion, and finally the plan would be drafted in the form of 
legislation. (6) 
This procedure was, in general, followed over the next two years, 
although not even the year of discussions after the White Paper of 
February 1944 saw the drafting of legislation accomplished before the 
dissolution of the Coalition in May 1945, the brief interregnum of the 
Conservative Caretaker government, and the dramatic election of July 
1945. 
Brown's Initial Discussions: The Local Authorities 
Discussions with the medical profession, the voluntary hospitals, 
and the local authorities did indeed begin in March 1943, and were 
reported upon by the Minister of Health to the War Cabinet Committee on 
Reconstruction Priorities in July. (7) 
The local government organisations represented in the first 
discussions were the County Councils Association, the Association of 
Municipal Corporations, and the London County Council (LCC). The 
discussions focused on the government's proposal that local authorities 
should be grouped into health regions and joint health authorities 
formed to administer all branches of the comprehensive service. The 
local government representatives made two major points: local authority 
'clinic' services would be better run by individual rather than grouped 
authorities; and there was a need for a general review of the future 
functions of local government. 
Other local government groups were also consulted: the non-county 
borough councils, urban and rural district councils, and the London 
metropolitan borough councils. 
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The Minister recorded his preference for the original (February) 
proposal for a service with all branches unified under combined or joint 
local authority auspices, and accordingly prepared a plan showing 
forty-two such areas. He argued the case for placing the general 
practitioner service under the new joint authorities on two grounds: 
the need for unification of services; and the likelihood that the 
medical profession would "summarily reject" the practitioner service 
being placed under existing local authorities, considering their 
traditional antipathy to local authority public health arrangements. The 
Minister also argued, on the same principles of unification, for placing 
the clinic and welfare services of the individual local government units 
under the new joint authorities. To ensure equity in the delegation and 
sharing of functions among the various hospitals participating in each 
area, he recommended the creation of district committees representing 
the joint authority, the medical profession, the individual councils, 
and the voluntary hospitals. It appeared that, although the Minister's 
recommendations of unification of all functions under joint authorities 
ran counter to the wishes of the local authority organisations, he did 
not expect strong opposition from them. 
Initial Discussions: The Medical Profession's Reaction 
Discussions with the medical profession did not proceed as 
smoothly. The SMA first appointed a Representative Committee of 
thirty-five members with the understanding from the Minister that the 
purpose of the consultation was to discuss, not to negotiate. After 
initial meetings, the Representative Committee requested that the 
government put in writing some of its ideas, particularly for the system 
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of group practice in health centres, and for proposals regarding terms 
and conditions of service, including remuneration and compensation for 
the loss of value of practices. According to Eckstein, lithe medical 
delegates had asked the Ministry what a salaried service for general 
practitioners might be like; the Ministry had responded by producing a 
plan which it was willing to discuss but to which it apparently attached 
no authoritative weight." (8) 
Wilson Jameson (later Sir), as Chief Medical Officer at the 
Ministry of Health, was one of several Ministry doctors, whose function 
it was, since they had no executive powers, to ilfly kites" in the talks 
with the medical profession, that is, to advance proposals unofficially. 
Jameson accordingly outlined the hypothetical details of a salaried 
scheme, worked out by the Ministry, to the Representative Committee. (9) 
Although the discussion was understood to be confidential, according to 
the Minister's memorandum of 28 July 1943, distorted and sensational 
reports of it were leaked to the press. Dr Hill, Deputy Secretary of the 
BMA delivered an "intemperate speech" to a mass meeting of doctors in 
London, 16 May 1943, purporting to reveal the government's firm 
proposals to be: fully salaried public medical work; general 
practitioners practising in health centres with the right to private 
practice; all medical services to be run by local authorities; and 
specific figures for the salary scale. The BRITISH MEDICAL JOURNAL 
reacted immediately, angrily accusing the government of an attempt to 
turn the medical profession into a "service of technicians controlled by 
central bureaucracy and by local men and women entirely ignorant of 
medical matters. II (10) The impression given to the mass meeting, 
Eckstein notes, was that the BMA Committee had been presented with a 
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fait accompli by the government, which would reduce the profession to 
the status of local government functionaries. 
The Minister was obliged to respond in the House of Commons with an 
explanation of the course of events. (11) The BMA called for a Royal 
Commission, a tactic which Eckstein interprets one of obstruction: "As 
soon as the government became serious about reforming the medical 
system, a sort of nameless fear of what might ensue gripped the 
profession's representatives." (12) 
As a result of these events, Brown approached the BMA to appoint a 
smaller committee to continue discussions. This was done, and the 
positions were clarified in the Minister's memorandum to the War Cabinet 
of 28 July. Three areas were explored: central administration; local 
administration; and the general practitioner service. 
1. Central administration. The BMA Committee proposed the health 
service be operated not by the Ministry but as a semi-independent 
medical commission. The Minister felt the BMA would be unlikely to 
pursue this matter, since a commission would in effect be similar to a 
government department. The BMA secondly proposed placing the health 
functions of all government departments under the Ministry of Health, 
including the school medical service, the factory medical service, the 
mental hospital and mental deficiency services, and the police and post 
office medical services. While non-committal on this range of services, 
the Minister changed his previous position to agree that the mental 
health services should be included from the start, rather than awaiting 
their overhaul. Thirdly, the BMA approved the Minister's proposed 
Central Medical Board along with a Medical Advisory Committee which they 
felt should be strengthened and enabled to have an independent public 
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voice in case of dispute. The Minister felt this point should be 
conceded, in the interests of a more effective central administration. 
2. Local administration. Substantial agreement was reached on medical 
representation on the proposed joint health authorities and on the role 
of local professional bodies. 
3. The general practitioner service. Discussion here focused on the 
Minister's original proposals taken, as he noted, from the Draft Interim 
Report of the Medical Planning Commission (1942). 
The basic proposal was for a health centre-based, salaried 
practitioner service, with superannuation and compensation for the lost 
value of private practices. The BMA now objected on four grounds to 
this idea: (a) it would mean that group practice would supersede 
competitive panel practice; (b) payment would be by salary; (c) private 
practice would be limited to those doctors already in private practice; 
and (d) the local health authority would be in charge of employing 
doctors and terminating contracts. 
The Minister accused the SMA Committee of failing to honour the 
commitment to health centres contained in their 1942 report. "Hence, in 
the discussions, the Committee, while not wholly repUdiating the 
conception of Health Centres, were at pains to suggest that at most the 
idea was an interesting one which might usefully be tried out on a small 
scale, and that throughout the country a system not unlike the present 
panel system would fill the bilL" (13) The Committee argued the idea 
was untried, would take time to build, would be impractical in rural 
areas, and that the National Health Insurance panel system of capitation 
payments to practitioners was satisfactory. The Minister questioned the 
practicality of maintaining parallel systems of health centre and solo 
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panel-type practice. 
On the second point, salaries, the Committee argued that capitation 
payments were the basis for a more personal relationship between doctor 
and patient. They did, however, endorse the view of the Medical 
Planning Commission report (which they were later to reject) that 
doctors in health centres should receive a basic salary, and that it was 
only the method of earning money above this amount that was at issue. 
The Minister reminded them that medical opinion on salaries would be 
divided, with more younger doctors in favour: "I do not doubt the 
opposition to a universal and compulsory system of salaries will be 
bitter and sustained. It is quite clear this opposition is being urged 
in the meetings of BMA Divisions." (14) 
On the limitation of private practice, the Minister foresaw 
possible abuses of a part-time system, such as neglect of the public 
side of a doctor's practice and the possible deterioration of public 
practice. Since it appeared unlikely, however, that more than ten 
percent of patients would prefer private treatment, there would be no 
need to allow more than a small proportion of doctors to practise 
privately. The Committee agreed that young doctors might fairly be 
expected to practise full-time in the public service for a number of 
years: the Minister agreed, and suggested a five to seven year public 
service requirement. 
On the matter of entry into the service, the Committee felt the 
Central Medical Board should be responsible for appointments and 
dismissals, a position to which the Minister acceded. His proposal was 
that, with the local health authority advising the Central Board on 
appointments, a system of tripartite contracts among the practitioners, 
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the health authority and the Central Medical Board should be arranged. 
This should, he felt, allay the profession's fears of local authority 
control and reflect the reality of dual employing agencies. 
With respect to the evident maldistribution of doctors in the 
country, the Minister noted to the Cabinet the obvious need for some 
procedure for allocation of doctors, particularly in industrial and 
isolated areas. He felt the profession would not be strongly opposed to 
some such mechanism. The consequence of regulating the location in 
which doctors might practise would, however, imply the end of the system 
of sale and purchase of medical practices, at least among doctors in the 
health service: "The sale and purchase of panel practices has for long 
been something of a scandal, as many leaders of the profession have 
admitted." (15) Compensation for the loss of value to those who had 
already purchased their practice, and a superannuation scheme in the 
health service, would in his view be a logical means of recompense. 
A further proposal to improve the quality of general practice was 
that practitioners should have full access to and consultation with the 
specialist and hospital services, and with welfare, school clinic, and 
other social services. 
Based on the tentative agreements reached in discussions with the 
SMA Committee and on his own proposals, the Minister therefore 
recommended several adaptations to panel practice including: allocation 
of doctors; ending sale and purchase; provision of basic salary and 
superannuation; controls over employment conditions for assistants; the 
establishment of medical boards for certification of doctors; and the 
linking of practitioner, specialist, and local authority public health 
and clinic services. These were perhaps the most contentious of Mr 
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Brown's proposals, those which later incurred the most determined 
opposition of the medical profession. 
On the question of whether there should be a full-scale conversion 
to health centre-based group practice with the commencement of the 
comprehensive service, or a gradual transition, with health centres 
being built alongside competitive 
reluctantly, it would appear, 
individual practices, 
favoured the latter 
the Minister 
course. His 
abandonment of hope for immediate, full-scale conversion was due to the 
resistance being voiced at that time by the SMA and BRITISH MEDICAL 
JOURNAL to any large health centre development. The opposition, he 
hoped, could be overcome with experience. Thus, he suggested the 
government make clear its firm intention to re-establish general 
practice after the war on the basis of group practice in health centres. 
Subject to practical difficulties of building, they should give local 
health authorities wide discretion in establishing centres, and should 
ensure full consultation with local medical opinion. "But in the last 
resort the public interest must prevail, and it should be made plain 
that a right on the part of the local profession to veto the 
establishment of a Health Centre cannot be admitted. 1I (16) 
Discussions with the Voluntary Hospitals 
The third group with which Mr Brown held discussions and reported 
in the 28 July memorandum was the British Hospitals Association (BHA), 
representing the voluntary hospitals. After several meetings, he 
recorded, their apprehensions of being placed "under" the local 
authorities were dispelled, and agreement was reached on several main 
points. The Minister agreed to their request for a central advisory 
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body and mixed local administrative bodies representing the voluntary 
hospitals in the area, the medical profession and the health authority. 
The health authority would draw up a plan determining the role of each 
hospital -- municipal and voluntary. Medical appointments would be, to 
some extent, centralised under the joint authority. 
The Minister conceded to the strong representations of the 
voluntary hospitals and the hospital savings associations in agreeing to 
the Beveridge position that patients should continue to pay some part of 
the "hotel" costs of their stay, either directly or through a savings 
association. One pound per week was suggested. The associations would 
be required to achieve uniformity in their contributions and accounting, 
and apply their benefits to all hospitals. Finance of voluntary 
hospitals was also discussed, and general agreement reached on a formula 
for their partial funding from rates and from the Exchequer. 
The 28 July memorandum concluded with comments on the difficulty of 
maintaining secrecy in discussions with the interested parties, and a 
strong recommendation for publication of a White Paper by the autumn of 
1943. 
The SMA and the MPU Petition Ernest Brown 
The SMA had also been persistent in its approaches to Brown in 
1943. In late February, following a meeting of the SMA Medical Planning 
Commission, Somerville Hastings of the SMA, supported by Labour Party 
Secretary J.S. Middleton, requested that Brown receive a deputation, 
either with the BMA's deputation of 9 March, or separately. Accordingly 
Brown met with the SMA on 26 March, having been briefed by his officials 
on the programme and on the background of some of the prominent members 
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of the SMA. The Minister outlined to the deputation the main principles 
the government would follow. This represented, in effect, the guiding 
principles upon which the government had made firm decisions. The 
service would be available to all, irrespective of means; it would aim 
at positive health and wellbeing; and it would be mainly free, with the 
possible exception of charges suggested by Beveridge. The service would 
be best located with local government, to ensure full public 
responsibility, while professional freedom and consultation would be 
guaranteed. 
In turn, the SMA presented a memorandum to the Minister in essence 
similar to that prepared for distribution by the Labour Party following 
its 1943 Conference. It stressed a single unified service, division of 
the country into areas larger than individual local authorities, and the 
creation of health units consisting of co-ordinated hospitals and health 
centres for population areas of about 100,000. One health centre should 
serve about 20,000 people. 
The SMA deputation welcomed the Minister's apparent acceptance of 
salaried general practice, and offered to submit to the Minister's 
announced sub-committee on health centres a detailed memorandum of SMA 
ideas. (Ministry documents show no further reference to this 
sub-committee.) They further stressed the unification of the hospital 
system -- making no reference to the means advocated and the 
desirability of keeping any private practice out of the state system, 
even though it might exist outside. They were particularly opposed to 
the capitation system in health centres, as introducing a destructive 
element of competition for patients; they did, however, emphasise that 
freedom of choice of doctor was as easily guaranteed in a salaried 
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system as with capitation, a position strongly opposed by the SMA. The 
SMA idea that capitation fees were an incentive to good medical work was 
dismissed as Itplain nonsense." 
In May the SMA sent the promised extensive memorandum on health 
centres, outlining numerous details of health centre services: 
population bases; co-ordination with hospital and specialist services; 
possible teamwork arrangements; integration of both health centre and 
district hospital work into medical curricula; high amenity standards of 
buildings; inclusion of dental and ophthalmic services; free choice by 
patients of doctors both within and between centres; and democratic 
control, both by health workers within the centre, and by adequate 
representation on the local health authority. (17) 
These proposals were therefore before the Minister during the 
beginning of difficulties with the SMA. His response to the deputation 
is not recorded. 
Not only the SMA approached the Minister directly in favour of a 
comprehensive service during mid-1943. The controversy with the SMA 
moved a number of trade union branches to write, urging the Minister to 
remain firm in his intention to implement Assumption B. 
The Medical Practitioners' Union, having requested from March to be 
included in discussions, was, in July, finally invited to send a 
deputation to the Minister, despite the anticipation by Ministry 
officials of anger in the SMA at the MPU being given an interview. The 
MPU was described to the Minister by his officials as left wing but not 
necessarily associated with the SMA, and as the only significant body 
outside the SMA representing general practitioners. It was noted, 
however, that "those on the councils of the SMA have the strongest 
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dislike of the MPU and possibly fear that its aggressive policies may 
one day make ita truly rival organisation. II The articulate opposition 
of the MPU to competitive private practice was noted, along with their 
advocacy of the inclusion, by transfer of ownership, of voluntary and 
municipal hospitals in one state hospital scheme, and of salaried 
general and specialist practice with appropriate expense allowances. 
TI1e deputation of ten, led by Dr Gordon Ward, introduced to Mr 
Brown several detailed MPU memoranda on aspects of health service 
policy, the most detailed of which had been prepared in August 1942. The 
deputation elaborated on some of its positions already known to the 
Ministry, and on some from its memoranda. Its proposals for a fully 
nationalised hospital system were explained, including the abolition of 
private wards, and the encouragement of voluntary work and of donations 
surplus to normal budgetary needs. The MPU's position in favour of 
whole time salaried practitioners and specialists was restated. Notably, 
also, it was suggested that the personal health or clinic services of 
the local authorities be split, with the maternity service and various 
clinics going to the new area health authorities, and home helps and 
health visitors remaining with the individual authorities a 
compromise similar to that ultimately chosen in the NHS. Reforms to 
democratise medical education were also expanded upon, as were the MPU's 
proposals for the reorganisation of general practice in a state service 
which would exclude any element of private practice inside the service, 
although it was not suggested to control private practice outside. It 
was assumed general practice would be grouped in a "central office," 
except in rural areas. It is noteworthy, however, that the MPU made no 
specific mention of the health centre concept as such, developed in 
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detail by the SMA. (18) 
Reaction by the Minister and his officials to the MPU deputation 
and memoranda is not recorded in the Ministry documents. The MPU were 
to make no further representations before the 1944 White Paper. 
Controversy in the House of Lords 
A debate in the House of Lords, 2 June 1943, added more fuel to the 
fire of controversy over the implementation of Beveridge's Assumption B. 
Debate was on a motion by Lord Derwent that, since the Beveridge Plan 
did not appear to be in the best interests of doctors or the public, the 
government should not adopt its proposals without careful examination. 
Viscount Dawson of Penn, famous for his report of 1919 advocating a 
comprehensive service, now criticised the government for introducing a 
"spirit of haste and hustle, instead of proceeding gradually," and of 
.. trying to build a structure in a few weeks time which was beyond the 
wit of man to do ••• The medical profession would not consent to be pawns 
on the local government chess board. 1I Lord fl'bran, on a more positive 
note, stressed the need for unification of all services under one 
government department, but was against local government as an employing 
agency of doctors. For the government, Lord Snell reassured the Members 
that avoiding a hasty decision was precisely the policy being pursued, 
that no decision had been made on a salaried service, and that the 
profession was being consulted at every stage. The government had 
resolved there would be neither unreasonable haste nor unreasonable 
delay in building the service. (19) Lord Derwent's motion was 
withdrawn, but the attention attracted by the debate again raised public 
and news media doubt about the firmness of the government's intentions. 
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(20) 
The War Cabinet Considers Brown's Revised Proposals 
The War Cabinet Committee on Reconstruction Priorities considered 
the Minister's recommendations from the end of July to the end of the 
year. In the first meeting following presentation of the 28 July 
memorandum, health centre policy was discussed. (21) "Varying views 
were expressed on this point. Most Ministers thought that the 
supersession of the Panel system by group practice in Health Centres was 
the right course. The Chancellor of the Exchequer [Rt. Hon. Sir 
Kingsley Wbod MP] favoured the continuance of the Panel system in an 
improved form." Some Ministers felt further consultation with the 
medical profession should precede any White Paper, lest their opposition 
be crystallised. It was agreed that the Committee would discuss the 
Minister's proposals in greater detail before taking any position on a 
White Paper. (22) 
The subsequent meetings in August and September, on the role of 
local authorities, agreed that larger administrative areas than counties 
or county boroughs were required, and that the best proposal was that 
suggested in the Minister's 28 July memorandum, for combined or joint 
local authorities. Some Ministers registered objections on grounds of 
opposition by the medical profession and local authorities. (23) 
At the following meeting, in mid-September, a disagreement surfaced 
between Mr Brown and the Labour Secretary of State for Scotland, Tom 
Johnston, who was responsible for planning the health service for 
Scotland, over responsibility for the general practitioner service. The 
Scottish Secretary argued that it should come under the central 
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authority, since Scotland already had successful experience with central 
administration of practitioner services. The Minister, on the other 
hand, put the case for unified local administration of all branches of 
the service by the joint local authority bodies. (24) 
At this meeting issues concerning private practice were also 
discussed, the Minister agreeing to allow private practice outside the 
service by existing practitioners, and payment by capitation to solo 
practitioners. Significantly, he remained committed ultimately to 
salaried practice in health centres. He reiterated the need to restrict 
new health service practitioners to full-time public practice for their 
first few years of practice, and again urged the end of sale and 
purchase: "The right to buy and sell a title to public remuneration 
(i.e., the purchase of private practices) seems to me indefensible. II 
(25) The Minister again urged that a number of health centres be 
constructed without delay at the opening of the service. 
The Minister and the Secretary of State for Scotland returned to 
the October War Cabinet Committee meeting on health services with a 
joint memorandum noting points on which they agreed and disagreed. They 
now expected that the practitioner service would be based on a 
continuation of panel principles with a gradual transition to group 
practice in health centres. But they noted that whatever the form of, 
or administrative authority for, the practitioner service, the 
principles of unification and co-ordination of specialist, practitioner, 
and clinic services were paramount; they specified several mechanisms by 
which such co-ordination might be attained. It was again reiterated 
that private practice should be limited, that sale and purchase of 
public practices should cease, and that public practices should be 
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distributed roughly according to population, by a Central Medical Board, 
using a "negative direction" approach, whereby II overdocto red" areas 
would be closed to new practices. The Board, the highest medical body 
within the service, would be appointed by the Minister, thus avoiding 
the "danger of the Board being composed of elderly doctors nominated by 
professional bodies who did not represent the more progressive sections 
of the profession, II as Brown pointed out to the meeting. On the issue 
of requiring new practitioners to engage only in public practice for 
several years, it was now suggested that no position be taken in the 
White Paper, only that the arguments should be set out. 
The Ministers were by this point taking the conciliatory position 
that a confrontation with the profession over salaried general practice 
would not be advisable: 
In spite of our belief that the salaried system is the 
right one for grouped practice we do not think that a 
time when the panel system is accepted as the main basis 
of practice still for the future [sic] is a good time to 
try to force the conversion of the profession to 
salaried remuneration. Similarly, we do not feel 
strongly that, with a centralised panel system, the idea 
of a part-salary, part-capitation basis is \~rth 
pressing against an unwilling profession. (26) 
Two other outstanding issues were addressed in accompanying 
memoranda. The Minister was still in favour of a system of charging 
patients for their maintenance in hospital, as Beveridge had 
recommended, while the Secretary of State for Scotland was strongly 
opposed, disagreeing with Beveridge's distinction between treatment and 
maintenance as separate aspects of hospital care. Charges, he felt, 
would deter people from treatment, would be resented, and the hostility 
to them, especially in Scotland where voluntary hospitals traditionally 




be collected (approximately 8 percent directly from 
The Minister felt that the abolition of charges would 
undermine the hospitals' and industrial contributory insurance schemes, 
which provided some twenty-seven per cent of the voluntary hospitals' 
income. The Rt. Hon. Ernest Bevin, Minister of Labour and National 
Service and known for his keen interest in a national health service, 
noted the industrial friction caused by, and the excessive work and 
overhead involved in the contributory schemes, and recommended inclusion 
of all hospital costs in the comprehensive insurance scheme, even if it 
meant an increase in the contribution. The Committee decided to postpone 
discussion on hospital charges. 
On the second issue, local authority clinic services, both 
Ministers now recommended they remain with the individual local 
authorities, rather than being transferred to the proposed joint 
authorities. (27) 
authorities. 
This would accord with the preference of the local 
The mid-October meeting of the War Cabinet Reconstruction 
Priorities Committee changed several fundamental aspects of the earlier 
planning documents. The Minister now proposed that the main 
responsibility for the practitioner services should rest with the 
central department (i.e., the Ministry) rather than with the joint 
authorities, that existing local authority clinics and public health 
services remain with the individual authorities, and that unification 
and co-ordination now be achieved by making the new joint hospital 
authorities responsible for local co-ordination of the three branches of 
the service. This they would do by preparing a scheme for co-ordination 
and submitting it to the Minister for approval or modification, which 
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would then become binding on all authorities concerned. This major 
change was approved by the War Cabinet Committee. The Committee 
requested the Ministers to prepare a draft White Paper, setting out 
general proposals for the service as a whole. (28) 
A New Minister of Health 
At its next meeting on the health service, the Committee decided in 
favour of the position taken by the Secretary of State for Scotland, the 
Chancellor, Sir John Anderson, and the Minister of Labour against direct 
charges to patients for hospital maintenance, and instructed the 
Minister of Health to begin discussions with the voluntary hospitals on 
alternate methods of funding. (29) 
This was the last War Cabinet Committee meeting for Ernest Brown as 
Minister of Health. In a major cabinet shuffle on 11 November 1943, Mr 
Brown, who was leader of the Liberal National Party and had been 
continuously in Ministerial office since 1931, was made Chancellor of 
the Duchy of Lancaster. Controversy surrounds the interpretation of his 
change of office, but it is clear from contemporary accounts that he was 
under severe attack by the medical profession for mooting the 
possibility of a salaried service, even after they claimed the victory 
of forcing him to place it "in the discard. II In addition, Cabinet 
records now available indicate that his firm stand in favour of hospital 
charges was overridden by Cabinet in favour of the Labour position, a 
free hospital service. Although the precise circumstances of his move 
are undocumented, these contemporary records would appear to lend 
support to a broader theory of Cabinet disagreement than that of the 
opposition of the BMA as the reason for the change of Ministers. 
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Brown was succeeded as Minister of Health by Mr Henry Willink, a 
Conservative backbencher and successful barrister, who had been in the 
House for only three years as the member for North Croydon, and who had 
been commended for his work, under Ernest Brown, as a 
commissioner for rehousing in the London area. 
special 
At the same time a new Ministry of Reconstruction, under Lord 
Wbolton, a member of the War Cabinet, was created to deal with all 
aspects of postwar reconstruction policy. Sir William Jowitt, who had 
had responsibility, without Cabinet rank, for reconstruction, rema.ined 
Minister without Portfolio as an aide to Lord Wbolton. (30) 
The SMA Meet with Clement Attlee 
The Socialist Medical Association sent only one other official 
deputation to the government before the White Paper. They had requested 
to see Ernest Brown, before the change of Ministers in the autumn of 
1943, to discuss progress in his general discussions and the recent 
Labour Party policy statement. Although their previous contributions 
were described by a Ministry official as "helpful and constructive," he 
suggested to the Minister that the time was not right to see the SMA, 
and that he meet with them after publication of the White Paper. 
The SMA arranged instead to send a deputation to the Lord President 
of the Council, Clement Attlee, 11 November 1943, the day Brown's 
replacement by Henry Willink was announced. Mr Somerville Hastings 
referred Attlee to Labour Party health service policy, which the SMA 
wished to see implemented, " ••• al though it was real ised that in a 
Coalition Government it might not be possible to carry out the Party's 
policy in its entirety. Certain compromises might, therefore, be 
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necessary, but his Association was anxious that they should not be of 
such a nature as to commit the Government irrevocably to an undesirable 
course of policy." The SMA deputation reiterated several of its and the 
Labour Party's fundamental policies for a health service including 
comprehensiveness, universality, free use, full administrative unity, 
preferably under enlarged local authorities, and abolition of the 
hospital savings associations. 
Attlee was curious about the position of the BMA, and was told by 
the deputation that the BMA accepted unification but wanted central 
administration to be by a medical corporation, that they objected to the 
practitioner service being under the local authorities and that they 
wished the right to collect fees. lilt was pointed out that in the BMA 
itself there was a difference of view and that only about twenty per 
cent of the older members were in favour of a completely reactionary 
policy. II There is no indication that Attlee correspondingly briefed the 
SMA deputation on the nearly finalised decisions on policy for the White 
Paper, many of which were in accord with SMA and Labour Party policy, 
taken in the War Cabinet Committee the previous week. (31) 
It would appear, in fact, that by the end of 1943 neither the SMA 
nor the MPU had been given by their Labour colleagues or the Minister a 
clear idea of precisely what had been won or lost of their proposals in 
the Cabinet's decisions. 
Summary: The Position Prior to the \Nhite Paper 
Several observations might be made on the state of development of 
plans for the health service by the end of Ernest Brown's tenure as 
Minister. It is, first of all, clear that a large body of agreement 
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existed among the Minister, Liberal National Ernest Brown, the senior 
Ministry officials who drew up the initial proposals early in 1943, and 
the socialists and other medical reformers who were the chief proponents 
of the health service. Indeed the Liberal Party itself had produced a 
detailed policy document in favour of a free, comprehensive scheme. (32) 
The agreement centered mainly on reorganising general practice into a 
salaried, health centre-based service, well integrated with the other 
branches. It also covered ideas for central and local administration, 
the Ministry of Health to be the superior, responsible body, with 
combined or joint local authorities carrying out planning, co-ordination 
and regional administration. 
There was less agreement on unification of the hospital service. 
The MPU pressed perhaps most strongly and explicitly for 
nationalisation, with the SMA agreeing in principle but less adamant and 
possibly likely to have agreed with a compromise scheme of local 
co-ordination. The Minister at no point agreed with the case for a 
unified, nationalised hospital system, although in his initial papers 
and discussions in the War Cabinet Committee he was strongly committed 
to a co-ordinated hospital service under joint local authority 
administration. 
Despite the BMA's fears, all parties were committed to generous 
professional representation and remuneration, full professional freedom 
in practice and free choice of doctor as far as practicable in any 
locality. The proponents suggested salaried practice in health centres 
as the most practical way to enhance free choice. The main differences 
with the SMA concerned issues of control and medical representation at 
all levels, and remuneration. The SMA held strongly to the view that 
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not the Ministry but a semi-independent medical corporation should be in 
charge, and was against any notion that the local authorities be 
primarily responsible for the daily operation of the practitioner 
service or of voluntary hospitals. On the issues of coverage for the 
whole population, rather than ninety per cent, and of Ministerial 
responsibility for the service as a whole, Brown stood firmly and 
consistently against the BMA's positions. 
He was clearly less convinced by the proponents' arguments that the 
voluntary hospitals should be financed from rates and the Exchequer, 
having voiced several times to the Cabinet Committee the argument of the 
hospitals contributory societies that they would stand to disappear with 
all-public funding. Similarly Brown was not at any time convinced of 
the argument for an all-free service, contrary even to Liberal policy; 
several times, against strong Cabinet opposition he defended Beveridge's 
case for direct patient fees for hospital IIhotel" costs, and deductions 
from sick benefits for wage-earners in hospital. 
Brown's final plan reflected several major changes from his 
original proposals as a result of representations from the major health 
services interests -- the BMA, the voluntary hospitals, and the local 
authorities. His mooted health centre and salaried service proposals 
had been considerably cut back by the end of his tenure; he had agreed 
with the BMA on establishing only a limited experiment in health 
centres, ostensibly as a transitional measure, and on the possibility of 
payment by capitation and part-private practice. Equally his strongly 
held preference for administration of a unified service by joint local 
authorities ultimately gave way under the opposition, for entirely 
different self-interested reasons, of both the BMA and the local 
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authorities. He did, however, maintain quite decisively the position, 
shared with the proponents, that sale and purchase of private practices, 
in a public service, should end, with adequate compensation. 
A.J. Willcocks, in assessing Brown's contribution to building the 
White Paper, considers that he had little useful role to play following 
the much publicised confrontations with the BMA in May: "For the rest of 
1943, Brown (having discarded his own plan) floundered as he listened to 
the conflicting views of the pressure groups. His promised White Paper 
on a proposed plan gradually faded further and further away. At the end 
of the year, whether because of this failure or not, he gave way at the 
Ministry to Henry U. Willink." (33) 
Recent evidence, however, indicates both the tentative nature of 
Brown's initial salaried service proposals to the medical profession and 
the continuity of his overall aims, for example, for unification, 
comprehensiveness, universality, and the importance of the local 
authority role, throughout the evolving series of memoranda to the War 
Cabinet Committee on Reconstruction Priorities during 1943. 
It would be more fair to say on the basis of recent evidence from 
Ministry and Cabinet documents, that the real "Brown plan" was not the 
one which he was, as it appeared at the time, obliged by the BMA to 
place "in the discard" in May 1943, but was rather the detailed plan 
which resulted from the revisions and compromises approved or directed 
by the Cabinet later in 1943, which formed the substantial foundation of 
the White Paper already formulated when Henry Will ink took over the 
Ministry in November. The delays in producing a White Paper in 1943 
appear to have been due in varying degree to the deliberateness of the 
discussions with all interested parties, the obvious political 
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sensitivities and complexities of constructing a national scheme, 
highlighted by the SMA's readiness to relive the battles of 1912, and, 
perhaps to the relatively infrequent scheduling of discussions on the 
health service by the War Cabinet Committee. 
Henry Willink, therefore, as the new Minister of Health at the end 
of 1943, inherited a very complex planning and negotiating situation, 
but one that was far from a shambles, and a plan that had been modified 
substantially, but that was far from "in the discard." The state's 
prerogative to be responsible for and supervise administration of a 
public health service had been maintained even though there had been 
apparent compromise on the terms under which the medical profession 
would practise and the local authorities participate. 
Some patterns in the representation of interests were beginning to 
emerge in the course of the evolution of the Brown plan. While the 
principles of universality and comprehensiveness were tenets of the 
proponent groups, they were chosen by the government, it would appear, 
because of their relevance to the general or national interest. With 
evident pressure from the Labour Ministers in the Coalition Cabinet, it 
was determined against Brown's objections and contrary to the interests 
of the private insurance organisations, that all services would be free 
of charge and state-funded. These were to be the fundamental bases of 
coverage and eligibility, of public responsibility and public finance. 
A state scheme organised on these principles would be medically more 
effective and politically more acceptable than the alternative, 
retrictive model advanced by the medical profession and the insurance 
interests. 
In addition to these main principles of the advocates, the more 
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operational goals of serving preventive and positive health, 
reorganisation of general practice, and close co-ordination of services 
were accepted, at least verbally. It was at this level of detail, 
however, that the interests or views of the advocates began to lose 
ground to those of the medical profession, the voluntary hospitals, and 
the local authorities. As a result of close preliminary consultation 
with these three major interests, Brown reversed his original position 
in favour of salaried, health centre practice, and unification of 
services under joint local authorities, and made concessions to the 
terms of participation which the major interests demanded. The views of 
the advocates on these issues were heard, and even to some extent 
accepted by the Minister initially, but their rational supporting 
arguments of medical effectiveness and administrative unification were 
of insufficient weight against the pressure of the dominant interests. 
Even though the state had taken steps to ensure that the overriding 
public interest would be served through universal access to free 
services, it appeared, with the Cabinet's acceptance of Brown's 
concessions, that a conflict of health service models and of goals, with 
Brown's original scheme, was implicit. In the period following 
publication of the White Paper, the advocates were to continue to seek 
representation of their views in planning not only the fundamentals, but 
the structural details of the service. 
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CHAPI'ER 6 
ADVOCACY AND RESPONSE: THE CHALLENGE 
OF THE WHITE PAPER 
Final Cabinet Preparations for the White Paper 
It is highly unlikely that any of the health service proponents and 
perhaps only very few Labour MPs were aware in detail of the state of 
the government's deliberations on the White Paper by the end of 1943. By 
this time, deliberations were almost entirely internal, the War Cabinet 
being responsible for the final form of the White Paper proposals and 
discussion. These of course also had to pass the approval of Prime 
Minister Churchill, and it is here that the final delay in the issue of 
the White Paper occurred. 
One of the last submissions to the Ministry before the issue of the 
White Paper was an extensive memorandum by Dr Stephen Taylor (later Lord 
Taylor), then Head of the Home Intelligence Division of the Ministry of 
Information, and former assistant editor of the LANCET. Dr Taylor had 
also been a contributor to Labour Party health policy discussions. His 
memorandum was forwarded officially to the Minister by Clement Attlee, 
who identified its author only as a "medical man. II It advocated a 
full-time salaried service; elimination of private practice; the full 
integration of the voluntary hospitals; more medical schools; a 
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universal scheme with no class discrimination; remuneration set at a 
generous level to win the support of the medical profession, with 
guarantees of professional automonYi minimal bureaucratic interference; 
and adequate support staff for general practitioners. A Ministry comment 
on Dr Taylor's proposals noted that they set out well the views of a 
group of doctors associated with socialist positions on health in the 
Labour Party. After an interview with Taylor, it was decided that his 
position was less "extreme" than indicated in his memorandum, and that 
he should be engaged by the Ministry of Health in its work following 
release of the White Paper. (1) This may be taken as perhaps further 
indication of the consolidation of opinion in favour of a comprehensive 
state medical service within the Ministry of Health, a consensus 
including the senior officials and the Minister. 
One final pre-White Paper memorandum from the SMA, "Administration 
of the Health Services," reached the Ministry in early January 1944. 
The document dealt with details of central and local administration, 
executive and advisory structures. It advocated statutory advisory 
groups, with some overlapping among professional, vocational and 
consumer representation, and a national advisory council with 
representation from local and regional committees. Perhaps most notably 
it recommended in favour of a regional, rather than a joint local 
authority structure, each region incorporating population areas of 
500,000 to 2 million. Other innovations were suggested: 1) to improve 
the scientific aspects of medicine through encouraging research and 
incorporating a Medical Research Council as an integral part of the 
health service; 2) to establish Health WOrkers' Councils to represent 
nurses and other grades of health workers at levels from local to 
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national; 3) to have central advisory boards for the medical, dental, 
and nursing professions and for general health personnel; and 4) to 
provide for health unit committees, in each hospital or health centre, 
which would have some decision-making powers. In summary, there would be 
only two levels of elected authorities, national and regional, while at 
the local level, all health v~rkers and consumers would be represented. 
The memorandum was acknowledged with interest by the Minister. (2) 
Murray makes the point that this memorandum suggested for the first time 
that doctors and other health workers be given representation on the 
local and regional committees, and that lay committees, representing the 
public, should have watch-dog powers. This document became the focal 
point in early 1944 for discussion meetings held by the SMA throughout 
the country; in some areas, Wandsworth, for example, SMA branches 
collaborated with other organisations including trade unions and trades 
councils to make detailed proposals for the linking of various local 
health resources. (3) 
A request by the Medical Practitioners' Union to the new Minister 
to send a deputation before publication of the White Paper was turned 
down, (4) as the government was in its final, and by now relatively 
independent stages of preparation. 
By December 1943 the discussions within the government had reached 
beyond the War Cabinet Committee on Reconstruction Priorities, which had 
approved the general issues to be included in the White Paper. The Prime 
Minister now became involved. Churchill, at that time serving with the 
Mediterranean Air Command, requested a copy of the paper as soon as it 
was approved by the War Cabinet. 
It took, however, all of January 1944 for the Committee on 
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Reconstruction Priorities to finalise several outstanding issues. These 
were: the local authority structure; the organisation of the proposed 
Health Services Councils, local and central; arrangements for the 
general practitioner service; and the question of hospital maintenance 
charges. The Committee's conclusions on these four questions were: 
1. The new local authority structure would consist of joint 
authorities, responsible for direct administration only of the 
hospital service, and for submitting to the Minister a plan for 
the coordination of the other services 
2. The Health Services Councils were proposed as independent, 
self-appointed bodies with the right of publishing their views 
and advice to Parliament and the nation. They would thus be 
privileged critics of Ministerial power, representing mainly the 
medical profession and voluntary hospitals 
3. Adapting general practice to the needs of a comprehensive 
service was referred to as the most difficult of the problems 
faced by the two Ministers. They did, however, remain committed 
to fundamental change, albeit in stages: "We contemplate a large 
scale experiment in grouped practice and Health Centres, and 
these ideas are placed in the forefront of the scheme. But only 
experience can show how far and how fast a change-over to the 
grouped system should be made. II It had now been determined that 
in Scotland the central government should be responsible for 
health centres, while in England it was proposed to have 
practitioners contract jointly with the local authority and the 
Central Medical Board. 
A universally salaried service was rejected, salaries being 
proposed only "where necessary to efficiency," for example in 
health centres, and optional for the doctor to choose in other 
circumstances. 
Private practice would be limited to a certain proportion of 
the total of a doctor's practice, and prohibited for the first 
few years of a new doctor's service. 
Sale and purchase of medical practices was termed: 
undesirable ••• , and it is regrettable to miss a chance 
of it." The cost of compensating doctors in existing, 
practices was estimated at forty million pounds 
"highly 
to be rid 
purchased 
4. The question of maintenance charges for patients in hospital had 
not yet been resolved. For Scotland it was rejected outright by 
the Scottish local authorities and voluntary hospitals (where it 
was the custom not to charge patients) and by the Labour 
Secretary of State for Scotland, Tom Johnston. For England, 
however, both Brown and Willink held to the view of the English 
voluntary hospitals, that charges were a fundamental part of the 
provision of care in voluntary hospitals, and vital for the 
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continued existence of the contributory schemes, a form of 
voluntary hospital insurance. This view had been reinforced in a 
discussion between the Ministers of Health and Reconstruction, 
and Sir William Goodenough (Chairman of the Nuffield Provincial 
Hospitals Trust), Sir E. Pooley (Honorary Secretary of King 
Edward IS Hospital Fund for London), and Sir Bernard Docker 
(Chairman of the British Hospitals Association) , who were united 
in their opposition to dropping hospital charges, which they 
felt would "gravely jeopardise the whole voluntary movement." 
Indeed the hospitals representatives wished to see voluntary 
contributory schemes extended in coverage. Thus the Minister of 
Health stood by his view, recommending a one pound per week 
charge with a means test and subsidies for those unable to 
afford it. The Ministers jointly could only recommend that the 
War Cabinet choose between charges or no charges, and implement 
a system uniform in England and Scotland. (5) 
By the end of January, final decisions had been made by the War 
Cabinet Reconstruction Committee. The proposed hospital maintenance 
charges, still supported by all major voluntary hospitals interests, by 
Minister Brown and subsequently by Will ink, were dropped entirely in 
early January under pressure from the Labour members, particularly 
Thomas Johnston. Minor changes were made in the local and central Health 
Services Councils, and to facilitate professional representation on 
local health authorities; alterations were made to the health centre 
proposals, particularly to make individual county and county borough 
councils responsible in England and Wales, and to provide for a three 
party contract for doctors. with respect to sale and purchase, the 
White Paper would contain no specific proposals, but would suggest full 
discussion with the profession. (6) 
This was the stage, before consideration by the full War Cabinet, 
at which Lord Wool ton, Minister of Reconstruction, commended the draft 
White Paper to the Prime Minister, with an explanation of the evolution 
of the proposals. 
Lord Cherwell, Paymaster General, also commended the draft White 
Paper to Churchill in a letter, noting that it" represents a courageous 
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attempt to find a via media between the conflicting views and 
interests," and he expressed the hope that it would be accepted by the 
Cabinet. He anticipated opposition from the medical profession 
concerning inadequate representation in the administrative bodies, 
payment of salaries in health centres, and coverage of the whole 
population without means test. Supporting the principle of 
universality, Lord Cherwell considered it "intolerable" to limit access 
to a publicly funded scheme only to poorer groups. He expected 
complaints also from local authorities and voluntary hospitals about 
loss of automony to the larger public authorities, but reiterated his 
belief in the basic plan. (7) 
The War Cabinet met 9 February 1944, Chaired by the Prime Minister, 
to discuss the draft White Paper. It was introduced by Lord Wbolton, 
who asked for approval to publish it as a discussion document. It had 
the unanimous approval of the Reconstruction Priorities Committee, after 
many months of preparation and the reconciling of many divergent 
opinions. Lord Wbolton reassured the Cabinet that: 
1. The abolition of private practice was not involved, nor would 
any class of persons be denied treatment in the public health 
service, merely by virtue of ability to pay privately 
2. Any comprehensive service would pose some threat to private 
practice, but proposals for grouped practice in health centres 
or elsewhere would increase the efficiency of the rank and file 
of the profession 
3. There would be no large bureaucratic machine directing doctors, 
as had been suggested by some; the state would act in an 
obligation to provide a universal service, but its powers of 
direction were not drastic and would not interfere with 
professional freedom 
4. The whole basis of the medical profession would not, as had also 
been suggested, be undermined. The thirty year success of the 
Scottish Highlands and Islands medical service indicated 
increased medical efficiency along with the retention of private 
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practice 
5. All references to Sir William Beveridge in the introductions to 
the White Paper and official summary were to be removed. 
With these reassurances the War Cabinet approved the publication, 
for 17 February, of the Paper as a discussion document only, 
representing no final position of the government (at Churchill's 
request), and planned the first Commons debate for two to three weeks 
later. Labour cabinet Ministers Clement Attlee, Ernest Bevin, and 
Herbert Morrison were present, in addition to Thomas Johnston, Labour 
Secretary of State for Scotland, and, of course, the Conservative 
Minister of Health Henry Willink. (8) 
The following day, 10 February, Churchill, indicating the decision 
to publish the White Paper was too precipitate, especially considering 
the potential problems in launching such a scheme, ordered a delay in 
publication, pending special meetings of the War Cabinet and the full 
cabinet. In a candid comment on the extreme pressures of wartime 
politics, Churchill wrote to Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden: "It is 
absolutely impossible for me even to read these papers let alone pass 
such a vast scheme of social change through my mind under present 
conditions. I do not want the Government to get into trouble which 
may tend to break up the Coalition in this critical year." (9) 
Lord Wbolton replied to Churchill's request for a delay, commending 
the White Paper again as timely considering the government's commitment 
to a health service, and as an ideal scheme from a party political 
standpoint: 
If you are to have a national service, I am satisfied 
that you will not get one which is more acceptable to 
the Conservative point of view, and more economical of 
public money than the scheme which has been thrashed out 
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Eden, 
by the Reconstruction Committee. This is a 
compromise scheme but it is a compromise which is very 
much more favourable to the Conservative than to the 
Labour Ministers; and, when it is published, I should 
expect more criticism from the Left than from 
Conservative circles. My difficulty on the Committee 
has been to persuade the Labour Ministers to accept a 
scheme which fell so far short of their desire for a 
State salaried service; and I had great trouble in 
persuading the Labour Ministers at the last moment to 
refrain from criticising the scheme at the War Cabinet 
on that ground. 
If discussion of the whole scheme is to be reopened, 
particularly if it is known, or believed, that this is 
being done to meet the views of Conservative Ministers, 
I fear that the Labour Ministers might withdraw their 
support of the scheme and stand out for something more 
drastic which would be far more repugnant to 
Conservative thinking. (10) 
Lord Wool ton also wrote the same day to Foreign Secretary Anthony 
explaining in greater detail the nature of the political 
compromise in the War Cabinet Reconstruction Committee over particulars 
of the health service proposals. He noted the difficulty he had had to 
secure the support of the Labour Ministers, especially the Deputy Prime 
Minister and Mr Morrison. The split in Conservative ranks was small by 
comparison, but if opened, could destroy their own political advantage: 
The Labour Party found it very difficult to swallow 
the idea that in the Health Centres that are to be set 
up doctors who are not completely whole-time salaried 
servants of the State should be allowed to practise. 
I mention this to show you that I have gone to much 
trouble, as chairman of the Reconstruction Committee, to 
get the Labour Party to the "middle of the road." If 
the Conservatives turn down the compromise at which we 
have so laboriously arrived on this issue, there will be 
little hope of getting the socialists to arrive at a 
compromise on the other issues with which the 
Reconstruction Committee is faced, and on which they 
have been publicly expressing their convictions for many 
years. 
Woolton noted that Eden had been asked to speak with Conservative 
members of the Reconstruction Committee, and requested that he convey 
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the foregoing explanation to any dissenters from the White Paper 
positions before reporting to himself and the Prime Minister. (11) 
The War Cabinet met again 11 and 15 February to continue discussion 
of the implications of the White Paper. After full reassurances from the 
Ministers that the scheme would have no major deleterious effects on 
voluntary hospitals or private practice, but would rather put the 
hospitals on a sound financial basis and greatly improve the quality and 
distribution of general and specialist practice, the War cabinet 
reaffirmed its decision of 9 February to publish the White Paper as a 
basis for discussion and negotiation. (12) The Paper was duly published 
in mid February and debated in the House of Commons a month later. (13) 
Responses to the White Paper 
In general, reaction to the White Paper was favourable. THE TIMES 
considered the proposals to be: "an eminently sensible compromise. The 
various parties in the Government have subordinated party views to the 
production of an agreed plan rather different from what would have been 
produced by any party government. II The same day's leading article gave 
unreserved praise to the scheme, particularly to the goal of making the 
best services available to all without charge. It approved the joint 
authorities as a necessary expedient pending local government reform, 
and approved removing the competitive element from grouped general 
practice, noting doctors "must therefore work as a salaried team or 
receive some other form of remuneration equivalent to a salary." Dr Guy 
Dain was quoted as saying the SMA was entirely in accord with the 
objects and general principles of the scheme, and would be sending a 
questionnaire to all doctors to ascertain their views. (14) The health 
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service proponents, since they were in substantial agreement with at 
least the fundamental proposals, were left in the position of being 
obliged to defend the White Paper and at the same time to advance their 
own notions of either a 'socialist' health service, or, as the TUC 
advocated, one geared more to issues such as preventive health, health 
workers' rights and democratic control, industrial medicine, and full 
extension of dental and optical care. 
Socialist Medical Association Reactions 
On behalf of the SMA, MEDICINE TODAY AND TOMORRCltV gave the "warmest 
welcome" to the White Paper's intention lito divorce the care of health 
from questions of personal means or other factors irrelevant to it; to 
provide the service free of charge and to encourage a new attitude to 
health the promotion of good health rather than only the treatment 
of bad. II It was noted that the basic principles on which the plan was 
modelled, especially elimination of insurance and reorganising general 
practice, were sound; indeed much was "clearly drawn from material that 
first appeared in these pages [Le. MTT)." But the language of the White 
Paper was seen as that of compromise, meaning that all interested in a 
socialist solution should keep up pressure on the Government. Several 
shortcomings were identified and remedies prescribed: 
1. The service 
authorities 
other 
should be unified; 
proposed were not 
the variety of responsible 
sufficiently linked with each 
2. liThe greatest weakness ••• is, without doubt, the attempt to 
maintain private practice wi thin the national service. II All 
health service practitioners should be full-time, and any 
private practice should be outside the service. liTo permit a 
doctor who is under [public) contract to accept private fees for 
the same service as he has agreed to give without fee is to 
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introduce into public life in this country methods which in 
other places would be called graft, racketeering, or black 
market." The analogy was drawn with private payments to the 
police or fire brigade for extra service 
The abolition of sale 
difficult as the White 
immediately 
and purchase of practices, not at all 
Paper implies, should be effected 
4. Salaried public practice in health centres should be made 
attractive enough, through generous remuneration, to engage at 
least sixty per cent of existing practitioners. 
MEDICINE TODAY AND TavJ.ORRGV concluded that the compromises in the scheme 
did "not arise from any doubt in the minds of the Government as to the 
correct method of running this service; they arise from a fear the 
profession may resist." (15) 
The SMA dedicated the remainder of 1944 to campaigning for its own, 
and the Labour Party's, priorities, chiefly for a salaried health 
service. A resolution passed by the SMA Annual General Meeting, and sent 
to the Minister, echoed views already voiced by the TUC, Labour Party 
and several unions. It accepted the concessions to private practice and 
the voluntary hospitals as necessary, but felt the public service could 
be made so efficient and attractive as to eclipse the private 
alternatives. This success would depend "mainly on the widespread 
establishment of health centres of the highest possible standard," which 
could best be assured by public pressure on all levels of government 
concerned, in which effort the SMA would seek to enlist as many health 
workers as possible. The statement concluded in the same spirit of 
militant enthusiasm typical of much of the SMA's activities: "We urge 
all working class and progressive organisations and individuals to make 
this matter their close concern. The people's interest in their own 
welfare is the real key to a better future. 1I (16) 
The SMA took note of the BMA Questionary to its members regarding 
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the White Paper, the results of which indicated a good deal of support, 
especially among younger and armed forces doctors, for many of the White 
Paper proposals including health centres, salaries, abolition of sale 
and purchase, and a one hundred percent, free and comprehensive service. 
(17) Although the BMA arrived at an opposite interpretation of the 
Questionary results, the SMA was greatly encouraged at the support for 
various of its own fundamental policies. (The antipathy of most doctors 
to working for local authorities was noted, although assumed to be an 
objection that could be dealt with to the satisfaction of the profession 
in the structuring of the scheme.) Thus the SMA launched a full 
publicity and education campaign, issuing three pamphlets during 1944, 
explaining and defending the White Paper, advocating the SMA programme, 
and answering in detail the BMA and BRA which, from March 1944, were 
very much on the attack against certain of the proposals. (18) The 
third SMA pamphlet was issued after Willink had made it known in October 
that a number of new agreements had been reached with the BMA and BRA 
and the local authorities, following the extensive negotiations of the 
summer and autumn. 
Reaction of the TUC and Health Wbrkers' Organisations 
The TUC embarked on a year-long consideration of the White Paper in 
March 1944. The first document to be approved by the General Council, 
prepared by a joint subcommittee of the TUC, Labour Party and 
Co-operative Congress, welcomed the White Paper as a large step forward, 
but regretted the many gaps and certain of the orientations of the 
proposals. In particular the position paper regretted the hospital 
system would not be unified and that a salaried practitioner service was 
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not proposed. It was recognised that the co-operation of the medical 
profession was necessary; to that end all conditions of practice in the 
public service should be such as to attract the best doctors. Other 
suggestions were for a first-class rehabilitation service; official 
representation of non-professional health 
expand medical research and co-ordinate 
curative services; and finally, it was 
workers; a commitment to 
it with the preventive and 
strongly suggested that an 
industrial health service should be interwoven with the national service 
as a whole, with the closest local contact between industrial and 
personal or family medical care personnel. Omissions noted from the 
scope of the White Paper were nutrition, environmental health, housing, 
and health education, policies on all of which would be relevant to the 
mandate of a comprehensive service to improve the nation's health. (19) 
The General Council of the TUC decided in March to make an overture 
to the BMA for joint discussion of the White Paper, and also began 
detailed consideration of a document submitted by the Association of 
Scientific Workers, which was to form the basis for the TUC policy paper 
on an industrial health service submitted to the Minister in December 
1944. (20) 
In May began a brief series of discussions with the BMA, through a 
standing joint committee which had not met since 1939. The discussions 
covered the entire range of the government's proposals, and the two 
organisations' views. Both bodies agreed that the hospital system 
should be organised in regions, with boundaries not necessarily 
co-terminus with local authority boundaries, a position which was to 
gain increasing favour as the joint authority idea lost ground, and 
which was to form the basis of the hospital service under the 1946 Act. 
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In these discussions the TUC declined to press its own policy of 
unification of the two hospital systems, but rejected any further 
concessions to the voluntary hospitals than those in the White Paper. 
The SMA wished a full operating subsidy to be paid to voluntary 
hospitals, rather than the nearly-full subsidy which, the ~hite Paper 
argued, would leave some room for voluntary initiative in fund-raising. 
The TUC representative did argue for salaried general practice, against 
SMA opposition that professional independence and an ideal 
doctor-patient relationship could only be secured with remuneration 
according to number of patients. The SMA claimed not to be opposed to 
health centres in principle, but rather to salaried practice, and wished 
"controlled experiments organised on a scientific basis" to determine 
the most appropriate type of facilities and remuneration. In contrast, 
the TUC saw no reason to delay, and wished local authorities to be 
encouraged to begin building and experimenting in health centres. On the 
important additional matter of an industrial medical service, the TUC 
had already submitted a memorandum to the Royal College of Physicians, 
and agreed to communicate further with the SMA on the assumption that 
substantial agreement existed. The organisations did not reach formal 
conclusions, but acknowledged each other's valuable contributions. (21) 
The WOmen Public Health Officers' Association, representing mainly 
local authority health workers, in March published and submitted to the 
Minister its comments on the proposed scheme. Health centres were 
especially praised; they would be the focal point of all local medical 
care, preventive and curative, and of child and maternity clinic and 
home services such as midwifery and health visitors. 
Shortly thereafter, resolutions were submitted from a national 
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conference of the Social Security League (closely connected with 
Beveridge) and the Health Workers' Council (which had strong SMA 
representation). Again, teamwork and health centres and attractive 
conditions of work for all health workers were stressed, in addition to 
the inclusion of an industrial health service. The joint conference 
prepared for a national campaign to urge implementation of the White 
Paper with the additional proposals. (22) 
Many trades councils and trade union branches, along with many 
community groups, women's co-operative societies and others, petitioned 
the Minister during 1944 for full implementation of the White Paper. 
These numbered, among others, several dozen trade union branches from 
Yorkshire, many of them representing the Yorkshire Miners' Association; 
the Leicester and District Trades Council; the Coatbridge Trades 
Council; the Medway Trades Council; and the London Women's Parliament. 
All supported health centres; the trade unions especially called for 
inclusion of an industrial medical service. (23) 
The Medical Practitioners' Union was one of the health workers' 
organisations able to see the Minister in the summer of 1944. In 
advance of their deputation the MPU forwarded a memorandum, in general 
agreeing with White Paper proposals, but stressing salary as the normal 
method of payment for full-time practitioners (but with optional payment 
by capi tation), and the "utmost importance" of health centres, which 
should be built early on a wide scale. Positions were taken in favour of 
strong medical representation, the operation and ownership of health 
centres and hiring of all doctors by the Central Medical Board, in 
addition to a number of minor suggestions. In an oblique reference to 
the SMA and the SMA, the MPU described itself as representing "the more 
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progressive of general practitioners, not those whose instincts make 
them increasingly wary of all new plans, nor yet those who are prepared 
to go to any length in support of academic political theories." 
The Minister was briefed by his officials, in advance of the 
deputation, on the status of the MPU, and was advised to avoid 
suggesting the ~FU might take part in formal negotiations. It would not 
be among organisations chosen by the BiY'lA as representative, "since the 
MPU and the BMA are at loggerheads, the MPU being a much smaller rival 
body with left-wing tendencies." Willink was advised of the MPU's 
position in close agreement with the White Paper, and of the several 
useful suggestions the memorandum made, especially concerning adequate 
medical representation, and the appropriate employing authority for 
doctors. It appeared unlikely, the Minister was advised, that the MPU 
would press some of its stronger views of 1942. The meeting with the 
Minister, therefore, was a rather perfunctory exchange of general 
agreement, the MPU claiming greater support for the White Paper than any 
other professional organisation, and emphasising a scheme in which the 
medical profession would be happy to work. (24) 
Another of the TUC affiliates, the Hospital and Welfare Services 
Union (earlier the National Union of County Officers) , made direct 
representations to the Minister. The Union, however, was more critical 
and less conciliatory than the MPU about the White Paper, and, in 
addition, was extremely critical of both the TUC and the Ministry for, 
in their view, not representing adequately the interests of health 
services ~urkers. The Union's memorandum referred to the White Paper 
scheme as not a health service but a treatment service, and attacked the 
Minister for his failure to consult organised trade unionists" in any 
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degree" in its preparation: "Those who have been consulted do not 
represent the mass of health workers," the Union claimed, and charged 
that the TUC had itself failed to consult the entire range of health 
workers' organisations. The document called for "one closely knit Trade 
organisation" in the health service, along with official joint 
consultative machinery and the right of direct trade union 
representation. The White Paper, it noted, was weak in preventive health 
policy, especially in the environmental and industrial health areas. The 
Union was also critical of compromises with respect to private practice 
and the apparent lack of acceptance of the principle of uniformity of 
treatment (i.e., in one high-quality public service) along with 
universality. On the hospital service proposals, the Union called for 
trade union opposition to voluntary hospitals through withdrawal from 
contributory insurance schemes, and for their takeover by the state or 
by local government. 
The Ministry, in keeping with its policy of attempting to 
centralise negotiations through the major interested bodies, in July 
approached the Ministry of Labour and the TUC, and secured agreement 
that the TUC should be the only association representing health workers 
to send a deputation, although it might include member unions in its 
group. It was noted that this would place in a difficult position the 
National Association of Local Government Officers (NALGO) which was not 
a member of the TUC. The Hospital and Welfare Services Union, informed 
of this policy, redirected its efforts later in 1944 through the TUC, 
submitting material on health workers' representation and an industrial 
health service for the 1944 Congress of the TUC, by this time voicing 
support for full implementation of the White Paper as a minimal step 
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toward a preventive health service, and stressing the rights of health 
workers and patients. (25) 
In April, the London Trades Council wrote to all London MPs and to 
the Minister with a resolution urging implementation of the health 
service and noting opposition to combined private and public practice, 
to sale and purchase, and to the continuation of the voluntary 
hospitals. The London Labour Party's conference in May welcomed the 
White Paper as a minimum programme, also urging the end of sale and 
purchase and of private practice in the public system, and a more 
thorough unification of all the branches of the service. Other 
resolutions making the same general points came from the Newcastle and 
District Trades Council, the Hackney Old Age Pensioners' Association, 
and the Association of Scientific Workers, which also submitted a 
memorandum on an industrial medical service. (26) 
Labour Party's Response 
The Labour Party's first major consideration of the White Paper was 
in the form of a Public Health Advisory Committee memorandum drafted by 
Dr Stephen Taylor in June 1944. The lengthy document began by noting the 
difficult battle ahead against powerful vested interests, and urging the 
Labour Party and the trade unions to publicise the plan, and Labour's 
modifications, and to rally public opinion to disarm the scheme's 
opponents and to assure a popular base of support for going beyond the 
White Paper proposals. 
While the Labour Party believed in the principle of a salaried, 
unified service, Taylor suggested, it should be prepared to accept the 
White Paper compromise on the assumption that a successful health 
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service, based on centrally funded health centres, administered by joint 
authorities, would soon supersede private practice. Generous terms 
should be given to medical staff, and sale and purchase of practices 
abolished, with compensation. Taylor also supported the strong central 
and local medical representation in the proposed Health Services 
Councils, providing the democratic control of the executive side of the 
service were not weakened. He emphasised that the "false social 
distinction" among grades of staff and patients should be eliminated in 
the health centre arrangement, as a new departure in the social 
relations of medical care provision, and he outlined a democratic 
structure of interlocking staff committees. 
With respect to industrial medicine, Taylor noted there were strong 
reasons for linking it with the Ministry of Labour, although it should 
at least be a fully public service, co-ordinated with general medical 
provisions. Improved medical research, education, and health promotion 
should also be part of the national scheme. (27) 
The voice of the Labour Left, TRIBUNE, gave qualified approval to 
the White Paper. It accorded well with Labour's insistence on a publicly 
operated comprehensive service, free at time of use, with no means test 
or income limit, meaning, in theory, one class of patient and one class 
of treatment. The most significant compromises, TRIBUNE felt, were in 
the area of health centres, where part-private practice and competitive 
remuneration might be allowed, and in leaving the establishment of the 
centres to local authority initiative. Another compromise TRIBUNE 
regretted was the continuation of voluntary hospitals as autonomous 
units. It approved the joint local authority administrative structure at 
least as an expedient pending local government reorganisation. "Vigorous 
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public initiative" was urged in support of an ideal service; Labour 
controlled local authorities should do their utmost to implement the 
aims of Labour policy, especially with respect to health centres, which, 
if successful and popular, should mean the end of private practice. (28) 
Joint Labour Party and TUC Initiatives 
During the autumn of 1944 the Labour Party and the TUC finalised 
the White Paper. The Minister had by detailed policy documents on 
October completed a major round of discussions with the SMA's 
Negotiating Committee and with the SMA and local government bodies. By 
mid-October he had announced several significant revisions to the White 
Paper scheme, including the replacement of the original joint 
authorities responsible for the hospital service, with a system of 
hospital regions based on central teaching hospitals. The major 
interested groups were made aware of these policy changes through 
October. 
By early October the joint committee of the Labour Party, TUC and 
Co-operative Congress had prepared a collective document which welcomed 
the original White Paper proposals, but with reservations regarding the 
co-existence of private and public practice, the retention of a dual 
hospital system, and the omission of an industrial medical service. 
Coincident with the Minister's decision to abandon the joint authority 
concept, the committee also recommended II natural" hospital regions, not 
necessarily co-terminus with local authorities, although it was assumed 
that joint authorities would be created to administer the health centres 
and clinic services. (29) This memorandum was sent to the Minister in 
early December, as the SMA was holding its annual Conference, and on the 
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eve of the Labour Party Conference. (30) 
The TUC at the same time provided the Minister with its 
supplementary position paper on the proposed health service, ratified at 
its 1944 Blackpool Congress. This document made virtually the same 
substantive points as the joint memorandum, with certain items 
emphasised by the TUC General Council, including its insistence that 
research and industrial medicine should be fully integrated in the 
scheme, and noting the TUC's preference for a single, unified hospital 
system. 
Ministry officials noted in internal memoranda that there was 
nothing in the TUC's expressed positions that would be likely to cause 
difficulties for the Minister in proceeding with the White Paper or the 
various modifications under consideration. It was decided the TUC should 
be invited to send a deputation representative of member unions in the 
health services and local government. This deputation was ultimately 
arranged for March 1945. (31) 
By this time, the government was already in the process of 
discussing, with the SMA and BHA, its second revised draft of 
alternative proposals arrived at through the difficult round of 
negotiations beginning in January 1945. Although the TUC was able to 
make its viewpoint known to the government, through submissions and a 
very few deputations, its representation in negotiations was clearly not 
seen by the Ministry to be in the same order of importance as that of 
the three main "interests" in the service -- the medical profession, the 
voluntary hospitals, and the local authorities. These interests were 
continuously consulted, unlike the TUC, which represented the great bulk 
of hospital and health workers. The TUC, it would appear, was consulted 
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only after the other three interests, in each round of discussions, and 
only after the Minister had reached tentative agreement on changes with 
the major interests. 
The Labour Party's 1944 Conference 
The Labour Party finished 1944 with its forty-third Annual 
Conference, 11 to 15 December. The work of the joint Labour Party, TUC, 
and Co-operative Congress committee on the White Paper was noted in the 
annual rep::>rt of the Public Health Committee, which was under the 
chairmanship of Somerville Hastings of the SMA. The report of the 
National Executive congratulated the Labour Cabinet Ministers whose 
influence was to be seen in the three major 1944 White Papers on Social 
Insurance, Workmen's Compensation, and a National Health Service. Dr D. 
Stark Murray moved the SMA resolution welcoming the White Paper as an 
essential part of an overall social security scheme and calling on the 
labour movement to press for changes to accord with Labour Party policy 
as articulated in the 1943 statement, itA National Service for Health"; 
the resolution was carried. (32) 
At the Annual Conference, a strengthening of the party's left was 
evident in the many criticisms of the Labour Ministers in the Coalition. 
Aneurin Bevan MP, future Minister of Health, attacked the party leader, 
Clement Attlee, who, he said, "had pitifully failed to represent a 
Socialist view in the Cabinet." A resolution, moved by Ian Mikardo and 
supported by Bevan, calling for state ownership of all significant 
economic sectors, was passed overwhelmingly, despite the Executive's 
opposition to the Conference taking any position on ownership. Aneurin 
Bevan was among those elected to the National Executive. He was, at that 
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time, also among those dedicated to breaking down the depoliticising 
effects of the Coalition and what was, in his view, the right-wing 
consensus among trade union leaders, the TUC General Council, and the 
Labour Ministers. Following the TUC's support in April 1944 for Labour 
Minister Ernest Bevin's Regulation lA(A) banning strikes in war 
industries, which was debated in Parliament in May, Bevan had launched 
bitter attacks on Bevin and on the TUC leadership for its co-operation 
with Conservative domestic policy. (33) The TUC had also supported the 
Labour Ministers and government policy in the 1943 debate on the 
Beveridge Report, in which Bevan supported the backbench revolt. 
Bevan suspected that the TUC leadership were interested not in a 
left wing victory after the war, but in a continued Coalition, in which 
they would more readily be able to wield their personal influence. He 
was, therefore, adamantly opposed to a postwar Coalition, and opposed 
the position of the TUC leadership sufficiently that he attempted to 
break their block voting power in the Labour Party by having trade union 
locals affiliate with Labour Party local branches, with the rationale of 
providing a more democratic franchise in the party for the trade union 
rank and file. (34) Bevan's irreconcilable differences with the TUC 
leadership, and with Ernest Bevin, together with his rising influence in 
the Labour Party in 1944 and the popularity of anti-Coalition 
sentiments, were, following his 1945 appointment as Minister of Health 
and Housing, to make for extremely strained relations with the TUC, and 
undoubtedly to some extent impeded the bargaining power of the TUC with 
respect to the health service. 
In the interim, however, the role of Bevan and the Labour Left at 
the 1944 Conference marked the beginnings of organised dissent against 
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the Coalition. While the Labour Party did not yet wish to dissociate 
itself from Coalition reconstruction policies, it was becoming clear 
that Labour was not anxious to allow the Conservatives to make greater 
compromises in implementing the new social policies, and to reap the 
substantial electoral credit that would accrue from their enactment. 
Trade Union Representations in Early 1945 
Early 1945 was the period of consolidation of Conservative health 
service planning under Health Minister Henry Willink. Some amendments 
to the White Paper were announced in October 1944, but there was a 
greater urgency and some sense of finality in bringing the complex 
negotiations to a pre-legislation point in Willink's discussions of 
January to April 1945. 
The trade unions and the pro-health service forces were equally 
moved by a sense of urgency to make their views known and influence felt 
by the government. There had been wide public discussion in the year 
following the release of the White Paper; there had been much committed 
agitation for the shared principles of the SMA, Labour Party, and TUC 
positions on a health service in the two years since the Beveridge 
Report and the publication of the first detailed Labour movement health 
service plans. General support had been accorded to the White Paper, as 
a first step toward the ideal of a fully unified, fully public, state 
health service. 
Knowledge that the government was now concluding discussions with 
the SMA and the BHA gave rise to apprehension that even the basic 
principles of the White Paper -- comprehensiveness, universality, and 
free access -- might be in jeopardy. This was particularly so in light 
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of the debate at the December BMA conference, which had supported merely 
the extension of National Health Insurance on a means-tested basis to 
all but the wealthiest, and elaborate safeguards for private practice. 
Many trade unions and major trades councils wrote to the Minister 
in early 1945, with resolutions noting alarm at the campaigns of the BMA 
and BHA against fundamental principles of the White Paper. The trades 
councils included those from London, Sheffield, Burnley, Ayr, Plymouth 
and district, Hayward's Heath and district, Nottingham and district, 
Swindon, and Aylesbury and district. Trade unions included the 
Amalgamated Engineering Union, the National Union of Railwaymen, the 
Mental Hospital and Institutional Wbrkers' Union, the Clerical and 
Administrative Wbrkers' Union, the Fire Brigades' Union, the Railway 
Clerks' Association, the Association of Scientific Wbrkers, the National 
Federation of Professional Wbrkers, and the National Amalgamated Union 
of Shop Assistants, Warehousemen and Clerks. Other organisations 
included the National Guild of Co-operators, the Co-operative Party, the 
Hospital Almoners' Association, and numerous Labour Party local 
branches. Virtually all expressed concern at the possibility of 
concessions to the BMA and BHA, and called for full implementation of 
the White Paper scheme. (35) 
The TUC itself sent a deputation to the Minister in March, having 
forwarded a policy resolution from its October 1944 Congress urging 
again that an industrial medical service be incorporated in the new 
health service. 
his agreement at 
personal medical 
The Minister was advised by his officials to indicate 
least with close co-ordination of industrial and 
services, the use of the same doctors in both 
capacities (as family and factory practitioners) and close central links 
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between medical staffs in the two branches. 
At the meeting, the Minister assured the TUC representatives that 
the White Paper principle of one hundred per cent coverage was not in 
jeopardy, despite BMA pressure. He acknowledged that certain major 
modifications had been arrived at, including the replacement of the 
joint local authority concept of administration with area planning 
councils composed equally of voluntary and municipal hospital 
representatives, to plan, with statutory authority, the hospital 
service, and advisory bodies for the larger regions, which would be 
established around university teaching hospitals. It was now felt, in 
contrast to the White paper, that a dental service could be included 
from the start, in accordance with the recommendation of the Teviot 
Committee. 
Mr Tom Johnston, Secretary of State for Scotland, advised the TUC 
of differences in the Scottish health service, including central 
government provision and maintenance of health centres, with powers 
ultimately to delegate the centres to local authorities; it was felt 
that this way health centres could be built more expeditiously on a wide 
scale, without awaiting the difficulties and delays of local authority 
planning. 
For the TUC General Council, and on behalf of the MPU (which had 
three members in the deputation), Mr W.P. Allen, leader of the 
deputation, sought assurances from the Ministers that there would be no 
contracting out of the service (i.e., all would pay through rates and 
taxes, and be eligible for treatment); that such private practice as 
would be allowed would not be superior in any way to the public service; 
that preventive health policies should be actively pursued; and he urged 
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that medical education be made free, with equal opportunity to all. 
Other items of Tue policy were stressed: fair remuneration for doctors 
and all health workers; a rehabilitation service integrated into the 
general scheme; the importance of adequate nursing staff and the 
provision of all ancillary services including ambulances; and the 
incorporation of industrial medical services with the elimination of 
private employers' "works doctors." The TUe and its member unions were 
not in favour of retaining independent voluntary hospitals, even on the 
basis suggested in the White Paper, but took note of the government's 
reasoning. They wished assurances that the hospital proposals would not 
be weakened in any way. 
The Minister, on the question of private practice, said the 
government was reluctant to create by compulsion two exclusive 
alternatives, obliging doctors to choose one or the other, and risking 
the possibility of a majority remaining out of the public service. There 
would be limits to the size of a part-private practice to protect the 
public patients. "The aim right through was to create a service far 
better than had ever existed before." Preventive services could very 
easily be incorporated in the health centres. Terms and conditions in 
the public service would be such as to attract and retain good doctors. 
With respect to rehabilitation, there was room for improvement based on 
war experience, and for integration with the curative services. The 
Minister felt the TUe's position on voluntary hospitals was "helpful and 
reasonablell but thought the government's course was correct; the 
proposed area planning machinery should encourage only healthy 
competition among voluntary and municipal institutions. The Minister 
promised that the nursing profession would be represented on planning 
240 
and advisory committees. In the area of medical education, 
recommendations of the Goodenough Report would be followed and student 
grants considered. 
With respect to industrial health, the Minister noted the 
similarity between the TUC's and SMA's positions; both regretted the 
division between industrial and personal health. The government noted 
the need of the Ministry of Labour for medical services in industry, but 
"any attempt to obtain complete integration with the general service at 
this stage might endanger the progress of the health service proposals 
as a who 1 ell ; it would take some time to prepare the complex legal 
changes, and it was more important, given the urgency, to relate the 
health service to the rest of the social insurance scheme about to be 
implemented. Mr Johnston noted his appreciation of the TUC's position 
on industrial medicine, and its dissatisfaction with meagre factory 
medical services provided by employers, often in their own direct 
interest, but reiterated the Minister's point that a full industrial 
scheme could more easily be provided later, after the complex 
arrangements of the general service had been accomplished. 
The Minister noted that discussions with the SMA and BHA were not 
yet complete. The government was likely, however, to drop the proposed 
requirement that doctors new to the service engage in full-time public 
practice for some years; it would alter arrangements for directing 
doctors to underdoctored areas; and alter the health centre remuneration 
method to basic salary plus capitation fees. It was essential, he said, 
that health centre doctors not be in competition but in partnership. 
Sale and purchase was a matter still under consideration. The Minister 
promised only to consider the matter of recognition of trade unions in 
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voluntary hospitals, one of the TUC's major points. (36) 
The TUC Joint Social Insurance Committee and the General Council 
discussed the positions taken by the Minister until June, when a further 
draft policy memorandum was prepared. This stressed that there should 
be no withdrawal from the White Paper and noted the irony, considering 
the medical profession's interest in freedom, that there should be not 
even the option for a doctor to choose remuneration by full salary. This 
memorandum had to await the change of government to be sent to the new 
Minister in August, and was not discussed with Mr Bevan until he 
received the TUC's first deputation on the health service in November 
1945. (37) 
The General Council also had discussions with voluntary hospital 
representatives, initiated by the BHA in late 1944 in order to exchange 
views without commitments. Sir Bernard Docker, President of the BHA, 
stressed representation of voluntary hospitals on planning committees 
and the need for co-operation with municipal hospitals. He admitted it 
should be possible for hospital staffs to join unions and regretted the 
neglect of industrial medicine on the programmes of teaching hospitals. 
The TUC, having put the case on behalf of the Amalgamated Engineering 
Union for a unified hospital system, and having commented on the irony 
of VJOrkers paying compulsory contributions to II vol untary" hospital 
insurance schemes, decided there should be no change of TUC policy with 
respect to the hospitals. The discussion was carried on in more detail 
in August 1945, before Bevan's announcement of hospital policy. At this 
meeting the BHA agreed to support the right of staffs, including nurses 
(who, the TUC claimed, were often discouraged by senior nurses and the 
Royal College of Nursing), to join without duress any trade union. The 
242 
BHA at this time again rejected a unified hospital system, but favoured 
full co-operation, and perhaps the rotation of medical and nursing 
staffs between voluntary and municipal institutions in order to break 
down the traditional barriers. (38) 
The Health WOrkers' Council 
Following the TUC's deputation in March, the Health WOrkers' 
Council, which was formed in 1943 to represent approximately twenty 
unions and professional associations in the health services, (39) sent a 
deputation to senior Ministry officials. The Council was founded upon 
an extensive list of principles: promoting a comprehensive, unified 
health service; the pooling of all medical knowledge and resources for 
the community; education of the public in preventive health and the best 
use of treatment services; adequate remuneration and working conditions 
for all health workers; democratic teamwork among doctors and other 
health workers as the "basis and the inspiration of the Service"; full 
representation of all health workers on planning bodies, with "a large 
measure of control by elected committees of all health workers, who 
should have collective and individual right of access to the regional 
authori ty"; and, the promotion of adequate nutr i tional standards, health 
education, leisure and recreation, and "optimum industrial, social, and 
environmental conditions." 
The Council registered its opposition to the SMA proposal to extend 
the insurance panel system, its acceptance in general of the White 
Paper, and its view that the health service would be successful only 
with the confidence of health workers. This, it said, could be achieved 
by the rights of organisation and representation, teamwork, and adequate 
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pay and working conditions. It also made similar points regarding the 
integration of a full industrial health service, and, as the TUC had 
done, emphasised health centres, prevention, and a national ambulance 
service. 
Ministry officials heard the deputation largely without comment, 
except to note that it had been decided to leave industrial medicine on 
the side "for the moment to avoid imperiling the remainder of the 
scheme." (40) 
The Labour Party's 1945 Conference: the End of the Coalition 
By late May, when the Labour Party held its 1945 Conference at 
Blackpool, it was clear that the Coalition was not destined to last much 
longer. Attlee and Bevin had agreed with Churchill to maintain the 
Coalition until the end of the war with Japan, Germany having conceded 
on 8 May. Neither the National Executive Committee nor the Conference 
would accept this condition 
leadership then united in 
for remaining in the government. The 
favour of ending the Coalition, a position 
Aneurin Bevan had taken for some time. 
At the Conference, 21 to 25 May, a number of local Labour branches 
submitted resolutions urging resistance to the BMA's moves to compromise 
the White Paper. The SMA proposed a major resolution on the health 
service regretting the Minister's alterations as violating the principle 
of democratic control of major services (such as the hospitals) by 
elected authorities, inherent in the new proposals for hospital regions 
and for greater representation for voluntary hospitals. The resolution 
reiterated the health policies of the SMA and Labour Party, and called 
for nothing less than implementation of the White Paper scheme. Dr D. 
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Stark Murray attacked the Minister's proposed modifications as: Ita 
perfect example of Toryism at work. ••• The Labour Members of the 
Cabinet had forced through the acceptance of the principles on which we 
stand, and [it was obvious that] the Tory Party dare not oppose this 
publicly and openly. But they set up a scheme whereby they could destroy 
the White Paper wi thout even coming into the open. II Will ink I s rev isions, 
circulated confidentially to the SMA, Murray charged, were for "a scheme 
which would completely destroy all hope of a National Health Service as 
we have envisioned it in the pasLII Dr Edith Summerskill MP, speaking 
for the National Executive, assured Dr Murray of support in opposition 
to Willink's modifications. She suggested that a salaried system would 
augment doctors' freedoms and that the dual hospital system should end. 
There should be equal opportunity for women in medical education, and 
democratic representation of all health workers, not medical domination 
of health service administrative committees. 
The SMA resolution was carried, and became the health policy 
section of the Labour Party's 1945 Election manifesto, IILet Us Face the 
Future." (41) 
The Caretaker Government 
Attlee delivered notice to Churchill during the Labour Conference 
of the party's decision to quit the Coalition in October. Prime Minister 
Churchill, having rejected an October election favoured by Labour and 
the Liberals, tendered his resignation 23 May, and was asked by the King 
to form a caretaker government until the dissolution of Parliament 15 
June, and the election 5 July, with the counting of votes delayed until 
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25 July due to war conditions. (42) 
This left health service planning somewhat suspended. As we shall 
see in the next chapter, however, the Caretaker government did 
reformulate the Coalition's modifications of the White Paper, making 
significant amendments. These were intended to be published in a new 
1945 White Paper which was, in the end, not released before the 5 July 
election. Hence the Caretaker government's changes remained shrouded in 
secrecy. 
The health service proponents had put their case to the government 
and although at no point did they have the official status in 
negotiations accorded by Mr Willink to the BMA and BHA, it was clear, 
particularly from the compromises that were inherited by the Caretaker 
government, that the Labour Ministers of the Coalition did have some 
significant influence in the framing and retaining of many of the White 
Paper proposals prior to the 1945 election. Labour's resolve to carry 
through its own party policy, as a government, was, of course, another 
matter. liThe Labour Party," says D. Stark Murray of the 1945 
Conference, "by adopting the [health service] resolution had thus 
cleared away any misconception that it was bound by the compromises 
Willink had negotiated with the medical profession. " (43) The 
realities, however, were somewhat more complex, as the planning record 
of Aneurin Bevan, Labour Health Minister after the July election, was to 
demonstrate. 
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CRAnER 7 
1942 to 1945: 
THE LONG NEGOTIATIONS AND REVISIONS, TO 
THE LAST WORD OF THE CARETAKER GOVERNMENT 
The British Medical Association and the British Hospitals 
Association were quick to react to the White Paper. One of the first 
steps of the BMA was to commission the British Institute of Public 
Opinion to send a questionnaire to all BMA members regarding the 
detailed proposals of the White Paper. (1) The responses of the 
approximately one-half of the members who replied were released in 
August. They were tabulated by age and type of practice, and showed a 
substantial lack of unanimity in the profession. A good deal of 
support, for example, was shown among younger doctors for salaried or 
part-salaried practice in health centres, for an entirely free, 
comprehensive, universal service, and for larger areas for hospital 
administration. Control or direct employment by local authorities or 
joint authorities, however, met with very little favour. 
In March 1944 the BMA issued an analysis of the White Paper 
according to a set of inviolable general principles approved by its 
Representative Meeting in September 1943. This was followed with a 
draft statement of policy intended for discussion throughout the country 
prior to the 1944 Annual Representative Meeting in July. (2) One of 
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these principles, in direct opposition to the White Paper and to the 
commitments of Ministers Brown and Willink, was a recommendation for 
coverage of only ninety per cent of the population, meaning, in effect, 
an extension of National Health Insurance to cover by means test the 
poorest ninety per cent, with inclusion of dependents, leaving the 
wealthiest ten per cent to make entirely private arrangements. 
In searching for an explanation for the BMA's "sudden hysteria over 
the alleged threat to the freedom of medicine," Lindsey concludes, along 
with the NEW STATESMAN, that the reasons could only have been monetary. 
Although not a trade union, [the BMA] was impelled by a 
desire to protect the economic and professional 
interests of its members. It favored, for example, 
maternity clinics and a school medical program for 
examination and educational purposes but not for 
therapy. The inclusion of medical treatment would 
obviously diminish the opportunities for private 
practice ••• 
'As soon as the government made clear its intention of 
providing an all-round service for all comers, this 
section of medical opinion became irreconcilable; it 
would have picked every possible hole in any "universal" 
scheme.' (3) 
Dissension left the profession without a positive 
program, and their leaders took negative positions on 
issues that once appeared to have wide support. It was 
only on the issue of remuneration that the doctors were 
able to achieve a large degree of solidarity. As in 
1911, they believed that a general policy of opposition 
to the proposals of the government offered the best hope 
for good financial terms. (4) 
One of the first BMA reactions to the White Paper came from Lord 
Dawson, then President of the Association. He referred to it, 
charitably enough given the public campaign to follow, as a 
"statesmanlike endeavour" in a difficult situation, but noted the BMA 
was not happy with the hospital proposals, preferring to see the 
voluntary conributory schemes retained and an equal partnership with 
251 
municipal hospitals established. In a speech slightly later to 
Conservative MPs, Lord Dawson suggested that health centres would create 
a salaried general practitioner service in which doctors would become a 
"profession of mediocrities" in the Civil Service pattern. (5) 
Reaction of the Voluntary Hospitals Associations 
The British Hospitals Association held a Conference of Voluntary 
Hospitals in London, in early March, to consider the White Paper. The 
BHA conference, in two resolutions sent to the Minister, indicated 
general approval of the aims of a co-ordinated hospital and consultant 
service for all regardless of income, but demanded a more sui table 
partnership between voluntary and local authority hospitals. The BHA 
found the financial proposals unacceptable, in that they afforded only 
partial payment of voluntary hospitals' expenses for services 
contracted, while suggesting the gap be filled through voluntary 
initiative. By offering a free service to all, the BHA complained, 
public incentive to give or contribute voluntarily would be destroyed. 
(6 ) 
The King Edward's Hospital Fund for London, a major organisation 
representing London voluntary hospitals, also made detailed 
representations to the Minister. An extensive memorandum and statement 
of principles, sent by the Chairman, Lord Donoughrnore, in June 1944, 
outlined an elaborate alternative administrative structure of five tiers 
for the hospital system. The Fund rejected the idea of thirty-five to 
forty joint local authority areas to comprise the national hospital 
structure, and proposed instead twelve to fourteen large "reg ions" 
organised around university teaching hospitals, subdivided into "areas" 
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according to population. A regional hospitals council would represent 
equitably both public and voluntary hospitals and meet as a common body. 
The region would be the planning jurisdiction, and would be fully 
integrated with central machinery. Areas would be smaller 
administrative units with several per region, and local hospitals 
councils would co-ordinate complex services in large cities. While all 
the levels would represent voluntary and municipal hospitals, the main 
departure from the White Paper's joint authorities was that they would 
not be tied directly to local government, which had been long the bane 
of both voluntary hospitals and the medical profession. The Fund also 
advocated a Central Hospitals Board, directly under the Ministry but 
with some independence of action. Payments to 
hospitals should be made directly from 
contracting voluntary 
the Exchequer without 
intermediary local authority involvement, and on a three- to five-yearly 
basis. The King Edward's Fund rejected supplementary grants to make up 
any gaps between the payments for contracted services and total 
expenses. This it was felt would undermine voluntary support which must 
be counted on to make up such differences. 
The Ministry's internal memorandum evaluating the Fund's plan saw 
it as primarily a plan for a voluntary hospital service, with maximum 
independence rather than co-operation, and as separating planning from 
administrative functions. The Fund had also suggested two grades of 
surcharged beds, superior public accommodation and wholly private pay 
beds. This the Ministry would not accept; it was noted that even the 
BMA was against "intermediate" public beds (i.e., extra payment for 
superior amenities but free public medical treatment), lion the grounds 
that this would leave little or no chance of private consulting practice 
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and would tend to depress the ordinary standard of accommodation in the 
public service to a I poor law' level. II This was the view the Ministry 
would take. (7) 
The White Paper in Parliament 
In March the first Parliamentary debate took place, on a motion by 
the Minister of Health proposing the health service as one of the 
pillars of the postwar 





along with changes in 
The health service, the 
Minister said, could only be seen as part of a larger programme: " 
the process of reshaping the background of individual life in this 
country ••• The health of the nation, the health of every citizen, young 
and old, is at the very root of national vigour and enterprise, and this 
should be the scale on which our discussions are framed. 1I The 
Minister stressed the scheme was not state charity for certain groups; 
it was intended to free individuals from the burdens of ill health and 
to raise and keep raising the standard of national health. 
The Minister outlined the main principles of the service, and their 
significance in medical care reform. (8) 
Speaking in reply for the medical profession, Sir Ernest 
Graham-Little, MP for London University, admitted the profession had 
once approved of health centres, but saw the White Paper proposals as 
devised to put practitioners in a salaried service, which the profession 
could not support. He opposed the probable end of private practice, 
regulation of the location of doctors similar to that under Defence 
Regulations, and the end of contributory schemes. 
For the Labour Party and the SMA, Dr Haden Guest welcomed the 
254 
proposals, suggesting that health centres would offer more freedoms to 
practitioners and patients. Despite the BMA's official position, he 
said, health centres were supported by many doctors, especially-young -
doctors in the armed services. For the TUC, Mr Alexander Walkden also 
praised the TNhite Paper but noted the lack of reference to 
rehabilitative and convalescent care, and urged the adoption of Whitley 
Councils for nurses and other hospital workers. Dr Morgan, MP for 
Rochdale, suggested central representation for all health workers, 
criticised the retention of a dual hospital system, and the apparent 
neglect of social medicine, environmental and health education concerns, 
and occupational health. 
Speakers generally praised the TNhite Paper; critical comments from 
the Conservative benches applied mainly to the alleged failure to 
preserve the voluntary hospitals adequately, and to the assumed move to 
salaried practitioner service. (9) 
These latter criticisms represented something of a division in 
Conservative ranks over the government's apparent enthusiasm for a 
health service. The Minister, and his Parliamentary Secretary, Miss 
Florence Horsbrugh MP, attempted to reassure the backbench Tory critics 
that the government had in mind the best interests of the medical 
profession and the voluntary hospitals. \~ile largely successful in 
quelling Tory dissent, they were unable to convince one critic, Major 
Lloyd, MP for Renfrew, who believed the White Paper to have been written 
by the hidden hands of Political and Economic Planning (PEP) and Sir 
William Beveridge. 
For the Labour Party and the SMA, Mr Silkin, MP for Camberwell, and 
Dr Edith Summerskill, Fulham West, offered criticisms from the left. Mr 
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Silkin opposed maintenance of the sale and purchase of practices and of 
private practice in the public service. He urged a greater role for the 
state in the administration of voluntary hospitals and the provision of 
more convalescent and chronic care facilities. Dr Summerskill saw the 
White Paper as too much oriented to curative rather than preventive 
medicine and as placing the interests of doctors before patients; the 
arrangements for private practice would only accentuate social class 
differences, and, she said, turn the health centres into centres for 
second class treatment. Mrs Hardie, an MP from Glasgow, urged the 
inclusion of dentistry and the integration of the mental health 
services, and called on Labour local authorities to spend generously on 
the new health centres and local authority services to make them 
attractive to doctors and patients. (10) 
Thomas Johnston, Labour Secretary of State for Scotland, 
responsible along with the Minister of Health for the White Paper, ended 
the debate by emphasising the flexibility of the proposals, especially 
with respect to payment of doctors and to the arrangements for private 
practice. He noted that not even in the socialised medicine of the USSR 
was private practice entirely eliminated, and the British government 
intended to win the goodwill of doctors through its retention. The 
resolution welcoming the intention of the Government to establish a 
comprehensive National Health Service was carried. (11) 
willink's Public Defence of the White Paper 
The campaign of the BHA and the voluntary hospitals against the 
White Paper provisions was launched in earnest following the March 
debate in Parliament. Between April and June approximately twenty of 
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the most prestigious of the voluntary hospitals sent their MPs 
well-organised petitions, or wrote to the Minister. They were reassured 
by their Members in most cases, in answers provided by Ministry of 
Health officials, that provisions would not be fixed until discussions 
had been held in which the BHA would take a full part. (12) 
The Minister was obliged to begin a public defence of his hospital 
and general health service proposals. In April he spoke in Birmingham, 
reassuring the medical profession and voluntary hospitals that their 
independence was not threatened. He noted that many hospi tals reg ret ted 
the ending of their contributory schemes, but that to keep them would 
mean "adapting the end to sui t the means, and that we cannot do. II A 
month later he spoke to an invited audience of his Conservative 
Constituency Association, in Norwood, South London, and several Norwood 
and Croydon groups, including the local BMA, voluntary hospital, 
headmasters' and business representatives. He made the same 
reassurances of independence, but declared that "the need for a scheme 
is such that obstruction by sectional interests will not be tolerated by 
public opinion. II He also defended the concept of health centres, noting 
that there was no intention to limit the experiment to one type; rather, 
the "whole object is to open up new forms of practice with consequent 
benefit to doctors and the public. 1I 
Clearly defending the ~hite Paper against attacks from the left and 
right, he again explained the flexibility of payment arrangements for 
doctors (all methods of remuneration would be possible, and salary never 
obligatory), the important role that local authorities would play in 
reflecting the personal, local and democratic nature of the service, and 
the evolutionary development envisioned for the whole scheme. It would, 
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he stressed, need the enthusiastic co-operation and compromise of all 
interests. (13) 
Willink Begins Discussions with the Three Major Interests 
The Minister's hopes, however, were to be frustrated in a 
continuing battle with the SMA and BHA, in public and in confidential 
negotiations, through the following year. The apocalyptic nature of the 
public statements of these two organisations was often in sharp contrast 
with the businesslike way in which the negotiations proceeded, but the 
element of struggle was present from the public forum to the boardroom. 
Under Henry Willink, before the end of the Coalition government, 
the formal discussions with the local authorities, the voluntary 
hospitals, and the medical profession went through two distinct stages: 
the first, from April to September 1944, after which certain revisions 
were announced; and the second, from January to March 1945, during which 
further revisions were made but not publicly announced. A third and 
perhaps the most significant series of revisions was made in May and 
June 1945, by the Conservative Caretaker government, following Labour's 
withdrawal from the Coalition, and pending the July election. 
The April to September 1944 Negotiations: 
Negotiations with the Medical Profession 
The Minister held discussions with representatives of the medical 
profession in April and August, 1944. In October, he announced proposed 
changes to them, and to the other two negotiating groups. 
At the first of the meetings in April, a lengthy list of questions 
258 
prepared by the BMA was discussed. One of the matters of greatest 
concern, early in the meeting, was that of the precise arrangements for 
private practice in the hospital and consultant service. The Ministry 
had made it clear that part-private practice would be allowed, i.e., 
that a specialist would be allowed to treat his private patients in 
public facilities, providing the patients paid both a full hospital 
maintenance charge and the doctor's private fee. Public patients would 
receive treatment and maintenance free, except for the possibility of 
introducing so-called "amenity beds", i.e., rooms of a higher standard 
in the public wards, for which patients would pay a small extra 
maintenance charge only. This proposal did not rest well with the SMA: 
"Dr Hill was emphatic that there should be no halfway house, no system 
of payment for extra amenities within the public service, no system 
whereby the patient could get, for example, private accommodation with 
the advantages of a free surgeon." He stressed that such a system would 
both depress private practice for consultants, and introduce grading of 
standards in the public service according to ability to pay. 
The BMA asked why the White Paper made no proposal to locate all 
government health services, including industrial, under the Ministry of 
Health, and why such a large responsibility as housing would not be 
separated from the responsibilities of the Ministry. No conclusive 
answer beyond the White Paper statements was given by Ministry 
officials. The BMA also raised but did not press the issue of 
administration of the service by a semi-independent professional 
corporation, and urged measures to expand medical education and to bring 
about equal opportunity, pay, and conditions for female doctors. 
Arguments were raised by the SMA committee in favour of Health 
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Services Councils, at central and local levels, which would have a 
majority of representatives elected by the medical profession, and would 
be free to publish advice and opinions on health service matters. They 
further wished to see the powers of the Central Medical Board reduced 
from those proposed; it should not have powers of direction of doctors 
to practise in designated areas. 
The sale and purchase of practices, which might have been expected 
to be a difficult issue, was at this point approached tentatively, and 
with little rancour. The BMA committee recognised that the value of 
practices would fall with the advent of the new service, especially with 
health centres, hence state compensation for this fall in value was 
logical. Dr Hill "thought that the right to general compensation must 
be conceded, and therefore that this would be a good time to consider 
abolishing sale and purchase altogether and buying out all practices." 
Dr Dain, the other senior ~~ representative, suggested that whether 
sale and purchase were ended or not, a general evaluation of all 
practices should soon be undertaken, in preparation. These positions 
were a strikingly liberal appraisal of the issue, in contrast with the 
later BMA position. 
The BMA representatives stood against the previously expressed 
positions of the BHA on two issues related to voluntary hospitals. They 
felt, first, that the hospitals should be paid in full, not just in 
partial compensation of their expenses, and secondly were glad to see 
the end of the contributory schemes, since the BMA IIfully supported the 
idea of free hospital treatment for all." The BMA supported the BHA 
wish to have Central and Local Hospital Services Councils, parallel to 
the Medical Councils. 
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With respect to consultant services, 
Negotiating Committee representing the 
the BMA were assembling a 
Royal Colleges, but took the 
position, in advance, that rates of remuneration should be uniform and 
determined centrally, and that there should be no incentive for 
consultants to remain entirely outside the service (apart from allowing 
part-private practice) • 
Experiments in health centre planning should be undertaken before 
any wide-scale central policy was set, the SMA argued, although wide 
experimentation should be undertaken by the Ministry directly, advised 
by the Central Health Services Council, and jointly evaluated. In 
contrast to the Ministry's idea, any non-competitive system of 
remuneration in health centres was emphatically rejected, although it 
was suggested capitation fees earned by health centre doctors might be 
pooled and redistributed according to a method of their own choosing. 
At the conclusion of the discussions, the BMA representatives 
requested official answers to their several questions, especially the 
issue, which they strongly advocated, of including all separate 
government health services under one Ministry. The Minister said it 
would be possible at a future date to discuss concessions, but urged 
caution in discussions in the interim: "It was felt -- and the doctors 
agreed -- that even if concessions could be made on some of the main 
po ints at issue, it would not be politic to make them all now." The 
Minister would, therefore, make general replies, and "offer discussion 
on points where there was likely to be room for concession later." 
These areas would include compensation, professional representation on 
planning committees, and the constitution of central and local 
administrative bodies. (14) 
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The Minister and his officials met again in August with a larger 
group of representatives of the medical profession, this time including 
Lord Dawson and members of the Royal Colleges. Views were exchanged, 
but no commitments made by the Minister. Dr Dain, for the BMA, again 
stressed that the profession must find the administrative structure 
satisfactory, and be satisfied that freedom, and a "proper part for the 
profession" were secured, as prerequisites to discussing any other 
questions. Sir Alfred Webb-Johnson advoca.ted a hospital service 
organised, for purposes of planning, regionally around university 
teaching hospitals. The Minister, with Lord Dawson, supported the White 
Paper joint authority concept, but offered to consult with the Cabinet 
on this and the issue of medical representation on planning and 
administrative bodies. (15) 
By the next meeting, in October, Willink had discussed a number of 
major changes with his War Cabinet colleagues, including Labour 
Ministers Attlee, Bevin, and Morrison. The War Cabinet Reconstruction 
Committee, in early October, had rejected Willink's request to expand 
the statutory powers of the Central Health Services Council and its 
medical representation. The Committee suggested it should be enlarged, 
with broader terms of reference and functional representation from other 
professional groups. The most significant decision was to authorise the 
Minister of Health to drop the joint authority proposal of the White 
Paper, and discuss a regional system of planning, the regions being 
organised around university teaching hospitals, with the planning 
authority representing local authorities and voluntary hospitals. The 
Committee determined that majority representation should go to the local 
authorities, against the Minister's wish to provide equal 
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representation. 
The Committee also agreed with Mr Willink's request, on behalf of 
the medical profession, to drop the powers of the Central Medical Board 
to direct doctors to areas of practice, but decided to retain its power 
to declare certain over-doctored areas closed to new practitioners 
(Le., "negative direction"), and agreed to drop the requirement that 
new doctors engage in wholly public practice for the first several 
years. With respect to health centres, the Committee rejected the 
Minister's request that doctors be engaged only as tenants, or solo 
practitioners, in the centres: liThe health centre experiment [in 
co-operative practice and teamwork] had great potentialities, and it was 
important that nothing should be done to weaken this part of the 
scheme." (16) 
This new mandate to the Minister from the War Cabinet 
Reconstruction Committee was discussed with the representative group of 
the medical profession the following week. The Minister now announced 
that the joint local authority regions would be dropped, in favour of a 
plan much closer to that advocated by the BRA and the King Edward's 
Fund. It was suggested that approximately ten regions be established, 
around university teaching hospitals, the regions containing altogether 
thirty to thirty-five joint authority areas. The medical group gave its 
approval, providing the medical profession would be represented directly 
as the predominant partner, at area and regional levels. With respect to 
the Central Health Services Council, the Minister now proposed several 
advisory groups, representing hospitals, and the medical, dental, and 
nursing professions. The doctors agreed to this, providing the advisory 
groups would have wide autonomy. This, the Minister cautioned them, was 
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not likely to be acceptable to his colleagues. (17) 
Official talks with the medical profession were left at this stage 
until January 1945, pending the calling together of a formal Negotiating 
Committee for the profession, and the holding of the BMA's Annual 
Representative Meeting in December, and a Panel Conference of General 
Practitioners. 
SMA Chairman Dr Guy Dain summed up the decisions of the BMA 
Representative Meeting as follows: 
We have expressed ourselves in favour of the development 
of the service; we have disapproved of the White Paper 
as it stands; we have decided to negotiate; we prefer 
evolution from National Health Insurance; we do not wish 
to be employed by local authorities nor to be subject to 
clinical direction, nor do we wish a whole time salaried 
service for general practice or to be without clinical 
control. (18) 
THE TIMES concluded: "From an impressive mass of negative 
resolutions, it emerges only that the conference has willed almost all 
the ends and rej ected almost all the means. II (19) 
This then was the indeterminate state of health service planning at 
the end of 1944, before the opening of formal negotiations with the 
medical profession and other two major interests in the new year. (20) 
Negotiations with the Voluntary Hospitals 
The first official meeting between the Minister and the BHA took 
place in early August 1944. The meeting was also attended by 
representatives of the SMA, the Contributory Schemes Association, and 
the Nuffield Provincial Hospitals Trust (the agency chiefly involved in 
the wartime Hospital Surveys and a strong supporter of a regional 
system) • 
The Minister agreed with the viewpoint presented in favour of 
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maximum autonomy for voluntary hospitals; he had not intended to 
establish a "partnership" with municipal hospitals in any legal sense, 
and hoped to be able to modify his proposals to establish a full and 
real partnership satisfactory to the voluntary institutions, although he 
could not support an independent Central Hospitals Advisory Council. 
With respect to the region versus joint authority issue, the 
Minister at this point still felt the joint authority system workable. 
He had been briefed for the meeting by his officials with a memorandum 
setting out the case against a three-tier regional planning structure as 
unnecessary and unduly complicated, and informed the BRA that he was 
considering some machinery for any problems needing to be co-ordinated 
among the several joint authorities. Details would have to await 
further consultation with his colleagues, and further talks with the 
hospitals association, to which the BRA committee agreed. (21) 
The Minister's next meeting with the BRA, in early October, 
followed immediately the decision of the War Cabinet Committee to 
authorise discussions based on a regional, teaching hospital-centred 
hospital scheme. Here the Minister announced, for the first time, that 
the government would consider a two-tier hospital planning system, of 
ten large regions for specialised planning, each subdivided into three 
to four areas for planning and co-ordination of more ordinary hospital 
services. This scheme the Minister offered as more acceptable to the 
voluntary hospitals, noting that representation at all levels would be 
more equal than proposed in the White Paper. He further announced that 
several central advisory bodies, including one for hospitals, were being 
considered, but that their autonomy would be limited. 
Another meeting with the King Edward's Hospital Fund for London was 
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held a week later to deliver the new proposals, and the following day 
again with the BRA committee. The BRA representatives accepted the 
proposal of hospital regions for consideration, but were now more 
concerned than previously about the financial arrangements. The 
voluntary hospitals had originally asked for only partial state funding, 
the remainder to be made up by contributions, but this had presupposed 
the existence of contributory schemes. The BRA was now in a dilemma, 
since it appeared logical that if the health service were to be funded 
as an all-in insurance scheme, the contributory schemes must go. The 
Minister suggested the hospitals could still make appeals to the public: 
"Unless the claim of the hospitals that they enjoy widespread public 
support for the voluntary system was unfounded--which he did not 
believe--they had a solid ground for appealing for funds to maintain 
their voluntary status." The Minister agreed to help the hospitals in 
presenting their case to the public. 
With respect to the manner of state payment to the hospitals, the 
Minister regretted the BRA's continuing opposition to payments being 
made via the local or joint authorities. The BRA had maintained that 
the voluntary hospitals would be tarnished with the Poor Law stigma of 
being "rate-aided" and wished payments direct from the central 
government. The Minister maintained that a worse dichotomy would exist 
if voluntary hospitals were "state-aided" and public hospitals 
II rate-aided, II which would be contrary to the main aim of a single 
planned hospital system resting on local partnership. (22) 
A second round of discussions between the BRA and Ministry 
officials took place in March 1945, following Willink's January and 
February talks with the medical profession. 
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Negotiations with the Local Authorities 
Talks with the local authority organisations began in June 1944, 
with meetings between Ministry officials and the County Councils 
Association, the Metropolitan Boroughs' Standing Joint Committee, and 
the Association of Municipal Corporations. While the Ministry stressed 
flexibility in arrangements for the local authority role in hospital and 
clinic services, the organisations opposed even a temporary joint 
authority scheme, preferring a wider, regional, non-executive planning 
body which would have its plan enforceable by the Minister, but operated 
by the individual local authorities directly. It was noted by the 
Ministry that this had been rejected earlier as too weak an authority, 
and as introducing too many complications. The few matters that did 
need wider regional co-ordination could be handled through special 
machinery. University teaching hospitals, they suggested, in opposition 
to the BHA and BMA view, could be represented on joint authority and 
local committees, rather than themselves being the centre of the 
regions. '!he London Metropolitan Boroughs' Committee, chaired by the 
influential Alderman Charles Key, later Parliamentary Secretary to 
Health Minister Bevan, feared the joint authority proposal would mean 
too great a transfer of power over health and welfare functions from the 
separate London Boroughs to the London County Council. The Minister 
promised to discuss this with the LeC and with his colleagues. (23) 
By October, Willink had bowed to the almost universal sentiment 
outside his own Ministry against the joint authority plan. The War 
Cabinet Committee had approved the new region-area scheme, and Will ink 
announced this to local authority representatives. Municipal hospitals 
would not be transferred to joint authorities, but would remain with the 
267 
major individual authorities, as would the health and welfare and clinic 
services, which had been the object of much of the local authorities' 
worries over loss of control of their traditional services. (24) 
Additional Considerations by the Ministry 
Several matters related to the health service but not included in 
the 1944 discussions were elaborated in Ministry memoranda prior to the 
beginning of the much anticipated negotiations with the medical 
profession in early 1945. 
Dentistry was one of these, since it had been excluded from the 
White Paper, pending the report of the Interdepartmental Committee under 
Lord Teviot. Based partly on this committee's Interim Report, the 
Minister now proposed a comprehensive dental service to be inaugurated 
simultaneously with the rest of the NHS, although limited resources 
might not permit fully adequate service for some time. The service 
would be set up along the lines of the practitioner service, 
guaranteeing freedom of choice for dentists and patients, full-time or 
part-time practice, and similar representation and contract arrangements 
for the dental profession. Notably, it was emphasised "that there 
should be a full trial of the Health Centre method of dental practice" 
after consultation with the medical and dental professions. 
These proposals were agreeably received by representatives of the 
dental profession early in January 1945. Sir Arthur Rucker, Deputy 
Secretary in the Ministry of Health, proposed payment to dentists by 
salary in clinics: liThe dentists did not demur; they would wish this 
salary to be paid by the Central Dental Board rather than the local 
authority. II They opposed any large scale provision of dental clinics 
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but agreed that dental treatment should be available in health centres. 
It was agreed that official negotiations should take place on this 
basis. (25) 
Implementation of the White Paper provisions for the Mental Health 
services was also covered by the Ministry, in discussions with the 
County Councils Association and the Association of Municipal 
Corporations. (26) 
Likewise, changes in financial arrangements for funding hospitals, 
for reciprocal payments among regions for utilisation by out-of-region 
patients, and for general administration of the services now to remain 
with the local authorities, were dealt with in several year-end 
housekeeping memoranda. (27) 
The Negotiations of the Spring of 1945 
The stage was now set for what was expected to be the final round 
of negotiations with the medical profession and the other groups defined 
by the Ministry as having a legitimate negotiating role. 
The first set of negotiations involved the medical profession 
almost exclusively. The Minister and his officials met weekly between 
January and March with the newly appointed Negotiating Committee; these 
meetings culminated in the preparation of a series of draft memoranda of 
alternative proposals. The first was produced in early February, 
revised in late February, and twice revised in March. These changes 
were consolidated by late April, after discussions with the voluntary 
hospitals. 
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The Medical Profession, and the Revised Proposals 
The negotiations proceeded from two sets of assumptions: the terms 
of reference of the Negotiating Committee, particularly the stipulation 
that agreement should be reached on the administrative structure before 
proceeding to other aspects; and from the brief given to the two 
Ministers, Will ink and Johnston, by the War Cabinet Reconstruction 
Committee. 
Thus, the issues that dominated the early discussions were the 
administrative arrangements, and in later meetings, health centres, the 
hiring and distribution of practitioners, methods of remuneration, and 
sale and purchase of practices. An issue raised frequently by the 
medical profession was the inclusion of the whole range of government 
health services, including industrial health, under the Ministry, along 
with the concomitant issue of the functional integration of all the 
separate government medical branches into a co-ordinated service, at all 
levels. This was a matter of concern common to the medical profession 
and to the Labour and trade union movements and socialist reformers, but 
was now pressed with particular vigour by the medical profession. 
The negotiations opened in January with the Negotiating Committee 
returning to their theme of a gradually evolving health service. They 
urged that the hospital and consultant service be started first, and 
that non-hospital services (general practice, principally) be added 
later by extension of National Health Insurance. 
The Minister noted in response that both branches of the service 
would take time to develop fully, but the objective of the government 
was to establish a fully comprehensive and universal service from the 
start, designed for lithe best advantage of the community as a whole 
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without any limitations of income, employment, or other irrelevant 
qualifications." 
The point that the general practitioner service should be included 
only by extending National Health Insurance had also been raised 
privately by one of the medical negotiators, the President of the Royal 
College of Surgeons, Sir Alfred Webb-Johnson, who had written to Will ink 
only days earlier. Willink saw it as impossible to build a health scheme 
with limited coverage alongside a national insurance scheme which would 
include the whole community, although the new service "should be built 
up and evolved from the existing system of National Health Insurance and 
should not be based on new or revolutionary principles." 
In response to the issue of integration of all government health 
services, Will ink could suggest only that they should be co-ordinated 
among the several government departments responsible, and that such 
major items as housing and water supply, inasmuch as they were related 
to health, should remain in the Ministry of Health. 
Although the government, through the Minister, was clear in making 
known its commitment to a comprehensive scheme with coverage of the 
whole population, it plainly did not share the views of the profession 
and the reformers alike that it would be consistent with these larger 
aims to bring all separate health services together into a co-ordinated 
whole. (28) 
During the January meetings, the Negotiating Committee were most 
concerned with the structure of the Central Health Services Council, the 
chief advisory body to the Minister, and the proposed Central Medical 
Board, which would be the body with statutory powers over hiring and 
distribution of doctors. 
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In his first "Alternate Plan," Willink attained a compromise with 
the Negotiating Committee over these two bodies. While the medical 
profession wished to see a single Central Health Services Council, and 
opposed the BRA's proposal of a parallel Central Hospitals Council, the 
Minister now proposed that several Standing Advisory Groups, 
representing the medical and dental professions, the hospitals, and 
perhaps other interests, be set up to work in conjunction with the 
Central Council. In deference to the medical profession, the Central 
Council would be primarily medical, with some representation of other 
interests, while the Standing Groups would represent exclusively one 
profession or interest. The Central Medical Board, in another 
concession to the medical profession, would lose its proposed power to 
require full time public practice for the first several years of a 
doctor's participation in the health services, and its power to direct 
doctors to certain areas by prohibition or incentive. 
The Minister would not concede the medical profession's demand that 
Regions be given statutory executive and financial powers. These powers 
would rest with the Areas, made up of local authorities. Thus there 
would be about ten Regions, the central institutions of which would be 
university teaching hospitals. They would have expert advisory, 
co-ordination and planning duties, presenting their plans for the 
regional health services to the Minister in consultation with (but not 
necessarily in agreement with) their constituent Areas. The Areas, 
which would total about thirty-five, would be based on the original 
Joint Authority proposal, i.e., combined local authorities, which would 
have executive and financial powers, and planning duties, for the 
services in their local authorities. The Area Councils would in 
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addition be the democratically responsible level, with majority 
representation from the local authorities (including municipal 
hospitals) and a combined minority representing the medical profession, 
voluntary hospitals, and others to be determined (e.g., dentists, 
pharmacists, nurses). 
Below this, the County and County Borough Councils would be 
responsible through Statutory Health Committees in each local authority 
for administration and operation of the maternity, children's, horne 
nursing and other services, including the maintenance and staffing of 
the planned health centres. 
The general practitioner service would be operated by committees 
adapted with little change from the National Health Insurance local 
committees, with statutory powers and majority representation of the 
local medical profession. These local committees would probably become 
the contracting bodies for general practitioners, in order 
the medical profession's rejection of any direct 
relationship with local authorities. 
to satisfy 
contractual 
Remuneration standards would be 
Committee's recommendations, while 
set according to the Spens 
the method would be determined in 
consultation with the profession, with the possibility of part-salary, 
part-capitation being the basis. The Minister clearly wished at this 
point to retain salaried remuneration as an open option: liThe views of 
the profession would also be welcomed on the possibility of providing 
salary as an alternative to capitation in suitable circumstances at the 
option of the individual doctor." Health centres might have a basic 
part-salary with the remainder of the capitation-based income pooled and 
distributed according to the agreed wishes of the doctors in the centre, 
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with a certain deduction for use of the health centre facilities. 
Free choice of doctor by patient would be guaranteed, as well as 
the choice by the doctor to treat any patient privately. Access to 
consultants would be through referral by a practitioner, who would have 
the greatest possible choice of consultants at his disposal. The 
patient, in turn, would have free choice of public or private treatment 
or a mixture. (29) 
To these positions the Negotiating Committee took objection on the 
grounds of dilution of medical power implied in the proposal for 
Standing Advisory Groups to the Central Health Services Council, and the 
lack of right of the Council and the Groups to publish opinions 
independently; the latter point the Minister agreed to reconsider. He 
declined, however, to concede added statutory powers to the Regional 
Councils, since they would not in any case be responsible to the public 
through normal democratic machinery. 
The first revisions to the Minister's Alternate 
February 1945 concerned primarily the central machinery. 
Proposals in 
The Standing 
Advisory Groups would remain, but, at the request of the profession, 
medical representation would be increased and the Groups would have 
direct access to the Minister. With respect to local arrangements, the 
objective of using National Health Insurance machinery as much as 
possible would be emphasised, the method favoured by the SMA. No 
changes were made in proposals for health centres, remuneration, or 
private practice and freedom of choice, but it was decided that consumer 
or lay representatives, appointed by the Council and the Minister, could 
be added to the local medical committees. (30) 
The amendments were generally acceptable to the Negotiating 
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Committee, which was now satisfied the government did not intend to 
dilute medical influence through the Standing Advisory Groups. Argument 
was still raised, however, over the lack of statutory planning and 
financial power for the Regions, a point on which the Ministry would not 
give ground, except to reassure the Committee that the interests of the 
profession, including the consultants at the regional level, were well 
safeguarded • 
Discussion went on to the general practitioner service. The 
profession would accept health centres, on a trial basis, providing the 
experiment would be widespread and controlled centrally, to which the 
Minister agreed. The Negotiating Committee displayed some disunity on 
the issue of part-salaries, some members wishing removal of any 
reference to salaries in future health service discussion documents, and 
others favouring part-salaried partnerships. The Ministry was not 
willing to rule out part-salaries at this point. 
The medical negotiators were opposed to ending sale and purchase of 
practices, but wished an early statement of government intent. In a 
lengthy discussion on this topic at the subsequent meeting, Sir Arthur 
Rucker, for the Minister, noted the difficulties with any of the 
alternatives to abolishing sale and purchase. In particular, there was 
much public antipathy to the sale and purchase of the "goodwill" of 
patients; in addition, it posed a large financial barrier to young 
doctors setting up practice; and it was plainly incompatible with a 
public health service. The medical representatives, although not 
unanimous, preferred a general abolition, with compensation, to any 
gradual or partial compromise. They did also, at this time, request the 
removal of any reference in the Ministry's Alternate Proposals to 
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payment by salary or part-salary. They agreed, however, to the pooling 
and redistribution of capitation fees in health centre practices. (31) 
The second revision of the Minister's Alternate Proposals, unveiled 
to the Negotiating Committee in late February, clarified and formalised 
the composition and power of Central, Regional, Area and Local bodies. 
It added Regional representation to Area level meetings, and general 
practitioner representation to local hospital committees. Health 
centres were lito be the subject of centrally controlled experiment with 
different types of centre." Despite the doctors' request, however, no 
change was made in the health centre part-salary remuneration proposal, 
and on the difficult question of sale and purchase the problems were 
described but no policy announced. 
In the meeting following the second revision of his proposals, the 
Minister requested the views of the profession by late April, so that 
the ,Parliamentary Bill could be framed; any matters undecided by then 
could be left for later discussion and regulations, or amendment in 
Parliament. The views of the BRA and local authorities were also being 
solicited on the basis of the second revision of the proposals. 
The Negotiating Committee again reiterated points made in earlier 
discussions: in particular that the Minister of Health should be 
concerned with all government health matters, and only with health; that 
the scheme should be implemented gradually, in stages; and that the 
profession doubted the value of a scheme covering the whole population. 
The Minister in reply reconfirmed the government's commitment to a 
universal and comprehensive scheme, and, while noting the widespread 
opinion in favour of integrating industrial and similar health services, 
pointed out the "considerable danger of delaying action on the main 
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problems if this p:>int were pressed at the present stage." The Committee 
also requested still more medical representation on the Central 
Committee, to which the Minister could not agree, and now considered the 
prop:>sal for a Central Medical Board dispensable, with which he did 
agree. It was also agreed that the Minister should provide a statement 
on sale and purchase, and the revised prop:>sals, prior to a SMA Council 
meeting in late March, which would be the last before the SMA Annual 
Representative Meeting in May. (32) 
In the third revision of the Alternate Prop:>sals, 
Central Medical Board was dropped (unless later 
therefore, the 
requested by the 
profession), and all other matters were left unchanged apart from the 
requirement that the "health centre experiment" be planned with the 
advice of the medically dominated Central Health Services Council (as 
requested by the profession), and the guarantee that practitioners in 
health centres would have no direct contract with the local authorities, 
which would provide all ancillary staff and maintain the centres. The 
issue of sale and purchase was once again left undecided. (33) 
The penultimate meeting of the Negotiating Committee with the 
Minister took place in late April, a month after the third revision of 
his prop:>sals had been produced, during which time he had consulted with 
the local authorities and the voluntary hospitals, and had received 
deputations from the TUC and the Health WOrkers' Council. 
Will ink now confirmed that even the Area Councils would have no 
p:>wer over the distribution of practitioners; only the Local Committees 
would have authority to hire doctors. This meant, in essence, that any 
effective Central, Regional, or Area influence over the distribution of 
medical practices had been given up to entirely local medical 
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prerogative; the Area Council (with largely local authority 
representation) would have only advisory power. 
Despite confidence expressed by Ministry officials that the 
part-salary proposal could only be beneficial to general practice, Dr 
Charles Hill asked that "payment by salary should be ruled out as 
opposed to the principles of the profession. II liThe profession did not 
accept the view that financial competition between practitioners in a 
heal th centre was inadmissible," he sa id , and bel ieved that 
"co-operation in work (which was accepted as essential) did not 
necessarily depend on financial partnership." 
The Committee made a final attempt to enhance the status of private 
practice by requesting that grants-in-aid be made available to persons 
seeking private treatment in hospitals. Sir Arthur Rucker, for the 
Minister, again pointed out that such a scheme would be appropriate only 
in an insurance-based system, not in a comprehensive public service 
financed by taxation. 
While other local administrative details were settled, the question 
of sale and purchase, with which the government was having a great deal 
of trouble, remained unresolved. (34) 
This then represented the substantial progress of negotiations with 
the medical profession prior to the BMA's Annual Representative Meeting, 
and the end of the Coalition government in May. Through the successive 
revisions of his alternate proposals, the Minister had conceded greater 
administrative, advisory and planning powers to the medical profession, 
and had removed any effective power over distribution of general 
practitioners. 
He had, however, retained the initial democratic and egalitarian 
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principles of the White Paper -- that the service should be universal 
and comprehensive, and that its local and central administration should 
be based on existing levels of elected government. 
Discussions with Hospitals and Local Authorities Groups 
The Minister's revised proposals were received relatively agreeably 
by the British Hospitals Association and the King Edward's Hospital Fund 
for London. They were satisfied with the proposal for a Standing 
Hospitals Advisory Committee to the Central Health Services Council, 
providing it had power to intervene in any Area-level disputes regarding 
voluntary hospitals. They approved in general the financial details, 
and were agreed that the future of contributory schemes could be 
discussed later, along with questions of the amount and procedure of 
government finance of the hospitals. These views were made known in 
several meetings with the Minister and were ratified by a Conference of 
Voluntary Hospitals in late March. (35) 
Discussions with the local authorities, one must assume from the 
scanty evidence in the Ministry's 
following the Minister's major 
file, went relatively successfully 
decision to drop the Joint Authority 
proposal, which would have entailed transfer of control of municipal 
hospitals and clinic services from individual to combined local 
authorities. They were satisfied with the majority representation on 
the Area Committees, and the statutory planning and financial powers, 
and with the retention of municipal hospitals and clinic services. Only 
the matter of health centres proved troublesome, because of the divided 
jurisdiction among central planning, local staffing and maintenance, and 
the general practitioners who would practise in the centres but who 
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wanted no contractual relationship and minimal contact with the local 
authorities. 
In the Ministry's March 1945 summary of discussions with the local 
government groups, it was noted that factors were weighted against the 
success of the health centres, for the above reasons, and that some 
authorities were cautious, fearing blame for their possible failure. 
But most authorities were optimistic about the long-run prospects, 
allowing the Ministry to conclude that, despite negative indications, 
"it is probable that the health centre system of family practice, 
particularly in urban areas, will improve the practice of medicine out 
of all knowledge, and this prospect of providing a really first class 
family doctor service should not be abandoned because of present-day 
difficulties." (36) 
Deferral of the Issue of Sale and Purchase 
Policy on the sale and purchase of medical practices was an issue 
with which the government still had particular difficulty, as evidenced 
by the long delays in making a statement, despite the urgent requests of 
the medical profession. It would appear that considerable differences 
of opinion existed, on the one hand between the senior officials of the 
Ministry of Health and the Secretary of State for Scotland, who favoured 
early and full abolition of sale and purchase with compensation, and the 
Minister of Health on the other hand, who appeared to be voicing the 
same doubts (although not absolute opposition) as those expressed by the 
medical profession. It was also clear that the SMA, the Labour Party, 
the MPU, many young doctors, and much of the public favoured immediate 
abolition of sale and purchase. 
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Accordingly, the matter was brought before the War Cabinet 
Reconstruction Committee by the Minister, in order to acquire some 
indication of government policy before the SMA's Representative Meeting 
in early May. Willink recommended the government defer any decision on 
the continuation of sale and purchase until the service had been in 
operation for several years. He felt the extra upheaval of abolition 
would be unnecessary and not productive for the profession, and that the 
government should provide some assistance for young doctors leaving the 
forces to enter new practices. The Secretary of State for Scotland 
proposed a Committee of Enquiry to make an early recommendation on 
future policy. All members were agreed that compensation must be part 
of any abolition of sale and purchase, but opposing views had been 
expressed on whether the new service would increase or decrease the 
value of practices. In two Reconstruction Committee meetings, it was 
decided to defer a decision, pending several years of experience and an 
enquiry, that a statement should be made to this effect, noting the case 
for abolition and the problems it would cause, and that the government 
would seek the profession's advice on facilitating young doctors' entry 
into practice. The Bill, which was expected to be ready for 
consideration in May, would therefore contain no definite policy. 
Lord Wbolton, Minister of Reconstruction, informing Prime Minister 
Churchill in late March of progress to date, noted the decisions of the 
War Cabinet Reconstruction Committee. His Labour colleagues, he said, 
would have preferred that all practices be bought outright by the state, 
but they were finally persuaded to make unanimous the Committee's 
decision to defer the matter. To this decision the Prime Minister gave 
his approval, for announcement in the House of Commons on 4 May, while 
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the SMA conference was in session. (37) Will ink at the same time 
obtained the approval of Ernest Bevin, Minister of Labour and National 
Service and one of the Labour members of the Reconstruction Committee, 
to make the Commons announcement on sale and purchase. Will ink stressed 
the urgency of reaching agreement on the proposals, so that the scheme 
"may be settled in a Coalition Bill and not left until after the 
election. II (38) 
Response from the SMA: The Annual Representative Meeting 
Thus it appeared by early May 1945 that the proposals of the 
Coalition government were settled, and that it now remained only for 
their ratification by the SMA Annual Representative Meeting to prepare a 
Bill based on the Minister's revised Alternate Proposals. 
The BMA conference took place on 3 and 4 May. It passed some 
forty-seven resolutions concerning the health service, the chief among 
which committed the Association to general approval of the Minister's 
revised scheme lias a workable basis of the new Health Service" subject 
to satisfactory negotiations on details. Several additional points 
remained to be settled, including: statutory powers for the Central 
Standing Advisory Committees; the integration of all local health 
services without local authority domination; and more medical 
representation on the Regional Councils, on the Area Councils, and on 
the hospital planning groups. In health centres, doctors "should work in 
free association, renting the premises from the particular authority." 
SMA Divisions should have a voice in any decision to expand the 
provision of health centres. 
The Association again went on record opposing a basic part-salary; 
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opposing any limit on professional income; urging "constant 
collaboration" among consultants and specialists, doctors in local 
authority, education, industry, and general practice; requesting that 
the right of patients to private treatment be clearly expressed in the 
legislation; and, significantly, accepting a scheme of universal (one 
hundred percent) coverage providing there were safeguards (grants-in-aid 
were again suggested) for private practice. Negotiations should 
continue on outstanding issues, but the BMA resolved to take no decision 
on approval or disapproval until after resolving the issues of: 
disciplinary machinery; control of certification; safeguards for private 
practice; and figures for remuneration and for compensation. 
The BMA was perhaps at one with the SMA in criticising the scheme 
for falling far short of the organisation required for a truly 
comprehensive national health service: "It does no more than provide 
one branch of such a service--that of personal medical treatment. It 
fails 'to bring the country's full resources to bear upon reducing 
ill-health and promoting good health in all its citizens' (White Paper, 
p. 5)." A "Health Cabinet, II consisting of all Ministers responsible for 
matters having a bearing on health, was suggested as one possible way of 
achieving this aim of the ~hite Paper. 
Thus the same Association which had recently spent several months 
in negotiation with the Minister attempting to reduce the power of 
elected and public authorities in favour of greater powers for local and 
central medical committees had, by the end of its 1945 conference, again 
taken what appeared as a cautious, conservative and nearly monopolistic 
view of the medical and administrative arrangements, while at the same 
time publicly taking a magnanimous position in favour of a service 
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broadly conceived to further preventive and positive health, and in 
favour of full integration and co-ordination of all separate health 
services. (39) 
The Caretaker Government: The Unpublished White Paper 
May 1945 was to be an eventful month for even greater reasons than 
the apparently ambivalent stance of the SMA, at what then appeared to be 
the juncture immediately preceding health service legislation. 
The Coalition government was dissolved 23 May following rejection 
by the Labour Party Annual Conference of Churchill's offer to continue 
the coalition arrangement until the war in the Pacific ended. Labour 
and the Liberals had proposed an October election, which Churchill 
rejected. While Clement Attlee and Ernest Bevin were prepared to accept 
Churchill's offer, the National Executive Committee and virtually the 
entire Labour Conference were not; Attlee was obliged to communicate 
this lack of mandate to the Prime Minister. Churchill accordingly 
resigned, and was asked within hours by the King to form a temporary 
government, until the dissolution of Parliament 15 June. The Commons, 
meanwhile, reassembled under the now predominantly Conservative 
Caretaker government on 29 May. (40) 
The final discussion between Will ink and the medical profession 
took place 24 May, the day after Churchill's resignation. It was clear 
that an election would be held and that further progress with 
negotiations would be impossible; the Minister did not know what course 
would be adopted with respect to legislation by the Caretaker government 
in the short period before the election on 5 July. (41) 
Willink moved quickly, however, to have a draft White Paper, 
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"Progress with Proposals for a National Health Service," prepared by 
early June for possible use in the election. It was presented to 
Cabinet, on 4 June, by the Lord President of the Council, who suggested 
its use, prior to the election, as a "desirable indication to the public 
of the government I s intentions." 'The draft 1Nhi te Paper affirmed that all 
the main principles of the 1944 White Paper would be retained: the ends 
were the same but some of the means would be altered. 'The detailed 
changes resulting from several months of negotiations were enumerated. 
(42) 
Despite the recommendations of Lords Wbolton and Cherwell to Prime 
Minister Churchill in favour of publication of the new 1Nhite Paper, the 
Cabinet took the advice of the Minister of Health and the (now 
Conservative) Secretary of State for Scotland against publishing. 'They 
suggested the Cabinet approve the changes outlined, and make only a 
general announcement, which would, on the basis of the negotiations and 
concessions, be supported by a great majority of doctors, the voluntary 
hospitals, and the associations of local authorities (with the exception 
of the London County Council) • 
In Cabinet on 15 June, the Minister of Health argued that 
government candidates in the election should have the most recent 
position available, since much progress had been made in negotiating 
issues originally objectionable to some groups. With the support of the 
Prime Minister, who urged emphasis on the improvement to the standard of 
general practice, the Cabinet decided to agree to the Minister's 
proposed changes, and to have speech material and a government 
announcement prepared for release the following week. This material was 
sent by Willink to Churchill on 16 June for his approval. 
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On 18 June, Churchill, writing to Willink, expressed approval of 
the changed health service proposals, but now doubted the need for any 
announcement, feeling the Opposition would attack any changes as a 
betrayal of the White Paper: "The only question is how well [the new 
proposals] strike the electors at this juncture." Commenting on the 
extent of the Prime Minister's interest in the scheme, Calder notes 
that: "Churchill, much to his irritation, had to apply himself hastily 
to the concoction, on the advice of his ministers, of plausible policies 
in such fields as the health service, in which he had little interest." 
(43) He urged Willink to see Lord Beaverbrook for final advice on 
whether to make a public announcement. 
Will ink, after seeking advice, notified Churchill on 19 June that 
he would make no statement until the Opposition attacked; only then 
would he make the general announcement approved by Cabinet. (44) 
The Labour Party manifesto, "Let Us Face The Future," on the other 
hand, contained the SMA-Labour policy which was passed at the Labour 
Party Conference of December 1944 and ratified again at the Conference 
of May 1945. The Labour Party thus went to the electorate relatively 
well-prepared both with its own detailed policies, and on the basis of 
its part in the development of the Coalition proposals. 
Polling day was 5 July, and the Labour landslide was confirmed when 
the votes were counted 26 July. Churchill immediately tendered his 
resignation, and Clement Attlee became Prime Minister of a Labour 
government charged with the implementation of much of the Coalition 
reconstruction plans, including the National Health Service. 
The Coalition had set a very clear pattern in the representation of 
interests, concentrating on the three major or established interests --
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the medical profession, the voluntary hospitals, and the local 
authorities -- those interests which dominated aspects of the production 
and distribution of medical care. Of these three (with the minor 




satisfied, since the Coalition had defended its original 
comprehensiveness and universality against the B~'s 
the administrative and contractual aspects of the health 
service, all three blocks of interests were satisfied. 
It is clear from discussions in the Caretaker government, that the 
Labour Ministers did indeed have some influence on the Coalition's early 
plans, but that these were accepted under duress, particularly the 
health centre provisions. 
It appeared clear that certain of the key issues of the Labour 
movement and the advocates, particularly the reorganisation of general 
practice in health centres, the provision of industrial health services, 
and the integration and co-ordination of all aspects of the NHS, would 
stand little chance under the Coalition. Several principles, in 
particular integration, had been sacrificed to serve one or another of 
the major interests. 
Thus it remained to be seen whether the new Labour government, 
taking over the state with an enormous electoral mandate, with 
well-developed health service policies and the close liaison of an 
expert socialist medical group, and with the massive backing of the 
Labour movement, would alter significantly the policy course charted, 
and compromises conceded, and the pattern of representation of interests 
established by the Coalition government. 
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THE HEALTH SERVICE PROPONENTS: 
THE SEARCH FOR A SOCIALIST HEALTH PLAN 
The pre-White Paper campaign of 1943, which began very much on the 
offensive to publicise the policies of the proponent groups, had turned 
in essence, in 1944 and 1945, into a defense of the White Paper 
proposals, which the groups believed were the best to be expected from 
the Coalition. Now, however, Labour had won the election in a landslide, 
and there was optimism that what was believed to have been lost in the 
course of Willink's last round of negotiations with the 'vested 
interests' under the Caretaker government might indeed be regained by 
starting afresh, with Labour's much reaffirmed Conference policy on a 
National Health Service. The SMA, for example, pointed out before the 
election that: 
"Only the return to power of a Socialist government can 
give the people what they so much desire, a complete 
service staffed by whole time salaried officers, able to 
give the very best possible service; a service of which 
the scope, quantity and quality is determined by the 
people themseles, advised by doctors who are free from 
restrictions which the present economic basis of 
medicine places upon them. II (1) 
In Prime Minister Attlee's 4 August 1945 announcement of his new 
government, Aneurin Bevan was named Minister of Health, which included 
responsibility for housing. liThe extraordinary nature of the commission 
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with which Bevan was charged must be emphasized," says Michael Foot: "it 
was nothing less than to persuade the most conservative and respected 
profession in the country to accept and operate the Labour Government's 
most intrinsically Socialist proposition." (2) 
This energetic member of the Labour backbench, MP for EbbwVale, 
outspoken left wing critic of the Coalition and of the Labour Party and 
TUC leaderships, adhered to political views which were, in Michael 
Foot's terms, a grafting on of the philosophies of the Levellers and the 
Chartists to his own studied Marxism. (3) But he was also a committed 
defender of Parliamentary methods. 
The SMA in particular had high expectations of the new Minister. 
Bevan, like the SMA, had been identified with the left wing of the 
Labour Party; his background, in a Welsh mining area, left him with a 
great concern for the health of the people and a great dislike for 
privilege and vested economic 
socialist views had led him 
interests. His independence and his 
into deep conflict with both Labour 
parliamentary leadership and TUC leadership in the past. 
Of the 393 Labour MPs in the new Parliament, twelve were members of 
the SMA. Of these, the most senior were: Mr Somerville Hastings, 
President of the SMA and long influential in its activities in addition 
to being Chairman of the London Hospitals and Medical Service Committee; 
Dr H. B. Morgan, Medical Advisor of the TUC; Dr Stephen J. L. Taylor 
(later Lord Taylor), formerly Assistant Editor of the LANCET and 
Director of the Home Intelligence Division and Social Survey of the 
Ministry of Information, who had earlier been called upon for advice by 
Health Minister Willinki and Dr Edith Summerskill, Parliamentary 
Secretary to the Ministry of Food. (4) Somerville Hastings became 
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Chairman of the Parliamentary Labour Party's Health Group. 
The Proponent Groups Approach the New Minister 
The SMA lost little time in making official contact with Aneurin 
Bevan, assuring him of the Association's willingness to "assist in any 
way possible" in the implementation of the health service. They advised 
him that the real views of the medical profession, as shown by the BMA 
Questionary, had been misinterpreted by the group of senior doctors who 
had negotiated with Mr Willink. Eight SMA pamphlets and memoranda, on 
various detailed aspects of SMA health service policy, were forwarded 
immediately to the new Minister. In September 1945 the Association 
requested to send a formal deputation to Bevan on the urgent matters of 
the future of sale and purchase of general practices and provisions for 
demobilised doctors. The deputation, however, was delayed by the 
Minister until mid-January 1946. (5) 
The Medical Practitioners' Union, in an effort to make an early 
contribution to a Minister they felt would be sympathetic, similarly 
requested in September and November to see Bevan; they were not received 
until late January 1946. (6) 
In August 1945, the TUC General Council sent Bevan, with a request 
to send a deputation, an extensive memorandum reconsidering the 
positions reached at their last discussion with Willink. The TUC's 
concern now was to press for features basic to their own conception of a 
health service, features serving the interests of their own members and 
of the general public, which they were afraid Willink might have 
conceded to the medical profession. 
The TUC thus called for the abolition of sale and purchase of 
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general practices; the establishment of health centres in accordance 
with public demand (with no retrenchment to a limited scheme) and the 
provision of a full-salary option for doctors, at least in health 
centres. They commented on the anti-salary position of the BMA: "Having 
regard to .. theclaim.by.the .. doctors ... that-- theysh0uld .. be -fr-eeiH . 
practically everything, it does not seem unreasonable to suggest that a 
doctor should be free to accept a full-time salary if he so desires." 
(7 ) 
It was decided after some discussion in the Ministry that the 
General Council should be asked to send a deputation only after the 
Cabinet had decided the main structure of the health service; this 
decision was reviewed and reaffirmed in October and late November. As a 
result, neither the TUC nor the other major proponent organisations 
would be consulted directly in the drawing up of the main features of 
the new scheme. 
The trade union movement in general, apart from the TUC, meanwhile 
stressed to Bevan its strong belief in the principles of the White 
Paper, largely out of fear that Labour's planning for the health service 
might start where Willink's planning, and assumed concessions, had 
ended. The Tobacco WOrkers' Union argued against concessions; the 
London Trades Council and the Association of Supervisory Staffs and 
Engineering Technicians (ASSET) urged the adding of an industrial 
medical service to the main scheme as had the Royal College of 
Physicians; the General Federation of Trade Unions and the Scottish 
Trades Union Congress urged immediate implementation of a unified health 
service. The Communist Party also took the opportunity to forward its 
health service policy to Bevan, in October. While accepting many of the 
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White Paper proposals, including the dual hospital system, they did 
argue for effective workers' representation in management, for health 
centres, and an occupational health service. Bevan was advised by one of 
his officials that the Communist Party did not go as far as the Ministry 
.... hopedto_.g o_.in.seSleraL.aspects_o L-the--scheme,-and--that--some--o f---i.ts----· 
positions were close to those of the Conservative government. Bevan 
turned down a request in January 1946 for a meeting with the Party's MP, 
Mr P. Piratin, on the grounds that it was not appropriate for him to 
receive party groups. (8) 
The Labour Health WOrkers Group of MPs, recently formed and 
including Mr Somerville Hastings as Chairman, and Doctors Edith 
Summerskill and Stephen Taylor, offered their assistance to Bevan, who 
in reply expressed the hope that their small group would instead join 
the Parliamentary Labour Party's official Health Committee. (9) 
MEDICINE TODAY AND TavIORRCW, the newsletter of the SMA, noted the 
formation of this group, and anticipated that the support it would give 
Bevan would be as significant as the part played by the SMA, through 
preparation of Labour's popular health policy, in securing the Labour 
victory. That policy, the SMA believed, perhaps optimistically, was 
virtually ready for implementation: lilt is probably true to say that no 
other proposal which the Labour Government has a mandate to carry out is 
so nearly ready for immediate application." (10) 
The several proponent groups, which had all had some role in the 
development and popularising of Labour Party policy, now looked forward 
to a role of close consultation with the Labour government in the 
implementation of a socialised health service for the nation. 
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The Decision to Nationalise the Hospitals, October to December, 1945 
Bevan in fact was moving quickly, in the confines of his 
Department, to put into effect one of the most significant of the 
proposals of the SMA. By early October, he had drafted and submitted to 
Cabinet a plan for a fully unified, nationalised hospital system. This 
he did without any further recourse to any of the concerned interests. 
He sought the approval of Cabinet on this major issue of principle, 
prior to any decisions on the remainder of the NHS. 
In a memorandum to Cabinet he noted that the White Paper proposals 
would have meant the state bearing some ninety percent of the funding of 
voluntary hospitals, in effect public financing without public control. 
Local authority hospitals would also have needed substantial Exchequer 
funds to continue functioning. Both systems provided at best uneven, 
and at worst very poor service. The joint boards of the 1944 White 
Paper were unpopular with both the hospitals and local authorities. A 
nationalised system would be consistent with the goals of the NHS--to 
provide a comprehensive, co-ordinated, well-distributed service of a 
uniform national standard, goals which would only be hindered by 
retaining existing management and finance structures and boundaries. 
"This seems to me strongly to be a case of starting again with a clean 
slate." University teaching hospitals would be exempted from a direct 
relationship with the state for reasons of their exceptional medical and 
educational standing and their independence. Regional Hospital Boards, 
appointed by the Minister from medical and local authority nominees, 
plus others, would be responsible for planning the regional service, and 
for general administration. District Committees, for "natural hospital 
districts" centred on a large general hospital or group of hospitals, 
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would handle day to day administration. Medical staff would be engaged 
and paid by the boards as agents of the Minister, with advice from 
regional medical advisory bodies. Some local authority clinic services 
might be incorporated as hospital outpatient functions, in the spirit of 
.... ·-----------------un-i-f-iE: at-io n.--------·-----------··-·-··---··---·-----·------··---.-.--.-.-----.---------.-- .... -.--.-. 
Bevan expected an outcry from both the voluntary hospitals, whose 
governing bodies would be abolished and endowments taken over, and from 
the local authorities, for whom the idea would appear to be "wrenching 
away the heart of their health services," although some would consider 
the scheme sound. He felt the reaction of the medical profession was 
uncertain. Many doctors would be opposed, but would choose a 
nationalised scheme over one dominated by the local authorities, 
especially if it were "part and parcel of a well worked out general 
health service in which they felt that the profession had a square 
deal." The Minister asked Cabinet for an early decision, so that he 
could proceed with plans for the rest of the service, and with 
legislation for that Parliamentary session. (11) 
The hospital plan had been designed under Bevan's instructions by 
his Deputy Secretary, Sir John Hawton, after their first meeting at the 
Ministry: '''Bevan put his finger on the hospital arrangements devised 
by Willink as the gravest weakness. And, of course, he was right. They 
would never have worked. I came away that night with instructions to 
work out a new plan on the new basis he proposed. III (12) 
The criticism of Willink's scheme was that he had succeeded in 
appeasing the major interests, but in doing so had imposed a weak 
regional apparatus with very little effective control over the 
hospitals, which would retain their powerful governing bodies and local 
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authority affiliations. 
One of Labour's champions of the local authorities, of the London 
County Council in particular, Herbert Morrison, Leader of the House of 
Commons and Lord President of the Council, was, as Cabinet records 
reveal, .. Bevan's chief opponent of nationalisationof the hospitals. 
Arguing before Cabinet, Morrison praised Bevan I s scheme as "brilliant 
and imaginative" but saw "no urgent and strong public need lt for 
nationalisationi it would rather be a major step in the weakening of 
local government. It would incur wide opposition, among Labour councils 
and others, which would be unfortunate considering the impending local 
government elections. He further claimed Labour had no mandate to 
nationalise the hospitals since no such policy was proposed in "Let Us 
Face the Future." 
Bevan recognised the difficulties but argued, point by point, that 
they could be overcome in the interest of a more sound hospital scheme. 
As for a mandate, he noted: "Even though we did not put this present 
proposal in our manifesto, it accords wi th its spi r it. " If the whole 
scheme were properly presented, with the support of the more forward 
looking representatives of all the concerned interests, Labour would not 
lose politically. (13) 
The Cabinet held one inconclusive meeting on the hospital 
proposals, with general sympathy being voiced, and ordered a delay to 
seek advice on financial implications. By the second meeting, Herbert 
Morrison had mustered his arguments in opposition, again stressing that 
the last Labour Conference had given no authority for such a measure. 
In its second discussion, the Cabinet was closely divided. The Prime 
Minister's support was crucial in the Cabinet's decision to approve 
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Bevan's proposal in principle, while maintaining the decision in 
confidence and sounding out local government opinion, then working out 
details with a view to attracting local interests. (14) 
This then was the government's course of action over the following 
approximately two months. Official silence was maintained, broken only 
by press rumours of nationalisation, of which the Tue and the SMA were 
aware. (15) No policy, however, was revealed by the government until 
Bevan's announcement in the House of Commons, 6 December, that sale and 
purchase of general practices would be ended in the new scheme. The 
Cabinet in late December again held discussions on the non-hospital 
portions of the NHS. The whole of the proposals, apart from those 
concerning sale and purchase, were kept officially secret until revealed 
in confidence in early January 1946, first to the TUC, then to the 
Negotiating Committee of the Medical Profession. 
The Decision to End Sale and Purchase of "Goodwill, II December 1945 
Bevan's second major policy decision was as decisive as the first, 
and again was a significant departure from Coalition policy. While the 
decision, like nationalisation of the hospitals, was made without formal 
consultation with his political colleagues in the SMA and TUC, it was 
consistent with 1945 Conference policy. This was the decision to end 
the sale and purchase of the "goodwill II (i.e., of 1 ists of patients) of 
general medical practices, and to arrange a system of compensation. 
Bevan noted to the cabinet the particular urgency of setting a 
policy, considering the large number of armed forces doctors about to be 
demobil ised , and the desire of the medical profession to know the 
government's intentions. Thus, with only the mild objections of Herbert 
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Morrison, who would have preferred not to deal with NHS proposals 
piecemeal, Cabinet decided 3 December 1945 to support 
announce the end of sale and purchase. Bevan 
Bevan's plan to 
accordingly met the 
Negotiating Committee of the medical profession 4 December--his first 
formal meeting with them--to give them confidential advance notice of 
his decision, which was announced in the House of Commons 6 December, in 
response to a pre-arranged question put by Somerville Hastings. (16) 
Bevan also announced in the House of Commons a "Charter for 
Nurses," drawn up in association with the Ministry of Labour and 
designed to modernise working conditions for hospital nurses in order to 
aid recruitment. The traditional, strict, and arbitrary rules of 
conduct would be liberalised, a ninety-six hour fortnight would be put 
into effect as soon as possible, and a national joint council was set up 
to cover domestic nursing and non-nursing staff. (17) 
The Decision Against a Fully Salaried Service, December 1945 
The SMA, and its members and allies in the Parliamentary Labour 
Party Health Committee, were now well aware that the overall plan of the 
health service was taking shape in the Ministry. Shortly after the 
Commons announcement on sale and purchase, the Committee met to discuss 
the issue of remuneration of doctors. Somerville Hastings informed 
Bevan of their unanimous opinion "that the payment of doctors should be 
exclusively by salary and without capi tationll ; a deputation was to meet 
Bevan's Private Secretary to argue the point in person. 
Bevan was advised by his senior officials against accepting the 
idea. Salary, they pointed out, was appropriate only for doctors 
working regular hours doing specified duties, as in a hospital or 
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clinic. Its disadvantage, in the opinion of the officials, was in 
removing a personal relationship between patient and doctor--it would be 
more appropriate in a wholly state service, separate from ony element of 
private practice. A blend of two systems was therefore suggested: a 
basic part-salary, plus capitation fees, which could be pooled in health 
centre practices to remove elements of competition. This was, of 
course, similar in essence to the proposals in Henry Willink's White 
Paper, which presumably had also been advocated or suggested by the same 
senior officials. 
The Health Committee of Labour MPs met Bevan 19 December, and were 
persuaded to accept, as an interim measure, since a full health centre 
system would take some time to build, payment by part-salary and 
capitation. Somerville Hastings, in noting to Bevan his acceptance of 
the compromise, urged the Minister to make a commitment to a fully 
salaried service when the health centres came into use; only this way 
could destructive competition be el iminated, and the "disease service" 
be turned into a preventively-oriented health service. Equally, the 
distinctions between specialists and practitioners might be lessened 
productively if both were paid on the same basis. Bevan, in reply, 
admitted Hastings might ultimately be right, but he was obliged to seek 
ways of minimising competition which would be acceptable to the medical 
profession; the compromise, he felt, should in lorge measure satisfy 
both ends. (18) 
Cabinet Approves the OVerall Organisation of the NHS, December 1945 
The hospital service, sale and purchase, and remuneration issues 
thus settled, Bevan, in mid December, put his general proposals for the 
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National Health Service as a whole to the Cabinet. The new service 
would consist of a tripartite structure: 
1. A national hospital and consultant service in Regions, 
under the Minister 
2. DomicilIary and clinic services to remain the primary 
responsibility of major local government units, in turn 
responsible to the Minister 
3. Family practitioner and dental services, under new local 
Executive Committees for each county or county borough 
area, with public, professional, and local authority 
representation, acting under national regulations. 
Equitable distribution of practitioners v~uld be the task of a special, 
mainly professional advisory body; a Central Health Services Council and 
special representative Standing Advisory Committees would provide expert 
advice on various general and professional matters. Teaching hospitals 
would enjoy special provisions: retention of their Boards of Governors 
and the right to accept and maintain endowments; and a separate annual 
budget provided directly by the Minister, with full discretion in 
expenditure. As for the remainder of the hospital service, the plan 
adopted by the Cabinet in October would stand. 
The general practitioner service would be administered by local 
Executive Committees, within major local authority boundaries; the 
representative composition of these bodies was also suggested. 
Significantly, the development of the health centre system was 
considered na principal objective from the outset," with publicly 
provided, staffed and equipped centres, under the local authorities, to 
be set up "as fast and as widely as possible." Practitioners would be 
encouraged to join the service and to group together in centres, from 
their existing locations, with the aim of assuring a family doctor for 
everyone, either in a health centre or not. Health centre services 
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could be co-ordinated with both the hospital specialist service, and the 
local authority clinic and welfare services. Medical staffs of health 
centres, and solo practitioners, would be hired by the local Executive 
Committees. 
Remuneration of practitioners, as previously decided, would be by 
basic salary, plus capitation, which doctors in health centres would be 
encouraged to pool. Remuneration rates for all doctors and dentists 
would be set nationally. Dentists, until a dental service could be 
established in health centres, would be paid by fee for item of service. 
A Central Committee on the Distribution of Practices would work with the 
Executive Committees to ensure a reasonable distribution of medical 
practices. 
Drugs and pharmacy services would be included in the scheme, 
contracted for by the Executive Committees. These Committees would also 
approve opticians and ophthalmologists for inclusion in the NHS, paying 
them fees for services rendered. In addition, a blood transfusion 
service and public health laboratories would be included. 
A major concession to the specialists and consultants who would 
join the public hospital service was the provision for "pay beds," in 
separate parts of some hospitals, to enable them to treat private 
patients in hospitals in which their part-public practices were located. 
This was designed, according to Bevan, lito prevent the national hospital 
service driving all private work into a rival nursing home service and 
to encourage the fuller association of the specialists with their 
hospi tals in all their professional activities." The "pay beds" should 
not encroach on necessary public hospital accommodation, and medical 
fees charged by specialists to private patients occupying them would be 
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within controlled limits, in addition to the fees charged by the 
hospitals to patients for use of the beds. 
Bevan noted to the Cabinet that his proposals concerned only the 
general treatment services; a review would also be needed of 
environmental and local government health provisions, in addition to a 
vigorous policy of health education. 
The matter which most concerned the TUC, and on which the BMA was 
agreed, industrial health, Bevan admitted was left "untouched, for the 
present" in his plan. He hoped to add, in the next session of 
Parliament, measures to come under local government for the care of 
children, the aged, blind, and the permanently disabled. 
Bevan asked the Cabinet for approval in principle of the NHS 
proposals, so that parliamentary counsel could begin drafting the Bill 
for introduction in February. He would at the same time negotiate with 
the concerned interests, but only "on the basis that all the main 
features of the proposals must stand and that any concessions made 
should be such as could be put into effect in administration." 
In response to Herbert Morrison, who voiced again his concerns that 
the nationalisation of hospitals would arouse a great deal of 
opposition, Bevan noted the support which would be forthcoming from many 
doctors, thus lessening the general antagonism. Some local authorities 
would also approve, as \~uld the great majority of government 
supporters, in Parliament and in the country. 
He noted the compromise on doctors' remuneration. It should, he 
remarked to Cabinet, in a statement which would have been heartening to 
the SMA and inflamatory to the BMA, "eliminate the worst features of the 
capitation rate system and lead eventually to a full-time salaried 
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service. II He acknowledged the strong pressure from the Health Group of 
Labour MPs for a full-time salaried service, and noted that he had 
finally been able to persuade them to compromise. 
With the exceptions of Herbert Morrison and J. Chuter Ede, the Horne 
Secretary, both of whom had doubts about the hospital scheme, the entire 
Cabinet approved, and authorised Bevan to submit an outline of the 
proposed legislation, and proceed with detailed drafting and 
negotiations. (19) 
Bevan clarified his position on several issues as the Cabinet 
discussed the outline of the NHS Bill in early January 1946. He would 
enter discussions with the interests concerned on the basis of the main 
principles, on which there could be no concessions; there would be scope 
for adjustment on details such as the composition of governing bodies, 
"or the extent to which general practitioners should be allowed to take 
private patients." It was important, he said, to attract both doctors 
and the overwhelming majority of the community at large to the new 
service; in order to do this, "it was important to ensure that the 
continuance of private practice should not prejudice the success of the 
national scheme." He again emphasised health centres as the best means 
of attracting doctors and patients and of revolutionising general 
practice. He further noted his plans to have the trade unions 
represented on Regional Hospital Boards. With respect to industrial 
medical services, however, it was clear that his intentions were not 
changed; even the existing services, such as in coal mining, would not 
be integrated, but it was hoped there would be close liaison between the 
Ministry of Health and other Departments responsible for medical 
services. With little discussion on other matters relating to the NHS, 
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the Cabinet then approved the Minister's summary report of the Bill and 
authorised its preparation in detail. 
The Bill was approved by Cabinet in early March, and was given 
First Reading in the House of Commons 19 March. During January and 
February, Bevan held initial discussions with the major interests, to 
relate to them the main proposals, confidentially, in a non-negotiable 
form, in order to make some assessment of the political reception the 
plan was likely to receive, and to prepare modifications to ensure the 
more ready acceptability of the NBS. He was also under continued 
pressure from the Parliamentary Labour Party Health Group, who were 
opposed to "pay beds" and to part-private general practice. (20) 
The First Announcement of NHS Policy, January 1946 
Bevan chose to release the NBS proposals first to a deputation of 
thirty-six, representing the General Council of the TUC and member 
unions in the health services, on 8 January 1946, the day the Cabinet 
gave its approval. The government's mandate, he said, was to provide a 
comprehensive service, for all, free of charge, the major part of the 
cost to be borne by the Exchequer, and the rest locally with central 
assistance. The 1944 ~~ite Paper had contained too many compromises 
with the existing situation, which would have led to excessive 
administrative complications. Bevan revealed the government's decision 
to "organise the hospital system on a national basis," under Regional 
Boards, on which he promised trade union representation. 
The government had decided against a fully-salaried practitioner 
service: "This would be too abrupt a break with the existing system, 
and took too little account of the principle of payment by results." 
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The distribution of doctors, he said, would be controlled by negative 
rather than positive direction. There would be no prohibition of 
private practice, in order to avoid doctors staying out of the service 
and creating a black market in private practice. Patients \~uld be 
allowed to choose private treatment, but those on public lists could not 
be charged a private fee. 
With respect to health centres, Bevan noted "the ultimate ideal was 
[their] establishment ••• in every local health authority area, but 
the service must necessarily be developed progressively." Part-private 
general practice would be allowed, but private patients could not be 
treated in public health centres; basic part-salaries would apply in or 
out of health centres. 
The TUC deputation appeared not entirely prepared for an 
announcement of such significance or decisiveness, especially having 
last met with the previous Minister in March 1945. In their opening 
remarks, while still prepared to mount a defense of such basic White 
Paper concepts as the issues of a "one hundred per cent," comprehensive 
service, which they had feared were in jeopardy under Will ink, they were 
nonetheless prepared to discuss points of direct relevance to health 
workers and professionals including representation of nurses and 
miscellaneous grades of workers. Representation of nurses, they argued, 
"should not be less than [that] of the medical profession," and 
miscellaneous grades should be represented on any committee of organised 
health workers. Concern with the future of health centres was shown in 
the request that they be built and staffed to the highest standards, and 
set up wherever there was public demand. The TUC agreed that sale and 
purchase of practices should end, and reiterated the Labour Party-TUC 
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position in favour of salaried medical practice; at the least, payment 
by full salary should be a matter of option for each doctor. (21) 
The largest disappointment to the TUC was that there would be no 
major initiative in industrial medicine. Reforms could be made, said 
Bevan, but (repeating Willink's earlier position) he advised that: 
II reorganisation could not be effected immediately, since the working out 
of the necessary changes would take time, and it would delay the main 
scheme to await the result. Everything would be done from the outset to 
ensure close co-ordination both centrally and locally, between the 
industrial and the general health services." (22) 
TUC Response to Bevan's Plan, January to June 1946 
The TUC deputation took Bevan's sixteen page memorandum on the NHS 
in confidence, sending copies only to member unions in the health 
services. The TUC waited until the Parliamentary Committee stage of the 
Bill, following Second Reading in May 1946, before requesting to send 
another deputation. 
First Reading of 
In the intervening period, 
the NHS Bill, they had 
particularly following 
lobbied Bevan, again 
unsuccessfully, for the full inclusion of industrial health services. 
In considering the NHS Bill, the TUC decided to confer first with 
the SMA and BRA, to obviate as many differences of viewpoint as 
possible, before contacting the Minister again. Position papers were 
accordingly exchanged, the SMA contributing its statement of seven 
principles regarding the NHS, and the BRA its "Plan for a National 
Hospital Service." (23) 
The next deputation to Bevan, on 17 June, immediately followed the 
Standing Committee debates and the 1946 Labour Party Conference. The TUC 
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introduced its several concerns to Bevan, including medical 
overrepresentation at all levels, and industrial health: liThe TUC would 
never be completely satisfied with the new health service if it did not 
incorporate industrial health. This was a point on which the SMA were 
in agreement." They repeated with emphasis their views on health 
centres, the salary option, adequate nurses' and health workers' 
representation, and reforms in medical education. 
Bevan expressed his thanks for the TUC's support, which "had helped 
ease the passage of the Bill through the House quite considerably." He 
requested further help in the detailed discussions which would be 
necessary to frame the regulations through which the service would 
evolve. "There was no unalterable contract between the State and the 
citizens," he said; much was not included in the Bill in order to ensure 
future flexibility. 
On many of the TUC's points of concern, Bevan offered reassurances. 
This applied to the scope for medical research; limitations on private 
practice and prohibition of contracting out; and a level of remuneration 
adequate to ensure a high standard of public service. He explained the 
government's position on private beds in hospitals as a measure intended 
to keep specialists within the NHS; the medical needs of public patients 
would be of first priority. With respect to preventive services, the 
Minister noted the government's progress 
nutrition, and children's allowances. 
preventive services specifically in the 
wi th housing, pure water, 
He was opposed to including 
Bill. Grants for medical 
education would aid recruitment from all classes. Private practice, he 
hoped, would diminish, especially with the success of the public 
service. 
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A whole-time salaried service, however, was rejected: "If [it] was 
insisted on at the present time the vast majority of the medical 
profession would be mobilised against it. A full-time service was not 
easy to work in conjunction with free choice of doctor. • •• It still 
seemed necessary to have some element of reward and punishment. If the 
same salary was paid for different services, then it would lead to a 
general slackening in the profession [sic]. II The government, Bevan 
noted, had already made substantial attacks on competitive private 
practice in the various measures of the Bill, and would encourage 
pooling of income in health centres; he attached great importance to the 
development of medicine at the health centre. 
A major area of difference appeared between the Minister and the 
TUC over health workers' representation. The Minister now proposed, 
rather than minority trade union representation on management 
committees, that separate staff associations be established. It was, he 
said, a step toward a "healthy industrial democracy" that workers should 
participate in the making of policy through their own associations 
rather than having minority representation on an employing body. In 
reply to a criticism from a member of the TUC deputation that doctors 
were represented on all committees throughout the service while nurses 
had virtually no representation, Bevan replied that doctors were 
appointed not to give them a special role in administration but "because 
they were concerned with health in general." He declined also to 
increase nursing representation on the Central Health Services Council. 
Again pressed on industrial health services, Bevan repeated his 
commitment to action only after the commencement of the main service. 
After a brief discussion of ancillary services, the TUC spokesmen 
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thanked Bevan and assured him of the support of the trade unions in the 
passage of the Bill through the House. (24) 
The SMA's Continued campaign for a Socialist Health Service, 
January to July 1946 
The Socialist Medical Association, having been reconciled to 
Bevan's basic salary and capitation fee compromise in early January, 
also offered its support to him, but in the next several months engaged 
in some close questioning about several features and implications of the 
NHS Bill. The SMA's first deputation to Bevan took place 17 January 
1946. In addition to explaining his general proposals, Bevan noted, 
with respect to some SMA policies, that his Nurses' Code would now 
remain only a series of recommendations, for lack of resources and the 
powers to make it compulsory, and further that it would be too large a 
problem for the government to take charge of medical education. On the 
issue of staff associations, which were now of much concern to the SMA 
in view of its strong stand on health workers' democratic participation, 
Bevan noted they would be encouraged, but "they could not properly be 
put in a position of controlling bodies." The deputation was also 
concerned about the failure to integrate industrial health, to which 
Bevan replied as he had to the TUC. 
Subsequent to this deputation, Bevan clarified his proposal for a 
salaried part or whole time specialist service for the hospitals. He 
would not, as the SMA had erroneously feared, implement fee for item of 
service remuneration for specialists. He also provided answers to 
several questions raised on behalf of the SMA by Dr David Stark Murray. 
These concerned the role of the university teaching hospitals, 
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arrangements for private treatment in hospitals, and, in Murray's view 
the vital issue of the difficulty under the tripartite arrangements of 
the NHS (hospital, general practitioner and local authority branches) to 
achieve "unity or even co-ordination between the curative and preventive 
services." 
Murray corrunented: "It was this [latter] point which, in the past, 
influenced us to insist on a single health authority, and while we 
appreciate the reasons for devising three separate administrative 
structures, this question of prevention of disease does still present a 
great difficulty. I may say that it is one which impresses the lay 
public almost as much as socialist health workers and I am constantly 
asked about it at my meetings." 
Bevan's reply provided brief details on all three issues. 
Significantly, he made it clear now that two standards of extra-cost 
accorrunodation would be available in hospi tals: extr a-charge II ameni ty 
beds" for public patients, and private "pay beds" for which the full 
operating costs to the hospital would be charged, in addition to the 
doctors' private fees. The latter category would be provided only where 
"reasonable" and would be available to public patients in case of urgent 
need. Co-ordination of the three branches, he said, would be the final 
responsibility of the Minister; he anticipated local liaison and 
overlapping among the branches. All these problems, he felt, could be 
solved administratively, and by trial and error in practice. Bevan 
declined to reply to Murray's request to supply the SMA with the date of 
publication of the Bill and to give the SMA a copy of it at the same 
time as sending it to the BMA. (25) 
Further inquiries by the SMA followed publication of the Bill. 
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These generally received routine replies drafted by Bevan's officers. 
Somerville Hastings did, however, request in May that Bevan see a 
deputation from the Association. This was arranged for 22 May, the day 
following the debate on pay beds in Standing Committee. The SMA 
presented two proposals which it hoped the Ministry would be able to 
incorporate directly into NHS planning, in such a way as to further SMA 
and Labour health policy. The first proposal was to identify 
underdoctored areas for immediate establishment of health centres, which 
would be staffed by men and women doctors recently demobilised. They 
noted that fifteen thousand such medical personnel would be leaving the 
forces. The second SMA suggestion was to employ these young doctors in 
industrial health facilities, since private industry was already cutting 
back on the relatively high level of wartime medical staffing. 
Discussion with the SMA deputation on these points was general, the 
Minister making no commitments apart from agreeing to encourage local 
authorities and voluntary hospitals, in the interim, to appoint more 
practitioners and specialists. The Ministry decided to wait at least a 
month before making any official statement of advice to young doctors 
with respect to establishing practices. (26) Plans were also being made 
in the Ministry at that time, as the 9~ was assured personally by 
Bevan, for detailed advice to be given to local authorities on the 
establishment of health centres, including model building plans, but 
were not yet ready for distribution. (27) 
Pressure was kept up by the SMA while the Bill was being dealt with 
in Committee. In early June, the SMA Annual General Meeting, in a 
spirit of critical approval, passed resolutions welcoming the NHS Bill 
but again recommending, rather than the tripartite structure, "a single 
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administrative body at the regional level, under democratic control, 
resp:::msible for all the services of the region," and that "provision be 
made in the Bill to enable doctors, if they so choose, to be paid by 
salary. II They again strongly urged that industrial health be 
integrated. The meeting resolved finally that the role of the SMA must 
now change "to support of the scheme through the legislative stages, 
proposing improvements and regulations; to ensure that conditions of 
service are satisfactory to health workers and encourage teamwork; to 
explain advantages of the Service via the Labour Movement and especially 
to the medical profession so as to encourage their enthusiastic 
participation. " 
A few informal contacts were made by the SMA with Ministry officers 
during the summer of 1946, mainly concerning plans for demobilised 
doctors. However, there is little or no evidence in Ministry documents 
that the SMA, through the various legislative stages, did other than 
provide only general advice; certainly the main framework of the Bill 
had been constructed by the time of the first SMA deputation in 
mid-January 1946, and the Minister's official answers (often provided by 
his staff) to the SMA's inquiries on salaried service, health centres, 
industrial health, and integrated administration continued to consist of 
justifications of his earliest policy decisions. 
According to Dr Stark Murray, there existed considerable tension 
between the Minister and the SMA over these issues, which were critical 
to the SMA's vision of a socialist health service. Particularly on the 
failure to establish single, elected regional authorities to run the 
whole service, and on the failure to provide that all employees 
including doctors be hired on an equal, salaried basis, the SMA felt 
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Bevan had given way needlessly to the BMA "in order to weaken their 
general resistance to a one hundred per cent service. Ii The SMA was, of 
course, extremely happy with the decision to nationalise the hospitals, 
IIBevan's greatest decision on a disputed point." Once the tripartite 
system had been designed, and the BMA was relatively satisfied, Bevan 
was prepared only to defend the structure against the SMA's advocacy of 
a unified service. 
The failure to establish a whole-time salaried service was, for the 
SMA, "the greatest misjudgement of 1946." It was felt by the SMA that, 
if the government were to end sale and purchase of practices, with 
generous compensation, lithe point that medicine was being taken out of 
the market place could have been carried to its logical conclusions." 
Without it, the old disease orientation of medicine ~~uld be more likely 
to persist, and health advice, education, promotion, and preservation 
could not so clearly become integral to the purposes of the NBS. (28) 
The MPU's Ill-Fated Attempts to Advise Bevan 
The MPU attempted to make a similar series of points to those of 
the SMA with Bevan between September 1945 and January 1946. They were 
particularly concerned to aid directly in promoting and planning health 
centres, and recommended several detailed proposals to locate 
demobilised doctors in the new centres. Despite persistent requests 
from the MPU to send a deputation, Bevan took the advice of his officers 
that the MPU should be seen only after his plans were more advanced, and 
after consulting the BMA. The deputation, which was received in late 
January, made points consistent with the MPU's health service policy, 
particularly emphasising that there should be a full-salary option for 
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doctors in health centres. Bevan replied by restating his own 
remuneration proposals as the government's firm decisions; he could not 
comment on unresolved matters, pending offical discussions with the 
medical profession. He promised only to consider MPU representation on 
the NHS Medical Advisory Committee. 
The cordiality of relations between the MPU and Bevan was broken in 
February and March following an MPU meeting in SWansea at which, the BMA 
complained to Bevan, the MPU had revealed confidential aspects of 
Bevan's proposals. The MPU was rebuked by the Ministry, and rebutted 
that the same points had appeared in the DAILY MIRROR and DAILY WORKER 
of 7 January, before even the TUC was informed. The MPU continued to 
hold meetings through March to discuss the proposals, as attitudes 
hardened within the Ministry against formal representation for it on the 
NHS Medical Advisory Committee. (29) 
The Advocates' Attempts to Modify the Bill in Parliament 
The Cabinet, having approved Bevan's draft Bill in its entirety, 
without amendment, decided to give it top priority in the government's 
legislative schedule. The National Health Service Bill was therefore 
given First Reading in the House of Commons 19 March 1946 and a White 
Paper issued simultaneously, explaining the provisions of the Bill. 
Debate on Second Reading began 10 April and ended 2 May, after bitter 
attacks by Henry Willink and other opposition Members. The Bill was 
sent to Standing Committee C, contrary to Winston Churchill's motion 
that it be dealt with by a Committee of the Whole House. Willink's 
amendment to deny Second Reading was rejected by 359 to 172 votes. 
Debate continued in the Standing Committee through May and June. (30) 
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During the legislative stages of the Bill, the focal point of SMA 
activity shifted away from formal presentations to the Minister and 
toward the daily pressures of seeing the Bill through Parliament with as 
much SMA influence as possible. Eight of the SMA MPs were members of 
Standing Committee C; they were in daily discussion with the SMA Policy 
Committee over Parliamentary strategy. They were also in frequent 
contact with Bevan, both informally and through exchanges in the 
Committee. The SMA took credit for establishing the principle that 
whole-time doctors or other health workers might be members of any board 
or committee, although in practice Bevan appointed very few 
non-professionals. (31) 
In the Second Reading debate and Standing Committee C, several 
Labour backbenchers were vociferous in defense of SMA policies, but 
stopped short of insistence that they be fully included in the NHS Bill. 
Somerville Hastings, while accepting extra-charge amenity beds in the 
public wards, expressed profound fears that the provision of wholly 
private beds would lead to two classes of hospital treatment. The same 
point was made by another Labour Member, Mr Boardman, representing the 
Lancashire mining consituency of Leigh. Mr Piratin, MP for Mile End, 
moved an amendment asking that an Industrial Hea.l th Service be 
established within five years, covering research, preventive and 
diagnostic facilities, regular examinations, treatment, and 
rehabilitation. Here Bevan again defended his decision to leave such a 
service out, for reasons of the extra difficulties involved, and the 
expected evolution of the service toward assimilation of industrial 
medicine, and assured Mr Piratin that the government would encourage 
such trends. Regional Boards would have the responsibility of setting 
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up special research and treatment facilities appropriate to the 
industrial diseases of the area. Still disappointed, but agreeing to 
the Minister's request, Mr Piratin withdrew his amendment. (32) 
The Issue of Workers' Representation, June 1946 to October 1947 
The issue of health workers' representation carne to the fore again 
in June and July, in the form of concerns expressed by COHSE and the TUC 
to Bevan that representation would not be adequate. Again Bevan 
defended his view that representation of miscellaneous grades of workers 
in staff associations would be more effective than the anomalous 
situation of minority representation on management committees; these 
views he put to Sir Walter Citrine, General Secretary of the TUC, in 
July. He noted that representation on the central bodies had been 
carefully designed for a proper balance of interest, and commented, 
perhaps presumptuously: " I am sure you will agree that the 
medical profession, which is concerned with every branch of the new 
Service, should have a majority of members on the [Central Health 
Services] Council." He pointed out that any health worker might be 
appointed in an individual capacity, rather than as a representative, to 
any of the management bodies, but that staff associations were the more 
appropriate form of formal representation. 
This view of the Minister's was treated with great concern by the 
TUC, sufficiently so to request urgently that Bevan receive a 
deputation. Three points were put to the Minister in writing, in 
September: 
1. The TUC did not agree the medical profession should have a 
majority on the Central Health Services Council 
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2. Health workers' representation on hospital boards should be made 
through the TUC under Schedule 3 of the Bill 
3. The TUC would disapprove of 
consider some alternate form of 
workers in hospitals. 
staff associations but would 
representation for organised 
It was also pointed out that Bevan's more recent statements that 
trade unions would not be represented on Regional Hospital Boards were 
in conflict with his commitment to the TUC deputation on 8 January 1946. 
Bevan's officers, not understanding the reasons for the strong 
objections of the TUC and of COHSE to staff associations, recommended 
the Minister meet personally with them. This was arranged for 14 
october. 
At the meeting, workers' representation at all three levels of 
administration was reviewed. The TUC put the case that, for the Central 
Health Services Council, the twenty-one medical members out of the total 
of forty-one, with only two nurses and one midwife to represent general 
workers, was an example of extremely disproportionate representation. 
Bevan again defended the proportions, on the grounds that doctors had an 
interest in every aspect of the service. He did however offer, if the 
TUC wished, to establish a Standing Advisory Committee for miscellaneous 
workers. This committee, would advise the Minister directly. The TUC 
agreed to consider this proposal. With respect to Regional Hospital 
Boards, it was the Minister's intention to consult the TUC for nominees, 
to be appointed by the Minister; he would not consult the member unions, 
or take nominees formally as representatives, but would appoint them as 
individuals. The TUC agreed to this procedure. 
Finally, with respect to local representation, Bevan expressed 
regret at having previously used the politically loaded term "staff 
association," which to the trade unions meant an association convened by 
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the employer and antithetical to trade union organisation. Bevan had in 
mind local, hospital-based committees of workers, democratically chosen, 
who would meet management on the day to day issues of running the 
service. He could not guarantee that only organised (i.e., trade union) 
workers would be chosen, since there were many grades of employees 
concerned, both organised and unorganised. He did agree with the TUC 
that an important objective would be to circumvent the traditional power 
exercised over nursing and other staff by matrons and superintendents. 
Bevan suggested that it would be up to the unions to organise freely in 
the hospitals, and to seek to have union members elected to the staff 
committees. Bargaining for wages and working conditions would not be a 
matter for the local committees, thus they should pose no threat to this 
vital function of unions. Bevan repeated his contention that it would 
not be good industrial democracy to have a few representatives of 
workers on management committees. Rather the staff committees would be 
in constant consultation with management to ensure the voice of the 
workers would be heard. with respect to guaranteeing freedom from 
management intimidation in organising, and other matters, Bevan offered 
to have future talks with the TUC when the management committees were 
being formed. The TUC deputation closed the meeting noting they were 
considerably reassured. (33) 
This then was the first occasion on which the Minister had 
effectively consulted with representatives of health service workers; in 
this case the consultation concerned the not unimportant issue of 
workers' rights to representation in the running of the service. 
Decisions on more substantive areas such as the scope of the NHS, 
particularly the exclusion of industrial health services, were taken 
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without such effective consultation, with either the TUC or the other 
trade union and socialist proponent groups. 
Further action on the matter of representation was not undertaken 
until June 1947 when the TUC's Joint Social Insurance Committee met with 
Ministry officials and gave a firm recommendation that a Standing 
Advisory Committee for miscellaneous grades of health workers be 
established, and offered to submit detailed suggestions for its 
functions. In August 1947, TUC and Ministry officials met to begin 
discussions on national collective bargaining machinery for health 
service trade unions; the discussions would be continued following the 
TUC's Annual Congress at Southport. 
By October 1947 the Ministry had issued a draft constitution for a 
National Whitley Council, and a conference of trade unions concerned had 
been called by the TUC. The Ministry was also suggesting in circulars 
to the already-formed Regional Hospital Boards that they consult with 
local Trades Councils Federations in the appointment of the Hospital 
Management Committees. (34) 
The Proponents' Campaign Continues in 1947: Three Major Issues 
The NHS Bill passed all House of Commons stages in July, 1946, and 
went on to the House of Lords, where it was debated in October. The 
Commons then rejected the Lords amendment to ensure payment by 
capitation alone, and on 6 November 1946 the Bill was given Royal 
Assent. 
As far as the SMA and the other proponents were concerned, however, 
several of their policies still remained on the Minister's agenda for 
attention, and inclusion in the NHS. The SMA, MPU and TUC were 
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committed to continue agitation for health centres and for an industrial 
health service (supported on the latter issue by the SMA), and were 
backed by various individual trade unions and other organisations. The 
SMA and the TUC were further committed to encouraging democratic 
representation of health workers of all grades on management committees, 
and in health workers' councils. MEDICINE TODAY AND TOMORROW continued 
to suggest the Minister had made unnecessary concessions to the SMA, 
whose leadership, the SMA felt, had very little following in the 
profession as a whole, and criticised the delay in the inauguration of 
the NHS, projected for April 1948 -- "the sort of date which a different 
type of government would have fixed." (35) Thus, from a position of 
critical support for the NHS as a whole, workers' representation, 
industrial health, and health centres were to be the three major issues 
pursued by the proponent organisations in 1947. 
An Industrial Health Service Postponed 
Within the government, the question of industrial health services 
was effectively turned over to the Ministry of Labour by the end of 
1946. Ministry of Health and Cabinet papers indicate nothing of the 
reasons for this apparent shift of responsibility. In January 1947 the 
TUC began preparation of evidence to submit to the new Industrial Health 
Advisory Committee established under the Ministry of Labour to look into 
the general questions of factory and industrial medicine. In its 
quarterly publication WHAT THE TUC IS DOING, the TUC announced it had 
recommended a curative and preventive industrial health service closely 
integrated with the NHS. What modest optimism remained about the 
establishment of such a service was to suffer a further blow much later, 
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in October 1948, when the government announced its decision to defer any 
action. (36) 
Health Centres: The SMA's Final Attempt 
Optimism about the health centre building programme also received a 
setback, apparently due to the serious difficulties in the rebuilding of 
war-damaged houses. Bevan had sponsored a housing finance Bill at about 
the same time as the NHS Bill, and had taken an active interest in 
public housing design, insisting on higher standards of space and 
amenities in new housing. Scarcity of labour and materials, however, 
meant that Bevan's goal of 750,000 new units per year, already 
inadequate in the face of enormous and growing housing demand, was 
almost impossible to attain. His high standards, and his insistence on 
a large-scale programme of repairing damaged dwellings further hindered 
attainment of the targets. The financial disaster surrounding the 
convertibility of sterling, according to the Anglo-American accord of 
July 1947, was behind a series of stringent austerity measures taken by 
the Cabinet in the autumn. In July, when the possibility was raised of 
cuts in the housing programme, Bevan resisted; he was soon obliged to 
concede or resign, and his resignation at that time, according to Foot, 
would have jeopardised the entire government. (37) 
Even by early 1947 there were signs that a major building programme 
of new health centres would be impossible. The SMA, however, was 
determined to see the centres established. Thus, at the May 1947 Annual 
Conference of the Labour Party, Dr 
resolution recognising difficulties in 
urging: 
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D. Stark Murray introduced a 
the building programme, but 
1. The rapid provision of health centres in all areas by the 
adaptation of existing large houses or by the use of 
temporary buildings 
2. The inclusion of plans and sites for health centres in 
all new towns and building si tes 
3. The building of comprehensive but experimental health 
centres in several large areas of population. 
Murray chose to introduce the resolution on health centres, on 
behalf of the SMA, " because we believe that the health centres 
will become the symbol to the whole people • • • of what a Socialist 
Medical Service really means ••• , [and] what we Socialists really mean 
by health and by the happiness of the people." He noted that, since 
health centres were to be a local government matter, they would directly 
concern many of the Labour Conference delegates. 
While suppOrted in debate by others from the SMA, he was not 
supported by the Minister. Bevan suggested the resolution was too 
detailed to be appropriate for the conference, and that it would be 
better to wait for purpose-built health centres. He asked, therefore, 
that Dr Murray withdraw the resolution, and continue to take up the 
matter informally with the party executive, with which Murray, for the 
SMA, complied. (38) 
This action of Bevan's may be explained in part by the political 
isolation he was experiencing, according to Foot, within the cabinet, 
and from his former colleagues of the Labour Left. On the basis of 
Ernest Bevin's foreign policy, with which the Left were in near total 
disagreement, and the looming financial crisis, a number of backbenchers 
had formed a "Keep Left" group, publishing a pamphlet by the same name a 
month before the 1947 Labour Conference. But between this group and the 
left-wing Ministers, including Bevan, there was no liaison. According to 
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Foot, IIBevan was even more isolated; he scrupulously refused to discuss 
Cabinet matters even with his most intimate friends." The isolation of 
the backbench Left (including the SMA MPs) from the Cabinet made them 
easy prey for attack from Ernest Bevin and the right wing of the Party. 
Aneurin Bevan remained, according to Foot, the "hero of the rank and 
file" in no small part due to attacks by Churchill, and was accordingly 
re-elected at the top of the list to the National Executive. 
But there were stirrings of opposition to his apparent lack of 
compliance with Party policy. While the SMA did withdraw the health 
centres resolution, the Conference itself rejected Bevan's pleas not to 
pass a resolution demanding immediate steps by the government to abolish 
tied farm cottages. In the face of financial and other domestic and 
foreign affairs crises, the Government was weak and stumbling. (39) 
This was, in mid-1947, only the prelude to the measures of economic 
stringency imposed by Chancellor Hugh Dalton by the end of the year. 
(40) It began to be clear that the effects on the health centre 
programme in 1948, despite Bevan's attempts in Cabinet to defend it, 
while maintaining silence publicly, would be worse even than the SMA 
feared in 1947. 
Health ~brkers' Representation Planned with the TUC 
The remaining major issue of concern to the NHS proponents in 1947 
was the representation of health service workers in the running of the 
service and in collective bargaining. 
In October TRIBUNE noted Hospital Management Committees were soon 
to be appointed and suggested to local trades councils to submit 
nominations to avoid domination by the old voluntary hospitals 
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interests. By December, TRIBUNE found many of the new Management 
Committees already controlled by doctors; this, it concluded, should 
hasten the organisation of health workers. 
In September the Report of the WOrking Party on the Recruitment and 
Training of Nurses was issued. The Report was critically reviewed in 
TRIBUNE by Dr Stark Murray who found it unenthusiastic for change in the 
traditionally low-status job of nursing, paying scant attention to 
democratising hospitals, and making no mention at all of the right of 
nurses to organise in trade unions or through representative councils. 
He noted that the Minority Report, written by Dr John Cohen, was not 
published, and recommended that the government make no formulation of 
long term policy until the Minority Report had been released and studied 
by the Labour movement. (41) 
The Ministry and the proponents, 1945-1947 
The determination of the basic structural features of the NHS, 
therefore, took place in the relative isolation of the Ministry of 
Health in the brief period from October to December 1945. In the period 
immediately after his appointment as Minister, Bevan had made himself 
thoroughly acquainted with the positions of the major interests, and was 
well aware of the positions of the proponent groups as a result of their 
communications to him. His only meetings with any of the groups, prior 
to his general announcement of policy in January 1946, were to impart 
information. His meetings from January to March were to outline the 
government's positions, as decided by Cabinet, and to receive opinions 
not to negotiate. 
In late 1945, Bevan had chosen a "model" scheme, taking into 
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account the positions of the medical profession, the voluntary 
hospitals, the local authorities, and the proponents. This scheme was, 
in effect, a hybrid scheme. It was certainly not a wholesale adoption 
of Labour Party health policy, although several features --
universality, comprehensiveness, funding from taxes rather than 
insurance -- were comparable with those of the Labour Party and of the 
Willink plan. The original plan, developed with the involvement and 
consensus of all the main proponent groups for the Central Committee on 
Reconstruction Problems of the Labour Party, and the National Council of 
Labour, had been oriented not only to these "common denominator" 
principles of accessibility to existing services, but to the prior 
principles of integration of services, preventive orientation, and full 
public responsibility of the scheme, combined with democratic 
representation of all levels of health workers. Subsidiary features of 
the advocates' model full public ownership, fully salaried 
remuneration, health centres, and occupational health services -- were 
practical aspects intended to further the prior principles. In 
reconciling the claim and positions of the major interests with those of 
the proponents while constructing his general proposals, Bevan was 
obliged to pay relatively less attention to the prior principles 
embraced by the proponents, and indeed by the Labour Party, and 
relatively more to the practical questions of satifying the major 
interests. This did not mean the claims and principles of the 
proponents were ignored; even the principles upon which the Will ink plan 
was based went further toward universality than Beveridge's, for 
example. But the proponents were arguing for substantial innovations on 
the one hand, and on the other, unlike the major interests, they were 
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not arguing from a position of equal institutional power within the 
existing services. 
The distinction, in Bevan's dealings, between the major interests 
which had a great deal of institutional power, and the proponents, which 
had little if any (but much popular support), is not perhaps as apparent 
at the stage of general policy determination, in late 1945, as at the 
later stages of negotiating the further demands of the major interests 
and of the proponents in 1946 and 1947. 
Whether out of political courtesy or for other reasons Bevan made 
his general proposals known first to a TUC deputation, representing a 
variety of health workers' unions. But the substantive demands of the 
unions, for wide representation of workers in the service and for an 
occupational health service, were not favourably received. Indeed, 
while Bevan dealt formally with the Negotiating Committee of the medical 
profession, settling terms of 
stormy period of disagreement), 
service by agreement (albeit through a 
the relationship with the TUC was 
considerably less formalised, and its demands treated by the Ministry as 
essentially not negotiable. In the end, when the central advisory 
machinery was established in 1947, the TUC was obliged to accept 
considerably less representation than it and its member unions desired, 
health centres assumed decreasing importance despite TUC protests, and 
the issue of industrial health services was treated as entirely closed. 
Attempts by the SMA and MPU to establish themselves in the role of 
permanent advisors to Bevan, in executing Labour Party health policy, 
were rejected by Bevan, with the advice of his Ministry officials. The 
proponent groups were treated at arm's length, even though their views 
were heard. Their attempts to offer advice most directly to Bevan, 
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through the Parliamentary Labour Party Health Group, were treated 
similarly. Members of the Health Group were expected to defend Bevan's 
proposals in Parliament, as the proponent group were in public, while 
their attempts to enrich the service with advice based on the Labour 
Party's policy were largely rejected, in deputations, in the Standing 
Committee, and at the Labour Party Conference. 
The role of the proponents had now become the difficult double one 
of attempting to advocate to Bevan basic features of their model, and of 
defending Bevan's compromises. In the period of his negotiations with 
the major interests, and both before and after the implementation of the 
NHS, all the proponents were to continue their campaign, both of 
advocacy and defense. 
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CHAPTER 9 
THE GOVERNMENT--1945 to 1949: 
CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN THE FINAL STAGES OF 
ESTABLISHING THE NHS 
Bevan Meets the Medical Profession 
Bevan's first contacts with the medical profession were informal--a 
dinner speech and a luncheon with the SMA Council--but, according to 
Foot, he disarmed his erstwhile adversaries with his sophisticated grasp 
of health service issues, his modesty and eagerness to learn. He 
learned quickly, particularly about the internal politics and divisions 
of the profession as well as about medical skills and duties. (1) 
While these initial informal overtures to the profession were 
taking place, Bevan and his officials had drafted the first proposals 
for the health service, in particular Bevan's most significant 
alteration to the Willink plans, the nationalisation of all the 
hospitals. This proposal was discussed and approved by Cabinet in 
October 1945. That the Cabinet was considering dramatic departures from 
the Coalition plans became the subject of rumours in the press, 
including rumours of nationalisation of hospitals and the end of sale 
and purchase, prompting Dr Charles Hill, on behalf of the Negotiating 
Committee, to request to Bevan in November that substantive discussions 
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begin. Bevan, replying on 13 November, recognised the profession's 
concerns with the wider issues of health care, not just with terms of 
service, and suggested the discussions be to the point: "Neither of us, 
I think, contemplates beginning afresh a long series of protracted 
negotiations. Indeed to do so would mean covering allover again ground 
which has been repeatedly tilled and so wasting time which we cannot now 
afford." Bevan noted he had no intention of introduc ing a Bill before 
hearing the views of the profession. (2) 
Their first formal discussions took place on 4 December 1945. 
Bevan's purpose was to announce to the profession's representatives his 
decision, which was to be made public in tv~ days in the House of 
Commons, to end the sale and purchase of medical practices, and to offer 
compensation. All relevant details would be discussed in full with the 
profession, as would his larger schematic proposals for a National 
Health Service, which would be ready early in the New Year. He wished 
to have the legislation ready to introduce in February, hence there 
would be no time for protracted negotiations. 
The Negotiating Committee of the SMA met following the discussion 
with Bevan, and and decided to oppose any proposal that would involve 
government appointment and direction of doctors to vacancies or any loss 
of doctors' freedom to choose a location in which to practise. With 
respect to sale and purchase, it was agreed that "a practice is a 
personal asset and the profession should not accept without protest the 
principle of the destruction of goodwill by the payment of 
compensation. " Their final attitude, they decided, would depend on the 
precise nature and value of the compensation proposals. Through December 
and early January the compensation sub-committee of the Negotiating 
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Committee met several times with Ministry officials and agreed 
(hypothetically, for the profession) on details of the compensation 
plan. (3) 
In December, the profession published its "Seven Principles," drawn 
up against the background of press rumours of nationalisation, direction 
of doctors to practices and full development of health centres, as the 
government's intentions. The seven cardinal principles were: 
1. No full-time salaried service for general practitioners 
2. Freedom to practise without state interference 
3. Freedom of choice by doctor and patient in general 
practice 
4. Freedom to practise anywhere 
5. Right of every practitioner to take part in the service 
6. Planned hospital services, based on teaching hospitals 
7. Adequate medical representation on the administrative 
bodies. (4) 
These principles were to form the professional, political and 
ideological terrain on which the Negotiating Committee would do battle 
with the Minister and Government for the next three years. 
On 8 January 1946 Bevan released his general plan for a National 
Health Service in confidence to a TUC deputation, and on 10 January he 
released the plan to the Negotiating Committee of the medical 
profession. The central principles, he said, must stand, but there was 
"plenty of room for discussion on the methods of working out and 
applying them." He requested the proposals be discussed only with the 
executive committees of the bodies represented on the Negotiating 
Committee--they should otherwise be confidential. (5) 
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The Initial Response of the Medical Profession, January 1946 
The Negotiating Committee held its first full discussion of Bevan's 
proposals a week later, 17 January 1946. The committee was most 
favourably impressed with the national hospital service outlined: lilt 
was felt that the transfer of local authority institutions to 
Ministerial ownership would outweigh the disadvantages arising from the 
discontinuance of the voluntary hospi tal system." The special provision 
for teaching hospitals was fully approved. "The general conclusion of 
the committee was that, providing the composition and functions of the 
regional and local executive bodies were satisfactory, the conception of 
a national hospital service administered through executive regional 
boards covering natural hospital areas should be approved." 
The committee was least satisfied with the tripartite division of 
the NHS, feeling that without unification of all branches under the 
regional bodies, "there was no satisfactory method of integration and 
correlation of what appeared to be three separate services." It was 
argued that responsibility for health centres should be transferred to 
the regional boards, with administration by the executive councils as 
part of the general practitioner service. It was also suggested that 
practitioners should be much more closely connected with the hospitals. 
"On the question of health centres, the omission of a period of 
experimental developnent [was] a serious defect." The basic part salary 
method of remuneration was favoured by some members of the committee, 
and not opposed strongly by the rest, as an efficient method of giving 
recognition or inducement under certain conditions. The proposals for 
distribution of practices were not approved by the committee, which 
would not support even 'negative direction' of doctors. (6) 
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The Negotiating Committee submitted a formal list of questions for 
the Minister's reply. While a number of detailed enquiries were made 
about the intended functions of administrative and staff bodies, perhaps 
the most substantive area of concern was integration and co-ordination 
within the tripartite structure of the NHS. The Minister replied that 
flexibility would be maintained by setting much policy through 
regulations under the NHS Act, which would be applied by the Minister to 
all branches of the service. In this way co-ordination could be 
achieved with respect to major policy matters. Local co-ordination would 
be undertaken by Ministry officials in consultation with the regional 
hospital boards, local health authorities, and executive councils, and 
boards of governors of teaching hospitals, bearing in mind that most of 
these bodies would have appointees of both the Minister and the 
professions. The closest local contacts among branches of the service 
would be encouraged. 
In response to the committee's concern with attaining a close 
association between practitioners and hospitals, the Minister noted the 
generous representation of practitioners on regional hospital boards and 
hospital management committees, and added that practitioners would be 
encouraged to consult with specialists over the care of their patients 
and to regard the principal hospital of the area as the "natural focus 
of medical work." (7) 
While the compensation subcommittee of the Negotiating Committee 
continued to meet with Ministry officials to discuss--still 
hypothetically--terms of compensation following the end of sale and 
purchase, the full committee also discussed the Minister's proposals and 
his replies to their questions. 
338 
The first formal meeting of the Negotiating Committee with Bevan to 
discuss his proposals took place 6 February. 
Bevan made clear his position on the function of the discussions, 
particularly with respect to his strong belief in the supremacy of 
Parliament. The discussions, he said, were consultations rather than 
negotiations. He would not ask the committee to commit itself or, of 
course, the profession as a whole, since the government and parliament 
must bear final responsibility. He would, however, take note of all 
representations since the substantial support of the profession was his 
objective. If the main lines of the service were agreed upon, details 
could be adjusted later. 
The committee's reactions on six principal issues were presented 
bluntly: 
1. They were disappointed the service would not be administered by 
a Ministry having health as its sole responsibility 
2. Co-ordination among the branches 
adequate; practitioner services and 
hospitals, should be regional 
of the service would not be 
health centres, like the 
3. They feared the government I s proposals "would in time lead to a 
full, whole-time salaried service" 
4. They feared the ownership of health centres by local authorities 
would in time lead to employment by local authorities of doctors 
and dentists 
5. TI1ey feared the proposed machinery for distribution of practices 
would lead to positive direction of doctors 
6. liThe Committee reiterated their view that the voice of the 
doctors themselves should be made predominant at all levels of 
the new service." 
In the meeting, Lord Moran, President of the Royal College of 
Physicians, supported Bevan's hospital proposals. He was later to play 




President of the Royal College of Surgeons, "pleaded that 
be as little restriction as possible on private 
accommodation in hospitals" in order not to drive even more private 
practice out of the health service. 
Bevan was certain that there was basic agreement on pay beds. He 
admitted there was very heavy pressure on him from some of his 
colleagues to prevent pay beds, indeed to deny any form of private 
practice in hospitals, but noted he had already committed himself to 
resisting this pressure and accepting the principle of pay beds, in 
order to keep the specialists in the hospital service. The final 
allocation of the beds was an administrative matter and could, with 
other such matters, be settled later. (8) 
The Negotiating Committee issued a ten page memorandum on 8 
February 1946 to its constituent bodies. The committee's main 
arguments, plus its strong support for an industrial health plan, as 
well as the Minister's positions, were noted, along with the supposition 
that there would probably be no further consultations with him before 
the introduction of legislation. (9) 
Having made its views known on only a single occasion to the 
Minister, and in its document to the constituent organisations, the 
Negotiating Committee, like the BMA and the Royal Colleges, and the 
other interests, awaited the publication of the NHS Bill in March. 
Bevan's Report to Cabinet, March 1946 
The Cabinet had approved the heads, or main features, of a draft 
Bill, along with the exclusion of industrial health services, in early 
January. The Bill itself was presented in full draft form to the 
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Cabinet on I March and approved a week later. In an accompanying 
memorandum, Bevan noted the results of his discussions with the medical 
profession and the interested groups to date. He had held all 
discussions under conditions of confidentiality, seeing the various 
organisations' representatives in their personal capacity as experts, 
not as delegates. He expected there would be vocal opposition from the 
medical profession at first, but that the responsible leaders and 
members "are broadly reassured that the proposals ••• represent a 
reasonable and fair solution to the problems involved." The voluntary 
hospitals' representatives, he said, were hostile and would certainly 
organise opposition; again, however, the responsible leaders would 
accept the proposals as reasonable. He expected the leadership of the 
London County Council, which was in favour of the proposals, to prevail 
over the County Councils Association and the Association of Municipal 
Corporations, both of which were opposed. 
Bevan noted the Cabinet's approval in principle of pay beds, and 
the fact that government supporters would object to this and to the lack 
of provision for salaried remuneration. Bevan was satisfied that in a 
salaried system it would not be possible to provide freedom in the 
choice of doctor. (This, of course, was a point long refuted by the SMA 
in its preparation of Labour policy, and under the Coalition government, 
by senior Ministry officials.) The strict controls to be imposed on pay 
beds should disarm some criticism, he noted, and the method of 
remuneration to doctors was not set out in the Bill. It would be 
determined by regulation. This, he said, seemed prudent considering the 
controversial nature of the issue. 
Much of the final shape of the NHS would be left to regulation. 
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This would ensure future flexibility, would provide a useful role for 
discussions with the several interests before finalising the service, 
and would save Parliamentary time. The appointed day to begin the 
service would be determined by Order in Council, to coincide with the 
beginning of the new comprehensive national insurance scheme. The 
separate Bill for Scotland would, at the request of the Secretary of 
State, be introduced later, when the Bill for England and Wales had had 
its Second Reading. 
The Cabinet, having approved Bevan's draft Bill in its entirety, 
without amendment, decided to give it top priority in the government's 
legislative schedule. (10) 
Concerted Opposition from the Medical Profession Begins 
As the debate was taking place in the Commons, the BMA, in early 
May, held the first special meeting of its Representative Body in its 
vigorous campaign against the provisions of the Bill. The doctors were 
in a militant mood--their opposition to the main provisions of the NHS 
was resolute: 
On the first day, by thumping majorities, any mild voice 
of dissent was silenced, and one by one large holes were 
knocked in the whole fabric of the scheme. State 
ownership of hospitals was defeated by 210 votes to 29. 
Any idea of control over the areas where doctors should 
practise was defeated by 214 votes to 2. The proposal 
to combine a basic salary with capitation fees was 
defeated by 209 votes to 9. (11) 
The meeting passed judgement on the Bill as a whole by agreeing that 
existing medical services needed improvement and co-ordination, but 
rejecting the methods proposed by the government to achieve those ends. 
The minority voice of the SMA in the BMA Representative Meeting, and at 
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large, was ridiculed, according to Foot. 
The Negotiating Committee, which had embarked on a reasoned 
strategy to concentrate on three or four major amendments, was taken by 
storm by the Representative Body. Any sense of priorities in 
concessions to be sought vanished as broadsides were launched against 
the scheme in general and in its particulars, but especially against the 
Minister. While the personal and political vehemence of the BMA attacks 
on Bevan and his scheme suited the Conservative opposition, there was 
little tactical co-ordination between the Tories and the BMA. Indeed 
some of the positions of the Tory front bench did not at all accord with 
the views of the BMA -- notably regarding the nationalisation of the 
hospitals. Conservative spokesmen took the stand of the British 
Hospitals Association - resolute opposition to takeover. But the BMA 
leadership had recognised in Bevan's proposal a more viable method of 
reconstructing the entirety of the hospital system on a sound financial, 
medical and organisational footing than Willink's plan had provided. 
Differences over Hospital Nationalisation -- the BMA and the BHA 
A split between the BMA and the BRA over nationalisation occurred 
as early as 7 February, in a meeting between the Negotiating Committee 
and the BHA. (12) Lord Moran of the BMA had spoken publicly and in the 
House of Lords in favour of Bevan's plan to consolidate all hospitals 
under the Minister. Between February and April, however, as Bevan had 
antic ipated, the BHA and dozens of voluntary hospi tals, large and small, 
joined in a massive publicity campaign to defend the autonomy of the 
voluntary hospitals against "confiscation." 
The day before the First Reading of the Bill, the BRA released its 
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"Plan for a National Hospital Service." '!he Secretary of the BHA, Mr 
J.P. Wetenhall, had earlier reacted vehemently to the revelation by 
Bevan, in confidence, of his proposal to take over the hospitals. '!he 
representatives of the BHA were not at all mollified by Bevan's 
suggestion that he wished to provide the best footing upon which the 
voluntary hospitals could carryon their valuable traditions, including 
that of local, voluntary interest, nor by his commitment that the 
government, while taking over endowments and trust funds, would do its 
best to ensure that benefactors' intentions were fulfilled. (13) The 
BHA I s "Plan for a National Hospital Service," a single-page leaflet, 
proposed a system of central and regional co-ordination in which 
existing ownership and management functions would be retained. Voluntary 
hospitals would be supported in the main by contractual payments from 
the state, much as the Willink plan had proposed. 
'!he King Edward's Hospital Fund for London took a more co-operative 
approach with the Ministry following Bevan's revelation of his plan. 
'!he Fund suggested the compromise that teaching hospitals with large 
trust funds be allowed to retain them, while others might have their 
funds disbursed by trustees for each hospital area, according to their 
original purpose as far as that could be reconciled with the goals of a 
unified hospital system. The Fund volunteered its own services, and 
those of the Nuffield Provincial Hospitals Trust, in an advisory 
capacity. 
Bevan had decided on the essence of such a plan by early March, and 
was duly congratulated by Sir George Aylwen, Treasurer of St 
Bartholomew's Hospital and Chairman of the Voluntary Hospitals Committee 
for London, who noted that one half of total trust fund monies were held 
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by the teaching hospitals. Sir George Aylwen, shortly after publication 
of the Bill, congratulated Bevan again on its general provisions, noting 
his differences with many of his colleagues, and complaining only of 
medical dominance of the new Boards. (14) 
While the King Edward's Fund chose to co-operate, the BRA 
spearheaded a massive protest campaign of voluntary hospitals from March 
through June 1946. The protests of some fifty hospitals are on record 
in the Ministry's files, with only one hospital, the Breconshire War 
Memorial Hospital, expressing approval. 
From Cambridge, for example, Addenbrooke's Hospital forwarded a 
lengthy memorandum arguing against nationalisation, and in favour of 
co-ordination with substantial local autonomy; otherwise, "the service 
will become one vast, slow-moving, soul-less state monopoly with no 
personal touch and no competi tion to keep it on its toes." Addenbrooke IS 
feared that, in the long run, treatment outside the service would become 
impossible. 
By late May, when the Bill was still 
disputes between the King Edward's Fund 
in Committee, all major 
and the Ministry had been 
resolved. The Fund accepted nationalisation in principle, and carried 
on a co-operative working relationship with the Ministry, providing 
detailed suggestions for the disbursement of Exchequer and endowment 
funds to the hospitals, accepting Bevan's principle that the endowment 
monies should be distributed primarily according to need. The Minister 
by this time had accepted the request of both the BRA and the Fund that 
local hospital management committees, in addition to regional boards and 
boards of governors of teaching hospitals, be allowed to accept and hold 
bequests of money or property to be used according to the wishes of the 
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testator. (15) This concession by Bevan was the last step in the 
official reconciliation of the BHA also, which felt that the ability of 
hospitals to hold bequests would go far to maintain the continued 
voluntary interest of the public. The BHA therefore sponsored only minor 
amendments during the Committee stage of the Bill. 
BMA Pressure and Bevan's Minor Concessions, May-July 1946 
The major contest of the Committee stage was that between the 
Minister, and the BMA, which had the support of the former Minister, Mr 
Will ink, and other opposition Members. Bevan sought to take a middle 
road between the BMA, and the SMA and Labour Left, \tihile hoping to 
retain the support of the public, which was now well-aware of the 
disputed features of his scheme: "The more violently the BMA protested, 
the more he could quell Left-wing suspicions that he had already 
conceded too much and the more he could mobilize support in Parliament 
and the country. This he believed was essential, for in the subsequent 
months anxious Morrisonian voices were often raised in the Cabinet." 
(16) 
The meeting of the BMA Representative Body in early May had set the 
tone of the opposition attack in the Standing Committee. The issues 
pursued by the BMA were the very ones which Bevan regarded as 
fundamental to his scheme and on which he refused to offer major 
concessions: 
1. Abolition of sale and purchase, even though a hypothetical 
figure of sixty-six million pounds aggregate compensation had 
already been agreed upon in meetings between the Negotiating 
Committee and Ministry officials 
2. The basic part salary in general practitioner remuneration 
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3. Final appeal procedure in cases of professional discipline, the 
doctors demanding a stage of appeal beyond the Minister to the 
High Court 
4. The use of some method of equitable distribution of doctors and 
medical practices 
5. State ownership of the hospitals, the Negotiating Committee now 
reversing its earlier position to take that of the majority of 
the SMA meeting -- resolute opposition. 
The Negotiating Committee met with the Minister some three times 
during May to press these issues. At the first meeting, Bevan sought to 
reassure the committee on several points. He had given the medical 
profession an extraordinary amount of self-government and administrative 
power in the scheme, he said, more than any other profession or trade, 
and felt grieved that this had not been sufficiently recognised. He had 
reduced the part salary from a large to a very small part of total 
remuneration in general practice, and now assured the committee, 
referring to his SMA colleagues, that "whatever disposition there might 
be in the minds of certain members of the House of Commons for a 
whole-time salaried service, it was not in the minds of the Ministry." 
With respect to the distribution of doctors, there were many safeguards 
against abuse, and the medical profession, through local and central 
bodies, would have effective power to determine the hiring of doctors. 
Abolition of sale and purchase of "goodwill" was a central principle and 
could not be changed. On the other hand, fears expressed regarding 
threats to the continuance of private practice would prove groundless, 
despite the criticisms from within the Labour Party of his provisions 
for private practice in the hospitals. Likewise, while he would 
consider greater autonomy for the new hospital management committees, 
state ownership of all hospitals was one of the major principles which 
must remain. 
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At the second meeting, on 20 May, Bevan turned down the Negotiating 
Committee's requests: a) to set aside a certain proportion of private 
beds in which maximum private medical fee limits would not apply; b) to 
provide grants-in-aid 
hospital; and c) to 
to patients receiving private treatment 
retain all existing private hospital blocks. 
in 
He 
again reassured the committee that it would be in the best interests of 
the profession to have disciplinary appeals stop at the level of the 
Minister rather than making them a matter of court jurisdiction. He 
also agreed to modify the Bill to allow employment of assistants by 
general practitioners, and sought the profession's views on the best 
policy for employment of young demobilised doctors. While the Minister 
would have compulsory purchase powers at his disposal, it was highly 
unlikely, he replied to the committee, that they would be used against 
private specialist clinics. 
The Minister stood by his earlier positions, at the third meeting, 
on 27 May, on regional co-ordination of services, and health centre 
planning, against the committee's suggestions, voicing SMA policy, that 
local authority services be brought under the administration of the 
regional boards, and that all proposals for establishing health centres, 
by local authorities, be approved first by the Central Health Services 
Council. Bevan also declined at this point (a matter on which he was to 
relent in April 1948) to accede to the committee's request to amend the 
Bill to preclude the establishment of full-time salaried practice by 
local health authorities. He did, however, agree to introduce, in 
Committee, a number of amendments which would improve the Bill and allay 
some of the fears expressed by the medical profession. (17) 
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BMA and Opposition Pressure Continued, July-December 1946 
One position likely to reassure the doctors was Bevan's refusal to 
include any reference, in legislation (at least at this point), to 
method and amount of remuneration; this would instead be dealt with by 
regulation, after further consultation with the profession. Bevan did 
agree to allocate some portion of endowment funds to the local hospital 
management committees. 
The Negotiating Committee considered their position in mid-July, 
following the Committee Stage of the Bill, and decided not to meet again 
until October 1946, deferring consultation with the various medical 
bodies concerned until after the Bill had become law. (18) 
The solidarity of the BMA, meanwhile, was showing some signs of 
weakness, and a certain polarisation was developing between members 
wishing to carryon a militant crusade against Bevan and his Health 
Service Bill, and those who supported in essence its general provisions 
and were willing to engage in amicable discussions over details. One of 
the latter, significantly, was the President of the BMA, Mr Henry 
Souttar, who in early June 1946 withdrew from the BMA Council's active 
opposition, indicating to the Ministry his support, along with many 
other eminent doctors, of the main provisions of the scheme. He noted 
these were arrived at only after extensive and thorough investigations 
by the experts of the Ministry, the Nuffield Foundation, and others. "I 
would reiterate that the service which is envisaged is not the mere 
doctrinaire whim of a Party, but has its foundations firmly laid in 
years of laborious discussion in which the Association [the BMA] has 
taken a most honourable share." (19) 
The BMA Representative Body, meeting in July, reaffirmed all the 
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major uncompromising resolutions of its May meeting. Bevan's 
concessions during the Committee Stage had had little, if any, effect on 
the attitude of the BMA activists. The meeting voted against further 
negotiations with the Minister, and in favour of a referendum on the 
issue of refusal to hold more discussions until such time as Bevan made 
major concessions. The split between the BMA leadership and the Royal 
Colleges was by now widening, with conciliatory statements expressed by 
Sir Alfred Webb-Johnson, President of the Royal College of Surgeons, and 
in a resolution of the Royal College of Physicians. 
During the debate on Third Reading in the House of Commons, held 
while the BMA Representative Body was meeting, the Conservative 
opposition moved rejection of the Bill" in terms even fiercer than those 
employed on the Second Reading. II (20) Bevan I s counter-attack on the 
opposition was equally fierce, especially on their own ground the 
defence of private medicine and the private ownership of voluntary 
hospitals. He defended the Bill as protecting, rather than harming, the 
security, 
profession. 
independence and conditions of practice of 
The Bill passed Third Reading by 261 votes 
Conservatives maintaining their opposition to the end. 
the medical 
to 113, the 
The House of Lords debated the Bill in October, making only one 
significant alteration, a clause forbidding the payment of a basic 
salary. This clause was subsequently removed in the Commons. The split 
in the medical profession continued to be evident in the Lords, however, 
in the acrimonious debate for and against the Bill between Lords Moran 
and Horder. Lord Beveridge was among those who recorded their approval. 
Royal Assent was given to the Bill on 6 November 1946. 
Later that month the BMA held its first referendum of members on 
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the question of whether the Negotiating Committee should continue to 
meet with the Minister. The vote was 18,972 in favour of holding 
further discussions and 23,110 against, with 64 per 
practitioners opposing, but only 55 per cent of 
cent of general 
specialists and 
consultants. Among younger consultants and salaried doctors, the 
majority were in favour of continued talks. The BMA Council's decision 
to break off discussions was ratified in another Special Representative 
Meeting by an overwhelming majority, and the Council informed the 
Minister it was without mandate to negotiate. 
Discussions Continue, February to December 1947; 
Bevan Reassures the Profession 
On 2 January 1947 the Presidents of the Royal Colleges intervened 
to avert an impasse by inviting the Minister to make clear his position 
on the main issues of concern to the profession by indicating policies 
to be adopted in regulations under the NHS Act, with respect to three 
areas of contention. Bevan, on 6 January, welcomed the continued advice 
and participation of the profession, and gave assurances on remuneration 
of practitioners by capitation payment, on freedom of movement for 
doctors, and on the scope of medical tribunals. On the basis of these, 
and the assurance that further amending legislation would not be 
precluded, negotiations with Bevan resumed 28 February. At the first 
meeting, Dr Dain commended Bevan not only for declining to implement his 
party's policy on a salaried service but also for accepting a number of 
other major points requested by the profession. Bevan replied, noting 
the pre-eminent position he had given the profession in the scheme 
despite criticism from his colleagues. The Negotiating Committee 
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appointed six sub-committees which met with officials of the Ministry 
through the summer of 1947. (21) 
The SMA Council published in early November the results of these 
sub-committees' meetings with the Ministry representatives, and the 
Minister met the full Negotiating Committee in early December, for the 
first time since February. The two-day meeting ranged over the entire 
list of objections of the Negotiating Committee to the Act, many of 
which were restated from May 1946. Bevan observed that the profession's 
points were so thoroughly contrary to the Act that not merely 
amendments, but a new Act would be necessary to satisfy them. Bevan 
stood firm. Limitations of NHS general practices in overdoctored areas 
would remain; this did not, however, mean the positive direction of 
individual doctors. TI1e abolition of sale and purchase would be carried 
out, but a medical practices committee would be set up to determine 
compensation arrangements and procedures for bringing partnerships 
wholly or partly into the service. The basic part salary had been set 
at three hundred pounds, and capitation fees of eighteen shillings per 
patient would be paid by the executive councils. The Minister could not 
agree to final appeal to the courts, believing it would not be in the 
interests of the profession. 
Bevan reassured the committee that the government did not intend to 
nationalise profit-making nursing homes under its powers to take over 
hospitals. He now changed his earlier position and offered to meet one 
of the committee's demands on private hospital practice, permitting the 
allocation of a certain proportion of private beds which would have no 
set maximum limits on medical fees. However, public 'amenity beds', 
which the profession had opposed on the grounds that they would compete 
352 
unduly with private hospital practice, would remain. 
On another issue of great concern to the committee, Bevan said he 
could not guarantee appointment of the profession's nominees directly to 
administrative bodies. This would be inconsistent with Ministerial 
responsibility; rather, the system whereby the Minister would choose 
from a list of potential nominees must stand. 
Bevan noted the capitation fee had been set initially at the 
relatively high rate of eighteen shillings as an incentive to join the 
service, and in the expectation that approximately ninety-five per cent 
of the population would join lists as patients of health service doctors 
in the first two years. If the proportion of the population joining 
were less, due to the scheme being launched in strife, the government 
would be obliged to reduce the fees after two years. Bevan noted that 
he had avoided for two years making any public statements likely to 
cause discord, that he hoped to avoid future controversy, and his hope 
that the profession would give the scheme a fair trial, "with the 
assurance that if it is found wanting in any particular we shall not be 
tardy in asking Parliament to make the necessary modifications." (22) 
The BMA Rejects Bevan's Reassurances, January to March 1948 
Following these important meetings a storm was unleashed in medical 
politics by the leaders of the BMA. The BRITISH MEDICAL JOURNAL, 
according to Foot, attacked the NHS Act as leading "unmistakably to the 
establishment of a full-time service," and as threatening the continued 
existence of the medical profession as a body of free men. On 1 January 
1948 a mass meeting of doctors at BMA House was told by Dr Cockshut that 
the future of medicine was at stake, with the imminent threat of a 
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"whole-time salaried service under the State." Another Special 
Representative Meeting of the SMA, on 8 January, planned a plebiscite of 
doctors on participation in the NHS, and voted unanimously for a 
resolution stating the Act, in its present form, should be rejected 
absolutely by all practitioners. 
Amid a welter of attacks from SMA leaders and the press, Bevan 
reaffirmed, in a resolution in the House of Commons 9 February 1948, the 
government's intention to adhere to the appointed day for the coming 
into operation of the NHS, 5 July. In the debate, Bevan attacked the 
SMA leadership for misrepresenting the views of the majority of the 
profession. He sought the detailed opinions of the opposition on those 
issues--part salary, abolition of sale and purchase, limited 
(linegative") direction of doctors, and appeal procedures--with which the 
SMA took strongest exception. He also noted the concessions made to the 
medical profession throughout his discussions with them: pay beds for 
private patients, both with and without imposed limits on fees, and 
part-private practice for general practitioners. Labour backbenchers 
had opposed both these concessions as elements of a two-class health 
service, carrying the dangers of a class distinction in the quality of 
medical treatment. Despite Bevan's acceptance of a Conservative 
amendment pledging support in general (and to Bevan innocuous) terms, 
the Tories voted against his motion welcoming the scheme. The resulting 
vote was 337 in favour to 178 against. Bevan accordingly directed his 
Ministry officials to proceed with all planning on the assumption of the 
NHS coming into effect on 5 July. 
Another plebiscite by the SMA at this time recorded the 
overwhelming opposition of the medical profession to the Act. While 
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Bevan announced the Act would, nevertheless, come into effect on the 
appointed day, Dr Cockshut, for the BMA, announced it would not. Amid 
much more heated argument in the daily press and the medical press, 
another BMA Special Representative Meeting was held 17 March. The 
meeting was once again united in welcoming the results of the 
referendum: of the 84 per cent who responded, 88 per cent declared they 
would not work under the Act. 
Bevan's Major Concession, an Amending Bill, April 1948 
By early April, Bevan decided it was he who must take the 
initiative in breaking the impasse so bitterly maintained by the 
profession. On 7 April, he announced in the House of Commons several 
substantive concessions and his willingness to continue discussions. 
The chief concession was his offer, after sustained BMA pressure, to 
introduce a statutory provision against a full-time salaried service, 
and to abandon the basic part salary. Most doctors would be paid by 
capitation fees only, while young doctors and others needing it would 
receive a supplementary rather than a basic fixed annual payment, the 
details of which would be worked out in future discussions. 
Bevan would not yield on the issues of sale and purchase, appeal to 
the courts, and negative direction, apart from promising a special 
review of the distribution of doctors in two years. On several other 
issues he gave unqualified reassurances: 
There would be complete freedom in clinical matters, as 
well as freedom of speech and publication • • • Approval 
of place of practice by the Medical Practices Committee 
would be automatic except in areas where there was an 
excess of doctors. Hospital appointments for 
consultants and specialists would in most cases be part 
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time. Private doctors would be able to obtain free 
hospital and specialist benefits for their patients. In 
selecting medically trained men for membership in 
administrative and advisory bodies, the Minister of 
Health would consult with the professional associations. 
(23) 
In the case of the agreement to statutory prohibition of a salaried 
service, the impasse had been broken by the consultations by Bevan in 
late March with Lord Moran, Sir Alfred Webb-Johnson, President of the 
Royal College of Surgeons, and Mr William Gilliatt, President of the 
Royal College of Obstetricians, aided by a resolution of the Comitia of 
the Royal College of Physicans urging the Minister to pass such an 
Amending Act. (24) The role of the Royal Oolleges and of several 
eminent consultants had been crucial in widening the split in the BMA 
leadership. Bevan made it clear, in announcing his statutory 
amendments, that this had been the turning point, and that he was fully 
in accord with the resolution. 
After his 7 April announcement in the Commons, Bevan met 
inconclusively with a small group from the Negotiating Committee on 12 
April. With the gulf now opening wider between the Royal Colleges and 
the BMA leadership, following the successful initiative of the Royal 
College of Physicians and Bevan's immediate response, the BMA Council 
met 15 April, "the most crucial Council meeting in the Council's history 
and, significantly, it is one of the few not reported in the columns of 
the BRITISH MEDICAL JOURNAL." (25) Amid great confusion in the BMA 
leadership, it was decided that the changed situation resulting from the 
Minister's promised Amending Act warranted a new plebiscite on 
participation in the NHS. The profession was rent with division, from 
local groups to the BMA Council and Representative Body. 
The plebiscite was held in late April; the results, announced on 5 
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May, showed some easing in medical opposition. A small majority were 
still against working under the Act, but the majority was more than 3000 
short of the figure of 13,000, chosen by the Council as the minimum 
number opposing, if doctors were to be advised to remain out of the NHS. 
By the end of May, the BMA Council, led by its Chairman, Dr Guy 
Dain, after lengthy agonising, had decided to continue negotiations on 
the terms of the Amending Bill, and to recommend that doctors should 
join the service. Despite opposition maintained by the minority faction 
through June, and at the BMA's Annual Representative Meeting, the 
profession now swung dramatically behind the Service. By the appointed 
day for the commencement of the NHS, 5 July 1948, ninety percent of 
general practitioners, for example, had registered. By now, historic 
objections of the BMA leadership notwithstanding, GPs had recognised 
that the maintenance (indeed enhancement) of their livelihoods depended 
on joining. It was apparent from the rate at which patients were 
joining -- three quarters of the population by the appointed day growing 
to ninety-seven per cent by the end of the year that doctors must 
either follow or lead, in order to retain their clientele. 
The Amending Act (the promise of which by Bevan in April and May of 
1948 brought the cessation of official medical opposition), was 
introduced in Parliament in May 1949 and became law in December of that 
year. The Bill itself was based, in its details, upon the 
recommendations of a joint committee of the Ministry and the medical 
profession. Its effect was 
departure from the original 
to validate existing partnerships (a 
Act) and to provide that the power of 
regulations should not be used to introduce full-time salaried general 
practitioner, hospital specialist, or dental services (except for dental 
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practises at health centres). It allowed for charges fur 
pharmacuticals, and for charges for non-residents of Britain receiving 
services. A number of minor changes were also made. The medical 
profession, well represented in the drafting of the amendments, was 
therefore satisfied that it had won a victory, on a major issue of 
principle. (26) Bevan's decision to prevent the provision of a fully 
salaried service was, of course, diametrically opposed to the position 
of the proponents who had maintained it was critical to the principles 
of a fully public service. 
The Ministry and the Proponents in 1948 
The year 1948, which saw the inception of the NHS and the 
satisfaction of the medical profession on many major points, also saw 
the frustration of the proponents on several major issues. These issues 
included health centres, salaried service, the appointment of health 
workers' (other than professional) representatives to NHS governing 
committees, and industrial health, an issue on which the TUC's continued 
persistence was met by equally continued resistance by the government. 
One of Bevan's earliest decisions of 1948, which met at most an 
ambiguous response from both the TUC and the medical profession, was to 
curtail formally the much hailed and long promised health centre 
program. This was announced by the Ministry in January in a circular 
distributed to the new and not yet functioning health authorities, 
relieving them of their compulsory responsibility to plan for the 
implementation of a health centre programme based on new purpose-built 
centres, and also precluding the conversion of older properties as 
substitutes on the grounds that the facilities must be the best. The 
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Ministry cited the need for further investigation into ideal types of 
centre and the shortage of building materials. Both these reasons are 
criticised by Eckstein. In the first place, he notes, plenty of 
planning and experience were available in Britain and abroad. Secondly, 
the Ministry had already approved the minimal conversion of a number of 
very substandard properties, and suggested elsewhere in the Circular 
that further conversions might be considered. Despite the large postwar 
rebuilding programme, however, the Ministry had taken no initiative even 
in seeking sites to be reserved for health centres. (27) 
The TUC, notwithstanding its early interest in health centres, 
received Circular 3/48 with equanimity. At its first committee meeting 
to discuss the policy change, in February 1948, only the MPU 
representative voiced opposition. By the second meeting in March, the 
MPU was prepared to support the majority TUC position accepting the 
Minister's arguments, and decided to press the matter of health centres 
no further, while continuing to support them in principle. No reasons 
are recorded in TUC documents for this easy acceptance of such a 
fundamental change, or for the MPU's change in position. (28) 
Even the left Labour journal TRIBUNE, known previously under 
Bevan's editorship for its determined defence of health centres as the 
key to reorganising general practice, accepted in good faith the 
arguments for the curtailment and the promise that at least some 
experimental centres would be built; only "perfectionists," it now 
suggested, would cd tic ise the new scheme for the absence of a full 
system of centres. (29) TRIBUNE continued to note Bevan's progress with 
organisational aspects of the NHS despite opposition from the medical 
profession, and to praise his firmness on maintaining the appointed day 
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and his willingness to make concessions. It mentioned specifically his 
compromises, on other key Labour Party issues such as a full-time 
salaried service, pay beds, and private practice, not in criticism of 
Bevan, but in wonderment that even such major concessions had not 
placated the SMA. (30) 
True to its advocacy of socialist health service principles, the 
SMA was not entirely happy with Bevan's progress. Not only the SMA was 
at fault; Bevan in particular had failed despite continuous urging from 
the SMA to realise the fundamental importance of reorganising general 
practice in health centres: "The dropping of Health Centres made the 
Service very much inferior to what it might have been, and has destroyed 
its attractiveness for thousands of doctors. II The SMA again urged Bevan 
to proceed with the centres, and to include at least the choice of 
salaried remuneration. (31) While the SMA had raised its concerns 
formally at the 1947 Labour Party Conference, it did not do so at the 
1948 Conference in late May. Instead, the SMA proposed the 
establishment (which was accepted) of a new Labour Public Health 
Advisory Committee, to watch over the organisation, implementation and 
operation of the NHS and to make detailed recommendations through the 
party. This was to be one of the vehicles through which the issues of 
health centres and an industrial health service would be pressed on the 
government. 
At the 1948 Conference no debate on the NHS took place; the only 
direct reference to the service was the comment of a delegate of the 
Confederation of Health Service Employees (COHSE) urging the government 
to consider increased worker participation at all levels of the NHS and 
better working conditions for nurses. Bevan's popularity in the party 
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was unquestionable; he topped the poll for election to the National 
Executive Committee. (32) 
While the TUC had accepted, at least temporarily, the government's 
decision to curtail health centre development, it was not willing to 
take a similar position on an industrial health scheme. From May 
through the end of 1948 - and after - it pursued several tactics, with 
its member unions and with three government departments, in order to 
bring the strongest pressure to bear upon the government. In early 1948 
the TUC established a new Social Insurance and Industrial Welfare 
Committee, with three subcommittees to match branches of the new state 
programmes: industrial health and welfare, National Insurance, and the 
NHS. These TUC committees would direct their efforts toward preparation 
of detailed advice to the government. 
In March the Committee made representation on behalf of the TUC to 
the Minister of National Insurance, urging increased government action 
in research, prevention and treatment of industrial accidents and 




Act for workers 
compensation under 
suffering employment 
Limited Development of the Service, 1948 to 1950 
the new 
related 
Through 1948 to 1950, developments were slow with the three 
remaining issues pursued by the advocates: workers' representation, 
health centres, and an industrial or occupational health service. 
The TUC took the lead in pressing the Ministry of Health for formal 
representation for health workers in NHS administrative bodies, with 
only very limited success. By October 1948 the Central Health Services 
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Council had been appointed, and the TUC complained that not one of its 
nominees had been chosen. Bevan's response was to ask the TUC to submit 
nominees for the Standing Advisory Committees, under the Central 
Council. Re did not agree with the TUC that there was medical 
overweighting on the regional hospital boards, and he could not 
influence the appointment of hospital management committees which were 
appointed by the regional boards, but he was actively urging the 
appointment of house committees, which "should be genuinely 
representative of the communities they were to serve." Nominees were 
selected by the member unions in December 1948. By February 1949 the 
nine Standing Committees had been appointed; TUC representatives were 
appointed one each to only five committees. No trade union nominees 
(including those put forward by the MPU, nursing unions and CORSE) were 
appointed to the Medical, Dental, Nursing, or Cancer and Radiotherapy 
Committees. Between March and June 1949, the TUC reappraised its 
strategy for attempting to have nominees appointed, acting particularly 
on the request of a deputation from the National Advisory Council for 
the Nursing Profession. With respect to appointments to hospital 
management committees, the TUC decided to urge local trade councils to 
make nominations, then make a survey of the results. By October 1949 a 
survey by the Scottish TUC indicated only four per cent of members of 
regional boards and management committees were drawn from the trade 
union movement. 
From 1949 through to early 1951, the TUC met Bevan several more 
times to urge greater trade union and public representation; it also 
encouraged trades councils to submit nominees in 1950 to coincide with 
the lapsing of two-year terms of the first set of NHS appointees. But 
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up to the end of Bevan's term as Minister, the TUC remained frustrated 
in its attempts; at the TUC's final deputation, Bevan was persuaded to 
allow election of NBS employees only as members of the public, not as 
representatives, and only to committees not of their own hospitals. He 
continued to insist that staff associations were the only appropriate 
avenue of direct representation: they "gave the best opportunity for 
putting the valuable knowledge and experience of the staffs at the 
disposal of the hospital management." This then was the end of attempts 
by the TUC, during Bevan's term, to secure wider democratic 
representation of health workers. (34) 
The Labour Party was the focal point of the advocates' attempts to 
restore the provision of health centres as an integral part of the NHS, 
following Bevan's circular of early 1948. Although in the atmosphere of 
strife surrounding the inception of the NHS the advocates were loath to 
criticise the government, the SMA published in June its criticisms of 
the lack of provision of health centres and occupational health 
services. Clearly under pressure from his supporters on these issues, 
Bevan in December requested the Central Health Services Council to 
appoint a special committee on health centres. This committee reported 
two years later, in December 1950, with both long-term and interim 
recommendations, emphasising the gradual phasing-in of comprehensive 
centres, beginning with the immediate encouragement of simple group 
practices and the building of a few experimentally designed centres. 
The report also suggested immediate planning for centres in new towns 
and large estates, despite economic difficulties. In the intervening 
period, the advocates did not lose sight of health centres. The Labour 
Party's election policy, "Labour Believes in Britain," drafted in 
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January 1949 by the health group under Dr Edith Summerskill, promised 
the building of health centres as necessary for realising the full 
benefit of the NHS. In March 1949, Bevan opened the first showpiece 
health centre, WOodberry Down, in the east end of London. In the same 
month, the MPU delivered a report to Bevan comprising detailed 
recommendations for health centre development. In November, the 1949 
Congress of the TUC passed a resolution, moved by the Association of 
Building Technicians and seconded by the MPU, asking the government for 
an immediate commitment to build one hundred health centres, and to 
complete a full national programme within ten years. Bevan's reply, 
discussed by the TUC in February 1950, indicated that any substantial 
provision of centres was out of the question due to the priority of 
house building. While the TUC took no further action, the SMA was not 
yet prepared to let the matter drop; it attempted to answer the official 
reason of building economies with renewed assertions of the urgency of 
centres to complete the NHS, and suggestions that skillful adaptations 
of existing buildings -- "make do and mend" -- be undertaken. (35) 
Labour won the February 1950 general election with a reduced 
majority. Against the background of increased pressure for economies 
(prescription charges had been announced by the Prime Minister in 
October 1949), including the appointment of a Cabinet committee to 
oversee NHS spending, much resented by Bevan, and the ceiling imposed on 
NHS spending in Stafford Cripps' budget, it appeared highly unlikely in 
1950 that sufficient funds would be found to complete the promise of a 
full health centre programme. (36) In this context, and that of the 
increasing tension between Bevan and his Cabinet colleagues, even the 
short term reco~mendations of the Central Health Services Council report 
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on health centres fell on infertile ground. 
A similar course of events with respect to industrial or 
occupational health services occurred between 1948 and 1951. In this 
case it was the TUC, both independently and jointly with the 
co-operation of the BMA and the Labour Party health policy committee, 
which took the initiative. The TUC made a series of independent 
approaches to Mr Griffiths, the Minister of National Insurance, in March 
1948, and to Mr Isaacs, the Minister of Labour, in May, June and July, 
to discuss weaknesses in the factory inspectorate to be established 
under the Factories Bill, to urge a greater government committment to 
research into industrial disease and injury, and to request compensation 
benefits for workers suffering from employment-related diseases whether 
listed under the Industrial Injuries Act or not. Detailed evidence and 
recommendations were submitted, along with criticisms of inefficiency in 
the existing services and government inaction. 
In September Bevan announced that the creation of an industrial 
health service must be deferred indefinitely, for lack of manpower. Not 
content with this answer from the government, the TUC and the Labour 
Party Public Health Advisory Committee reactivated their activities on 
industrial health in November. The TUC met Bevan on 5 November, with a 
request that he establish the beginnings of an industrial health service 
in a limited number of locations where facilities could easily and 
economically be provided. Ministry files do not record Bevan's reponse. 
In December the Labour Party-TUC committee published detailed proposals, 
and the BMA joined with the TUC in the pressure campaign to have a 
service established. 
The BMA had passed a resolution in support of an industrial medical 
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service in 1945 and was now taking action at the local level, 
encouraging Joint Councils of medical and trades council representatives 
to discuss both local and general policy questions concerning industrial 
health. The TUC was quick to agree that such joint local activity could 
facilitate a full national service, and agreed to lend support. It also 
agreed to establish close liaison with the BMA Occupational Health 
Committee, which was preparing a draft scheme for a comprehensive 
occupational health service. 
The Labour Party and TUC took some time to formulate their joint 
policy, with some disagreement on the local administrative structure. 
While the Labour Party committee wished to see the service organised 
primarily locally, under the Medical Officers of Health, the TUC wanted 
a service nationally organised, under the Ministry. On the general 
principles of the service, however, there was complete agreement that it 
should be preventive in orientation, with a strong research component, 
that it should be integrated as fully as possible with NBS services, and 
that there should be extensive powers of workplace supervision and 
regulation. The joint policy was ready by April 1949, with the Labour 
Party and the TUC agreeing to disagree on the issue of local 
administrative structure. The promise of a service "as soon as 
circumstances permit" was presented in the Labour Party's official 
policy statement, "Labour Believes in Britain,1I in early 1949. 
In the face of this escalation of activity by the TUC, BMA and 
Labour Party, the government took two measures in May 1949. The 
Ministry of Health proposed to the TUC the establishment of some limited 
services for small factories. The proposal was not, however, calculated 
to please the TUC, since it suggested making local health authorities 
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responsible, to which the TUC was strongly opposed. The second measure 
was an invitation to the TUC from the Prime Minister to nominate members 
for a Committee of Inquiry on Industrial Health Services (the Dale 
Committee), which was to investigate the best uses of present medical 
manpower in existing industrial health services. Two nominees were duly 
named. The Prime Minister, in announcing in the House of Commons the 
appointment of the Committee, noted that any substantial development of 
services would be postponed, pending its report. For the remainder of 
1949, amid Bevan's expression of worries about his future as Minister, 
and the Prime Minister's announcement of NBS prescription charges as an 
economy measure, the TUC, along with the SMA, prepared detailed evidence 
for the Dale Committee. The two organisations agreed to maintain 
pressure on both the Ministries of Labour and Health. The TUC's brief 
was accordingly presented to the Dale Committee in January 1950. During 
the following year, the TUC met several times with the Ministry of 
Labour to encourage expansion of the factory inspectorate and to discuss 
specific cases of industrial injuries and diseases brought forward by a 
number of member unions. (37) 
The report of the Dale Committee, in February 1951, indicated the 
general concerns of the proponent groups over the urgency of reforms in 
industrial health. The Committee argued that services covering the 
widest spectrum of industrial and occupational health problems would be 
of benefit to workers' health and security, to productivity and work 
satisfaction, to good industrial morale, and to the industrial 
efficiency of the nation as a whole. While the committee recognised 
that the ideal would be a comprehensive service, it concluded that the 
very limited medical and nursing manpower available would make this 
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impossible in the short run, and it could recommend only greater 
unions, the co-ordination among government departments, 
professions and private industry in a new Standing 




further surveys and 
It was clear by early 1948, when Bevan was consolidating the NHS 
Act and regulations for implementation of the service that these major 
outstanding ambitions of the health service advocates -- key elements of 
their model of an integrated, preventive service -- were in jeopardy. 
They were in jeopardy because of a complex of factors ranging from the 
differential representation of medical versus trade union interests 
within the Ministry of Health, to the decreasing prominence of that 
Ministry within the government, coinciding with Bevan's increasing 
political isolation from his Cabinet colleagues, to the overall 
economies in government spending imposed by Prime Minister Attlee as a 
result of the sterling convertibility crisis of 1947 and the later 
decision in favour of large scale rearmament. It was these economies 
which lay directly behind the cuts imposed in the housebuilding 
programme (which were never fully implemented) on local authority 
construction, and which, presumably, were closely related to the 
decision in early 1948 to curtail local authority construction of health 
centres. 
At the same time, the government finally negotiated with the TUC a 
policy of wage restraint, in effect a further consolidation of the 
triparate bargain between labour, capital and the state, and a further 
brake on the independence of labour. This policy was approved by the 
General Council in April and by the annual Congress in September. 
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Enforcement of restraints on prices and profits was weak however, and 
the inflationary effect of the devaluation of 1949 was sufficient to 
cause the annual Congress of September 1950 to reject the triparate 
arrangement overwhelmingly. 
Not only the Ministry of Health was in a period of retrenchment 
between the implementation of the NHS in 1948, without the features 
central to the advocates' model, and the fall of the Labour government 
in October 1951. The shift from physical and manpower planning to 
financial planning between 1947 and 1950 as the basis of Treasury policy 
for guiding the economy, along with restraints on social spending, 
caused an irreparable rift in the government, in which Bevan and the 
Keep Left group of Labour backbenchers opposed the orthodox approach of 
Chancellors Dalton, Cripps, and finally Gaitskell. (39) As Michael Foot 
reports, Bevan waged a solitary battle in Cabinet against spending 
restraints, a battle parallel to that of his Keep Left colleagues but 
unco-ordinated, due to his devotion to Cabinet secrecy. 
Having suceeded in persuading Cripps not to implement a 
one-shilling charge on NHS prescriptions, the powers for which were 
included under Treasury pressure in the 1949 NHS (Amendment) Act, Bevan 
had to accept both a ceiling on NHS spending and the surveillance of the 
NHS by a special weekly Cabinet Committee, of which Hugh Gaitskell, 
Bevan's nemesis on the matter of health service charges, was a member. 
In October 1950 Gaitskell succeeded Cripps as Chancellor, against 
Bevan's objections, and renewed his demands for charges in the health 
service. Bevan, locked in the secrecy of the Cabinet, in opposition to 
the majority view in favour of massive rearmament, agreed in January 
1951 to Attlee's suggestion that he take over the Ministry of Labour, on 
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the condition that the 1950 compromise, to reject NBS charges, be 
honored. 
Bevan was suceeded on 17 January 1951 at the Ministry of Health by 
Hilary Marquand who was identified with the Gaitskell School of fiscal 
planning. By March, however, Gaitskell and the Treasury, in concert 
with Herbert Morrison, had marshalled sufficient support for the 
imposition of charges, against Bevan's continued opposition, that the 
cabinet voted in favour of a fifty percent charge on false teeth and 
spectacles. This was announced in Gaitskell's budget on 10 April, and 
an amending Bill introduced in the Commons in late April. Against this 
majority position, Bevan carried out his threat to resign from the 
government on 21 April, along with Harold Wilson and John Freeman, at 
that time making public his opposition to government policy on a number 
of fiscal and foreign policy issues, including his view that charges 
were absolutely contrary to the principle of a free health service. (40) 
Conclusion 
In this climate of fiscal restraint and the emergence of a new 
orthodoxy in the government in favour of deterrent or use charges, and 
of Bevan's increasing isolation both from his Cabinet colleagues and his 
backbench colleagues of the Labour left, proposals for the expansion of 
the NBS to embrace its original aims, in the case of health centres, or 
the model of the advocates, in the case of occupational health services, 
stood little chance. 
In the area of workers' representation, even though there was close 
central consultation between the TUC and the government following the 
agreement of the TUC to wage restraint, the TUC's entreaties during 1948 
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for increased formal representation at all levels of the NHS were not 
met by the government. 
While the health service was being consolidated administratively 
between 1948 and the end of the Labour government in October 1951, and 
the medical profession had been accommodated in the Amending Act of 1949 
preventing imposition of a salaried service, the advocates were 
repeatedly frustrated in their attempts to extend the service to their 
original model. They were left little option but to defend the service 
as it was, against attacks from the right. The SMA, notwithstanding, 
continued to oppose retrenchment from the original goals of the service, 
maintaining a campaign against health service charges through 1951. At 
the TUC Congress of 1951, there was a substantial split on the issue, 
the General Council's position in support of the government winning only 
narrowly against opposition to the charges. Bevan himself, and a number 
of prominent 'Bevanites' did well in elections to the National Executive 
Council at Labour's 1951 conference. 
After the inauguration of the NHS in 1948 and after the conclusion 
of Bevan's compromise with the medical profession - the Amending Act of 
1949 - the chief problematic within the state with respect to the NHS 
was Bevan's increasingly less successful struggle to defend it from cuts 
and charges imposed under the new Treasury fiscal policy. Even though 
the health service advocates were intimately concerned with NHS policy, 
Bevan's adherence to Cabinet secrecy prevented him from enlisting 
extra-parliamentary or even backbench support from them or others in 
defence of original health service principles. In addition, the alliance 
between the TUC and Labour government leadership would appear to have 
been a factor in the General Council's reluctance to mount a vigorous 
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defence of those principles, or even to press the additional issues 
fundamental to TUC health policy. This left the SMA to carryon its 
pressure activities in much greater isolation than previously. It might 
be concluded then that the representation of the advocates in state 
policy making during the 1948 to 1951 consolidation of the NHS was 
extremely weak. Indeed even the 'representation' of the NHS, under 
Bevan's guardianship, within government policy making, was faltering in 
the face of the Cabinet's turn to the more conservative fiscal policy 
long advocated by the Treasury and Chancellor Hugh Gaitskell. 
By the end of Labour's term of office in October 1951 the stage was 
set for only the most minimal progress in the following decade, in most 
cases without central encouragement, in the provision of health centres 
and industrial health services. 
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